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Abstract 
 
 
     Under the Koizumi and Abe administrations, the deterioration of the Japan-China 
relationship and growing tension between Japan and North Korea were often interpreted as 
being caused by the rise of nationalism. This thesis aims to explore this question by looking at 
Japan’s foreign policy in the region and uncovering how political actors manipulated the 
concept of nationalism in foreign policy discourse. The methodology employs discourse 
analysis on five case studies. It will be explored how the two administrations both used 
nationalism but in the pursuit of contrasting policies: an uncompromising stance to China and 
a conciliatory approach toward North Korea under the Koizumi administration, a hard-line 
attitude against North Korea and the rapprochement with China by Abe, accompanied by a 
friendship-policy toward India. These case studies show how the nationalism is used in the 
competition between political leaders by articulating national identity in foreign policy. 
Whereas this often appears as a kind of assertiveness from outside China, in the domestic 
context leaders use nationalism to reconstruct Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’ through 
foreign policy by highlighting differences from ‘other’s or by achieving historic reconciliation. 
Such identity constructions are used to legitimize policy choices that are in themselves used to 
marginalize other policy options and political actors. In this way, nationalism is utilized as a 
kind of political capital in a domestic power relationship, as can be seen by Abe’s use of 
foreign policy to set an agenda of ‘departure from the postwar regime’. In a similar way, 
Koizumi’s unyielding stance against China was used to calm discontents among right-wing 
traditionalists who were opposed to his reconciliatory approach to Pyongyang. On the other 
hand, Abe also utilized a hard-line policy to the DPRK to offset his rapprochement with 
China whilst he sought to prevent the improved relationship from becoming a source of 
political capital for his rivals. The major insights of this thesis is thus to explain how Japan’s 
foreign policy is shaped by the attempts of its political leaders to manipulate nationalism so as 
articulating particular forms of national identity that enable them to achieve legitimacy for 
their policy agendas, boost domestic credentials and marginalize their political rivals. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
                                                             
1.1 Introduction 
 
The general topic of this research is Japan’s nationalism and its role in 
contemporary foreign policy toward Asia. Recently, the resurgence of nationalism in 
Japan from the 1990s has drawn attention among academics and practitioners within 
and outside the country. Rozman (2002) discusses Japan’s foreign policy after the Cold 
War in terms of the rise of right-wing nationalism with emphasis on its ‘great power 
identity’. The foreign policy led by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
(2001-2006), in particular was characterized as more proactive and assertive than 
conventional policy and has been widely criticized as ‘distorted by nationalism.’ For 
example, the Prime Minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, in which Class-A War 
Criminals in WWⅡ are enshrined, fueled international tensions between Japan and 
China and led to the deterioration of the bilateral relationship. In addition, Koizumi’s 
successor, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2006-2007), who is well known as a ‘staunch 
nationalist’ with a revisionist historical view, insisted on launching a more assertive 
diplomacy in the region and took a hard-line policy toward North Korea. Combined 
with a series of changes in its security policy toward a ‘normal country’ from the 
mid-1990s1, including the ‘reaffirmation of the US-Japan Alliance’, a commitment to 
human security activities, and the participation in the ‘War on Terror’, there can be seen 
a growing skepticism that nationalistic actors and a nationalistic agenda have gradually 
gained influence in Japanese society (Soeya 2011: 73).  
                                                   
1 There are enormous amounts of relevant literature, but the recent notable work is Soeya, 
Tadokoro, and Welch (2011), Japan as a ‘Normal Country?’, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press. 
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In this context, it has become a subject of controversy how nationalism and 
foreign policy are interlinked with each other in post-Cold War Japan. In the subject of 
International Relations (IR), nationalism might be considered as one of the major causes 
of war as well as one of the main factors shaping the emergence of an international 
society (Mayall 1990). From this standpoint, the ‘emotional’ and ‘irrational’ aspects of 
nationalism tend to be illuminated as Cottam and Cottam (2001: 25) argue that states, 
which have a stronger propensity to emphasize nationalism ‘will engage in aggressive 
behavior’. Yet, nationalism is also an ideology that shapes the modern nation state, 
making liberal ideas of citizenship and civil society possible (Smith 1995).  
Likewise, although the rise of Japan’s nationalism is likely to be regarded as a 
destabilizing factor in East Asia, it might be too early to conclude whether this is an 
over-simplistic judgment to make about the relationship between domestic politics and 
foreign policy. In the case of recent Japan, although it is clear that the visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi created a hostile atmosphere between 
Japan and China, at the same time, he took a conciliatory approach toward North Korea. 
On the other hand, Prime Minister Abe took a hard-line approach toward North Korea, 
which was largely supported by nationalism, whereas, at least on the surface, his foreign 
policy toward China might not have been seen as confrontational. Rather, he tried to 
improve and stabilize the relationship with China and South Korea when he came into 
office. Thus, the case of Japan’s foreign policy might demonstrate that the relationship 
between nationalism and foreign policy may not be explained as one of simple causality. 
Instead, it seems that nationalism in foreign policy is closely interrelated with domestic 
power relationships in more complex ways. In this context, this thesis aims to explore 
the role of nationalism in contemporary Japan’s foreign policy towards Asia, using the 
relationships with China, North Korea, and India as case studies.   
 11 
 
1.2 Conventional explanations of nationalism in the study of Japan’s foreign policy 
 
     In the subject of IR, it has often been argued that Japan has been a ‘passive’ and 
‘reactive’ state, which has single-mindedly pursued economic gains, eschewing the use 
of military forces, as an instrument of state policy and relying on the US for handling its 
security affairs (Calder 1988, Pyle 1997)2. It also is described as a country, which 
adopts a ‘low-cost, low-risk, and benefit-maximizing strategy’ in pursuit of its national 
interests (Pharr 1993). Heginbotham and Samuel (1998) describe postwar Japan’s 
national strategy as ‘mercantile realism’, which is a deliberate, conscious promotion of 
Japan’s power through the accumulation of economic wealth rather than the expansion 
of military capability. However, in the mainstream of IR theories, neither neorealism 
nor neoliberalism, has been able to provide a satisfactory explanation for how the 
politics of nationalism relates to Japan’s foreign policy. Furthermore, even 
constructivism has not fully explained the relationship between foreign policy and 
nationalism in Japan. In addition, the existing literature on Japan’s nationalism does not 
tell us much about the conduct of contemporary foreign policy. While there has also 
been a proliferation of research on the Japan-China and the Japan-North Korea 
relationship during the Koizumi and Abe administrations and most works point out the 
rise of nationalism in Japan, there appears to be little coherent discussion of the 
relationship between nationalism and foreign policy. In short, it can be argued that the 
issue of nationalism in Japan has not been systemically studied in relation to foreign 
                                                   
2 Calder (2004) calls features of Japan’s national strategy ‘the San Francisco System’. This 
system consists of (1) a defense network of bilateral alliances, (2) an absence of multilateral 
security structures, (3) strong asymmetry in alliance relations in both the security and 
economic domains, (4) precedence for Japan, and (5) liberal access to the US market, coupled 
with limited development assistance. 
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policyso far. 
 
1.2.1 Studies on Japan’s foreign policy within IR theory 
 
Neorealism emphasizes material capabilities and the structural pressures imposed 
by the international system; it downplays ideational and domestic factors3. Ideational 
factors such as ideology and historical experience would have little impact in 
neorealism because interests of states are similar. (Peou 2002: 121). States are assumed 
to be unitary rational actors with exogenously determined and intrinsically given 
interests and unchanging identities (Kubalkova 2001: 31). It overwhelmingly focuses on 
material circumstances at the international system level as a source of explaining state 
behavior (Waltz 1979, Roy 2000: 168). Thus, in neorealist theory, there would be no 
need to look into the black box of the foreign policy making because state foreign 
policy would be primarily shaped by the external environment such as its position in the 
international system and the distribution of material power capabilities (Smith 2001: 51). 
Neorealism tends to regard nationalism as having no role in system theory and to put it 
into the black box as a domestic factor, although some neorealists like Mearsheimer 
(1990) refer to it (Ruggie 1998: 865). However, Lapid and Kratochwil (1996:13) argue 
that they are likely to focus exclusively on the role of nationalism as a source of conflict. 
Therefore, in addition to the fact that neorealism has long been suffering from a serious 
puzzle of Japan’s foreign policy in some respect 4 , the conventional wisdom of 
neorealism cannot fully explain Japan’s nationalism in relation to its contemporary 
                                                   
3 On neorealism, see Waltz (1979), Walt (1987), and Mearsheimer (2001). 
4 A large number of scholars argue that Japan might not be a ‘normal’ state in realist terms. 
One of the most typical argument is that Japan has been modestly armed incommensurate 
with its economic super-power status and relied its security on the US since the end of the 
WWⅡ(Buzan 1988). 
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foreign policy because it does not take nationalism into consideration as a source of 
international behavior, regarding it as a ‘domestic’ and ‘ideological’ factor. While 
recent works based on neorealism like Kawasaki (2001) and Lind (2004) have 
attempted to defend the utility of realism in explaining Japan’s foreign policy, they still 
seem to pay little attention to nationalism in Japan.  
 Another paradigm of mainstream IR theories is neoliberalism, which focuses its 
attention on the centrality of interests and the role of institutions5 and tends to neglect 
actors’ identities (Okawara and Katzenstein 2004: 98). As with neorealism, it sees states 
as ‘pre-given’ unitary actors with fixed identities. On the other hand, neoliberalism 
emphasizes the utility of international regimes to mitigate the destabilizing effects of 
anarchy and highlights the impact of a state’s domestic polity on its foreign relations. 
This theory has also recently developed in ways that illuminate the importance of ideas, 
norms, and the transparency of information. It can be utilized to explain 
institution-building and economic policy based on the highly interdependent 
relationship among states. Neoliberalism, however, seems to show only limited 
relevance in explaining the role of nationalism in Japan’s foreign policy in the region. 
This is because neoliberal institutionalism intrinsically shares the basic assumptions of 
neorealism that states are unitary actors with unchanging identities (W˷ver 2001: 21) 
and pays little attention to the phenomenon of nationalism, taking for granted the 
preferences or identities of actors (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 2002: 33). With 
its emphasis on economics-first policy without much attention to domestic politics in 
depth, neoliberalism is not well equipped to explain the relationship between Japan’s 
nationalism and its foreign policy.  
                                                   
5 According to neoliberalism, in institutions, cooperation channels can facilitate 
communication, thereby reducing uncertainty and the costs of making and enforcing 
agreements, international institutions would help states achieve collective gains (Keohane 
1988, Hurrell 1995). 
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The third theoretical approach to Japan’s policy, which came to the forefront in 
the 1990s, is constructivism. Constructivists hold that norms and identities have a 
powerful effect on state policy and highlight domestic factors which are downplayed by 
mainstream IR theories. Although there can be seen divisions among constructivists, 
they share some core propositions. This is because constructivism rests on some basic 
assumptions; that normative and ideational structures are important as well as material 
structures because they construct identities and interests; that identities constitute 
interests and actions; and that agents and structures are mutually constructed (Houghton 
2007: 27-28). In a nutshell, constructivists maintain that in contrast to the claims of 
neorealism and neoliberalism, the behavior of a state like Japan is determined not solely 
by the material structure of international politics, but also by domestic constraints and 
identity factors (Roy 2000: 160).  
This constructivist turn is reflected in the work of scholars like Berger (1993, 
1998), Katzenstein (1996), Soeya (1998-a), Hook, Hughes, Gilson and Dobson (2001), 
who have highlighted the normative and institutional constraints on the use of force, 
most notably the constitution and its legacy of history --- the use of force is highly 
contentious and strictly controlled by decision-makers considering the concerns of 
neighboring countries. Recently, in addition to Rozman (2002), drawing on identity 
theory, Catalinac (2007) maintains that the changing conceptions of the international 
role that Japan should play can explain its different responses to the Gulf War in 1991 
and to the Iraq War in 2003.  
Although a constructivist perspective can explain much about postwar Japanese 
foreign policy, however, so far it has failed to offer a satisfactory explanation of the role 
of nationalism. Firstly, while nationalism could possibly be explored through a 
constructivist framework due to its focus on ideational and domestic factors, detailed 
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analysis on the relationship between Japan’s nationalism and its foreign policy has yet 
to emerge. Secondly, constructivism is likely to see identity as a stable factor, 
suggesting a strong theory of permanence that is likely to explain the robustness of the 
status quo rather than change. Thus, it might not be able to account for how 
contradictory foreign policies emerge from within the same cultural and historical 
background (W˷ver 2001: 21).  
Given these shortcomings, IR theories have not yet been able to explain much 
about the relationship between nationalism and Japan’s foreign policy. The main 
reasons for this might be the tendency of the mainstream theories to downplay domestic 
and ideational factor such as culture and domestic politics. Furthermore, both of 
neorealism and neoliberalism regard the state as a pre-given unitary actor with 
exogenously given and fixed identities, which obviously impedes deliberate analysis of 
the role played by the politics of nationalism inside states. Even some branches of 
constructivism, such as that pioneered by Wendt also treat the state as a ‘socially 
pre-given’ actor. Those that do look at unit-level constructivism have so far not 
accounted for the specific issue of nationalism in state behavior. Thus, it can be argued 
that conventional IR theories have not been able to explain much about the relationship 
between Japan’s nationalism and its foreign policy.   
 
1.2.2 Studies on Japan’s nationalism 
 
This section reviews the development of research on postwar Japan’s nationalism 
in English academic literature and explores in particular how nationalism has been 
discussed in relation to the foreign policy of Japan. In contrast to the abundance of 
literature on the prewar period, fewer English literatures have been written on postwar 
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nationalism, except for some short articles until the 1990s (Yoshino 1992: 2). Nakanishi 
(2012: 1) points out that there seems to be no research which focuses on the relationship 
between postwar nationalism and Japan’s foreign policy including Japanese literatures. 
Heavily influenced by the high concern over prewar nationalism, Brown (1955) 
published one of the earliest studies on Nationalism in Japan, which discusses the 
development of nationalism in Japan from about the Seventh Century to the late 1940s. 
Morris (1960) further explores how right wing nationalism was related to the 
Occupation policy in Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan. In these works, prewar 
and wartime nationalism is named ‘ultra-nationalism’ and its impacts after the defeat in 
WWⅡon postwar nationalism are examined by Maruyama (1963) in his book Thought 
and Behavior in Japanese Politics. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a surge of interest in 
cultural nationalism triggered by the appearance of a vast array of literature on 
‘nihonjinron’, a popular genre that seeks to rediscover, redefine and reaffirm Japanese 
uniqueness (Yoshino 1992: 203, Kowner 2002: 169). This rise of cultural nationalism in 
this period coincided with and was influenced by Japan’s economic success. Thus, 
Yoshino (1992: 189-190) explains that, ‘nihonjinron’ attributes Japan’s economic 
success to its ‘uniqueness’ and moral victory of Japanese. Publications on ‘nihonjinron’ 
and criticism of it occupy the mainstream of studies on Japan’s nationalism in the 1980s 
and since.  
This coincided with the emergence of the argument that Japan should play a 
greater role in international society, commensurate with its strong economic power. On 
the other hand, however, Japan’s nationalism became a matter of concern among East 
Asian countries, which were the main victims of its aggression in the Asia Pacific War. 
Since the ‘nationalism’ of Japan can evoke memories of prewar militarism, it has come 
to be regarded as a destabilizing factor in the region. Buzan (1988: 559-560) goes so far 
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as to argue that it is the corresponding lack of a fully legitimized nationalism that 
prevents Japan from being able to play a full political role in the international 
community and impedes amicable relations between Japan and neighboring countries. 
The recognition among East Asian countries that Japan’s nationalism can often be a 
source of friction and a tendency of the identification of the ‘rise of nationalism’ as the 
‘drift to the right’ seems to be shared by academics until now, even though postwar 
Japan has not shown any signs of aggression in its foreign policy.  
Since the 1980s, however, highly controversial historical problems such as the 
issue of textbook revisions and visits by politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine have caused 
diplomatic crises. The rise of a revisionist form of nationalism from the 1990s is thus 
said to have culminated in the Koizumi and Abe administrations. Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s unconventional policies, including dispatch of the Self Defense Forces to the 
Iraq War and his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which led to the deterioration of the 
bilateral relationships with China and South Korea, have drawn much attention to the 
‘resurgence of nationalism’ in the 2000s and its impact on foreign relations (Matthews 
2003).  
In the development of studies on postwar Japan’s nationalism, some tendencies 
can thus be observed. In what follows, I would like to discuss these in relation to my 
interest in the relationship between nationalism and foreign policy. First of all, 
conventional studies on postwar Japan’s nationalism tend to rely on the use of 
dichotomies such as ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’, or ‘political’ and ‘cultural’ nationalism and to 
focus on the socio-cultural aspect of the subject. It is often argued that ethnic, political 
and state-oriented nationalism has been a predominant trait of Japan’s nationalism from 
the prewar period, while its postwar nationalism can be characterized as a socio-cultural 
and non-official type (Stronach 1995, Doak 1997, Rose 2000). However, there are some 
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problems with this perspective. Firstly, the efficiency of the dichotomy depends on the 
idea of a ‘suppressed’ political nationalism. Although most academics who deal with 
‘cultural nationalism’ seem to draw a clear line between political and cultural 
nationalism (Rose 2000, Yoshino 1992), these two aspects can hardly be separated in a 
strict sense, but are better understood as being mutually constitutive. For instance, the 
political nationalism in the 1980s espoused by Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone, was 
based on the rise of cultural nationalism and ‘nihonjinron’. Furthermore, the cultural 
nationalism manifested in the history textbook revisions had a political impact because 
it caused diplomatic crises with neighboring countries in the 1980s. The second problem 
is that political nationalism has been assumed to be suppressed as a ‘taboo’ 
phenomenon in postwar Japan (Rose 2000: 171). According to Pyle (1997: 58), political 
nationalism has largely disappeared or been marginalized in the success of postwar 
foreign policy under the Yoshida Doctrine. This might be because Japan’s political 
nationalism is often identified with prewar right-wing militarism. As will be explained 
later, however, it can be observed that Japan’s political nationalisms has been expressed 
in various ways, and it may be better to think in terms of nationalisms.  
     The second tendency concerns the overemphasis on a simplified version of 
Japan’s political nationalism, which tends to be identified with the prewar type of 
right-wing militarism (Morris 1960, Brown 1971) or ‘ultranationalism’ (Maruyama 
1963) characterized as a mixture of statism, militarism, xenophobia and aggressive 
expansionism (McVeigh 2004: 3). Thus, the rise of Japan’s nationalism tends to be 
identified with the resurgence of right-wing militarism, which is a strong concern of 
neighboring countries. Matthews (2003: 75) argues that the rise of contemporary 
nationalism could be ‘an alarming consequence’ and that ‘the rise of militarized 
assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan, which would be a nightmare for the country’s 
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neighbors’. Buzan (1988: 566) also maintains that ‘unconstrained Japanese nationalism 
might once again result in military aggression.’ In sum, the nature of Japanese 
nationalism seems to be assumed as aggressive, competitive and militaristic as it was in 
pre-war period and holds revisionist history view that glorifies prewar Japan. It is not 
surprising that this perception can considerably influence the views on the impact of 
nationalism on Japan’s relations with East Asian countries, presenting Japan’s 
nationalism as an obstacle to building warm relationships and something that could 
bring diplomatic havoc.  
     Although it is certainly plausible that nationalism could destabilize the 
international relations of Japan, however, it might be premature to conclude that foreign 
policy shaped by nationalism is always aggressive and hostile against other countries 
and leads to the deterioration of relationships. If nationalism always helps to shape and 
create adversarial foreign policy, it is hard to explain how a ‘staunch nationalist’ Prime 
Minister like Abe tried to improve relations with China and South Korea after he came 
into office. In a similar vein, Rose (2000: 179) states that the extent to which 
nationalism threatens to affect the Japan-China relationship adversely is still open to 
question. This indicates that Japan’s political nationalism might not be as monolithic as 
many analysts assume. As will be touched on in later chapter, Japanese academics do 
actually often recognize that there are different types of nationalism. ‘Progressive 
nationalism’, for example, can be opposed to the prewar type of right-wing nationalism. 
To explore this issue, it is necessary to not only highlight the right-wing prewar type of 
nationalism, but also to pay attention to what alternative kinds of nationalism have been 
represented in foreign policy. 
       The third tendency in the study of Japan’s nationalism concerns the debate on 
the notion of the contemporary ‘resurgence of nationalism’. As Matthews (2003: 78) 
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argues, recent English literature tends to focus exclusively on a few domestic issues like 
the history textbook revisions, the Yasukuni Shrine visits of political leaders, and an 
issue of the revision of the Constitution. Although these works are useful to grasp the 
some aspect of the nature of Japan’s nationalism, however, the sources and 
manifestation of nationalism might not be limited only to the domestic arena but can 
also be found in the international field. Ahn (2004), for example, maintains that a clash 
between Japan's nationalism and Chinese nationalism is turning into rivalry over the 
FTA negotiations (Ahn 2004: 30). While his argument could have an important 
implication for exploring the linkage between nationalism and foreign policy, he does 
not explain how they interact with each other. Yamamoto (2005) notes that the North 
Korean issues concerning the missile problem and the abduction of Japanese citizens 
have caused the rise of nationalism among the Japanese people and have had an impact 
on policy towards North Korea. However, he does not account for how nationalism can 
shape a certain policy outcome and how this might be made possible. In sum, there has 
yet to be seen any significant research that can fully examine and explain how Japan’s 
nationalism may exert an influence on its contemporary foreign policy towards East 
Asia. 
 
1.3 Nationalism and foreign policy in the subject of IR 
 
Despite the richness of existing literatures on nationalism, it might be argued that 
not much attention has been paid to the relationship between nationalism and the 
international behavior of states among mainstream IR scholars. Among specialists on 
nationalism, Mayall (1990) discusses how nationalism has influenced the development 
of international society. A.D. Smith (2001) also discusses the ‘internalization of 
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nationalism’, which involves the trend in which the ‘normalization’ of nations and 
nationalism have proceeded to become the international norm of political organization. 
However, as Ruggie (1998) points out, under the premise of neorealism, nationalism has 
long been black-boxed into domestic factors as well as other ideational and cultural 
factors. Despite a critical and growing significance of nationalism as a hot global issue 
after the end of the Cold War, studies on the role of nationalism in foreign policy have 
enjoyed only limited success. This might be because the interest of neorealist scholars 
in nationalism is largely limited to understanding its role as a source of conflict or in 
affecting the capacity of existing or would-be states to wage war (Kratochwil 1998). At 
most, there does seem to be a shared understanding that nationalism can be a 
destabilizing factor in international relations. As Smith (2001: 139) argues, ‘it played a 
crucial role in the genesis of the two world wars.’ To take another example, Van Evera 
(1994) explores the causal nexus between nationalism and war, but only offers 
unproven hypotheses, which the author leaves untested. While the war-causing 
character of nationalism seems to be taken for granted among some IR scholars, as Van 
Evera put it (1994: 5), it is obvious that the relationship between nationalism and 
foreign policy needs further inquiry.   
In contrast to the insufficient explanation in IR theory, recent years have 
witnessed the development of empirical researches on nationalism and foreign policy 
such as the case of China (Hughes 1997, 2002, 2006, Downs and Saunders 1998, Zhao 
2004, Guang 2005), the United States (Citrin, Haas, Muste and Reingold 1994, 
McCartney 2004, 2006), and Ukraine (Furtado 1994). These empirical studies offer the 
opposite views to the expectation of the conventional IR wisdom, drawing the 
conclusion that nationalism need not always become a source of conflict nor make the 
international behavior of the state aggressive.  
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Although these empirical works could give some indications on the relationship 
between nationalism and foreign policy, they do not give sufficient insights into the role 
of nationalism in Japan’s foreign policy towards East Asia. Firstly, this is because the 
case of contemporary Japan has not been fully examined yet. Although Prizel (1998) 
discerns five categories of relationships between national identity and the conduct of 
foreign policy, Japan’s case does not seem to fit into any of these groups. Secondly, two 
propensities of the existing literature might hinder the full-understanding of the 
relationship between nationalism and foreign policy; the conceptualization of 
nationalism and foreign policy and the interaction between nationalism and foreign 
policy in the policy making process. This is because the existing literature tends to leave 
the conventional conceptualization of nationalism and foreign policy unquestioned, 
usually exclusively focused on whether nationalism can influence foreign policy. In 
what follows, I will discuss these propensities of the conventional framework in terms 
of exploring how to develop a new perspective on the relationship between nationalism 
and foreign policy.             
The first point concerns how nationalism or national identity and foreign policy 
are conceptualized in order to grasp the relationship between them. First, existing 
research tends to assume that nationalism/national identity and foreign policy are 
ontologically independent concepts. As Campbell (1998: 40) points out, foreign policy 
is understood as ‘the bridge between sovereign states existing in an anarchic world, a 
bridge that is constructed between two prior, securely grounded, and nominally 
independent realms’. If this is taken as given, then it allows an exclusive focus on the 
separation between them. Second, existing studies tend to assume that national identity, 
which is at the core of nationalism, is pre-given and stable. That is, it is unquestioned 
how the boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ --- who belongs to a certain political 
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community and which identities are attached to it --- is constructed and reconstructed. 
As Hall (1996: 34) argues, however, ‘identity does not signal that stable core of the self’ 
directly contrary to what appears to be. Rather, identities are ‘subject to a radical 
historicization, and constantly in the process of change and transformation’. In addition 
to this, defining foreign policy as bridging the boundaries of sovereign states is also 
problematic as will be discussed later. In other words, an alternative conceptualization 
of nationalism and foreign policy is needed in order to analyze the relationship between 
them.   
The second point is that, conventional research has sought to explore whether and 
to what extent nationalism can influence and shape foreign policy. However, it seems to 
be questionable that the relationship between nationalism and foreign policy is one-way, 
with the former unilaterally exerting impacts on the latter. Although the way in which 
foreign policy can influence nationalism has rarely been illuminated, such an aspect 
should not be ignored. Kaldor (2004: 165), for example, argues that war constructs 
nationalism rather than the other way round. Oguma (1995) points out that shifts in 
foreign policy and the international environment led to changes in nationalist discourse 
in Japan: from a ‘multinational empire’ to a ‘single’ and ‘homogeneous’ Japan. More 
specifically, Messari (2001) argues that foreign policy constructs the political aspect of 
national identity. Such insights indicate that the relationship between nationalism and 
foreign policy can be assumed not unilateral but interactive. Moreover, little work has 
been carried out to explore how and in what situations nationalism may be operative in 
foreign policy making. More specifically, it has not been fully examined how a 
particular policy which is shaped by nationalism was made possible while other options 
were precluded. Therefore, it is important to examine how nationalism and foreign 
policy interact with each other in the process of policy making. The third point is that 
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when scholars of foreign policy analysis look at whether nationalism can shape the 
foreign policy of a certain state, they tend to focus on whether actual policy coincides 
with nationalist rhetoric or not. The existing literature tends to conclude that if there is 
the separation between nationalist rhetoric and the actual practice of policy, it means 
that nationalism does not influence foreign policy making. This overlooks, however, 
what kind of influence such a separation between ideology and practice could have on 
nationalist consequently. 
 As will be argued in the next section, the reorientation of foreign policy analysis 
to take account of these dynamic and mutually constitutive relationships between 
nationalism and foreign policy is needed. In order to explore their relationship, this 
thesis should develop a perspective on the interaction between nationalism and foreign 
policy in the policy making process. 
 
1.4 Alternative Conceptual Framework on Foreign Policy 
 
Recently, attempts have been made to apply constructivism to foreign policy 
analysis by scholars like Kubálková (2001), Snyder (2005), and Houghton (2007). In 
accordance with these developments, efforts have been made to re-theorize ‘foreign 
policy’ within a constructivist framework by post-positivist scholars, such as Campbell 
(1992), Doty (1993, 1996) and Messari (2001). Their arguments reject the commonly 
accepted image that foreign policy is a bridge between preexisting states with secure 
identities. Instead, they propose that foreign policy can be conceptualized as ‘a specific 
sort of boundary-producing political performance’ and thus constructing and 
reconstructing national identities (Campbell 1998: 62). By adopting this idea, a new 
perspective on the interface between nationalism and foreign policy can be expected. 
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The following section will thus introduce some of the key works that adopt this 
post-positivist approach and try to draw insights from their central arguments.  
Attempts to re-theorize Foreign Policy can be traced back to the 1980s. Neumann 
(1996: 156) states that Michael J. Shapiro introduced self/other theorizing in his ‘The 
Politics of Representation’ (1988). What is notable is that Shapiro put forth the notion 
that foreign policy is about making an ‘other’. This line of thought is further developed 
by David Campbell’s landmark study ‘Writing Security’ (1992, 1998). Campbell 
illuminated the performative constitution of identity and gave a thick description of US 
foreign policy as a seamless web of discourses and political practices, which 
continuously deal with others. He explained how the conventional understanding of 
foreign policy has long relied on a particular representation of history and how foreign 
policy has represented fear and danger, constructed the identity of states, and authorized 
practices of differentiation and hierarchization. In this argument, foreign policy is 
re-theorized as ‘one of the boundary-making producing practices central to the 
production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates’ (1998: 68). Doty 
(1993) analyzes US counterinsurgency policy in the Philippines in the 1950s within a 
constructivist framework that adopts a Discursive Practice Approach. Similar to 
Campbell, she maintains that US foreign policy is an important factor for the production 
and reproduction of the identity of the US and that this identity is created against ‘other’ 
states (1993: 310). Doty (1996) also analyzes the immigration policy of Britain and 
explains how the inside and outside boundary of nation is constructed through foreign 
policy. The boundary is not simply territorial but also concerns national identity; it 
attempts to stipulate fixed and stable meanings about who belongs and who does not 
belong to the nation. Along the same lines as Campbell, Messari (2001) rejects the 
conventional framework of foreign policy analysis and proposes that foreign policy can 
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be seen as ‘an identity-making tool that erects boundaries between the self and the other, 
defining in the process what are national interests’ (2001: 227). However, Messari 
considers ‘assimilation’ as a possible alternative in foreign policy making and maintains 
that national identity can be constructed not only through rejection but also by the 
assimilation or construction of similarities. 
On the other hand, national identity of states can also be alternatively 
conceptualized, resting on three premises; that identities are not natural or essential but 
socially and discursively constructed; that they are relational and inextricably linked to 
the notion of the ‘other’; and that the relationship between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, or 
between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ is not only relational but also co-constitutive.  
First of all, national identity is not completely consistent or stable but, to the 
contrary, dynamic, fragile and vulnerable (Wodak, Cillia, and Reisigli 1999: 154). 
Therefore, states are never finished as identities and always in the process of 
reconstruction and reproduction. Then, there might be hidden dualism and mutual 
construction of the self and the other in the notion of the ‘self’ national identity. As the 
representation of the ‘self’ inextricably indicates the existence of the ‘other’, national 
identity always needs constructing the ‘other’. Hall (1996: 4-5) explains the process of 
constitution of the ‘self’ in relation to the ‘other’ in detail: 
 
Identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails the radically 
disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the Other, the relation 
to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive 
outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term – and thus its ‘identity’ – can be 
constructed (Derrida 1981, Laclau 1990, Butler 1993). ---The unity, the internal 
homogeneity, which the term identity treats as foundational is not a natural, but a 
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constructed form of closure, every identity naming as its necessary, even if 
silenced and unspoken other, that which it ‘lacks’. 
 
     In addition, Triandafyllidou (1998: 596) argues that national identity can be 
defined from inside and outside: while it is a self-awareness of a community, which has 
a certain degree of community within the group, it can be defined ‘through a process of 
differentiation from and in contrast to others’. That is, national identity cannot be 
constructed just by internal commonality. In IR literature, how the self and other, 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are represented and linked with one another is central to the 
notion of the construction of identity. It has been widely accepted among most of IR 
scholars that there is a clear distinction between the inside of the national boundary and 
its outside. The former, the domestic realm is assumed to be ‘secure’ and ‘peaceful’ 
while the latter, an external realm tends to be regarded as ‘insecure’ and ‘threatening’.  
     Post-positivist scholars such as Walker offer further insight into this dichotomy, 
by arguing that the relationship between the two realms is not only antagonistic in that 
the ‘outside’ could be a ‘threat’ to ‘inside’, but also co-constitutive. In this sense, 
national identity and the ‘other’ are mutually constructive as Hopf (2002: 288) noted 
that ‘it is only in interaction with a particular other that the meaning of a state is 
established’. Doty (1996: 126-127) supports this idea arguing that it would be more 
useful to consider inside and outside as mutually constitutive rather than conceive them 
as dichotomous oppositions. Because of this co-constitutiveness, the self, who belongs 
to ‘us’, cannot be conceptualized independently of other, who does not belong to ‘us’. 
Thus, states seek to articulate ‘differences’ and ‘others’ in order to establish its national 
identity (Campbell 1998). Campbell (1998: 99) explains that identities are constituted 
by inscribing boundaries ‘that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside”, a “self” 
 28 
from an “other”, a “domestic” from a “foreign”’. These lines of thought can be 
underlined and enriched by the notion of political frontiers as found in theorists like 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and in Derridia’s notion of a ‘constitutive outside’ (Norval 
1996: 65). Norval explains that political identities are constituted through externalizing 
and positioning the ‘other’ that is constructed symbolically as opposed to the identity of 
the Self. In short, ‘the positioning other is what allows for the closure which facilitates 
the individuation of a certain identity’ (Norval 1996: 65). As Campbell (1992: 12) 
demonstrates, to construct their identity, states are continuously urged to articulate 
threats and others, constituting ‘a range of differences as intrinsically evil, irrational, 
abnormal, mad, sick, primitive, monstrous, dangerous or anarchical’ (Connolly 1991: 
209-210). 
In such approaches, the relationship between national identity and foreign policy 
thus comes to the forefront of the theorizing effort. In this process, foreign policy plays 
a significant role as in the differentiation and exclusion that takes place in transforming 
‘difference’ into ‘otherness’, thereby building boundaries between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
(Messari 2001: 233). As such, the boundaries which foreign policy creates stipulate 
stable and fixed meanings about who belongs and who does not belong to the nation. 
That is, foreign policy is a practice on the construction of national identity through 
drawing borders and maintaining the lines of difference. This deliberate construction of 
identity contributes to creating a particular ‘reality’ which appears as ‘normal’ and also 
serves to establish standards of domestic legitimacy, privilege a certain interpretive 
disposition and marginalize alternatives. Therefore, foreign policy is understood as a 
political practice, which constitutes, maintains and reproduces national identity. 
With regard to identity making, there is another important role which foreign 
policy plays, transforming differences into otherness by explicitly drawing borders 
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between inside and outside as Campbell suggested. On the whole, the ‘other’ is more 
likely to be represented as a threat to what ‘the self is’ rather than just what ‘the self is 
not’. When inside is described as secure and peaceful and all the dangers would come 
from outside, any identity could always be threatened by something that is external to it 
(Howard 2000: 106). Torfing (1999: 124-129) argues that this radical otherness would 
precisely agree with ‘constitutive outside’ as they constitute and negate the identity of 
the inside. Furthermore, he regards ‘constitutive outside’ as coterminous with ‘social 
antagonism’, which is central a concept of discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985). Social antagonism would occur because social subjects are unable to attain their 
identities and they would construct an ‘enemy’ who is deemed responsible for this 
‘failure’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, Howard 2000: 105). Thus, the negation or blockage 
of identity could highlight a friend-foe division between the self and other. Identity of 
the ‘self’ is reinforced through the specification of a threat of a radical other by focusing 
on differences.  
     Such attempts to re-theorize foreign policy promise to have some important 
implications for the analysis of the relationship between nationalism and foreign policy. 
Firstly, they assume that national identity is far from stable or fixed; it is in the process 
of reproduction and reconstruction, as Smith (2001: 18) describes. This indicates that 
states are continuously required to reconstruct and simultaneously reproduce what is 
‘domestic’ and what is not, containing challenges to the constituted identity while this 
process of reproduction is never completed. Foreign policy makers are deliberately 
involved in this process in order to construct and maintain a national identity that 
sustains the foundations of domestic legitimacy (Messari 2001: 233).  
     Secondly, what is being proposed here is a shift in the understanding of foreign 
policy itself away from seeing it as a bridge between preexisting entities called states 
 30 
with secured identities and toward something that constructs and reconstructs national 
identity by making differences between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. From this viewpoint, the 
state does not exist prior to policy. Instead, the boundary is reproduced and sustained in 
order to stabilize and naturalize a particular ‘reality’ which can serve to legitimate a 
certain policy and preclude any alternatives. Nationalism might also not independently 
exist because national identity, the core of nationalism, is constructed and reconstructed 
by foreign policy practice. Therefore, the relationship between nationalism and foreign 
policy might not be unilateral or one-way. Thirdly, when national identity and foreign 
policy are mutually constitutive, any political practice, even when it is seemingly 
separated from nationalist rhetoric, can essentially reconstruct national identity. Hansen 
(2006: 1) succinctly summarizes their relationship; ‘Foreign policies rely upon 
representation of identity, but it is also through the formulation of foreign policy that 
identities are produced and reproduced’. Thus, it becomes necessary to pay attention to 
how national identity is represented in foreign policy discourse.  
     In this way, foreign policy, which could be conceptualized as the practice of 
states to erect a boundary between inside and outside would have a function to impose 
and fix meaning about ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the boundary, thereby ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
How the ‘self’ is constituted would be closely linked with how the ‘other’ is represented 
in foreign policy discourse. In other word, what kind of ‘self’ could be revealed through 
the definition of ‘other’ in foreign policy discourse. Therefore, foreign policy would be 
an identity-making practice by dealing with ‘other’ by which national identity is 
permanently reconstructed. It would be crucial to pay attention to how ‘other’ is 
articulated in foreign policy discourse to construct identity of the self. 
 
1.5 Research Questions  
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 Adopting the above theoretical perspective, this thesis seeks to answer the following 
research questions: 
 
◎ What was the role of nationalism in Japan’s foreign policy towards Asia during 
the Koizumi and Abe administrations? 
- What kind of national identity was constructed in Japan’s foreign policy?  
- How did political leaders of Japan try to utilize national identity and nationalism 
in foreign policy? 
    
     The first and primary question concerns how nationalism can be defined in 
Japan’s foreign policy in the region and how political leaders exploited it. In order to 
achieve an answer, this thesis sets some sub-questions. The first of these is to try to 
grasp what kind of nationalism is expressed in Japan’s foreign policy and how a 
particular policy which is influenced by a certain version of nationalism becomes 
possible while others are precluded in the policy making process. The second 
sub-question explores how political leaders utilized nationalism in foreign policy in 
relation to power relationships in domestic politics. By exploring these questions, this 
research attempts to uncover a complex and multi-faced relationship between 
nationalism and foreign policy in Japan’s politics. In this way, it seeks to develop a 
more comprehensive and convincing account of the role Japan’s nationalism plays in its 
foreign policy towards East Asian countries.       
 
1.6 Hypotheses 
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     In accordance with the alternative conceptual framework on foreign policy and 
national identity discussed above, this thesis formulates hypotheses to be tested in order 
to explore the relationship between Japan’s nationalism and foreign policy:  
 
1) Japan’s political leaders tried to reconstruct Japan’s national identity in the 
post-Cold War era by using foreign policy towards Asia. 
   2) Japan’s political actors tried to manipulate a certain version of ‘nationalism’, 
which seemed to be appropriate to legitimize their policy agendas by articulating 
national identity in foreign policy, in order to take advantages in domestic politics. 
 
     The first hypothesis can be tested by adopting the concepts presented by 
re-theorized foreign policy, because this theoretical orientation sees foreign policy as an 
identity-making practice rather than as a bridge-making tool between states. That is to 
say, foreign policy is used to construct and reconstruct national identity, which is in 
itself at the core of nationalism. By building boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and 
constructing the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, foreign policy produces identity and builds a 
particular ‘reality’, which in turn makes a certain policy possible and marginalizes other 
options. In other words, Japanese political leaders should be seen as trying to 
reconstruct and protect national identity through their foreign policy. In the case of 
post-Cold War Japan, mainstream conservative politicians sought a new national 
identity of Japan beyond the framework of the Yoshida Doctrine, which was based on 
the twin pillars of the alliance with the US and the Constitution. They adopted the 
strategy of historic reconciliation, which was as a part of a policy that aimed to remove 
obstacles, that is, history issue and distrust from the neighboring countries, against 
taking a more proactive leadership role in the region. On the other hand, the right-wing 
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traditionalists and neo-revisionists harshly opposed to the strategy arguing that it would 
harm Japan’s national dignity. They alleged different national identity and diplomatic 
orientation in foreign policy making. In this way, those two schools of thought were 
behind each foreign policy toward China and North Korea under the administration of 
Koizumi and Abe.  
     In addition, it should be clarified what the term ‘nationalism’ would indicate in 
this thesis in order to explain the second hypothesis. As an abundance of literature 
demonstrates, ‘nationalism’ seems to be one of the most contested and unfixed concepts 
because it has a number of definitions and different usages such as ideology or political 
movement. For this reason, nationalism might make possible for various political 
leaders to appropriate it in order to obtain legitimacy for a variety of their policy 
agendas. In fact, nationalism in postwar Japan was far from monolithic despite the 
tendency that it is often identified with the ‘traditional right-wing nationalism’. It would 
be wrong to assume that ‘nationalism’ in postwar Japan belongs to only one group or 
the other. As will be touched on in chapter 2, the progressives who embraced the 
pacifist constitution as a national value, tended to emphasize national identity to 
legitimize their argument and increase their credentials as well as the ‘traditional 
right-wing nationalists’. Thus, all political actors were likely to contest and manipulate 
their ‘nationalisms’ so as to obtain legitimacy for their policy, to boost their domestic 
credibility, and to marginalize their political rivals. 
     In this contest, this thesis treats nationalism as ‘a discourse on the continuous 
process of attaining, maintaining, and reproducing national identity’. This 
conceptualization relies on the argument of Finlayson (1998) and Özkirimli (2005) in 
which nationalism was treated as a particular kind of discourse so as to go beyond the 
conventional typologies of nationalisms. In his article ‘Ideology, Discourse and 
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Nationalism’, Finlayson argues that the discourse of nationalism ‘oriented towards the 
production, exploration, clarification or furtherance of a nation and its identity (1998: 
105)’. He also stated that nationalism should also be understood as a strategy of 
ideological legitimization. According to Finlayson, nationalism is always linked to other 
political ideologies and it is through association with ‘nation’ that these political 
ideologies are legitimated. By providing political ideologies with the appearance of 
natural origins, nationalism can convince people that the political ideology derived from 
their ancestry. Therefore, treating nationalism as a particular kind of discourse on 
national identity allows us to concentrate on how nationalism was manipulated in 
foreign policy making as a tool for legitimization. This thesis thus focuses on how 
nationalism is contested and manipulated among political actors within the process of 
foreign policy making, which was embedded in power relationship in Japanese politics, 
rather than integrating various definition of nationalism. 
     What is more, by conceptualizing nationalism as a discourse, it serves to focus on 
the relationship between nationalism in foreign policy and domestic power relationship 
among political actors. As Japan’s nationalism is far from monolithic and always 
contested, as will be touched on in Chapter 2, various political actors can use it for 
different purpose because all political actors, who contend for power and influence in 
domestic politics, seek legitimacy to boost their domestic credentials. In this context, 
political actors attempt to utilize nationalism as a source of political capital so as to 
legitimize their policy agenda and to take advantages in domestic power struggles. In 
addition, as a ‘discourse’ reflects power relationships among subjects, treating 
nationalism as a discourse would contribute the examination of how nationalism in 
foreign policy was related to domestic power struggles. Therefore, this thesis will 
demonstrate the variety of ways in which political actors try to legitimize their position 
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and policy by appropriating the discourse of nationalism in their own way. 
    Taken together, my argument can be summarized as follows: Japan’s political 
leaders tried to reconstruct Japan’s national identity through foreign policy toward Asia 
and attempted to legitimize their policy program by a certain type of nationalism which 
was appropriate to their alleged national identity and marginalize other policy options 
proposed by their opponents. In this way, nationalism played an important role in each 
foreign policy initiative and domestic power relationship as well, because it would give 
political actors a source of political capital to legitimize each policy and to defeat their 
opponents. 
     In addition to these main hypotheses, this thesis proposes a theoretical hypothesis 
that not only defining the radical ‘other’ as ‘inassimilable’ by negative differences can 
construct the identity of the ‘self,’ but also positioning the ‘other’ as ‘assimilable’ with a 
series of juxtaposing positive signs as commonalities with the ‘self’. The positive aspect 
of others would be assimilated in order to reproduce specific aspects of identity of the 
self. In the case study on Abe’s India policy, I would attempt apply this theoretical 
framework to Japan’s approach to India in the Abe administration. It intends to explore 
how a certain aspect of national identity of Japan is attempted to be reproduced and 
affirmed through constructing similarities with India in foreign policy discourse. 
 
1.7 The Selection of Case Studies 
 
This thesis will deal with five cases in which nationalism appears to have played 
a significant role in Japanese foreign policy making toward Asian countries: the 
deterioration of the relationship with China and a conciliatory approach toward North 
Korea under the Koizumi administration, the hard-line attitude against North Korea and 
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the improvement of the bilateral relationship with China by Prime Minister Abe, and 
finally, Abe’s friendship-policy toward India. All of these cases seem to be related to 
the issue of nationalism, but they have quite different outcomes.  
     First of all, the Koizumi era witnessed a remarkable deterioration of the 
Japan-China relationship due to an unyielding attitude on the Yasukuni Shrine issue. 
While Japan needed to maintain close cooperation with both these countries with regard 
to a settlement of the North Korean issue and in order to attain a permanent seat in the 
United Nations Security Council, the Koizumi government refused to make concessions 
on this issue and the diplomatic row was not resolved. Despite strong demands to 
improve the bilateral relationship from oppositions from inside and outside the party, 
Koizumi was coherent in his belief. Although it tends to be explained as an expression 
of right-wing nationalism, it might be doubted that Koizumi’s policy was in fact shaped 
by traditional right-wing nationalism. Thus, this thesis aims to examine what kind of 
national identity and ‘reality’ was constructed, and how nationalism was utilized to 
legitimize his policy. In other words, this case study explores how Koizumi manipulated 
the Yasukuni Shrine issue as his political capital and legitimized it in accordance with 
‘nationalistic rhetoric’ by articulating a certain version of national identity in foreign 
policy toward China. 
 On the other hand, contrary to his China policy, Koizumi did not take a tough 
stance against Pyongyang. He sought to normalize diplomatic ties with North Korea 
through dialogues rather than merely imposing sanctions as the pressure school insisted. 
In this sense, Koizumi’s policy toward the DPRK would be notable in that it makes a 
sharp contrast with his tougher China Policy and Abe’s hard-line policy. Therefore, the 
second case study would focus on what kind of national identity was represented in the 
foreign policy under the Koizumi administration and how Koizumi utilized the North 
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Korea issue to legitimize his position by articulating national identity in foreign policy.  
To the contrary, Shinzo Abe, who is well known as a staunch nationalist, was able 
to exploit popular sentiment and to demonstrate a hard-line policy against North Korea. 
During his tenure, he put emphasis exclusively on the abduction issue in the whole 
North Korea policy and never made any concessions to break a stalemate of the 
negotiations. As Abe’s stance coincided with the traditional right-wing group, it might 
be easy to argue that nationalism had an impact in the foreign policy making. However, 
it has not been fully examined how a particular policy could be made possible while 
other options were precluded as improper by the dynamics of nationalist politics. Hence, 
this section examines how the abduction issue was conceptualized and manipulated to 
raise his domestic credentials in accordance with his nationalism by articulating national 
identity in foreign policy toward North Korea. 
     In contrast with his hard-line North Korean policy, Abe attempted to improve the 
relationship with China when he came into office, reversing his hostile stance to China. 
In order to achieve rapprochement with China, Abe shelved the Yasukuni Shrine issue 
and adopted a ‘strategic ambiguity’. As a result, he could improve the bilateral 
relationship with China and established a ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on 
strategic interests’. If Abe was merely defined as the traditional right-wing nationalist, it 
is difficult to explain his policy shift toward China. This case can thus be used to 
explore how he tried to legitimate his change in political stance to China and utilize it as 
his political capital. 
     It might be better to explain a little bit more about the reason why Abe’s policy 
toward India is selected as one of the case studies in this thesis. The primary reason is 
not only that India was an important country in Japan’s Asian diplomacy under the Abe 
administration, but also that Abe’s policy toward India seemed to be related to his other 
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policy, namely, the rapprochement with China. Although, it might be persuasive in 
geopolitical terms to argue for balancing China by strengthening ties with India, 
considerations for domestic politics seemed to be more plausible in this case. Simply 
put, the Abe administration had to ease the discontents among his anti-China and 
rightwing supporters against his policy of improving the bilateral relationship with 
China. In order to achieve his China policy without impediments from them and to 
retain their supports, Abe needed to offset his China policy by other foreign policy 
issues. In this context, a friendly-approach to India was selected in addition to a 
hard-line approach to North Korea. It was because India was regarded to be a perfect 
candidate for Abe; the country is perceived as a ‘Japan-friendly country’ without any 
history disputes unlike China; thus it would not polarize public opinion unlike North 
Korea. More importantly, India is the mother country of ‘Judge Pal’, who found all the 
Japanese defendants to be innocent at the Tokyo War Tribunal. As Judge Pal has had 
enormous popularity with Japanese people especially among the right-wingers, to 
enhance ties with India would strongly appeal to Abe’s supporters. In fact, Abe’s visit 
to Calcutta to meet Judge Pal’s family was significant because it indicated that Abe‘s 
fundamental view of history did not change. It thus served to ease the frustration over 
his rapprochement with China and the shelving of history issues among his 
‘conservative’ supporters. In fact, the existence of Judge Pal makes strengthening ties 
with India different from other foreign policy cases such as Australia or South Korea. 
Although those two countries are treated as sharing ‘universal values’ with Japan, they 
do not have historical icons like Pal and thus might not appeal to the right wing.  
     In addition, there is a reason not to focus on Koizumi’s policy for India. While he 
offsets the discontents of anti-Chinese groups against his conciliatory approach to North 
Korea by his uncompromising stance against China, he did not seek to balance his 
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policy to North Korea by policy to India. This was symbolized by his visit to the 
memorial of Mahatma Gandhi, not Pal. In this way, this thesis focuses on the policy 
toward India under the Abe administration as one of the case studies because it would 
have a great importance to analyze how political leaders try to offset their weakness in 
one foreign policy by choosing and conducting other foreign policies. 
     Taken together, these five case studies are supposed to be touchstones for 
examining the relationship between nationalism and the foreign policy of Japan in 
different situations; how nationalism is manipulated by political actors in order to 
legitimize their policy and boost their domestic credentials. 
      
1.8 Methodology 
 
 Discourses construct “particular subject identities, positioning these subjects 
vis-à-vis one another and thereby constructing a particular “reality” in which this 
policy became possible, as well as a larger “reality” in which future policies 
would be justified in advance (Doty 1993:304-305). 
 
As stated above, this thesis will be carried out within a constructivist framework 
with a new thinking of foreign policy drawing on post-positivist scholars such as 
Campbell (1998) Doty (1993, 1996), and Hansen (1996). The most suitable 
methodology for such an approach is discourse analysis. This section aims to show the 
advantages of applying this approach to my research. First, after a brief introduction of 
the method, three presuppositions of discourse analysis will be argued for. Then, 
analytical framework for this research will be explained. Next, I will discuss how a 
discursive approach offers certain advantages for this particular study.   
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Discourse analysis can be defined as a method to inquire into the articulations by 
which social reality and identities are constructed. In other words, Discursive practices 
construct social reality by inscribing identities for subjects and defining the relationship 
between them. Discourse is presumed to construct a particular ‘reality’ through shaping 
subjects and objects by differentiating them, creating their relations by making 
hierarchy among them, and defining the state of affairs by naturalizing these relations. 
In this conceptualization, discourses would include both linguistic and behavioral 
practices: not only a group of texts but also social practices to which those texts are 
linked. Doty (1996: 123) argues that ‘the linguistic and behavioral aspects of social 
practices form a complex and inextricably connected whole that is a discourse.’ This 
understanding of discourses is the one that Laclau and Mouffe (1985) suggest and Doty 
(1993, 1996), Wennersten (1999), and Diez (2001) have applied in foreign policy 
analysis. Although discourse analysis has not received much attention from mainstream 
IR scholars, recently it has become a more active area in IR (Milliken 1999: 225, Diez 
2001: 5). This is partly because its focus on the knowledge/power nexus can challenge 
the ‘scientism’ of mainstream IR theories. According to Milliken (1999: 227), discourse 
analysis is ‘a post-positivist project that is critically self-aware of the closures imposed 
by research programmes and the modes of analysis which scholars routinely use in their 
work and treat as unproblematic.’  
Milliken (1999) discusses the application of discourse studies to the subject of IR 
and explains three theoretical presuppositions; discourse as system of significance, 
discourse productivity, and the play of practice. The first concept assumes discourses as 
‘structures of signification which construct social realities’ through defining various 
subjects and objects and imposing relational distinctions on them (Milliken 1999: 227). 
Doty (1993: 302) refers to this idea as a ‘linguistic construction of reality’, drawing 
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from Shapiro (1984: 222) that ‘language can be seen as a set of signs which are part of a 
system for generating subjects, objects, and worlds.’ As Milliken (1999: 229) points out, 
it seems to be compatible with an idea of constructivism that material things by 
themselves might not have intrinsic meanings; their meanings would be socially 
constructed by ideas. Structures, which discourses would create, are largely formed in 
terms of binary oppositions in which one element is privileged over the other (Derrida 
1981). These binary oppositions would constitute relations between subjects and objects 
or subjects and subjects so as to define identities of them. In this way, as Doty (1993: 
303) puts it, discourses in various texts could produce meanings and in doing so actively 
create the ‘reality’ on which foreign policy is based. 
The second theoretical presumption illuminates the aspect of power as productive. 
It emphasizes the power that might be inherent in discourses and by which actors, both 
subjects and objects, are constructed. Doty highlights the dimension in which ‘subjects 
are themselves constructed, defined as particular kinds of subjects, and given particular 
identities (Doty 1996: 129)’ in particular discourses. In addition to constructing various 
kinds of subjects, discourses ‘simultaneously position these subjects vis-à-vis one 
another (Doty 1993: 303)’ by creating hierarchy among them and thus constitute 
‘particular interpretive dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude 
others (1993: 298)’. As a result, they construct particular subjects with certain identities, 
which would be indeed socially constructed, such that certain practices would be made 
possible thereby create a way of operationalizing a particular ‘regime of truth’ while 
excluding other possible modes of identity and action. Applying this to foreign policy 
analysis means being concerned with the question of how particular subjects and 
identities are constructed so as to make possible a certain course of action while 
marginalizing other options.  
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The third presupposition is a concern for the vulnerability and the instability of 
the concept of an objective ‘reality’ which is constructed by hegemonic discourses. In 
spite of efforts to stabilize and fix dominant meanings and exclude alternative 
discourses, all discourses could be unstable and historically contingent. Thus, they 
would require continuous work for authorized actors to ‘articulate and rearticulate their 
knowledge and identities’ in order to fix the ‘regime of truth’ (Milliken 1990: 230). In 
sum, a discursive approach does not assume the pre-given and fixed identity of subjects 
and social reality but presumes that subjects are socially and discursively constructed 
and reconstructed in order to stabilize their hegemony. Foreign policy is thus treated as 
an integral part of this permanent process of reconstruction. 
To be sure, it seems plausible that the discursive approach and re-theorized 
foreign policy analysis can be closely interrelated with each other given that a range of 
existing works have used this approach. In her analysis of US counterinsurgency policy 
with new thinking of foreign policy as social construction, for example, Doty (1993) 
takes the Discursive Practice Approach which uses three analytical concepts as a textual 
mechanism; Presupposition, Predication, and Subject Positioning. These three concepts 
will contribute to explaining how a ‘reality’ is constructed, producing positions among 
various subjects and endowing them with particular attributes. Wennersten (1999: 278) 
also analyzed how the foreign policy practices of the European Union (EU) have been 
stimulating the formation of a collective identity between the Baltic countries and the 
EU within a constructivist framework using the method of discourse analysis. He argues 
that discursive practices construct social reality by inscribing certain identities for 
certain subjects and that a collective identity was formed through a reconstruction of 
boundaries between the European/Western inside and outside. Diez (2001) similarly 
examines the discursive formation of European governance with an emphasis on the 
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concept of the discursive nodal point that is proposed by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). He 
maintains that powerful discursive practices are not only shaped by but also reproduced 
by their discursive context, simultaneously attempting to pin down specific meanings in 
the meta-narratives, which are often unquestioned or presented as ‘natural’ or taken for 
granted.  
Moreover, foreign policy and national identity can be regarded as a product of 
discourse (Wodak, Cillia, Reisigi and Liebhart 1999: 22). One of the successful works 
of this line of thought is Hansen’s (2006) ‘Security as Practice’. This conceptualizes 
identity as discursive, political, relational and social and argues that foreign policy 
discourse always articulates the self and the other. ‘It is only through the discursive 
enactment of foreign policy that identity comes into being, but this identity is at the 
same time constructed as legitimization for the policy proposed’ (Hansen 2006: 21). 
Özkirimli (2005: 33) also suggests that nationalism can be regarded a discourse which 
divides the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’, makes hierarchies, naturalizes itself, and is 
operated by various institutions. Given these, the discursive approach is supposed to be 
a suitable method for the framework of this thesis. 
Looking at the particular question of how policy makers construct a particular 
national identity in foreign policy discourse, Hansen (2006: 28) argues that as the goal 
of a foreign policy maker is ‘to present a foreign policy that appears legitimate and 
enforceable to its relevant audience’, they seek to construct ‘a link between policy and 
identity that makes the two appear consistent with each other’. Following this approach, 
this thesis will highlight two analytical concepts; the dual process of identity 
production; assimilation/ dissimilation, and intertextuality. When a particular 
construction of identity underlies or proscribes a certain policy, dual boundary-making 
practices for identity formation come into play. While the process of assimilation forms 
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‘homogeneous’ nations and consolidates national unity, it also engages with the process 
of dissimilation that externalizes any difference that is opposed to the self 
(differentiation). By positioning the ‘other’ as a ‘threat’ with a series of juxtaposing 
negative signs, the morality and legitimacy of the ‘other’ is devalued (hierarchized) and 
a policy to externalize the ‘other’ can be authorized (normalized). In this process, ‘threat’ 
plays the role of legitimizing policy that externalizes the ‘other’ and plays the role of 
promoting national unity to counter itself. Thus, political elites deliberately manipulate 
a ‘threat’ to construct national identity, which in turn comes to underpin their foreign 
policy. Hansen (2006) thus depicts how subjects are constructed through positive signs 
on the one hand (linking), and negative ones on the other hand (differentiation). These 
juxtapositions would form binary oppositions that constitute the relationship between 
subjects and objects.  
In addition, when conceptualizing foreign policy as a discursive product, Julia 
Kristeva’s conception of ‘intertextuality’ is useful both methodologically and 
analytically. This means that all texts including foreign policy texts do not exist 
separately from a wider web of societal discourse. As Hansen (2006: 55) explains, ‘texts 
are situated within and against other texts’ and ‘they draw upon them in constructing 
their identities and policies.’ To construct a particular identity in foreign policy 
discourse for the official narratives, and to attain legitimacy, foreign policy texts thus 
have to make references to previous texts. Policy makers deliberately choose which 
facts and knowledge are to be drawn from which texts and how to locate them within a 
particular discourse. Thus, as foreign policy discourse is constructed through a larger 
body of texts, this thesis will pay attention to its intertextuality as well as how ‘threat’ is 
constructed within it.  
     Finally, it needs to be explained here what the advantages are in applying a 
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discursive approach to the analysis of the relationship between nationalism and foreign 
policy. Firstly, the discursive approach can offer a new perspective on the analysis of 
Japan’s foreign policy because exploration of this topic in terms of discourse analysis 
has been limited so far. While traditional IR theories have not been able to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of Japan’s foreign policy, the discursive approach could cast 
some light on it from a different viewpoint that can be expected to either supplement or 
challenge them. Secondly, it could help to maintain a degree of coherence between the 
theoretical framework and the methodology of this thesis. This is because the 
conception of national identity and foreign policy as discursive practice implies that 
policy and identity can be seen as ontologically interlinked. As identities are produced 
and reproduced through foreign policy discourse, there might be no national identity 
prior to and independent from foreign policy (Hansen 2006: 21, 28). Thirdly, the 
discursive approach can uncover power relations and hierarchies among subjects behind 
a particular construction of national identity, and thus denaturalize an objective ‘reality’ 
on which foreign policy is based. Therefore, it would be appropriate to reveal how 
political actors utilized nationalism as political capital to raise their domestic credentials 
and defeat their rivals in domestic politics. In addition, this has an advantage over 
conventional foreign policy analysis, which tends to take as unproblematic the 
possibility that a particular decision or course of action could take place and neglect 
exploration of an important aspect of power as productive by posing why-questions 
(Doty 1993: 298). On the other hand, the discursive approach poses how-possible 
questions that examine particular constructions of identity by which certain practices are 
made possible (Doty 1993: 298-303). Therefore, by adopting discourse analysis, this 
research focuses on how a certain policy becomes possible while others are excluded as 
improper in foreign policy making and how it is legitimized in domestic power 
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relationships. 
     What should be noted here is that this thesis analyzes a number of texts, which 
are mainly cited from the congressional record, articles and books written by policy 
makers, and newspaper articles. It also examines wordings in speeches, interviews, and 
press conferences of politicians and diplomats. It is because those texts represent 
official viewpoints of each political actor and are intended to appeal to the public to 
strengthen their credentials. 
In sum, discourse analysis offers the possibilities for developing an original thesis 
because it is a highly critical approach insofar as it makes more elements of policy 
making problematic and takes less as given by focusing on the particular ways in which 
identity is constructed. Through the examination of representational practices, which 
rely on a series of relations between subjects, the discursive approach can be used to 
explore how certain practices are made possible and others are precluded by the 
hierarchy of subjects. Therefore, it can offer a new perspective on the analysis of the 
relationship between Japan’s nationalism and its foreign policy.   
 
1.9 Chapter Outline 
     
     This thesis will consist of 8 chapters including introduction and conclusion. The 
first chapter aims to clarify research questions and hypothesis, looking at existing 
literatures on Japan’s nationalism and foreign policy, and explaining the theoretical 
framework, methodology and selection of case studies. The primary question, which 
this thesis seeks to answer, is to explore the role of nationalism in Japan’s foreign policy 
toward Asia during the Koizumi and Abe administrations, focusing on the relationship 
between national identity and foreign policy. In order to explore this question, this 
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thesis adopts an alternative conceptual framework based on post-positivist thinking and 
uses discourse analysis approach.  
     The second chapter will offer a brief explanation of basic information of postwar 
Japanese politics after WWⅡwith emphasis on the division in domestic power politics. 
Foreign policy of postwar Japan was rebuilt and developed on the basis of the ‘Yoshida 
Doctrine’, which relied upon the twin pillars of the war-renouncing Constitution and the 
Japan-US Security Treaty. On the domestic front, power struggles between the 
progressives and the conservatives formulated the ‘1955 system’ at the same time with 
confrontations among factions within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This chapter 
describes how political actors contended for power and legitimacy by upholding and 
manipulating national values in postwar Japanese politics, which was behind the power 
relationship surrounding Prime Minister Koizumi and Abe.  
     The third and fourth chapters will examine Japan’s foreign policy toward China 
and North Korea under the Koizumi administration: the first case is the deterioration of 
Japan-China relationship focusing on the Yasukuni Shrine issue in the Koizumi era, and 
his conciliatory approach toward North Korea, aiming at diplomatic normalization, is 
examined in the second case study chapter.  
     The following chapter discusses on the discourse of ‘neo-revisionists’, who are 
Abe and his supporters, with special emphasis on what kind of national identity and 
national values were constituted through making domestic others in Abe’s political 
slogan of the ‘departure from the postwar regime’ and ‘Toward a beautiful country’. 
Abe’s argument focuses primarily on dismantling the discourse of ‘postwar democracy’, 
which has been dominant in Japanese society since 1945. At the same time, he seems to 
transform, redefine, and fix the meanings of the core of identities established in 
‘postwar democracy’ discourse, such as ‘peace’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘democracy’. In the 
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process, he constructs radical others on the domestic front and alleges the legitimacy of 
his policy. Chapter 6 deals with two case studies on Abe’s unexpected rapprochement 
with China and on his hard-line approach against the DPRK, emphasizing the abduction 
issue.  
     The fifth case study in Chapter 7 concerns the enhancement of the partnership 
with India under the Abe administration. Abe’s India policy, as a part of a policy of the 
‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, is discussed in relation to his ‘departure from the 
postwar regime’ and his China policy. The construction of India as a ‘Japan-friendly’ 
country without a history issue, which shares universal values, and respect Japan’s 
contribution for peace served to highlight the radical ‘otherness’ of China. This made 
the fundamental improvement of the bilateral relationship with China less likely 
because it was an ‘inassimilable other’. In addition, the emphasis on ‘value-oriented 
diplomacy’ was treated as a source of political capital of political leaders to offset 
discontents among anti-Chinese groups and to consolidate support for the Abe 
administration in order to realize the ‘departure form the postwar regime’. 
     Finally, the last chapter will conclude what kind of role Japan’s nationalism 
played in foreign policy and how it was associated with domestic power relationships. 
As Japan’s nationalism is not monolithic, not only radical politicians but also all 
political actors endeavor to utilize nationalism as a source of political capital over 
different issues. They tried to contest a version of nationalism by articulating and 
reconstructing a certain national identity in foreign policy discourse in order to 
legitimize their footings, to offset weakness of a policy, and to marginalize opponents in 
domestic politics by constructing the self/other nexus. Nationalism thus could be bound 
up with various political thoughts and has played an important role as a source of 
political capital to legitimize different policy programs by producing subjects and the 
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hierarchical relationship among them. In this sense, nationalism is more than just a 
vote-gathering machine at the election. Instead, it can be regarded as a discourse: it 
produces power relationships among subjects and naturalizes them. Therefore, this 
thesis might be contributory to the development of a study of nationalism by confirming 
effectivity in treating nationalism as a discourse. In addition, this thesis argues that 
although both Koizumi and Abe sought for ‘a closure of the history issues’ and 
diplomatic autonomy by upholding a ‘peaceful country’ as national identity, they 
became trapped into a negative cycle of nationalism and foreign policy. Therefore, the 
termination of the vicious cycle might be necessary for Japan to obtain leadership and 
diplomatic autonomy in the region.  
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Chapter 2. Political History of Postwar Japan and Factional Politics 
                                                           
    
     After the defeat of WWⅡ, the dominant discourse in Japanese policy making was 
based on the theme of reconstruction while showing ‘deep remorse over its aggression’ in 
Asia. The result was outstanding economic growth while embracing the postwar 
Constitution. Despite the economic and diplomatic success of this formula, however, 
postwar Japan has never reached domestic consensus on how to define its national identity, 
except for the ambiguous representation that being a ‘peaceful country’ is a national virtue. 
In this context, a number of political actors sought to fulfill their policy, expand their 
domestic credentials, and defeat their rivals. In order to realize this, they tried to juggle 
various issues, from domestic to international, and to legitimize their policy through the 
consistency with alleged national identity. Put another way, political actors would attempt to 
legitimize their stance and policy by utilizing the construction of the self/other nexus over 
diversified issues. Therefore, all power struggles in domestic politics would take the form of 
contests over the orthodoxy of national identity. In this sense, not only foreign policy but also 
domestic power relationships might closely be associated with the construction of national 
identity. In particular, domestic controversy over the Constitution or the history issue were 
linked with international concerns over the Japan-US Security Treaty or the relationship with 
China and contested in terms of what kind of national identity postwar Japan should express.  
     For this reason, it would be wrong to assume that ‘nationalism’ in postwar Japan 
belongs to only one group or the other. Actually, the progressives who embraced the pacifist 
constitution and rejected the conservative tendency emphasized a version of national identity 
and national values to legitimize their argument and increase their credentials as well as 
‘traditional right-wing nationalists’. For instance, when the progressives insisted on unarmed 
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neutrality and the abolition of the Japan-US Security Treaty in the 1950s and 1960s, it was 
expressed as a national desire for the restoration of Japan’s ‘autonomy’ from the US. The 
Japan Communist Party, which has been identified as a typical ‘progressive group’, claimed 
‘patriotism’ as a part of their political slogan immediately after WWⅡ as Oguma (2002) 
pointed out. In this sense, the progressives can be as ‘nationalistic’ as the conservatives, who 
advocate ‘traditional cultures’ and the ‘sacred’ Emperor system. Therefore, it can be argued 
that postwar Japan’s nationalism has not been limited to ‘traditional rightwing’ nationalism; 
it has been not monolithic but multi-dimensional. All political actors, whether progressives 
or right-wing traditionalists, are thus likely to manipulate their ‘nationalisms’ so as to obtain 
legitimacy for their policy, to boost their domestic credibility, and to marginalize their 
political rivals.     
     In this context, as a background for the case studies in later chapters, this chapter 
primarily discusses the linkage between nationalism in foreign policy and domestic power 
struggle, by demonstrating that postwar Japan’s nationalism was not monolithic and that 
political actors utilized various ‘nationalisms’ to appeal their legitimacy of power. It thus 
focuses on what kind of political actors formed power relationships in domestic politics by 
deploying discourse by deploying national identity discourse and what kind of issues could 
be utilized as political capital for them.  
     My argument is as follows: under the ‘1955 system’ during the Cold War, the 
conservatives and the progressives competed against each other for the legitimacy of their 
claimed version of national identity. Despite the dominance of the conservative camp in the 
Diet, postwar pacifism, which was rooted in the peace Constitution, became firmly 
embedded in postwar Japanese society, and national identity as a ‘peaceful country’ was 
established as a national value. At the same time as the confrontation between the 
progressives and the conservatives, there was an unremitting row among factions within the 
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Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), especially between mainstream conservatives and 
anti-mainstream conservatives. These included longstanding divisions over security and 
history issues in the form of debates over the revision of the Constitution and foreign policy 
toward neighboring countries. Within these, foreign policy toward China polarized the LDP 
between a pro-Taiwan group and a pro-China group. As the importance of the bilateral 
relationship increased and the history issue with China intensified, both the pro-China stance 
and anti-China stance became sources of political capital in domestic politics.  
     After the end of the Cold War, various political leaders continued to seek to 
reconstruct the national identity of Japan. Although the rise of a ‘neo-revisionist’ movement 
among young politicians of anti-mainstream conservatives from the 1990s drew international 
attention as it was seen as the ‘resurgence of Japan’s nationalism’, however, it was actually 
aimed at countering the ‘historic reconciliation strategy’ conducted by mainstream 
conservatives, which attempted to reconstruct Japan’s identity as a more active contributor to 
regional and world peace and to take political initiatives in the region by coming to terms 
with its past. Yet, this conservative effort at reconciliation did not proceed smoothly because 
of resentment against China’s manipulating the ‘history card’ and its rapid economic and 
military growth. In this context, both the settlement of the history issue and the anti-China 
stance became political capital for political actors. Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe were 
both operating in this context and pursuing their foreign policy towards China and North 
Korea by utilizing these themes as political capital.  
     In order to discuss this, this chapter provides explanation firstly of the political division 
between the progressives and the conservatives. It then examines the division between 
conservative groups, which revolves around factional rivalry and polarization over the China 
issue. Explanations of the two Prime Ministers, Koizumi and Abe, in factional politics are 
followed by a history of factional politics in the LDP. 
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2.1 The division between the progressives and the conservatives 
 
     The ‘1955 system’ represented a situation of postwar Japan in which domestic politics 
was divided between the two major camps, the ‘progressives’ and the ‘conservatives’. Those 
two groups conflicted with each other over various issues such as security policy and war 
interpretation, in particular, and the Japan-US Security Treaty. Among them, the controversy 
over Article 9 of the new Constitution, which renounces the right to use force in the conduct 
of foreign affairs, represented the division of different versions of postwar nationalisms. The 
progressives including the Socialist Party, the Japan Communist Party (JCP), many labor 
unions and major mass media, adhered to the war-renouncing Constitution, advocated the 
ideal of unarmed neutrality, and preferred non-alignment policy to deepening ties with the 
US. On the other hand, those who sympathized with the prewar traditional values questioned 
the legitimacy of the Constitution because it was ‘foreign-written’ and ‘imposed’ by the US. 
They thus insisted on the necessity to recreate the Constitution by the Japanese people and to 
regain the right to protect the nation. The latter group consisted of right-wing traditionalists 
and right-center conservatives who insisted on full-fledged rearmament. This polarization of 
domestic politics can be traced back to the reaction to the early Occupation reforms after 
WWⅡ, and formed a basic structure of postwar Japanese society during the Cold War. 
     It was the issue of rearmament that caused severe disagreement between the two 
camps. Along with the intensification of the Cold War, the US began to press Japan on 
rearmament as a part of a reverse course of the Occupation policy. The growing concern 
over the spread Communism with the outbreak of the Korean War and the establishment of 
Communist China urged the US to promote the rearmament of Japan. However, Prime 
Minister Shigeru Yoshida refused drastic rearmament for several reasons, most notably, the 
restraint of the Constitution. According to Otake (2005: 33), Yoshida refused drastic 
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rearmament for four reasons as follows; the rearmament would considerably delay Japan’s 
economic recovery, cause alarm among neighboring countries and the opposition parties and 
lead to widespread anti-militarism among Japanese people, as well as risk the revival of 
militarism. 
     The rearmament issue caused a heated debate because it was not just a defense 
problem, but touched on the fundamental issues of the domestic regime and national identity, 
such as choosing the revival of the emperor system and militarism or the preservation of a 
liberal democratic system (Sakamoto 1963: 123, Otake 2005: 3). In the discourse of both the 
Yoshida government and right-wing traditionalists, ‘rearmament’ was promoted as a symbol 
of the ‘restoration of Japan’s independence’. On the other hand, the progressive groups 
severely criticized the gradual rearmament policy, being vigilant against the revival of 
militarism and maintaining that the SDF was unconstitutional.  
     What is interesting is that both the progressives and the traditionalists regarded the 
SDF as unconstitutional and attacked the ‘limited and gradual’ rearmament policy of the 
Yoshida government as evidence of subordination to the US, only for diametrically opposite 
reasons. While the progressives espoused the ‘unarmed neutrality’ policy, the leaders of the 
traditionalists claimed that the constitution should be revised to have its own full-fledged 
army to protect the country, emphasizing autonomy from the US and patriotism. Whereas 
only the Yoshida government presumed the SDF to be constitutional, however, the 
progressives shared its pro-Constitution stance for their own reasons. The progressives had 
an ideal of pacifism based on the constitution, while Yoshida used it as a pretext to avoid US 
pressure for burden sharing. In this way, Yoshida’s policy was attacked by both the 
progressives and right-wing traditionalists (Kosaka 1969-d: 123). The conservatives tended 
to use this policy as an internal Cold War strategy, that is, anti-communism and 
anti-progressivism. Therefore, it was not surprising that the progressives regarded 
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rearmament policy as a part of the reverse course to restore prewar social order and a crisis of 
postwar ‘democracy’. In this way, as Sakamoto (1963: 123-4) noticed through the reverse 
course especially on the issue of rearmament, the polarization of Japanese society, that is the 
contest of Japanese nationalist discourse, was reproduced and intensified.  
     Furthermore, the anti-Security treaty demonstration of 1960 became a watershed for 
the development of postwar nationalism in Japan. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, a 
grandfather of Abe, set out to revise the Japan-US security Treaty, motivated to revise the 
one-sided and unequal nature of the treaty as infringing on Japan’s independence as a 
sovereign state (Soeya 2005: 68). Kishi insisted on ‘autonomy’ from and ‘equality’ with the 
US as symbols of nationalism. However, the progressives, supported by intellectuals, mass 
media, and public opinion, clearly opposed the revision of the Security Treaty, arguing that it 
would strengthen Japan’s dependency on the US. Their opposition was directed not just to 
the revision of the Treaty itself, but against Kishi’s reactionary policy toward the ‘internal 
Cold War’ and his ‘authoritarian’ method to force the treaty through the Diet, which was 
regarded as a threat to democracy. In this circumstance, the slogans of the anti-Security 
Treaty movement were “to protect ‘peace’, ‘the Constitution’ and ‘democracy’” which were 
core values of progressive nationalism. However, the anti-Security Treaty movement could 
appeal not only to the progressives but also to a wider range of people and called for the 
‘restoration of Japan’s autonomy’. In this sense, it can be argued that the anti-Security Treaty 
movement of 1960 would exemplify the expression of progressive nationalism of postwar 
Japan. Although progressive nationalism failed to inhibit the revision of the Security Treaty 
and was toned down to some extent after the movement, it has enjoyed long-term popular 
support as under the guise of ‘postwar pacifism’. Its influence lasted to the extent that it was 
able to prevent the revision of the constitution in the Diet under the ‘1955 system’ during the 
Cold War Era (Fujiwara 2001: 158).  
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     In addition to the issues of the Constitution, rearmament, and the Japan-US Security 
Treaty, the question of how to recognize the nature of Japan’s Asia-Pacific War1 and its war 
responsibility drew a line between the progressives and the conservatives. The former denied 
the legitimacy of the ‘Greater East War’, regarding Japan’s war as ‘aggression’ and 
condemning prewar militarism. They accepted the judgment of the Tokyo War Tribunal 
where prewar military and political leaders were prosecuted as Class-A War Criminals for 
the crimes against peace and humanity and the ‘honorable’ Japanese imperial army was 
accused of committing atrocities in East Asian countries. This perception of the war was later 
labeled as the ‘historical view of the Tokyo War Tribunal’. On the other hand, the 
conservatives rejected this historical perception and glorified the war as a ‘fight for the 
emancipation of Asian people from Western imperialism’. They questioned the legitimacy of 
the Tokyo War Tribunal and often cited Judge Pal’s ‘Dissentient Judgment’, which had 
announced that all the Class-A War Criminals had been innocent, in order to deny the 
legitimacy of the tribunal itself. In this manner, whether they regarded the war as ‘aggression’ 
or not became the divisive point between the conservatives and the progressives as Yoshida 
(1995: 175) pointed out.  
     It is important to look at the historical understanding of Japanese people at the 
grass-roots level because politicians can use the dominant discourse in public opinion as 
political capital. As Seaton (2007:44) argues, the Occupation policy had a considerable 
impact in shaping the historical understanding of postwar Japanese people of the Asia Pacific 
War. As a result of the Tokyo War Tribunal, atrocities of the ‘holy’ imperial army were 
widely exposed and caused shock among the Japanese people, which led to a strong aversion 
to prewar militarism. Another important impact on the public view of history was the 
                                             
1 This research will call Japan’s war from 1930 to 1945 as the Asia Pacific War to keep its neutral 
stance because conventional names would have connotations. The ‘Pacific War’ tends to focus on 
the aspect of war against the US and the ‘Greater East Asia War’ might emphasize fight against 
China and war in East Asian countries. 
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emergence of the ‘leaders’ responsibility view’. Demonstrated in the Tribunal, the GHQ took 
a policy of distinguishing ‘political leaders’ from ‘ordinary people’ and emphasized the war 
responsibility of the former. This ‘leaders’ responsibility view’, was quickly accepted by 
Japanese people, who came to recognize that they had been victims of not only attack by 
foreign enemies, but also of their own leaders. The resentment for their prewar leaders 
waging war against the US with little opportunity to win then led to a distrust of prewar 
militarism and ultra-nationalists. The establishment of the ‘view of leader’s responsibility’ 
contributed to the smooth acceptance of ‘postwar democracy’ and shelved a problem of war 
cooperation and war responsibility of the Japanese people (Yoshida 1995: 55). In this way, a 
strong aversion against prewar militarism and war itself was embedded in postwar Japanese 
society, which firmly supported a national value of ‘peace’.  
     Therefore, postwar Japan could not build a nation-wide consensus on the interpretation 
of war, because this progressive-leaning historical understanding among the public made a 
stark contrast with the ‘conservative’ historical view, which was dominant in the ruling LDP. 
Japan's conservative leaders tended to emphasize the defensive motives and to neglect the 
wartime atrocities of Japan’s imperial army in the narrative of the Asia Pacific War and 
complained about the limitations of the Tokyo War Tribunal. In addition, the fact that a large 
number of ruling prewar elites, who held the revisionist historical view, were brought back 
by the red purge and joined the LDP strengthening this propensity.  
     As a result of the mixture of the enhanced victim mentality of Japan’s people, 
limitations of the Occupation policy on the history issue and tendency of conservative 
domestic narratives, a sort of ‘double-standard’ on war responsibility was formed in the mid 
1950s. Yoshida (1995: 82, 1997: 172) explains that the double-standard is a way to separate 
how to deal with the war responsibility issue between domestic explanation and external 
posture; ‘while externally Japan acknowledges minimum war responsibility by accepting 
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judgments of the Tokyo War Tribunal in article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty’, 
however, ‘the Japanese government would have often denied the de facto war responsibility 
or shelved the issue’ (Yoshida 1995: 82). In so doing, it became a convention that 
conservative politicians, who were in governmental positions and had a revisionist historical 
view, tended to hesitate to categorize Japan’s wartime action as a definite ‘aggression’ in 
domestic discourse and to argue that ‘it should be left to the judgment to future historians’ 
like Prime Minister Abe. Such an attitude often invited a situation in which some 
‘conservative’ politicians, more precisely they were ‘revisionists’, made a ‘gaffe’ on the 
history issue like denying war responsibility while Japanese Prime Ministers expressed deep 
remorse on wartime behavior. As a result, this ‘double-standard’ on history would make it 
difficult for Japan to achieve reconciliation with neighboring countries because it would give 
the impression that Japan has not come to terms with its past aggression in Asia. In this way, 
domestic disagreement on the historical view shaped the ‘double-standard’ of war 
interpretation, which made Japan’s history issue more complex and prolonged. 
     In this way, immediately after its defeat in WWⅡ, the domestic politics of postwar 
Japan was split between the progressive camp and the conservative camp, which was called 
the ‘1955 system’. The two groups competed to realize their vision of how Japan should be 
constructed, causing disagreements on a number of issues concerning Japan’s national 
identity such as the legitimacy of the Constitution and historical perception. In this sense, 
there can be found a divided nationalism: ‘progressive’ or ‘pro-Constitution’ nationalism, 
which espoused ‘peace’, ‘democracy’ and ‘autonomy from the US’ and which was based on 
the ‘historical view of the Tokyo War Tribunal’ on the one hand, and ‘right-wing 
traditionalist’ or ‘revisionist’ nationalism which embraced the prewar value system centering 
on the Emperor and rejected the ‘historical view of the Tokyo War Tribunal’. In this 
situation, the government failed to unify this divided nationalism but seemed to consolidate 
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the division. In addition, while the progressive historical view was widespread among the 
public, the ‘double-standard’ on war responsibility emerged in political circles. As a result, 
the ideational structure of the ‘1955 system’ is one in which the progressives and the 
conservatives fight against each other, both calling themselves ‘guardian of the nation’ and 
defining the other as the ‘enemy of the nation’. This is a visible tension in Abe’s discourse, 
as will be discussed in later chapters. Furthermore, it can be argued that the emphasis on 
‘peace’ came to be regarded as an important source of political capital because it became a 
national value in the public aversion to war. 
       
2.2 The sub-division among the conservatives: mainstream versus anti-mainstream 
 
    Postwar Japanese politics is often described as a simple confrontation between the 
progressives and the conservatives represented as the ‘1955 system’. However, the 
conservative camp was far from monolithic; it was divided into mainstream conservatives 
（hoshu-honryu保守本流）and anti- or minor-mainstream conservatives (hoshu-boryu保守
傍流)’. The former can roughly be regarded as the ‘Yoshida School’ in that the Kochi-kai 
(宏池会) was launched by Yoshida’s protégé, Hayato Ikeda, and the Keisei-kai (経世会) 
was originally established by Yoshida’s protégé, Eisaku Sato, followed by Kakuei Tanaka. 
On the other hand, the latter was descended from Ichiro Hatoyama, political rival of 
Yoshida2. Mainstream conservatives tended to be right of center while minor-mainstreams 
were generally consisted of the right-wing traditionalists. As there was political rivalry and a 
number of disagreements between them, it developed a trilateral relationship among the 
progressives, the Yoshida School, and the traditionalist. This section focuses on the 
                                             
2 In this sense, the rivalry between mainstream and anti-mainstream conservative reflected the 
division before the unification of conservative camp (hoshu-godo 保守合同) into the LDP. 
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confrontation among conservatives because it constitutes important background factor of 
foreign policy making under Koizumi and Abe. 
 
2.2.1 The Division between the Yoshida Line and anti-mainstream on the security issue    
 
     Among a number of disagreements, rearmament was one of the major topics, which 
the Yoshida School and anti-mainstream conservatives contested. First, the course of foreign 
policy, which aimed to attain early independence and achieve economic recovery, conducted 
by Prime Minister Yoshida was called the ‘Yoshida line’. It was based on close cooperation 
with the US though Yoshida skillfully avoided full-fledged rearmament for the US alliance 
by using the Constitution as a pretext. Although the presumption of the Yoshida line had 
collapsed due to Japan’s independence and economic recovery, it was re-established as a 
grand design of postwar Japanese foreign policy. Against this stance on rearmament, the 
traditionalists attacked the ‘limited and gradual’ rearmament policy of the Yoshida 
government and claimed that the constitution should be revised to allow a full-fledged army 
to protect the country, emphasizing autonomy from the US and patriotism. In this way, 
Yoshida’s policy was attacked by both the progressives and the right-wing traditionalists 
(Kosaka 1969-d: 123). 
     In this context, Nobusuke Kishi came into office and attempted to amend the ‘Yoshida 
line’ in foreign policy. Kishi set out to revise the Japan-US security Treaty, motivated by the 
desire of traditional nationalists to gain the autonomy of Japan because traditionalists often 
problematized the one-sided and unequal nature of the Treaty as infringing Japan’s 
independence as a traditional sovereign state (Soeya 2005: 68). For instance, the Treaty 
permitted the US the right to intervene in domestic affairs to maintain peace and stability. 
Thus, the revision of the Treaty was an answer from the traditionalists to the question of how 
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Japan could enhance its prestige in international society (Kosaka 1969-d: 179). Furthermore, 
being unable to ignore the anti-US feeling expressed by both the traditionalists and the 
progressives, Kishi insisted on ‘autonomy’ from and ‘equality’ with the US as symbols of 
nationalism.  
     The anti-Security Treaty demonstration of 1960 had some impact on right-wing 
traditionalists. Although Kishi could revise the Treaty, it meant the limitation of the request 
to achieve absolute ‘autonomy’ beyond the framework of the Japan-US alliance. They thus 
began to be incorporated into the mainstream Yoshida group and to express their desire for 
‘autonomy’ within the framework of cooperation with the US (Soeya 2005: 81). This also 
had an impact on the centrist Yoshida School in the government. Hayato Ikeda, who 
replaced Kishi as Prime Minister, demonstrated a ‘tolerant’ and ‘low posture’ in order to 
prevent intensified polarization from causing political disturbance like the anti-security treaty 
demonstration of 1960. Instead of claiming ‘autonomy’ as a symbol of nationalism like his 
predecessors, he set out an economic-first policy attempting to reduce the national goal to 
‘economic growth’. His attempt turned out to be a success. From then on, Japan 
single-mindedly pursued a policy focused on its economic growth and achieved material 
prosperity as an economic ‘major power’ in the 1970s. 
     In this process, the Yoshida line was redefined as a grand design of Japan’s foreign 
policy deliberately based both on the Constitution and the Japan-US Security Treaty. These 
two institutions were fundamentally conflicting because while the Constitution was a part of 
the postwar US strategy before the Cold War3, the latter was genuinely a product of the Cold 
War. Yoshida had no choice but to accept these two due to the relationship with the US, so 
they became the twin pillars of the Yoshida line. Iokibe (2005: 142-143) argued that 
                                             
3 According to Koseki (2002), however, it was a pragmatic politico-military strategy of the US for 
MacArthur because it would enable evasion of the prosecution of the Emperor’s war 
responsibility and Okinawa base at the same time with Japan’s come back to international 
society. In this sense, Article 9 was a product of postwar strategy of the US in Asia-Pacific region. 
 62 
accepting the necessity of both the constitution and the Japan-US Security Treaty became a 
national consensus among the Japanese people in the 1960s; Japan would not participate in 
international power politics with military means. At the same time it would not take an 
unarmed neutrality policy but rather would rely on cooperation with the US.  
     As a result, the Yoshida line just fixed the political divisions among the progressives, 
the mainstream conservatives and anti-mainstream conservatives. The ‘dual identity’ of 
postwar Japan was thus maintained by its foreign policy as Soeya (2005) argues. The 
progressives attempted to embody a ‘peace state’ Japan based on the Constitution, 
characterized by resistance to all-out armament and the rejection of nuclear weapons (Pyle 
1997: 46). On the other hand, traditional right-wing revisionists aimed to enlarge Japan’s 
autonomy as a ‘major power’, promoted the enhancement of SDF capabilities, and even the 
possession of nuclear weapons. The Yoshida line played a role of satisfying a part of the 
desires of both nationalisms and preventing them from transgressing the framework of the 
Japan-US security cooperation. Pyle (1997: 44) makes a similar point though he treats 
right-wing as only ‘nationalists’; by describing how the Yoshida School ‘navigated skillfully 
between the contending views of the progressives and the political nationalists, often 
coordinating elements of their agendas to maintain the consensus of the Japanese people’. It 
is more accurate to say that progressive nationalism and traditionalist nationalism began to 
coexist within the framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty in the Yoshida line, all the 
time maintaining their profound disagreements. 
 
2.2.2 The Division between the Yoshida Line and the anti-mainstream on the history issue 
until the 1980s 
 
     Another major point of conflict in addition to the security issue was the history issue, 
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or more precisely, how to deal with Japan’s war responsibility in international relations with 
neighboring countries. This problem was not treated as a domestic issue any more because it 
was closely associated with Japan’s diplomacy in East Asia. Put simply, mainstream 
conservatives came to recognize that the history issue had become a delicate diplomatic 
problem, and began to take a strategy of ‘historic reconciliation’, which anti-mainstream 
revisionists harshly resisted.  
     Hatano (2004: 331) argues that the issue of war interpretation and the responsibilities 
of Japan came to be a diplomatic problem with South Korea and China due to the 1982 
textbook crisis. This was triggered when several newspapers reported that the Ministry of 
Education had instructed the editors of history textbooks to change passages that originally 
referred to Japan’s ‘aggression’ (shinryaku) to China to use the term ‘advance into’ 
(shinshutsu) China and to remove an article on the Nanjing Massacre. Although this later 
turned out to be misinformation, China and South Korea severely criticized the Japanese 
screening of textbooks. Against these protests, the right-wing traditionalist politicians in the 
LDP who were deeply associated with the Ministry of Education, such as Seisuke Okuno, 
claimed that if the government ordered a revision of textbooks, it would mean that Japan had 
yielded to foreign pressure. However, there were also counter arguments from the 
progressive side, which contended that textbooks should deal with the perception of victims 
of the Asia Pacific War.  
     As a result, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki determined to settle the debate by 
expressing the public comments of Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kiichi Miyazawa, that ‘the 
Japanese government is keenly aware that our country’s act caused great hardship and 
extensive harm to Asian nations, including Korea and China (Miyazawa: 1982)’. The 
government also decided to add the ‘neighboring country clause’ to the screening system, 
which stipulated that descriptions of modern historical facts in textbooks should take into 
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consideration the sentiments of neighboring countries. This ‘neighboring country clause’ 
came to be used to express the official stance of the Japanese government on the history 
issue down to the present. 
     The 1980s witnessed another internationalized history issue, the prime ministerial visit 
to the Yasukuni Shrine. Prime Minister Nakasone’s worship at Yasukuni in 1985 caused a 
diplomatic crisis because of the fact that it enshrines Class-A War Criminals of the Asia 
Pacific War and the date, August 15th, is the anniversary day of the end of the War in Japan. 
China and South Korea thus problematized Japan’s war interpretation because they 
considered that Nakasone’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on that day could imply that he 
praised War Criminals who invaded China and Korea. In response, Nakasone relinquished 
his worship at the Yasukuni Shrine the year after out of consideration to neighboring 
countries4. Furthermore, Chief Cabinet Secretary, Gotoda issued an official comment that 
Japan ‘should emphasize international relations and adequately take the national sentiment of 
neighboring countries into consideration (Gotoda 1986)’.  
     Although Nakasone managed to handle the situation at this time, he faced the second 
textbook crisis immediately after the Yasukuni Shrine issue receded. The publication of the 
history textbook, ‘New Edition: Japanese History’ which explicitly played down Japan’s war 
responsibility triggered the controversy. Nakasone tried to bring the situation under control 
and to respond to protests from China and Korea. However, the political ‘gaffes’ of a cabinet 
member intensified the crisis. Masayuki Fujio, the Minister of Education, remarked at the 
briefing that compared to other aggressions like the Opium Wars, ‘I doubt if the Nanjing 
Massacre exemplifies an atrocity of Japan’s invasion because the truth of the event has not 
been revealed.’ Fujio also criticized the Tokyo Tribunal as a revenge of Western imperialism 
                                             
4 Nakasone explained that criticism to Nakasone would have been used to attack Hu Yaobang for 
his drastic liberation and pro-Japan posture (Yokoyama 1994: 62-81). 
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in a journal by saying that the Japan-Korea annexation was agreed upon as a bilateral and 
legal consensus in both form and substance. Korea should thus bear some responsibility for 
the annexation because there had been a possibility for China and Russia to intervene in the 
Korean peninsula (Fujio 1986: 125). These remarks neatly summarize a revisionist view of 
the right-wing traditionalists. Prime Minister Nakasone asked Fujio to take back his remark, 
but he refused. As a result, Fujio was displaced from Nakasone’s cabinet. Otake (1993: 393) 
points out that behind Fujio’s statements, there were strong frustrations among the right-wing 
politicians in the LDP against Nakasone’s policy shift such as unhappiness over the 
relinquishment of the Yasukuni worship. 
     As the history issue became internationalized in the 1980s, the double standard on war 
interpretation came to be questioned. As the Japanese government was urged to officially 
acknowledge that the war had been an ‘aggression’ in domestic narratives out of 
consideration to the national sentiment of neighboring countries, the discord with the 
revisionist group within the conservative camp intensified. In fact, the narratives of 
high-ranking government officials shifted to a progressive leaning in that they came to 
acknowledge Japan’s wartime aggression. For instance, Education Minister Heiji Ogawa’s 
remark that the war with China was Japan’s aggression marked the first time that a cabinet 
minister called Japan’s wartime behavior ‘aggression’ in the education committee of the Diet
(National Diet, Records of Proceedings: 1982)5. In 1982, when asked about the character of 
the Asia-Pacific War, Prime Minster Nakasone merely stated that ‘I believe that the verdict 
of history should be made by a large number of scholars and historians. But with respect to 
what Japan did, historians all over the world might agree that it was an aggressive war’. 
However, in 1986, on the second textbook crisis, he clearly stated that ‘the fact of aggression 
cannot be denied (NDRP: 1985)’ and that ‘to have enshrined Class-A War Criminal together 
                                             
5 This research hereafter abbreviates National Diet, Records of Proceedings as NDRP. 
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at Yasukuni Shrine would antagonize other nations’ (Mainichi Shimbun: 1986). Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, Masaharu Gotoda, also argued that the Japanese government had 
accepted the judgments of the Far East Military Trial and admitted that the Fifteen years war 
(1930-1945) had been Japan’s aggression (NDRP: 1986). In short, conservative politicians in 
the government who had shelved or had not admitted to the issue of their war interpretation 
in domestic discourse before, changed their domestic narratives because they understood that 
these could cause a diplomatic crisis with neighboring countries. They had come to 
recognize that the double standard of the Japanese government on the history issue might 
have a corrosive impact on regional affairs. 
     It can be argued that through a series of events in the 1980s, a certain pattern, which 
has endured in the 1990s and the 2000s, was formed on how the history issue could cause a 
diplomatic crisis with East Asian countries. Firstly, Japan’s domestic narratives based on the 
double standard caused severe protests from other countries via reports of the Japanese mass 
media. Secondly, right-wing traditionalists became more outspoken as a reaction against not 
only protests from foreign countries but also against the progressive-leaning policy of their 
governments. Otake (1993: 397) thus concludes that the rise of right wing nationalism within 
the LDP politicians in the 1980s can be interpreted as a resistance to the policy shift of the 
government over the history issue. These patterns would reflect the fact that the mainstream 
conservatives failed to accept the orthodox historical view, which would be fundamental to 
constructing a unified national identity and that the division between mainstream and 
anti-mainstream within the conservative camp was reproduced through the history issue. 
 
2.2.3 The Division between the Yoshida Line and the anti-mainstream on the history issue in 
the 1990s 
2.2.3.1 The strategy of historic reconciliation 
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     The confrontation between the mainstream conservatives and right-wing traditionalists 
on the history issue grew intense in the 1990s because the former launched the ‘strategy of 
historic reconciliation’ and the latter concentrated their effort on hampering this project. 
While the efforts of the revisionists in the 1990s, in which Abe emerged as a young leader of 
the new generation of the anti-mainstream camp, are often regarded as the rise of 
‘nationalism’, this overlooks the fact that it was actually a reaction against the ‘strategy of 
historic reconciliation’ of the Japanese government. In this way, it should be clear that Abe 
and his supporters antagonized mainstream conservatives over the history view and 
constructed their rivals as the ‘enemy within’. What is more, because of the divided historical 
view, both reconciliation and confrontation towards neighboring countries over the history 
issue came to be used as political capital by political leaders. This is why politicians have to 
try to utilize foreign policy towards East Asian countries to boost their domestic credibility 
and defeat their rivals. 
      After the Cold War, Japan faced structural changes in its international relations and 
was urged to respond to an uncertain environment in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to 
survive and to expand its political role in the region, Japanese leaders became vividly aware 
that Japan’s coming to terms with its past was inevitable to regain trust from neighboring 
countries and to build amicable relationships with them. In addition, as Lind (2011: 309) 
argues, distrust among neighboring countries against Japan’s perceived failure to admit its 
past violence during the war obstructs Japan’s ability to contribute to international 
peacekeeping missions. In this context, a private advisory council of Prime Minister Kiichi 
Miyazawa, the ‘Commission on Japan’s goal in the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century’ 
released its report in 1992. This report clearly stated that ‘Japan has to face various issues 
derived from an unhappy period of time with many countries in the region and to think of the 
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future of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region (Commission on Japan’s goal in the Asia-Pacific 
Region in the 21st Century: 1992). In other words, this statement recognized that Japan’s 
history issue should be resolved to build future-oriented relationships with Asian countries. It 
also argued that the Japanese government should deal with the issue of compensation ‘with 
understanding of the mental suffering of the victims in the Asia-Pacific region’ beyond the 
legal form of the settlement. Hatano (2004: 345) points out that behind this report is the idea 
that Japan could not expand its diplomatic horizon without sincerely responding to the war 
responsibility and compensation issues that had become established inside and outside the 
government.  
     In line with this idea, the ‘strategy of historic reconciliation’ was gradually formulated 
and initiated by mainstream conservatives. In this context, high-ranking government officials 
were more likely to demonstrate ‘deep reflection’ and ‘apology’ on Japan’s past aggression 
in foreign affairs. This strategy can be defined as an attempt to reconcile with neighboring 
countries on the history issue and to complete the war settlement to regain trust from them, 
which would enable Japan to take leadership in the region and to expand its role as a 
‘responsible and respectable’ member of international society. In this sense, this strategy 
expressed a desire to reconstruct Japan’s identity from that of ‘political dwarf’ to become a 
‘major power’ commensurate with its economic power without fuss over the history issue 
with neighboring countries. Therefore, a new form of nationalism emerged in post-Cold War 
Japan. 
      Following this reconciliation strategy, the Chief Cabinet Secretary under the 
Miyazawa administration, Yohei Kono released the ‘Kono Statement’ in 1993. This was 
regarded as a watershed for how Japan took its wartime responsibility, because Kono clearly 
admitted the Japanese imperial army’s seizing of the ‘comfort women’ by force and 
officially made an apology to them (Kono: 1993). The long-standing effect of the Kono 
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Statement would be that it came to serve as a basis for the descriptions on the ‘comfort 
women’ in history textbooks after 1996. Immediately after that, Prime Minister Morihiro 
Hosokawa, who broke the LDP-rule of 38 years in Japanese politics, noted that ‘I believe 
that it was a war of aggression, which was wrong’ at a news conference (Asahi Shimbun: 
1993). In addition, the Prime Minister stated in his first policy speech that 
 
We would like to take this opportunity to clearly express our reflection to the past and 
a new determination to the world. Firstly, we would like to express our deep remorse 
and apology for the fact that invasion and colonial rule by our nation in the past 
brought to bear great sufferings and sorrow upon many people (NDRP: 1993).  
 
The subsequent Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata also expressed deep remorse and apology for 
victims, admitting Japan’s aggression just after his inauguration (NDRP: 1994).  
 
     Followed by the short-lived Hata administration, Tomiichi Murayama, Prime Minister 
of the LDP-SDP coalition government, put forth efforts toward a no-war resolution in the 
parliament on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Asia-pacific War. The 
coalition government launched the ‘Project Team for a no-war resolution on the’ fifty years 
anniversary of the end of the war’ and tried to build a consensus within the government. At 
first, the ruling SDP insisted that the resolution should articulate Japan’s reflection on its 
aggression and colonial rule, apologies to neighboring countries, and pledge not to fight a 
war again. However, facing fierce opposition from the right-wing lobby groups and the 
anti-mainstream LDP politicians, the government was urged to make a concession on the 
issue of compensation so as to pass the resolution.  
     As a result, the ‘Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of 
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Lessons Learned from History’ was approved on 9 June 1995. It firstly expressed ‘sincere 
condolences to those who fell in wars’, which responded to the request of the LDP, and 
stipulated reflection on ‘its colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the 
world, and recognizing that Japan committed those acts in the past’, and demonstrated deep 
remorse for ‘inflicting pain and suffering upon the peoples of Asian countries’. In order to 
alleviate the strong resistance from right-wing revisionists in the LDP, however, the 
resolution lacked any clear focus on the acknowledgement of ‘aggression’ and ‘apology’ 
compared with the original plan. For this reason, Prime Minister Murayama released the 
‘Statement on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the War’s End’ on 15 August 1995, 
which articulated his idea more clearly: 
 
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national 
policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful 
crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and 
suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the 
hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these 
irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse 
and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound 
mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history (Murayama: 1995).  
 
Although the LDP government replaced the ruling coalition, the mainstream conservatives in 
the LDP succeeded with their strategy of historic reconciliation again, considering that all of 
the subsequent Prime Ministers clarified that they would follow the so-called ‘Murayama 
Statement’. For instance, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto made clear that he would take 
on the ‘Murayama Statement’ and offered ‘apology from the bottom of the heart’ to people 
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of the Asian countries and expressed ‘deep remorse’ for ‘its aggression and colonial rule 
(Hashimoto 1997-a)’. Yasuo Fukuda, the Chief Cabinet Secretary under the Mori and 
Koizumi administrations, explained that the ‘Murayama Statement’ remained a basic 
understanding of the Japanese government on history in the textbook row in 2002 (Fukuda: 
2001). Considering Abe, who was one of the staunch revisionists in the LDP, also took on 
the ‘Murayama Statement’ (NDRP: 2006-l), the historical perception of ‘Japan’s aggression’ 
in the ‘Murayama Statement’ was institutionalized as an official view of the Japanese 
government.   
     Although these efforts of governments to focus on a satisfactory interpretation of 
‘Japan’s aggression’ and official apology to neighboring countries aimed at achieving 
closure on the history issue as a part of the strategy of historic reconciliation, efforts were 
also made in the area of foreign policy. When President Kim Dae Jung visited Tokyo in 
1998 and had a meeting with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, the two leaders agreed to work 
on a draft declaration that would stipulate Japan’s formal apology. Behind this, there was a 
political intention that when South Korea accepted Japan’s apology, it would lead to an 
official statement of the closure of the history issue between Japan and South Korea. Despite 
strong objections from the right-wing traditionalists in the Diet, the ‘Japan-Republic of 
Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the 
Twenty-first Century’ was signed in October 1998, in which the Japanese government 
offered an ‘apology’ for its ‘past’ in the bilateral relationship for the first time (Obuchi: 
1998-a). It stated:    
 
Looking back on the relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea during this 
century, Prime Minister Obuchi regarded in a spirit of humility the fact of history that 
Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous damage and suffering to 
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the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed his deep 
remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact. President Kim accepted with sincerity this 
statement of Prime Minister Obuchi's recognition of history and expressed his 
appreciation for it. He also expressed his view that the present calls upon both 
countries to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented 
relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly 
cooperation. 
 
This was a critical moment for the settlement of the history issue with South Korea and the 
strategy of historic reconciliation. The success of this summit meeting and the Joint 
Declaration was interpreted as a ‘real’ normalization of the bilateral relationship, which had 
not been achieved at normalization in 1965 (Green 2003: 136).  
     In contrast, the bilateral summit with President Jiang Zemin, which also aimed at the 
settlement of the history issue, turned out to be a failure. Unlike the Joint Declaration 
between Japan and the ROK, the ‘Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership 
of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development (Obuchi: 1998-b)’ did not 
articulate Japan’s ‘apology’ in writing while the Chinese side strongly demanded that it 
should do so. This was partly because both leaders were reluctant to make concessions on 
this point. In addition to Jiang’s rigid insistence on the history issue, Foreign Minister 
Masahiko Komura at that time explained that it was because President Jiang did not promise 
that China would not pick on Japan’s aggression/apology issue any more if Japan stipulated 
an ‘apology’ in the Joint Declaration unlike President Kim (Funabashi 2011: 58). Although 
the Obuchi administration failed to settle the history issue with China, it was clear that 
Obuchi attempted to finish the diplomatic dispute on the history issue with neighboring 
countries, especially China and South Korea, along with the strategy of historic 
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reconciliation.  
     In addition to this initiative, Prime Minister Obuchi also established the Commission 
on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century in October 1999 appointing sixteen leading intellectuals 
from diverse fields of expertise as its members. The commission aimed to discuss the 
‘desirable future direction of Japan to which the next generation of Japanese can aspire in the 
new century’ and submitted its final report ‘The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment 
and Better Governance in the New Millennium (Japan's Goals in the 21st Century: 1999)’. 
Motivated by a ‘sense of urgency’ and fear that ‘as things stand Japan is heading for decline’ 
because of the ‘harsh environment’ inside and outside Japan, the Commission tried to 
delineate Japan’s long-term national objectives and its policy principles. Among them, one 
of the pillars of foreign policy orientation was ‘Neighborly relations (rinko): Cooperation 
with Asian neighbors.’ Assuming that it was a ‘gross and lamentable folly of early modern 
Japanese history’ that ‘Japan forced its self-serving goals and order on surrounding countries, 
pursued aggrandizement of the Japanese empire at huge cost to other countries, and brought 
war and calamity to the Asia-Pacific region’. In this context, it argued that although to build 
constructive relations with neighboring countries, ‘with which Japan has a long history of 
exchange and a more recent history of colonial rule and invasion’, ‘will be a valuable 
spiritual and tangible foundation for the Japanese people in the twenty-first century’, and that 
historically ‘Japan has been unable to build mature, mutually beneficial relations with its 
neighbors’. Therefore, the improvement of neighborly relations (rinko) was regarded as a 
major challenge in the new century.  
     In this way, it would be clear that the mainstream conservatives in power recognized 
the necessity to settle the history issue with neighboring countries based on the ‘deep 
remorse for past aggression’ in order to build trust from Asian countries. This was because it 
was essential for Japan to cultivate a new path for the contribution to regional peace, to take a 
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leadership in the region, and to expand Japan’s international role. These efforts, that is, the 
strategy of historic reconciliation, were not interrupted during the non-LDP coalition regime, 
and rather promoted by Hosokawa’s statement and the historic ‘Murayama Statement’. Even 
the subsequent LDP regime followed the ‘Murayama Statement’ and advanced the cause of 
the ‘apology for Japan’s aggression’ throughout the 1990s. This line of foreign policy was 
passed on to the mainstream conservative politicians in the 2000s, even though it might not 
have gone smoothly because of obstruction by the right-wing traditionalists. Due to the 
strategy of historic reconciliation, the division between mainstream conservatives and 
anti-mainstream conservatives was intensified and reproduced. 
 
2.2.3.2 The rise of ‘neo-revisionism’ 
 
     Apart from the effort to build the strategy of historical reconciliation by mainstream 
conservatives, the 1990s witnessed the intensified activities of the anti-mainstream 
conservatives. In 1993, the three Councils of Diet members on the Yasukuni Shrine were 
merged into the Committee on History and Screening, which consisted of 107 Diet members 
of the LDP from the both chambers. They published the ‘Review of the Greater East Asian 
war’ in 1995, arguing that it was an urgent task to revise the ‘anti-Japanese’ historical view 
and regain the ‘authentic’ understanding of history for the Japanese to restore national pride. 
On the occasion of the discussion on the Diet Resolution for no-war in 1995, 
anti-mainstream conservatives of the LDP opposed to the articulation of an ‘apology’, were 
backed by various right-wing lobby groups. They established the ‘Diet Member Committee 
on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of the War’ and claimed that the condolence and 
appreciation to war dead should be emphasized over the apology and that the Diet 
Resolution for the apology was unacceptable because it would lead to serious problems in 
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Japan’s future (Hatano 2004: 342-3)6. Those anti-mainstream politicians insisted that this 
resolution would be against the national interest because it offended the feelings of the 
bereaved families, while the coalition government argued that it would serve the national 
interest to consider public opinion in Asian countries (Hatano 2004: 344). Although they 
failed to pass the Resolution, the right-wing traditionalists were able to put the coalition 
government at bay and pull its teeth.  
     In addition, the 1990s saw a series of ‘gaffes’ of traditionalist politicians on the 
historical view, such as Minister of Justice Shigeto Nagano, who noted that the ‘Nanjing 
Massacre’ was nothing but a ‘fabrication’ (Mainichi Shimbun 1994: 1). The Minister for the 
Environment, Shin Sakurai, mentioned that Asian countries could achieve independence 
from the Western colonial rule thanks to Japan (Asahi Shimbun 1994: 3). Takami Eto, a 
senior legislator of the LDP, stated that Japan had done good things for the Korean people 
during colonial days (Asahi Shimbun 1995: 2). Shoichi Nakagawa, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan, remarked that the ‘comfort women’ issue was 
still open to question rather than a historical fact to put in children’s textbooks7. With regard 
to the Joint Declaration with China, a strong objection was raised from the revisionist group 
in the LDP that Japan should not apologize to China because the issue had been settled in the 
1972 Joint Statement and in the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty. In addition, the ‘Young 
Diet Members Committee to Consider the Future of Japan and History Education’ was 
launched in 1997 by young revisionist lawmakers of the LDP, initiated by Shoichi 
Nakagawa and Shinzo Abe. It published ‘The Disputed history Textbooks’, in which the 
revisionists clearly demanded a retraction of the ‘Kono Statement’. This Committee also 
collaborated closely with the Society for Writing a New Textbook on History in order to 
                                             
6 According to Hatano (2004: 342), 205 members of the LDP joined this committee.  
7 He retracted his remark and stated that he would follow the official government view on the 
same day.  
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break the ‘masochistic history view’ and opposed inclusion of any description of the 
‘comfort women’ in textbooks.  
     In this way, active movements of right-wing traditionalists were salient throughout the 
1990s and drew attention from home and abroad. At this point, there can be seen two 
features in these movements of revisionists. Firstly, there was a generational change in the 
camp of right-wing traditionalists. A majority of the young generation were hereditary 
politicians and motivated by frustration against the ‘postwar democracy’ inherited by their 
parent generation. Shinzo Abe or Shoichi Nakagawa would represent these ‘neo-revisionist’ 
politicians, who believed that their political mission was to renounce the Constitution and 
break the ‘postwar regime’. Sharing the ‘revisionist’ historical view with the traditionalists, 
they tended to be ‘hawkish’ on security policy and more prone to take a hard-line policy 
against China and North Korea. The most notable difference from the previous generation of 
revisionists was that they blindly promoted the enhancement of the Japan-US Alliance and 
strove to exploit the ties with the US to achieve their goals such as the revision of the 
Constitution or the expansion of military capability (Yamaguchi 2004: 53). Although their 
discourse on ‘the postwar regime’ and foreign policy will be examined in Chapter 5, it can be 
argued here that these ‘neo-revisionists’ took a pivotal role in constituting the division among 
conservatives within the LDP in the 2000s and had impacts on foreign policy making toward 
China and North Korea in the later administrations of Koizumi and Abe.  
     Second, it is important to point out that although the intensification in the activities of 
right-wing traditionalists and neo-revisionists is often interpreted as a sign of Japan’s drift to 
the right, it might be premature to conclude this because it was actually the reaction of the 
anti-mainstream camp against a series of official statements which acknowledged Japan’s 
‘aggression’ and reiterated an ‘apology’ as a part of the strategy of historic reconciliation 
initiated by the government and mainstream conservatives. In other words, revisionists might 
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not have gained momentum without the rise of the reconciliation policy. For instance, the 
Committee on History and Screening was launched based on the resentment towards the 
remark of Prime Minister Hosokawa, cited above8. Considering that a series of ‘gaffes’ on 
the history issue coincided with the debate on the Diet Resolution for the fiftieth anniversary 
of the end of the war, these remarks were aimed to counter what they called the ‘masochistic 
view of history’. The purpose of the ‘Young Diet Members Committee to Consider the 
Future of Japan and History Education’ was obvious: it demanded the retraction of the 
‘Kono Statement’. In short, the increased activity of right-wing traditionalists and revisionists 
in the 1990s would indicate not that the right-wing groups dominated Japan but that the 
confrontation between conservatives on the history issue became intensified. 
     As described above, the division lines between the progressives and the conservatives, 
between mainstream and anti-mainstream conservatives shaped Japan’s postwar politics. In 
particular, the confrontation among conservatives within the LDP was intensified over how 
to deal with the history issue with neighboring countries after the end of the Cold War. 
Although a major point of controversy was the different perspectives on the strategy of 
historic reconciliation, what should not be neglected was that it was an inextricable part of 
the power struggles in domestic politics. In other words, it is difficult to achieve a domestic 
consensus on the history issue not because of the divergent understandings of history, but 
because a certain perception of history tends to be bound up with a particular faction and 
utilized as a measure of their political maneuvering in domestic power struggles. In this 
sense, the history issue as well as foreign policy issues can be regarded as a bargaining chip 
in domestic politics. Therefore, as the view of history is associated with foreign policy 
toward China and North Korea and domestic power politics, the next section explores the 
                                             
8 Tadashi Itagaki, the president of the Committee clarified in the ‘Review of the Greater East 
Asian war’ stated that the committee was established to demand the government to retract 
Hosokawa’s remark (1995: 443).  
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power relationships within the conservative camp of the LDP. 
 
2.3 Factional politics within the LDP 
 
     Japan’s political system is often characterized by the fact that the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) had maintained its dominance in the Diet for thirty-eight years since its 
inception until 1993. Even after the LDP regained control over the government in 1996, it 
remained the ruling party until the change of administration in 2009. However, the LDP is 
often said to be a loose alliance of factions in which a great amount of party affairs are 
managed (Hashimoto, Iida and Kato 2002: 142). These factions are not ideologically divided 
but usually formed as an instrument by which power politics within the party are carried out 
(Hrebenar 2000: 112). Despite much criticism against factional politics within the LDP, 
however, factions have played an important role in Japanese politics in various ways. This 
section aims to explore the political struggles among factions within the LDP, which provide 
the context of settings of foreign policy making toward China and North Korea under the 
Koizumi administration and the Abe administration. 
     The structure of a faction is essentially hierarchical: it comprises one leader, several 
senior officials, and a number of minor members. The faction leader provides political funds 
and opportunity to acquire cabinet posts and executive posts in the party in return for the 
support of rank and file members such as giving their votes in the party president elections. 
In addition, the LDP factions have long played a crucial role in party operations in terms of 
two aspects: the resolution of personnel matters and the support for election campaigns 
(Stockwin 1982: 126, Hashimoto, Iida and Kato 2002: 144). Personnel affairs are used as a 
form of leverage by the factions in order to expand their power and to consolidate factional 
unity. Above all, the selection of the party president, who would usually become Prime 
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Minister, is the most important personnel matter. In the party presidential election, faction 
members are usually supposed to vote for their leader or whom their leader supports in return 
for assistance they have received. Thus, unity and the relative size of the faction would surely 
be important instruments for power struggle in the party. 
     In addition to the selection of the party president, the LDP factions deeply involve the 
appointment of cabinet ministers and the three key posts in the LDP such as the 
secretary-general. The three posts of the secretary-general, the chairman of the Policy Affairs 
Research Council (PARC), and the chairman of the Executive Council are conventionally 
treated as the most important posts in the LDP. These key posts are distributed based on an 
unwritten code in which the seniority system, power balance among factions and 
consensus-building are subtly mixed (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986: 67). In this principle, a 
dominant faction can occupy a majority of key posts, which would surely make other 
factions frustrated and could lead to serious disruption within the party. In order to avoid too 
much concentration of power on one particular faction, the secretary-general, has often been 
selected from another faction. This transformation might be of great importance because the 
secretary-general in the LDP plays an important role in party management, bargaining with 
faction leaders on the distribution of cabinet posts, party executive posts, and financial aid.  
     It is said that the origins of LDP factions might be traced back to when political leaders 
of the LDP formed eight intra-party groups to compete over the successor of Ichiro 
Hatoyama as the party president in 19569. Through a series of disruptions and absorptions, 
the number of factions gradually converged on five major factions in the 1970s. These 
factions were led by powerful leaders who were former or later Prime Ministers: Kakuei 
                                             
9 In the 1960s, there were the Ikeda faction (Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda), the Yoshida/Sato 
faction (Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida and Eisaku Sato), the Kishi faction (Prime minister 
Nobusuke Kishi), the Kono faction (Ichiro Kono), and the Miki/Matsumura faction (Prime 
Minister Takeo Miki and Kenzo Matsumura). 
 80 
Tanaka, Takeo Fukuda, Yasuhiro Nakasone, Masayoshi Ohira, and Takeo Miki10. In 2007 
when Abe was a Prime Minister, there were nine factions, which were offshoots of those five 
factions in the 1970s11. Today, there are seven major factions: the Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyu-kai
（清和政策研究会）12, the Kochi-kai（宏池会）13, the Heisei Kenkyu-kai14（平成研究会）
15, the Kinmirai Seiji Kenkyu-kai（近未来政治研究会）16, the Shisui-kai（志帥会）17, the 
Iko-kai（為公会）18and the Miki faction or the Bancho Seisaku Kenkyu-kai（番長政策研
究会）19. In terms of the number of factional members, the Seiwa-kai, the Keisei-kai and the 
Kochi-kai are often described as the ‘major three factions’. In addition, the latter two factions 
are sometimes called ‘mainstream conservatives （保守本流）’ in the LDP while the former, 
the Seiwa-kai, is labeled as ‘minor-mainstream conservatives（保守傍流） ’ or 
‘anti-mainstream’. In general, Shigeru Yoshida and Kakuei Tanaka, who emphasized 
Japan’s economic recovery and growth instead of remilitarization and comparatively stressed 
the importance of ties with Mainland China, represents ‘mainstream conservative’ politicians. 
On the other hand, Nobusuke Kishi and Takeo Fukuda, who insisted the necessity of 
                                             
10 When a leader of faction is replaced, the name of faction is usually altered to the new leader’s 
name. For example, when Abe inherited the faction from Fukuda, the name of faction shifted 
from the Fukuda faction to the Abe faction. However, some factions have unaltered names other 
than leader’s name; the Keisei-kai (経世会) and the Seiwa-kai (清和会) are typical example. The 
Keisei-kai refers to the generic name of faction founded by Sato and inherited by Tanaka, 
Takeshita, Obuchi, Watanuki, Hashimoto, and Tsushima in order. Likewise, the Seiwa-kai refers 
to the generic name of the faction derived for the Kishi group and established by Fukuda , then 
succeeded by Abe, Mitsuzuka, Mori, Koizumi, and Machimura.    
11 There are the Machimura faction (Seiwa-kai), the Tsushima faction (Keisei-kai), the Koga 
faction, the Yamazaki faction, the Ibuki faction, the Komura faction, the Tanigaki faction, the 
Nikai Group, and the Aso faction.  
12 Thich is the Machimura faction and its progenitor was Nobusuke Kishi. 
13 Thich is the Koga faction and is originated from Hayato Ikeda. 
14 The Keisei-kai（経世会）changed its name to the Heisei-Kenkyu-kai（平成研究会） after Prime 
Minister Hashimoto’s resignation in 1996. Yet, as a large number of books and researches adopt 
the name of ‘Keisei-kai’, and otherwise tend to use various names suck as ‘former Tanaka faction’, 
‘former Takeshita faction’, or ‘former Obuchi faction’, this paper standardizes the name to the 
‘Keisei-kai’. 
15 This is now the Nukaga faction and was former Tanaka faction. 
16 This is the Yamasaki faction and its originator was Ichiro Kono. 
17 This is the Ibuki faction and is composed of three groups from several factions. 
18 This is the Aso faction and was separated from the Kochi-kai. 
19 This is the Komura faction and was originally formed by Takeo Miki. 
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constitutional reform and placed significance on the relationship with Taiwan, represented 
the Seiwa-kai. Both Koizumi and Abe belonged to the Seiwa-kai faction20. 
     Until the mid-1970s, the factional political structure can be described as competition 
between ‘mainstream and anti-mainstream’, in which the mainstream faction tended to 
dominate the cabinet and party official posts (Curtis 1999: 82). Anti-mainstream factions 
sought to take an opportunity to replace the cabinet with their own members. The Setwa-kai 
(the Fukuda faction at that time) often played an anti-mainstream role while it also 
sometimes cooperated with mainstream factions to stabilize the dominance of the LDP 
(Hrebenar 2000: 109). Prime Ministers had relatively strong leadership over the government 
and controlled the party by appointing a member of their own faction or a close associate to 
the post of secretary-general for the effective control over the party (Shinoda 2000: 10). This 
concentration of power on the one faction, however, tended to intensify inter-factional 
conflict because of the discontent of non-mainstream factions over unequal treatment in 
terms of support for election campaign and the distribution of political funds. 
     After the mid-1970s, the political structure in the party is often characterized by the 
seniority system, power balance among factions and consensus-building, all of which were 
the basic principles on the resolution of personnel matters (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986: 67, 
Curtis 1999: 83). Whereas the Keisei-kai tended to dominate the party as the largest faction 
in the LDP, it did not put forward its members as a candidate for the party president except 
Takeshita himself21. Instead, the Keisei-kai usually sent one of its faction members as the 
                                             
20 Krauss and Pekkanen (2011: 138) pointed out that at the time of the Abe administration the 
largest faction was the Mori-Machimura faction, part of the Seiwa-kai. 
21 One of the background factors might be involved in internal conditions of the 
Tanaka/Takeshita faction. To take an example, some powerful leaders who had been expected to 
become a candidate of the party president hence Prime Minister, such as Ichiro Ozawa and 
Shintaro Abe, had to give up their ambitions because of ill health. In addition, a number of 
powerful politicians who were potentially candidates of Prime Minister were reported that they 
had committed money scandals such as the Lockheed scandal, the Recruit scandal and the 
Sagawa Kyubin scandal. Therefore, the largest faction had to refrain from putting forward 
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secretary-general to seize real power over the party management22. As a result, the 
secretary-general from the Keisei-kai actually controlled party affairs and had a near-veto 
power over the policy-making process (Hrebenar 2000: 108). In this circumstance, it was 
only through obtaining support from the Keisei-kai, that LDP members who were not 
members of the largest faction were able to become the party president, hence Prime 
Minister. The establishment of administrations led by Nakasone, Ohira, Suzuki, Miyazawa 
and Kaifu would exemplify this situation (Curtis 1988: 82, 105, Curtis 1999: 86, Hrebenar 
2000: 107-8). At the same time, to lose support of the Keisei-kai would mean the end of the 
administration for those Prime Ministers like Kaifu and Miyazawa (Otsuka 1992). Therefore, 
the support of the Keisei-kai was thought to be a vital political resource in party politics 
during this period. 
     What was notable in the development of factional politics here is that historical 
problems and foreign policy issues could be utilized as political capital, and they sometimes 
played an important role in the power relationship among the political leaders. As touched on 
before, there was a dividing line on the view of history among the LDP lawmakers. In 
general, members of the Seiwa-kai shared the revisionist view, while the majority of the 
Kochi-kai members were prone to have a more progressive-leaning view of history. On the 
other hand, the Keisei-kai politicians were likely to use the ‘double-standard’ during the Cold 
War period and then, adopting ‘Japan’s aggression/ apology’ view, relied on the strategy of 
historic reconciliation. Therefore, opposition movements of the anti-mainstream against the 
strategy of historic reconciliation took the form of the campaign by the Seiwa-kai members 
to topple the government led by the Keisei-kai. Therefore, a policy to advocate the strategy 
                                             
‘tainted’ politicians of their factions as the party president (Otsuka 1992: 58). In addition, it 
became institutionalized from Miki administration that the LDP secretary-general was no longer 
selected from the president’s faction (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986: 67-72). 
22 The purpose of this transformation might be to avoid too much concentration of power on 
mainstream, which could cause serious disruption within the party (Sato and Matsuzaki 1986: 70, 
Hashimoto, Iida and Kato 2002: 142). 
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of historic reconciliation could be a source of political capital to appeal to mainstream 
conservatives and the progressives, while the rejection of this line could be a source of 
political capital to maneuver lawmakers of the Seiwa-kai faction and other revisionists. 
     Furthermore, the perception of history was closely related to foreign policy in East 
Asia, especially China. Wakamiya (1999: 125) argued that the China problem was a 
‘particularly contentious and serious bone of the contestation’ within the conservative camp. 
After independence in 1952, Japan was urged to abandon Mainland China and build ties with 
Taiwan due to the pressure from the US. However, as the international status of the People’s 
Republic of China overwhelmed Taiwan, and even the US sought a rapprochement with 
China, normalization of the relationship with China became an urgent task for Japan. In this 
circumstance, the China problem became a decisive factor in the succession race of Prime 
Minister Sato, and thereby in the presidential election of the LDP in 1972. At first, three of 
five candidates, Miki, Ohira and Nakasone, clarified their stance of promoting normalization, 
while the two candidates with the most potential to win, Kakuei Tanaka and Takeo Fukuda, 
did not articulate their stance. This was because Tanaka tended to concentrate on domestic 
politics rather than foreign affairs and Fukuda’s faction was composed of pro-Taiwan 
members. However, after Tanaka realized that the normalization policy would bring other 
candidates over to his side, he arranged to team up against Fukuda, promising that Tanaka 
would normalize the relationship with China. Therefore, it was to win the presidential 
election of the LDP for Tanaka that the policy of normalization with China was put forth23. 
Furthermore, it was actually the stance on the China issue that had a decisive impact on the 
result of the election (Hattori 2011: 50). Tanaka defeated Fukuda and won the presidential 
election of the LDP in 1972. 
                                             
23 Ogata (1992) and Hattori (2011) provided a detailed explanation on the process of how the 
China issue affected the presidential election of the LDP in 1972.  
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     Given these developments, the China issue has been treated as a source of political 
capital among the political actors. In this sense, the China issue was not only a foreign policy 
issue but also a ‘domestic political issue’. Prime Minster Kishi was the founder of the 
pro-Taiwan faction or the Taiwan lobby, who established a close relationship with Chiang 
Kai-Shek (Wakamiya 1999: 131). The pro-Taiwan lawmakers strongly resisted 
normalization of the Japan-China relationship, and some radical members of this group, such 
as Shintaro Ishihara, Ichiro Nakagawa24 and Michio Watanabe formed the ‘Seiran-kai’ and 
advocated out-and-out resistance to normalization. Although those pro-Taiwan politicians, 
the majority of whom were concentrated on the Fukuda faction, could not block 
normalization with China, they maintained a significant influence on the governmental 
decision, considering the consensus-based policy-making process of the LDP (Ogata 1992: 
182). The hawkish-Seirankai was harshly opposed to the bilateral airline negotiations, and 
according to Wakamiya (1999:137-8), ‘it was an open secret in the political community that 
Fukuda was pulling the strings’ because the Keisei-kai faction included a number of 
pro-Taiwan lawmakers and because ‘Fukuda undoubtedly wanted to make a nuisance of 
himself to the Tanaka cabinet over the controversial issue’. In this circumstance, the 
negotiations for the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with China were 
protracted under the Tanaka administration. Given these, the China issue was closely 
associated with factional politics within the LDP. The pro-China policy could thus become a 
source of political capital by which one could obtain support from the Keisei-kai and the 
Kochi-kai factions while the anti-Chinese policy would appeal to the Seiwa-kai members 
and other anti-mainstream politicians. In this manner, political leaders were likely to deploy 
this capital in order to defeat their political rival and to boost their credentials in domestic 
                                             
24 Ichiro Nakagawa was father of Shoichi Nakagawa, who represented ‘neo-revisionists’ and 
anti-Chinese politician in the LDP. 
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politics.  
  
2.4 Koizumi and Abe in factional politics 
     
     In this context of factional politics, Junichiro Koizumi emerged as a new leader of 
Japan. It might be a less well-known fact that Koizumi is a third-generation politician. His 
grandfather, Matajiro Koizumi was the Telecommunication Minister and a vice-speaker of 
the House of Representatives, and his father Junya Koizumi was the Director General of the 
Defense Agency. Yet, not all had been smooth for Koizumi’s political career. As Mishima 
(2007: 733) noted, Koizumi had never followed the ‘elite course’ for the LDP’s leadership 
because he never held key posts in his cabinet such as Foreign Minister or Finance Minister25. 
In addition, Koizumi had not been the leader of a strong faction, as Uchiyama (2010: 17) 
mentioned that Koizumi shared with Miki and Nakasone a lack of internal party support. 
There were other Prime Ministers who were not leaders of any large faction such as 
Miyazawa and Kaifu. However, they could become Prime Minister due to the consideration 
for factional balance or support of the largest faction, the Keisei-kai. Koizumi’s novelty was 
not only that he became Prime Minister while he had not been a powerful faction leader but 
also without any support of mainstream factions of the LDP. Before the presidency election 
in 2001, factional support had almost determined the LDP presidency and thereby the Prime 
Minister. At that time, however, Koizumi could defeat Ryutaro Hashimoto, who was former 
Prime Minister and supported by the largest faction, the Keisei-kai26. The weakness of 
                                             
25 When Koizumi stood for election to the Lower House in 1969 for the first time, he could not win 
a seat as a Diet member and was hired as a secretary to Takeo Fukuda, who was Koizumi’s 
political mentor and became a Prime Minister in 1976. Koizumi gained his first cabinet seat as a 
Minister of Health and Welfare under Prime Minister Takeshita in 1988 and then became a 
Minister of Post and Telecommunications under Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa. 
26 A part of reasons for Koizumi’s victory was changes in the selection rules of the LDP president. 
According to the LDP constitution, the party president should be elected by the party convention, 
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support from the Keisei-kai was not a disadvantage for Koizumi. Rather, Koizumi could be 
free from the constraints from and influence of the Keisei-kai. One of the notable instances 
might be his foreign policy toward China especially on the Yasukuni Shrine issue. Since 
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka restored diplomatic ties with the PRC in 1972, the Keisei-kai 
became the most Beijing-friendly faction within the LDP. Furthermore, the Keisei-kai has 
had a strong connection with China partly because Japan’s ODA loans to China provided 
Keisei-kai politicians with lucrative business opportunities there (Taniguchi 2005: 452). 
Therefore, it conventionally might be difficult for Prime Ministers who could keep their 
administration in power to take a confrontational approach against China. However, as 
Koizumi eliminated the power of the Keisei-kai within the LDP and became uninhibited by 
intra-party power politics, he seemed to be able to take a tougher stance toward Beijing. 
     Furthermore, Koizumi nominated cabinet ministers and senior officials of the party 
without consulting with faction leaders, thereby breaking unwritten code of sharing out 
cabinet posts between factions (Kitaoka 2001: 280). Indeed, members of his faction, the 
Mori faction occupied most of the important posts and the Obuchi faction was greatly 
marginalized (Bowen 2003: 11)27. As a result, its composition was far from factionally 
balanced, sending a strong signal of ‘defactionalization’ instead (Uchiyama 2010: 13)28. 
However, while he exclaimed that he was going to ‘smash the LDP’, he never tried to deny 
                                             
which is consisted of all Diet members of the party and delegates from each prefectural chapter. 
From the mid 1990s, the electoral rule of the party president was amended to extend the 
electorate to party members and increased the voting power of the prefectural chapters of the 
party. Kabashima and Steel (2007: 101) point out, Koizumi took advantage of changes in the 
selection rules for the LDP president. About the LDP president election, Lin (2009) discussed in 
detail. 
27 Koizumi’s first cabinet included three members of the Mori faction, two from the Hashimoto 
faction, one each from the Eto, Kamei, Horiuchi, Yamasaki, Kato and former Komoto factions, 
two non-faction lawmakers, one lawmaker each from the Komeito and Conservative parties, and 
three non-lawmakers. 
28 In terms of the selection of secretary general, Koizumi assigned firstly Taku Yamasaki, who is 
a close friend of Koizumi and took over the Watanabe faction (former Nakasone faction), then 
Shinzo Abe from the same faction as Koizumi, and finally Tsutomu Takebe from the Yamasaki’s 
faction, emphasizing their personal ties and coherent support for Koizumi. 
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factional politics itself; rather, he was a man of ‘power politics’ among factions and loyal to 
his faction, the Seiwa-kai. What he intended to ‘smash’ was not the LDP or factional politics, 
but the dominance of the Keisei-kai in the LDP.  
     On the other hand, Abe, the youngest Prime Minister since the end of WWⅡ, comes 
from an extraordinarily well-established political family (Envall 2011: 150). His grandfather 
was former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, his granduncle was also former Prime Minister 
Eisaku Sato, and his father was former Foreign Minister and ex-leader of the Seiwa-kai, 
Shintaro Abe. In Abe’s case, his strong connection with the conservative camps in the LDP 
might unexpectedly contribute to the rapprochement with China. Conventionally, the China 
issue has been a focal point of domestic political struggle among factions within the LDP. 
The Seiwa-kai, which Abe belonged to, has been behind the pro-Taiwan and anti-China 
school in the LDP and often impeded the development of the Japan-China relationship. 
Actually, the opposition campaign of the pro-Taiwan camp successfully hampered the 
conclusion of the Japan-China Aviation Agreement (Ogata 1992: 145-146). Here, there can 
be seen interesting commonalities between former Prime Minister Fukuda and Abe. Firstly, 
it was a well-known fact that not only themselves but also the majority of their faction 
members took a pro-Taiwan and anti-Chinese stance. Generally speaking, it might be natural 
for a pro-Taiwan group leader to pursue a hard-line policy against China. Yet, these two 
Prime Ministers did the opposite. In fact, both of them achieved rapprochement with China; 
Fukuda could sign the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty and Abe built a ‘Mutually 
Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests’. Pro-Taiwan members did not 
hamper their leader’s foreign policy. Therefore, it can be argued that given Fukuda’s case, a 
strong power base in the LDP especially in the pro-Taiwan group might actually serve Abe’s 
rapprochement policy toward China. 
     What is notable here is that both Koizumi and Abe explicitly or implicitly constructed 
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their political ‘enemy’ in their political discourse, and their target was mainly the Keisei-kai. 
It was rather obvious that Koizumi attempted to minimize Keisei-kai’s influence within the 
LDP by excluding lawmakers of the Keisei-kai from key cabinet and party positions. In 
addition, since the Keisei-kai traditionally served as the political home for many powerful 
Posts and Construction zoku lawmakers, Koizumi’s pursuit of ‘structural reforms’ like postal 
privatization and the reduction of public works expenditures were ‘poised to cut deeply into 
the vested interests of the bureaucracy and zoku lawmakers alike (Uchiyama 2010: 13-14)’. 
Furthermore, Koizumi labeled the zoku lawmakers who opposed his structural reforms 
‘forces of resistance’. He constructed an oppositional framework in which Koizumi was 
‘good’ and the ‘forces of resistance’ were ‘bad’. Uchiyama also explains that this was partly 
because of the ‘long-standing animosity’ between former Prime Minister Tanaka and former 
Prime Minister Fukuda, to whom Koizumi had attached himself as his political mentor.  
     In other words, Koizumi’s challenge of the ‘structure reform’ was an extension of 
power struggles between the Keisei-kai and the Seiwa-kai. When Koizumi exclaimed that he 
was going to ‘smash the LDP’, it really meant that he was going to break the rule of the 
Keisei-kai. Likewise, Abe’s political agenda of the ‘departure from the postwar regime’ had 
also an oppositional framework in it. As discussed in later chapters, Abe’s targets were those 
who had created and supported the ‘postwar regime’. According to Abe, they were ‘bad’ 
because they should be responsible for postwar Japan’s disgrace through actions such as 
‘apology diplomacy’ in Asia, the endorsement of the ‘imposed Constitution’, and the rise of 
values of materialism without national pride among the public. In terms of factional politics, 
they were mainstream politicians in the LDP: the Kochi-kai and the Keisei-kai although it 
was not clearly named. In particular, the Keisei-kai was implicitly constructed as a kind of 
‘fifth column’ because of its ‘friendship-first’ policy toward China. While Abe sought 
rapprochement with China when he took office, his discourse on the ‘departure of the 
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postwar regime’ might indicate that he did not withdraw his antagonism towards his 
factional opponents. 
      
2.5 Conclusion 
 
     The purpose of this chapter was to provide an explanation of the domestic power 
politics of Japan behind foreign policies toward China and North Korea under the 
administrations of Koizumi and Abe. Historically, there can be seen two division lines in 
postwar Japan, which characterized domestic politics after the end of WWⅡ: between the 
progressives and the conservatives, and between the mainstream and anti-mainstream 
conservatives. Both the progressives and the right-wing traditionalists criticized the ‘Yoshida 
Line’ initiated by the mainstream conservatives and expressed their national values. Failing 
to unify these different nationalisms, the mainstream government established the Yoshida 
Line, which was built on the twin-pillars of the Constitution and the Japan-US Security 
Treaty, and tried to incorporate the two nationalisms into the ‘postwar regime’. However, the 
confrontation over historical perception made it impossible to bridge the gap between the 
progressives and the conservatives. Furthermore, after the end of the Cold War, the division 
among the conservatives was intensified because revisionists made vehement protests 
against the strategy of historic reconciliation, which aimed to regain trust from the 
neighboring countries by the closure of the history problems. These confrontations continued 
to structure Japan’s domestic politics under the Koizumi and Abe administrations and 
provided a setting for their foreign policy.  
     In addition, factional politics within the LDP provide more explanation for the 
historical context of confrontations among conservatives, which was emerged in the 
narratives of Koizumi and Abe. Put simply, power rivalry over the dominance in the LDP 
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between the Seiwa-kai and the Keisei-kai was behind their construction of a ‘domestic other’. 
This division was likely to be reproduced and intensified around foreign policy toward China. 
Political actors in the LDP manipulated the China issue as political capital to gain advantage 
in factional politics. In this way, the domestic power relationship surrounding Koizumi and 
Abe was formulated in postwar Japan in ways that were to have a radical impact on foreign 
policy. 
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Chapter3. Case Study 1: Nationalism and Foreign Policy toward 
China under the Koizumi Administration 
                                                           
 
     Under the Koizumi administration, annual prime ministerial visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine polarized Japanese society and prompted an international outcry. 
Since the Shrine honored the spirits of the Japanese war dead in the modern era, 
including fourteen Class A War Criminals, Koizumi’s worship is often interpreted as a 
symbol of the rise of nationalism in contemporary Japan. From this perspective, it 
seems to be a highly irrational action, especially because Japan needed close 
cooperation with those countries to settle the North Korean issue and attain a 
permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Therefore, it is worth exploring how such 
a seemingly irrational policy in which Koizumi would not make a concession with 
China could be justified in foreign policy discourse. Two prominent explanations are 
often introduced to account for this matter, one focuses on the rise of nationalism as a 
broad social phenomenon and the other emphasizes domestic politics in the narrower 
sense of the actions of political parties and factions. Although these explanations seem 
to be persuasive to some extent, however, there are some points that they could not 
cover. Therefore, this thesis attempts to offer a different perspective to this issue by 
focusing on the discourse on national identity. 
     My argument can be summarized as follows: Koizumi’s visits to the 
controversial Yasukuni Shrine resulted in an international outcry based on China’s 
criticism over the history issues, in which Japan was described as an ‘unrepentant, 
insensitive and irresponsible’ country. In order to resist such representations of its 
identity and justify their positions, Japanese political leaders tried to construct 
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alternative ‘self’, around the identity of a ‘victimized and trustworthy’ Japan. This 
would require the construction of a ‘victimizing and untrustworthy’ ‘other’, a role that 
came to be performed by China. Behind this, there seemed to be Koizumi’s intention to 
remove ‘a spell of history’ and to manipulate the Yasukuni Shrine issue as political 
capital to minimize frustrations with his other policies, especially toward North Korea. 
From this perspective, a curious inversion took place in which the Yasukuni 
issue could be used not as a symbol of the rise of Japan’s ‘nationalism’, but as 
evidence that shows postwar Japan reflects on its past and pledges not to commit war 
again. This can actually serve to construct and reinforce Japan’s national identity as a 
‘peaceful country’. Thus, there was strong support for Koizumi not to make a 
concession on attitudes towards the Yasukuni issue because it was an identity problem. 
This marks a sharp contrast with his conciliatory approach toward North Korea on the 
abduction issue in order to achieve normalization of the relationship with Pyongyang. 
 In this context, this chapter aims to explore how foreign policy toward China 
under the Koizumi administration was used to construct a certain version of Japanese 
national identity and how the Koizumi administration manipulated the Yasukuni 
Shrine issue as political capital and legitimized it in accordance with ‘nationalistic 
rhetoric’ by articulating national identity. In doing so, this chapter firstly examines the 
shortcomings of conventional explanations and then introduces the competing 
discourses on the Yasukuni Shrine issue in the Japanese Parliament. After scrutinizing 
Koizumi’s narrative on the Yasukuni Shrine issue, identity construction in foreign 
policy discourse become the focus. By examining foreign policy discourses, it 
scrutinizes the way in which China came to be represented as the radical ‘other’, how 
these representations could help to reconstruct Japan’s national identity, how they were 
manipulated to provide rhetorical justification for policy toward China, and then what 
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role the Yasukuni Shrine issue played in the reconstruction of Japan’s identity and 
Koizumi’s identity politics.  
 
3.1 Conventional explanation of the Yasukuni Shrine issue  
 
3.1.1 Chronology  
 
      The bilateral relationship between Japan and China under the Koizumi 
administration started with tension. In addition to Prime Minister Koizumi’s pledge to 
visit the Yasukuni Shrine, there were a series of diplomatic issues such as the 
government’s approval of new history textbooks and the approval of a visa for 
Taiwan’s former President Lee Teng-hui. Koizumi’s first visit to the shrine in August 
2001 further exacerbated relations, but he tried to improve the relationship by visiting 
China to meet with President Jiang and Premier Zhu Rongji. In October 2001, Koizumi 
visited the War Memorial, expressed his apology and regret for the victims of Japanese 
aggression and the determination of not going to war again. While the Yasukuni Shrine 
issue was not settled despite China’s strong pressure, Koizumi’s visit to Beijing 
seemed to be successful because it contributed to the alleviation of tensions between 
the two countries. A cozy relationship reached a climax at the Koizumi-Jiang meeting 
at the Boao Forum held in Shanghai in April 2002 when Koizumi described the rise of 
China not as a ‘threat’ but as a ‘big opportunity’. Yet, his second visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine as a Prime Minister caused China’s vehement protest. Coupled with the 
Shenyang Incident, the bilateral relations was aggravated again despite efforts to 
improve it from both sides because of Koizumi’s annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
High-level meetings were broken off in the rise and spread of anti-Japanese 
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movements across China, which was triggered by Japan’s bid for a permanent seat in 
the UNSC. The soured relationship was never rectified until the end of the Koizumi 
administration and Abe’s unexpected rapprochement with China. 
 
3.1.2 The rise of nationalism in Japanese society  
 
      In the first conventional explanation of the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the prime 
ministerial worship at the Yasukuni Shrine might often be interpreted as a symbol of 
the rise of Japan’s revisionist nationalism from the mid-1990s, or it reflected the ‘right 
shift in Japanese society’. That is, Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine because he 
wanted to manipulate the historical record to accord with certain nationalistic values. 
However, if Japan’s nationalism is regarded as a right-wing ideology based on the 
revisionist historical view, it might actually conflict with his perception of history. In 
particular, revisionists would not agree with his view that the war dead sacrificed their 
lives ‘against their own will’, because they insist that all of them voluntarily and 
proudly scarified their lives to protect their motherland. A diplomat Mitoji Yabunaka 
stated that Koizumi himself did not have a historical view of the right wing and thus 
his intention of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine was far from supporting the revisionists 
view1.  
     It has also been argued that the rise of nationalism in Japanese society might 
provide support for Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine because nearly half the 
Japanese people favored his worships2. According to an opinion poll conducted by the 
                                                   
1 15 March 2011, personal interview at the LSE. Hitoshi Tanaka (2009: 150) also argued 
that Koizumi’s perception of history was almost the same as view in the Murayama 
Statement. 
2 Results of public opinion differed by periods and media. According to Asahi Shimbun on 
28 June 2005, 52% of people were opposed to Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit while 36% approved 
of it. However, 42% agreed on Koizumi’s worship and 41% disagreed on 19 October 2005.  
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Asahi Shimbun in April 2006, it was true that Koizumi’s worship had a 50% approval 
rate. However, the same poll also demonstrated that 70% of respondents, and a 
surprisingly 90% of young people in their twenties, did not know what had happened 
in the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. Therefore, although nearly half of respondents 
approved Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, it was not due to a common view on 
history or a prevalence of revisionist sentiment. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude 
that Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and the popular support for it indicated that 
Japan had become ‘nationalistic’ in a revisionist sense.   
  
3.1.3 domestic political factor  
 
      The second explanation puts more emphasis on domestic electoral factors and 
appears to be more persuasive. More precisely, it explains that Koizumi manipulated 
his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as political leverage to win the election of the LDP in 
national elections, as well his own election as party president because the prime 
ministerial visits to the Shrine would be favored by conservative constituencies in 
Japanese society. According to Hata (2002:13), Koizumi recognized the strong impact 
of the Japanese Association for the Bereaved Families of the War Dead (JABF) would 
have on the LDP presidential election from his experience in the previous two 
presidential elections against Ryutaro Hashimoto. As is well known, Koizumi had 
pledged that he would visit the Yasukuni Shrine as a Prime Minister in the presidential 
election of the LDP in April 2001. It is often pointed out that he intended to attain 
support from the JABF, an influential supporting organization of the LDP with more 
than 100,000 local party members that lobbies for the imperial and prime ministerial 
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visits to the Yasukuni Shrine3. An opposing candidate, former Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto, was considered to be in the lead of Koizumi because he had a much 
stronger support base inside and outside the party. For instance, Hashimoto had been a 
president of the Association and relied on its vote-gathering capacity. However, he 
visited the Yasukuni Shrine as Prime Minister only once in 1996 and gave up the 
practice after provoking criticism from neighboring countries.  
     Hiromu Nonaka, a powerful politician of the LDP, mentioned that ‘at the time of 
the presidential election Koizumi said he was going to visit the Yasukuni for the first 
time. It was because he was aware of the importance of votes from local members4. 
Koizumi intended to whittle away votes of the Association from Hashimoto (Nonaka 
2007: 251)’. Therefore, it seemed to be plausible to think that the pledge of worship 
was Koizumi’s strategy for winning the presidential election. His second visit to the 
Shrine, in April 2002, was also aimed at winning three midterm elections, held a week 
later5. Of course, this might not be a decisive factor, but at least, it could be argued that 
Koizumi prioritized domestic politics over diplomatic consideration unlike Hashimoto 
and tried to utilize his Yasukuni visit as political capital to win an election. 
                                                   
3 About the Association for the Bereaved Families of War Dead and how this organization 
has maintained strong connection with the LDP, see TanakaN., Tanaka H., and Hata 
(1995), Izoku to Sengo (Bereaved families of war dead and postwar), Tokyo, Iwanami 
Shoten, Tanaka, Tanaka and Hata (1995: 195-6) explained that the Association had two 
ways to exert influence on the LDP. The first one is to field candidates for the national 
election from their members and the second way is to support the LDP to win elections, 
functioning as a vote-gathering machine, in return for achieving their goals such as the 
legalization of backup of bereaved families. In sum, there have been basic ties between the 
Diet members and the Association in which the LDP members fulfill demands from the 
Association by the enactment of bills and the Association cooperate in the election 
campaign by gathering votes. Hata (2002: 11) also made clear about this point.  
4 The number of votes from the local party members was 487, outnumbered members of 
parliament in the LDP, 346. 
5 There was an Upper House by-election in Niigata prefecture, a Lower House by election 
in Wakayama prefecture No. 2 constituency, and Tokushima Prefecture’s gubernatorial 
election on the same day, 28 April 2002. As approval rate of the Koizumi Cabinet dropped to 
40% and the LDP lost the Yokohama mayoral election in the previous month, it was 
reported that Koizumi and the LDP attempted to secure the organized support (Asahi 
Shimbun: 2002-a). 
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However, this election factor cannot provide a complete explanation either. This 
is because, during the presidential election of the LDP of September 2003, Koizumi 
did not pledge his annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August. Instead, he stated 
that this might be avoided due to consideration of various factors (Asahi Shimbun: 
2003). Furthermore, on the worship on 1 January 2004, a confidant of the Prime 
Minister mentioned that if Koizumi had visited the Shrine in August, the cabinet could 
avoid an adverse effect on the Upper House election in July (Asahi Shimbun: 2004-a). 
In other words, by 2004 the prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni had come to be 
regarded as a negative factor in elections. Thus, it could be argued that the explanatory 
power of the election might be limited though pervasive to some extent.  
    In this way, conventional explanations tried to answer ‘why Prime Minister 
Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine’. However, as all of these explanations to answer 
the ‘why’ question are not enough to prove causal relationship, this thesis focuses on 
the ‘how’ questions. That is to say, rather than asking ‘why Koizumi visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine’, it is more informative to ask ‘how his worship could be possible’ or 
‘how it was justified in foreign policy discourse’6. This involves an exploration of the 
kind of national identity that Koizumi was attempting to reconstruct through his 
rhetorical justification of a certain policy.   
 
3.2 The division on the Yasukuni Shrine issue in the Parliament  
 
     Foreign policy debate in the Diet had been split over the Yasukuni issue and the 
relationship with China under the Koizumi administration. There were two main 
conflicting groups on China policy, namely the pro-Chinese school and the 
                                                   
6 About differences between ‘why’ question and ‘how’ question, See Doty (1993). 
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anti-Chinese or pro-Taiwan school. This division corresponded with divisions of 
attitudes towards the prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine: the former 
disapproved and the latter supported the visit. Both camps had different definitions of 
what kind of crisis Japan was facing in the Yasukuni issue or in the entire Japan-China 
relationship. Along with their construction of these alternative ‘realities’, legitimate 
subjects for foreign policy choice were articulated and then, a certain policy choice 
was legitimated as a way to resolve the crisis. 
 
3.2.1 Background of the issue  
 
From a longer historical perspective, intensive debates on the prime ministerial 
visit to Yasukuni in the Diet started when former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone 
relinquished his revisit to the Shrine in 1986. Because of harsh criticism from China 
and South Korea, it was confirmed that the Yasukuni issue was considered to be a 
measure of the extent to which Japan reflects on its past aggression and colonial rule. 
As an official explanation, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Masaharu Gotoda released a 
statement: 
 
 While it would be an obvious responsibility for political leaders to respect 
the people and families of the war dead who wish to see an official visit of the 
prime minister, however, as a peaceful nation, our country should emphasize its 
international relations with other countries and consider the perceptions of people 
among neighboring countries (Gotoda: 1986).  
 
Since then, this so-called ‘Gotoda Statement’ has been taken as the basis for the 
 99 
abandonment of the prime ministerial worship at the Yasukuni Shrine. It is notable that 
this view might be based on such a historical perception that prewar Japan can be 
articulated as a ‘victimizing’ self and Asian countries are represented as ‘victimized’ 
others. Therefore, the Yasukuni visits could be interpreted as legitimization of Japan’s 
aggression towards Asia during WWⅡ. As Zenmei Matsumoto of the Japan 
Communist Party maintained, the Yasukuni Shrine has been a spiritual pillar to 
supporting the Japanese aggression during war and was a typical and common 
criticism (NDRP: 2002-d). A ‘peaceful’ country should thus show reflection on its past 
‘wrongdoings’ by relinquishing the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. From then on, the 
essence of the Gotoda Statement has been the predominant official discourse in the 
Diet.  
 
3.2.2 Discourse of the opponents against the prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine  
  
The pro-Chinese/anti-Yasukuni group argues that the Prime Minister should not 
visit the Yasukuni Shrine out of consideration for the national feelings of neighboring 
countries especially China and South Korea, in line with the Gotoda Statement and that 
official worship would damage the bilateral relationship with these countries. Such 
critics often define Japan’s international relations with China and other Asian countries 
as being ‘damaged by Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine’. Thus, 
the critical situation in Japan’s diplomacy in East Asia was ‘hot in economy and cold 
in politics’ with China and ‘Japan’s isolation in Asia’, which were all caused by the 
Yasukuni Shrine issue7. Particularly, it was often pointed out that soured relations with 
                                                   
7 For example, Azuma Konno of the DPJ, made the same point (NDRP: 2003-b). In addition, 
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China would not meet national interests giving the necessity to closely cooperate with 
China over the Six Party Talks on the North Korean issue and Japan’s bid for a 
permanent seat in the UNSC8. In their argument, Koizumi can be represented as an 
inappropriate political leader to conduct foreign policy because his visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine seemed to prioritize his private feelings over national interests9. In addition, 
they criticized that the proponents of the prime ministerial worship would be 
inappropriate and irresponsible for foreign policy makers because they might lack the 
‘right’ understanding of history and moral and rational diplomatic consideration. 
Furthermore, the prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was regarded as 
behavior which might show that Japan may not only have failed to reflect on its past, 
but also be liable to ‘victimize’ and harm Asian people once again (NDRP: 2001-b). 
This interpretation of ‘a reality’ and subjects can be used to legitimize urging Prime 
Minister Koizumi to discontinue the visit to the Shrine and immediately improve 
bilateral relationship with China.      
 
3.2.3 Discourse of the supporters of the prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine  
 
In contrast, supporters of the prime ministerial visit to the Shrine insisted that the 
Prime Minister should go to the Yasukuni Shrine to console the souls of the war dead 
because they sacrificed their lives for our country. This thought has conventionally 
been based on the traditional right-wing nationalism and the revisionist historical view 
                                                                                                                                                     
Katsuya Okada of the DPJ, repeatedly criticized Koizumi on this matter (NDRP: 2003-d, 
2005-n).  
8 For instance, Katsuya Okada of the DPJ, repeatedly criticized the Koizumi 
administration on this point (NDRP: 2003-d, 2005-n). In the same way, Tsuyoshi Saitou of 
the DPJ (NDRP: 2004-g) and Satoshi Arai of the DPJ (NDRP: 2005-t) also raised this issue.  
9 For example, Takashi Yamamoto of the DPJ, (NDRP: 2004-f) and Akihiro Ohata of the 
DPJ (NDRP: 2006-g) emphasized this point. 
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that Japan initiated the previous war to emancipate Asia from the great powers and 
thus it was completely innocent. According to this school of thought, China’s criticism 
was nothing but ‘intervention in Japan’s domestic affairs’, because it impairs the 
inherent right of the Japanese to console the souls of their war dead10. Masahiro 
Morioka maintained that “Class A War Criminals” are not ‘criminals’ and the 
Yasukuni Shrine is the only place to combine the war dead and living Japanese people 
(NDRP: 2005-o). Therefore, it is the responsibility of Japanese Prime Ministers to 
honor the Yasukuni Shrine, and other countries should not interfere. 
Masayuki Fujishima, a member of the Liberal Party, stated in the Diet that at this 
point, the Japanese Prime Minister should keep in mind that China’s insistence that this 
issue profoundly damages the national feelings of the 1.3 billion Chinese people was 
nothing but ‘a menace and interference with our country.’ Fujishima then insisted that 
Koizumi should not be submissive to China on this issue and should take a hard-line 
stance against such a foreign intervention (NDRP: 2002-m). From this point of view, 
Masahiro Morioka of the LDP argued that, to give up the Yasukuni worship in order to 
improve bilateral relations with China would not serve Japan’s national interests, but 
rather would damage the long-term national interests (NDRP: 2005-o). In other words, 
the crisis situation with which Japan was now confronting could be one in which 
Japan’s diplomacy may be too submissive to China’s pressure, despite the military and 
political threat posed by the rise of China. Pro-Chinese politicians and diplomats were 
thus criticized for their conciliatory approach to China because their submissive 
attitude had been causing China’s interference and damaging Japan’s national interest. 
The DPJ lawmaker Ken Kishimoto thus accused the China School diplomats in MOFA 
                                                   
10 For instance, Masayuki Fujishima of Liberal Party (NDRP: 2002-m), Shozo Azuma of 
the DPJ (NDRP: 2002-p), and Toshio Yamauchi of the LDP (NDRP: 2005-q) described this 
issue as such. 
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of being primarily concerned with China’s interests when diplomatic disputes occurred 
and asserted that they might have a cozy relationship with China’s privileged ruling 
class and thus downgrade Japan’s own national interest (NDRP: 2005-h). In other 
words, they were labeled as ‘anti-Japanese’, or an ‘enemy within’ in pro-Yasukuni 
discourse. 
In this context, political actors have utilized the Yasukuni Shrine issue as 
political capital based on anti-Chinese sentiment in Japanese politics. Since the prime 
ministerial visit to the Shrine has been abandoned, it was used as political leverage by 
Prime Ministers who had a weaker power base within the conservative camp. As the 
case of Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine demonstrated, 
the prime minister’s worship can serve to ease or offset the opposition from the 
right-wingers against a conciliatory policy toward China and North Korea, or against 
any concessions on the history issue with those countries. In this respect, it can be 
argued that Koizumi could utilize this issue as political capital to not only to obtain 
support from the conservative groups but, more importantly, to appease frustrations 
among anti-Chinese groups over his North Korea policy. Yoshibumi Wakamiya (2006: 
19) pointed out that Koizumi told him that thanks to his Yasukuni worship in the 
previous year, backlash from the right wing against his visit to Pyongyang was less 
strenuous than he had expected. In short, Koizumi could minimize discontents among 
anti-Chinese and anti-DPRK groups over his policy for normalization by utilizing his 
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Therefore, the Yasukuni shrine issue can be manipulated 
as a source of political capital by political leaders to minimize opposition against their 
other policy choices.  
 
3.3 Discourse analysis of Koizumi’s argument  
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 It should be discussed how Koizumi’s argument could be interpreted or which 
school of thought he relied on to legitimize his actions. Koizumi typically attempted to 
explain his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine:  
 
Japan has realized and maintained a wealthy society for 60 years after 
WWⅡ, reflected the past prewar behavior and endorsed freedom and democracy 
as a peaceful country. It is the intention to visit the Yasukuni Shrine to pay 
respects to the war dead that based on the reflection of the previous war, we 
should never initiate a war again and that we should not forget that the present 
Japan owes its peace and prosperity to sacrifices of people who were victimized 
and lost their lives in the battle field. (NDRP: 2006-i)  
 
There can be seen some notable points in Koizumi’s insistence on continual visit 
to the Yasukuni Shrine. First, while Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni and 
little concession to China’s criticism might often be regarded as an expression of 
traditional rightist nationalism, it does not depend exclusively on the traditional 
right-wing argument. Rather, his logic to justify the Yasukuni worship seems to mix 
and exploit ideas drawn from both of the schools of thought above. Second, there can 
be seen a linkage between Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and discourse of 
Japan’s national identity as a ‘peaceful country’ in his argument, which could be 
developed in the foreign policy debate. This reconstruction of national identity as a 
‘peaceful country’, coincides with the reproduction of Chinese national identity from 
the Japanese perspective and conventional postwar Japan’s diplomatic relations with 
Asian countries, and would justify Koizumi’s uncompromising attitude towards China. 
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In what follows, the next section explains each point in order. 
 
3.3.1 Commonalities and differences of the two groups  
 
3.3.1.1 Perception of history  
 
Although Koizumi’s stance is often identified with the anti-Chinese group and 
right-wing nationalist thought on the Yasukuni issue, it might be premature to reach 
such a conclusion because he also tried to make his argument compatible with the view 
of pro-Chinese groups and exploit both schools of thought. It is of course easy to find 
common arguments between Koizumi and the anti-Chinese group. First, both of them 
alleged that foreign criticism against prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine 
would be an utter intervention with internal politics. In line with such a view, Koizumi 
himself mentioned that he reckoned other foreign countries would not interfere in 
Japan’s way of commemorating the war dead because other countries would also have 
a feeling to commemorate the war dead (NDRP: 2005-k).  
 
There should be different thoughts and ways of how to enshrine the war 
dead country by country. ------ Although I know that China might feel uneasy 
about this, as a Japanese, it would not be inadequate to respect and appreciate 
Japanese war dead. I also would be skeptical about whether I should follow 
foreign request just because they claim that the Japanese way of enshrinement of 
the war dead is different from theirs (NDRP: 2004-t).    
 
However, it is important to note that Koizumi’s argument also seems to be 
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different from the views of the supporters of the pro-Yasukuni group. One of the 
remarkable differences from the traditional pro-Yasukuni argument, for example, is 
Koizumi’s perception of history. While people who support and demand the prime 
ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine tend to hold a ‘Yasukuni view of history’, a 
typical right-wing idea that glorifies the Asia-Pacific War as a ‘just war’, Koizumi 
declared that he would follow the Murayama Statement, which describes the 
Asia-Pacific War was an aggression (NDRP: 2005-f) and holds that Japan should not 
have initiated the war (NDRP: 2004-f). According to Koizumi, his visits were made 
not for mourning the Class A War criminals, who were held responsibility for the 
aggression in the Tokyo War Tribunal, but for the number of ordinary soldiers who 
had ‘unwillingly’ sacrificed their lives for their country (NDRP: 2004-c). At this point, 
the word ‘unwillingly’ might be seen as playing an important role insofar as it shows 
Koizumi’s historical perception because it implies that ordinary Japanese people were 
unenthusiastic about their commitment to the war. This seems to be very different from 
the traditional right-wing nationalist discourse, in which all Japanese people should 
and would be willing to devote themselves thoroughly to their country and the 
Emperor. In addition, Foreign Minister Machimura in the Koizumi Cabinet stated that 
‘we must sincerely acknowledge the fact that Japan invaded and colonized neighboring 
countries during WWⅡ and brought about big damage’, adding that Japan should 
remark and behave taking into consideration the damaged national feelings of 
neighbouring countries (NDRP: 2005-d). He also emphasized that the intension of 
Prime Minister Koizumi’s worship was far from whitewashing prewar aggression or 
glorifying prewar militarism (NDRP: 2005-p). In that sense, Koizumi might not be 
identified with the right-wing traditionalists. 
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3.3.1.2 Perception to China  
 
Another important point that differs from the anti-Chinese camp might be that 
Koizumi emphasized the importance of the Japan-China relationship and never 
described China as a ‘threat’ against Japan. Rather, he repeatedly emphasized that the 
rise of China would be not a ‘threat’, but an enormous ‘opportunity’ for Japan11.  
 
Some see the economic development of China as a threat. I do not. I believe that 
its dynamic economic development presents challenges as well as opportunity for 
Japan. I believe a rising economic tide and expansion of the market in China will 
stimulate competition and will prove to be a tremendous opportunity for the 
world economy as a whole (Koizumi: 2002-a). 
 
It also sharply contrasts with Abe’s hard-line policy toward North Korea in 
which the DPRK was clearly articulated as a ‘threat’ to Japan. In this sense, although 
he came to criticize China’s relentless pressure against the Yasukuni Shrine visits and 
indicated that China negated Japan’s identity, which helped produce social antagonism, 
Koizumi’s stance on China was not as hostile as that of other anti-Chinese politicians. 
This is quite different from the stance taken by anti-Chinese schools, which often 
describes the neighboring country as a military, political, and economic threat to Japan. 
Taking these points together, Koizumi’s argument exploits the ideas of both the 
pro-Yasukuni-anti-Chinese group and the pro-Chinese-anti-Yasukuni group.   
 
                                                   
11 Koizumi referred to this in the speech at the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2002 
(Koizumi: 2002-a). In addition, he repeatedly emphasized this point in the National Diet 
(NDRP: 2003-d, 2004-t, 2004-u).  
 107 
3.3.2 The link between the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and Japan’s ‘peace country’ 
identity  
 
      The second and most important point of Koizumi’s logic is that he tried to 
establish a link between his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and postwar Japan’s national 
identity as a ‘peace country’. That is, Koizumi indicated that his visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine is public evidence of postwar Japan as a ‘peaceful nation’, which reflects its 
past and renews its pledge not to engage in war. This does not appear to be as natural 
as Koizumi insisted because his notion of ‘a peaceful nation’ did not completely 
coincide with the conventional usage of that term. The phrase ‘Japan is a peaceful 
nation’ in the Gotoda Statement articulated that Japan should prioritize diplomatic 
consideration over domestic concern in order to show its repentance and legitimize 
Prime Minister Nakasone’s discontinuation of his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Koizumi’s usage of the term clearly conflicts with this idea. Instead, Koizumi 
established a new connection between the Yasukuni Shrine and the concept of a 
‘peaceful country’. First, he negated any link between postwar Japan and militarism 
emphasizing its ‘peaceful’ development: 
 
While people refer to the resurgence of militarism, but where in the world 
could they find evidence to suggest that Japan is a militaristic country? As a 
“peaceful country”, Japan has strived for peace building in international society 
in our own way. Japan was not involved in a war nor did it go to war, insomuch 
that there has been no loss of human life because of Japan’s war in the region. 
Therefore, Japan as a ‘peaceful country’ is now highly praised by a number of 
countries. By taking this into consideration, how could it be possible to identify 
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my visits to the Yasukuni Shrine with the rise of militarism? (NDRP: 2005-n) 
  
Put simply, postwar Japan was articulated as being completely distanced from 
militarism and being respected around the world. Coupled with a previous citation of 
Koizumi’s statement, this globally esteemed way of the peaceful development is 
closely associated with Japanese people in the past because peace and prosperity in 
postwar Japan was firmly ‘founded upon sacrifices of people who were victimized’ in 
battlefield (NDRP: 2005-j). According to Koizumi, peace and prosperity of the 
present-day Japan is heavily indebted to the soldiers who were enshrined in the 
Yasukuni Shrine. The Japanese Prime Minister should thus pledge that Japan would 
not commit any acts of war in remembrance of those who unwillingly sacrificed their 
lives in the previous war. In this there can be seen a nationalistic logic, which unites 
the Japanese people of today with those of the past. Therefore, paying honor to its war 
victims was not to glorify militarism but to make an oath not to take such victims again. 
In other words, the condolences to the war dead were treated as equal confirmation of 
Japan’s decisive break from militarism and the pledge of not going to war again. In this 
context, the Yasukuni Shrine was treated not as a place where prewar militarism was 
whitewashed and supported, but a place where Japanese political leaders renewed their 
pledge of abstaining from war. Therefore, according to Koizumi, his visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine should be viewed as a sign, which signifies Japan’s ‘peaceful’ 
identity.  
Although this linkage to justify Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine might not 
be self-evident or persuasive, it was manipulated and strengthened by supporters of 
visits to the Shrine by utilizing the concept of a ‘peaceful country’ in foreign policy 
discourses. As China’s criticism became increasingly harsh, claiming that the 
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Yasukuni Shrine was a symbol of Japanese prewar militarism and that the prime 
ministerial visit might mean the resurgence of it, came to be regarded as more than 
‘interference in domestic affairs’: it was treated as a negation of Japan’s ‘peaceful’ 
identity. It was especially after the anti-Japanese movement spread across China in the 
spring of 2005 that the issue of the Yasukuni visit, China policy and a ‘peaceful 
country’ became the subject of heated debate. In what follows, this thesis attempts to 
examine how the concept of a ‘peaceful country’ as postwar Japan’s identity was 
reconstructed over the Yasukuni and China Policy issue.  
 
3. 4 Construction of national identity in foreign policy discourses  
 
As Shogo Suzuki (2011: 52) puts it, controversies over the ‘history issue’ in 
Sino-Japanese relations can be regarded as ‘part of a quest for identity’. He provides 
new insights and observations on this rivalry focusing on the ‘othering’ of China in 
narratives of Japan’s rights, and argues that the Japanese right attempted to redraw 
moral boundaries between Japan and China. In doing so, they aimed to shore up 
Japan’s identity as ‘righteous, honorable’ and ‘ethical’ state, which has ‘legitimate’ 
membership within the society of states, portraying China as ‘irrational’ and 
‘unethical’. Although Suzuki’s argument is convincing, this chapter focuses not on 
narratives of right-wing groups and anti-Chinese politicians but on discourse of the 
Koizumi administration because it seeks to explore how Koizumi aimed to legitimize 
his policy toward China.  
It can be argued that discursive construction of Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful 
nation’ could not be possible without a context in which China contributes to the 
construction of Japan’s identity in its criticism. In other words, Japan as a ‘peaceful 
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country’ was reconstructed in the Japan-China war of words concerning a series of 
historical problems most notably the Yasukuni issue and Japan’s bid for a permanent 
seat in the UN Security Council in spring 2005. The Chinese government blamed 
Japan on these issues and took up an international anti-Japanese campaign. In the 
campaign, Chinese discourse produced Japan’s identity as, ‘glorifying militarism’, 
‘unrepentant on the past’ and thus ‘untrustworthy’ for a great role in international 
community. It was against these representations of Japan that the Koizumi 
administration attempted to reconstruct and appeal Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity. In order 
to highlight a ‘peaceful country’ identity, China’s identity was reshaped to illuminate 
differences from Japan.  
 
3.4.1 The Representation of Japan’s Identity in China’s criticism  
 
The two countries criticized each other over who should be blamed for a range 
of anti-Japanese behavior across China. Taking seriously these demonstrations, the 
Chinese government took a hard-line stance towards Japan’s bid for a permanent seat 
in the UNSC. Premier Wen Jiabao stated that ‘It is only a country which respects 
history and takes responsibility without reluctance that could assume greater 
responsibility in international society’ (Asahi Shimbun: 2005-a). That is, Japan was 
constructed as a country, which could not be qualified for a greater role in international 
society because it avoided taking historical responsibility. He clearly indicated that 
Japan should review its stance on the history issues if it sought to become a permanent 
member of the UNSC. Chinese officials would not acknowledge their responsibility to 
control ‘destructive activities’ aimed at the Japanese embassy and shops in China. Vice 
Minister Wu Pawei told the Japanese press that the fundamental source of this problem 
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was Japan’s incorrect understanding of history and that there was no reason for China 
to apologize. China’s Ambassador to Tokyo, Wang Yi, also stated that it was Japan 
that had raised issues behind the current problems when he was summoned and 
protested to by Foreign Minister Machimura. In addition, against the remark of the 
LDP lawmaker Masahiro Morioka that the Class A War Criminals were ‘no longer 
regarded as criminals in Japan’, the Chinese spokesperson, Kong Quan, stated in 
response that ‘it is highly arguable whether Japan can play a reasonable role in the 
international community’. According to the Chinese side, it was Japan which should be 
responsible for causing such a situation because the Japanese side stepped on the toes 
of the Chinese people by its failure to reflect on its past. In short, Japan was 
constructed as a country which would beautify militarism, fail to reflect on its past, and 
thus be irresponsible as a major power. It was in this context that new effort was made 
to reconstruct Japan’s identity, in order to resist and reverse these representations 
created by China.   
This construction of Japan’s identity in Chinese discourse yielded two important 
reactions from the Japanese side: the reconstruction and reinforcement of postwar 
Japan’s identity and the reproduction of China’s identity in Japan. Put simply, in order 
to resist China’s construction of Japan’s identity as a militaristic, unrepentant, and 
untrustworthy country, Japan’s political leaders tried to reconstitute Japan as a ‘victim’ 
and reshape China as a ‘victimizer’.   
 
3.4.2 The Reconstruction of Japan’s identity in Koizumi’s policy toward China  
 
What would be constructed and reinforced as Japan’s identity in foreign policy 
discourse might be the notion that Japan was a ‘peaceful country’. Especially in order 
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to resist China’s emphasis on Japan’s lack of a ‘proper understanding of history’, 
which would recall Japan’s past colonial rule and aggression as a ‘victimizer’, Japan’s 
political leaders repeatedly referred to the 60-year path of peaceful development after 
WWⅡ based on the ‘deep reflection of its past’. Koizumi’s speech at the Asia Africa 
summit in Jakarta would be a typical statement of such a narrative. 
 
In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused 
tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to 
those of Asian nations. Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of 
humility. And with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always 
engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of 
WWⅡ, never turning into a military power but rather an economic power, its 
principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to the use 
of force (Koizumi: 2005-a). 
 
 In Koizumi’s narrative there can be seen a discourse in which Japan was articulated 
as a non-military nation with deep remorse for its past, contrary to China’s description. 
In addition, the primary emphasis of this speech, according to Foreign Minister 
Machimura, was not put exclusively on an apology for the history issue but rather on 
Japan’s postwar achievements and its further contributions as a peaceful nation 
(NDRP: 2005-i). He also explained that the expression of deep remorse and heartfelt 
apology was used as a ground to express Japan’s confidence in its development as a 
peaceful nation (NDRP: 2005-j). Therefore, it would be wrong to claim that Koizumi 
and his cabinet merely attempted to focus on an apology for the history issue. In fact, 
they just ‘followed’ the existing line of the Murayama Statement based on the ‘strategy 
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of historic reconciliation’ from the 1990s without clarifying further any war 
responsibility. It seems that the focus was exclusively put on resisting China’s 
criticism that Japan would beautify its past aggression and militarism. By taking the 
position that Japan has fully reflected and apologized for the past, Koizumi was saying 
that Japan might be ready for playing a more proactive role as a ‘peace country’ in the 
region. 
In this context, the representations of Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’ were 
used as a foundation for seeking a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Foreign 
Minister Nobutaka Machimura repeatedly argued that the Japanese government has 
demonstrated its primary posture that Japan pursues world peace based on reflection of 
its own prewar history and the principle of a ‘peaceful country’, such as an exclusive 
defensive policy and three non-nuclear principles. This, he contends, has contributed to 
world peace with a series of non-military means, such as the ODA program. It is 
because Japan takes pride in its postwar peaceful development and posture that 
Machimura hoped it might be rightly evaluated by many countries around the world, 
Machimura thus emphasized that Japan was qualified to seek a permanent seat in the 
UN Security Council (NDRP: 2005-p). It would thus be natural for Japan to desire to 
become a permanent member of the UN Security Council because it was a part of the 
expression of the reality of its national identity, a ‘peaceful nation’.  
In this way, the Japanese government tried to reconstruct Japan’s identity as a 
‘non-militaristic’ ‘peaceful’ country which sincerely reflects upon its past, and thus, is  
‘trustworthy’ and ‘suitable’ to become a permanent member of the UNSC.  
 
3.4.3 The Reproduction of China’s identity in Koizumi’s policy toward China  
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Another important reaction against China’s construction of Japanese identity 
would be the reproduction of China’s own identity in foreign policy debate. It was not 
only reconstituted as ‘savage’ and ‘victimizing’ ‘other’, but also used to articulate 
Japan’s new identity by using binary oppositions. In other words, the articulation of 
China as a ‘militaristic’, ‘interfering’ and ‘authoritarian’ state might reinforce Japan’s 
alleged new identity of a ‘peaceful’, ‘respectful of rule of law’, and ‘democratic’ 
nation.  
In order to justify the Yasukuni visits of Prime Minister, any differences 
between Japan and China have been emphasized. At the first stage until late 2004, 
cultural differences rather than its political system or ideology were used to explain 
and justify conflicting understandings over the Yasukuni Shrine. For instance, Koizumi 
argued that the way to console the war dead should vary country to country (NDRP: 
2004-t) and stated that contrary to China, there might be no idea that the sins of the 
dead could not be forgiven in Japanese traditional culture (NDRP: 2004-c). However, 
there can be seen a shift from this focus on cultural differences to the distinctions in 
ideology, values and political system between the two countries. Moreover, the 
reconstruction of China’s radical ‘otherness’ and the emphasis on how it can be a 
‘threat’ to Japan came to be the forefront in China policy discourse.  
‘Threatening’ China had been discursively reformulated in foreign policy debate 
of the pro-Yasukuni group: it is a ‘militaristic’ country with a double-digit increase in 
military expenditure for more than a decade. Koki Kobayashi of the LDP clearly stated 
that this military expansion of China should be interpreted as a serious threat to not 
only Japan but also regional security (NDRP: 2001-a). Foreign Minister Aso stated of 
China in a press conference ‘when one of our neighbors has more than one billion 
population and atomic bombs, and its military expenditure has increased for 17 years, 
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and its contents are extraordinarily opaque, what will happen? It is becoming a 
tremendous threat (Aso 2005-b).’ According to Shigeru Ishiba, a member of the 
Koizumi cabinet, in contrast to ‘democratic’ Japan where transparency concerning 
military and defense strength is always checked, ‘one-party ruled’ China lacks military 
transparency (NDRP: 2004-i). Thus, it was argued that China should be perceived as 
more militaristic and dangerous than Japan, even though it propagates the ‘mythical’ 
argument that militarism has been revived in Japan over the Yasukuni issue. This 
construction of a ‘savage’ and ‘threatening’ China is linked with and strengthened by 
its undemocratic and authoritarian regime.  
In addition, the argument that universal values might not be shared with China 
would have a major importance in the reconstruction of China’s identity. It was 
described as an undemocratic country where freedom and human rights could easily be 
suppressed. This trait might be attributed to its ‘authoritarian’ and ‘single-party 
regime’ in a sharp contrast with ‘democratic’ Japan, which respects universal values. 
In particular, lack of freedom of speech and press was often highlighted when defining 
Chinese society. The LDP lawmaker Hiroshige Seko argued that anti-Japanese 
demonstrations in China showed that there was no freedom of speech or freedom of 
press, but only narratives controlled by the Chinese government (NDRP: 2005-e). 
Overall, China was articulated as a country in which all universal values were not 
respected but rather oppressed.  
The negative image was further strengthened by the Shenyang incident, which 
took place in May 200212. The DPJ lawmaker Jin Matsubara asserted that the Chinese 
government clearly violated the Vienna Convention three times in the recent 
                                                   
12 This was an incident in which a family of North Korean asylum seekers ran into the 
Japanese Consulate General in Shenyang, but was removed from the Consulate’s premises 
by Chinese police guards. 
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relationships with Japan: the intrusion into the Japanese Consulate General in 
Shenyang without warning, the abduction of a family of North Korean asylum seekers, 
and the destructive behavior against the buildings of the Japanese Embassy (NDRP: 
2006-h). Hajime Nakatani of the LDP argued that anti-Japanese movements would 
downgrade China’s international reputation and status because they might show that 
China did not possess the qualities of a responsible major country (NDRP: 2005-d). In 
short, China was articulated as a country, which did not hesitate to violate national 
sovereignty and infringe human rights. Japan’s criticism against violent behavior in 
anti-Japanese demonstrations across China and the Chinese governmental response to 
them reinforced the view of China as ‘unapologetic’ and ‘provocative’ character and 
acting against international law. These constructions were sharply contrasted with 
Japan’s repeated apologies on the history issue and respect for the rule of law. As a 
result, it was insisted that China should be regarded as an ‘untrustworthy’ and 
‘mindless’ country.  
     Taken together, representations of China in foreign policy discourse seem to 
create binary oppositions that form a sharp contrast with Japan, such as 
militaristic-peaceful, authoritarian-democratic, untrustworthy-trustworthy. This had 
two important implications. Firstly, these representations reconstructed not only 
China’s identity but also Japan’s identity. By constructing these binary oppositions, it 
was possible to give meanings to and reconstitute Japan’s identity. Although a concept 
of a ‘peaceful country’, for instance, can be empty as long as it was merely defined as 
a ‘peace-loving’ country, it can be clearly articulated by contrasting it with a 
‘militaristic’ China. In a similar way, the tendency to stress its commitment to 
universal values like freedom and democracy would be all the more significant when 
some countries can share these values and some can not. It was this idea that led to the 
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policy of the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ designed by the diplomat Shotaro Yachi 
and proposed by Foreign Minister Aso in the Abe administration.  
 
3.5 The construction of reality  
     
     In accordance with identity constructions discussed above, a certain kind of 
‘reality’ was constructed in foreign policy discourse. There can be seen double 
‘realities’: that the Chinese government manipulated the Yasukuni Shrine issue as a 
‘diplomatic card’ in a self-serving way and; that China disregarded the peaceful 
development and contribution of postwar Japan and thereby negated Japan’s identity as 
a ‘peaceful country’.  
     The constructions of China’s identity allowed the Koizumi administration to 
shape a certain reality that China maneuvered the history issue to hold Japan 
responsible for the deterioration of the Japan-China relationship and benefited from it.  
Some anti-China lawmakers claimed that China tended to exclusively focus on the 
prewar history issue and represent Japan as a ‘savage’ militaristic nation in order to 
emphasize the legitimacy of the CCP regime. In their thought, the soured relationship 
between Japan and China itself might not be a diplomatic crisis because they 
considered the conventional ‘friendship framework’ since the normalization in 1972 
not to be at ‘normal’ relationship. As the Chinese side exploited the existing 
framework, according to Akira Imaizumi of the DPJ, the proponents of the Yasukuni 
Shrine group argued that it allowed China to interfere with Japan’s domestic issues, 
especially how history is viewed (NDRP: 2006-d). In addition, they also thought that 
the anti-Japanese demonstrations were an outlet for frustrations against tremendous 
material disparity and lack of freedom. Thus, it was China’s identity as ‘self-righteous’, 
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‘anti-Japanese’, and ‘authoritarian’ that caused anti-Japanese movements in order to 
blockade Japan’s identity. From this perspective, Japan might not be responsible for 
the deterioration of the bilateral Japan-Sino relationship because it was not the 
Yasukuni visit itself but China due to its manipulation of the Yasukuni issue or other 
history issues as a ‘diplomatic card’13. 
     While China blamed Japan for the deterioration of relations and the rise of the 
anti-Japanese movement, Foreign Minister Aso declared that ‘it cannot be acceptable 
to admit that Japan should take all the responsibility to improve the current situation 
(NDRP: 2006-f).’ Koizumi himself would not admit that his visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine damaged the bilateral relationship with China (NDRP: 2004-h, 2004-u). He 
repeatedly criticized China by arguing that it would not be reasonable to hinder the 
Japan-China summits and damage the whole Japan-China relationship by only the 
Yasukuni issue (NDRP: 2004-w). At this point, Robert Novak (2004) reported that 
Koizumi told him ‘I think to advance this perception of Japan as a rival and to create a 
sense of “anti-Japanese” in China would be advantageous to the Chinese leadership.’ 
In other words, China deliberately utilized the Yasukuni Shrine issue to inflame the 
anti-Japanese feelings in its own country to take advantage in diplomatic relations with 
Japan. Thus, in Koizumi’s logic, it was not him but China that should take 
responsibility for the deterioration of Japan-China relationship and the Yasukuni issue.  
In this articulation of a ‘reality’, China was represented as a country, which often 
interfered with Japan’s domestic affairs by utilizing the history issue as a ‘diplomatic 
card’, depicting Japan as a country whose sovereignty could be infringed upon because 
of its historical burden. In sum, Japan was represented as a ‘victim’ rather than 
‘victimizer’ and, instead, China was depicted as a ‘victimizer’ of Japan. Therefore, 
                                                   
13 Michio Sato of the DPJ, for instance, claimed that anti-Japanese movements were ‘ traps 
planned by the Chinese government.’ (NDRP: 2005-g).  
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these constructions of the ‘reality’ and subjects could marginalize any policy to make 
concessions on the Yasukuni issue to immediately improve the relationship with China 
and could be used to legitimize instead to advocate Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine. 
     Another construction of a ‘reality’ by the Koizumi administration was that 
China’s criticism against Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine was interpreted not 
only as the condemnation of the justification of prewar Japan’s aggression and the 
resurgence of militarism, but as the negation of postwar Japan’s development as a 
‘peaceful country’. Until this time, the conventional counterargument against China’s 
criticism on the history issue had mainly been objection to China meddling with 
Japan’s internal affairs or the accusation that China’s argument might be based on 
distorted historical facts. At this moment, however, it came to be highlighted as a focus 
of a broader debate on how to evaluate the path of postwar Japan. According to this 
narrative, China might have misunderstood that Koizumi’s worship at the Yasukuni 
Shrine meant that militarism and aggression were romanticized because it refused to 
recognize that postwar Japan had followed a path of a ‘peaceful nation’.  
     Japan’s consequent frustration against the negation of its ‘pacifist’ development 
would be expressed even in diplomatic negotiations. When Chinese ambassador to 
Japan Wang Yi sharply criticized Japan on the history issue, Yukio Takeuchi, a vice 
minister of foreign affairs of the time, retorted that  
 
I could not agree with you on China’s exclusive focus on the prewar history 
because postwar Japan also has a history of sixty years. Japan has devoted itself 
to world and regional peace. Which country in the world would have a fear of 
Japan’s military attack? It is impossible to gain wide support from Japanese 
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people on this matter without impartial appraisal of this fact (Yomiuri Shimbun 
Seizibu 2006: 259).  
 
In addition, Foreign Minister Machimura reiterated Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity that 
justified its bid for the UNSC. In response to his counterpart Li Zhaoxing, who refused 
apology for the ‘destructive activities’ of the anti-Japanese movements and 
problematized Japan’s stance on the history issues, Machimura countered that Japan’s 
evaluation as a ‘peaceful nation’ had been established based on its sincere reflection on 
the past, which provided a firm enough reason for it to become a permanent member of 
the UNSC (Asahi Shimbun: 2005-b). 
Furthermore, from Japan’s point of view, China’s criticism of the prime 
ministerial worship at the Yasukuni Shrine was interpreted by the Koizumi 
administration as a part of an international anti-Japanese campaign. For instance, 
Hitoshi Tanaka, a prominent diplomat in the administration, noticed that Prime 
Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni might provide China and South Korea with 
an excellent excuse to oppose Japan’s bid for membership of the UNSC (Tanaka 2009: 
152). He points out that China manipulated the Yasukuni issue and insisted that Japan 
was a provocative and self-righteous country which could not be trusted in order to 
hinder Japan’s bid for the reform of the UN Security Council and a permanent seat in 
the UN Security Council in 2005 (Tanaka 2009: 151). In other words, it was 
interpreted that China attempted to block Japan’s realization of its identity as a 
‘peaceful nation’.  
     In addition, there has been a growing frustration that postwar Japan’s 
contribution to peace and stability in the region through initiatives such as its large 
amount of ODA programme towards China might not be rightly understood or 
 121 
appreciated. For instance, Hiroshi Takano of the Komei Party argued that 
anti-Japanese movements might not have erupted in China if Japan’s ODA had been 
profoundly appreciated by the Chinese people (NDRP: 2006-c). Since the ODA 
program was regarded as a central tool for Japan’s international contribution as a 
‘peaceful country’, China’s ungratefulness could be interpreted as the negation of 
Japan’s preferred identity. As a result, discontent that China would not recognize 
postwar Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’ came to the forefront in the foreign 
policy argument.  
This situation can be explained in theoretical terms by using the concept of 
‘social antagonism’ that is introduced by Laclau and Mouffe (1985). This is something 
that occurs because subjects are not able to attain their identities when ‘the presence of 
the ‘other’ prevents me from being totally myself (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 125)’. In 
other words, the negation and the blockade of identity gave rise to social antagonism 
against the ‘other’ because social agents construct an ‘enemy’ who is deemed 
responsible for this ‘failure’ (Torfing 1999: 120, Howard 2000: 105). Playing a role of 
‘constitutive outside’, antagonisms thus would shape a subject’s identity, especially 
conflict with a radical ‘other’ with purely a negative identity, and social relations 
between social agents by emphasizing friend-foe divisions based on ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ formation. In this case, there can be seen an argument that the development 
and the realization of Japan’s postwar identity as a ‘peaceful nation’ was negated and 
blocked by China’s construction of its desired identity. Therefore, this negation and 
blockade of postwar Japan’s identity formation by China might give rise to social 
antagonism in Japan, which constituted and strengthened the ‘friend-foe’ division line. 
In this context, Japan can be described as a ‘victim’ and China as a ‘victimizer’, which 
could legitimize Koizumi’s policy choice of adopting an uncompromising attitude 
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towards China.   
 
3.6 The legitimization of Koizumi’s policy toward China  
 
These representations of China above could allow Japanese political leaders to 
legitimize a certain policy toward it and marginalize other policy choice. In this case, 
representations of China were used to justify Koizumi’s uncompromising attitude 
toward China despite the improvement of the bilateral relationship that was necessary 
to move forward on other critical issues on the diplomatic agenda, such as the bid for 
the UNSC. There were three main components in this foreign policy discourse used to 
legitimize Koizumi’s uncompromising stance: self-victimization, social antagonism, 
and binary oppositions.  
First of all, China was blamed for paralyzing the entire Japan-Sino relationship 
by clinging to the Yasukuni issue. In this discourse, the basic framework was that 
Japan is victimized by China; China manipulated the history issue for its own sake, 
violated Japan’s sovereignty, promoted anti-Japanese education and even negated 
Japan’s postwar identity; on the other hand, Japan was a genuinely ‘innocent’ ‘victim’. 
Japan should not be blamed for triggering anti-Japanese demonstrations because the 
primary cause can be found not on Japan’s side but in Chinese society; its 
anti-Japanese education to maintain the CCP legitimacy. On that point, it can be 
argued that Koizumi might seek to amend the conventional framework of the 
Japan-China relationship, in which the relationship was liable to be shaken by China’s 
manipulation of the ‘history card’. According to Funabashi (2011: 89), Koizumi 
refused to accept China’s claim in order for China to relinquish its maneuver of the 
Yasukuni Shrine issue as a ‘diplomatic card’. In order to achieve it, he believed that, 
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such an experience that Japan fall into temporal stagnation in diplomacy with China 
was necessary in the long run. Hitoshi Tanaka also mentioned that Koizumi insisted 
that he would continue to visit the Shrine to make China give up the manipulation of 
the history issue as a bargaining chip (Tanaka and Tahara 2007: 36, Tanaka 2009: 152). 
Furthermore, in November 2002, Koizumi’s ‘Task Force on Foreign Relations’ 
released its report, ’Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century 
New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy’. This report articulated that the relationship 
with China was ‘the most important theme in Japan's foreign policy at the outset of the 
21st century’ (Task Force on Foreign Relations: 2002). Among its policy 
recommendations, the report called on the Japanese government to sincerely face the 
history issue, and the Chinese government to acknowledge postwar Japan’s 
development and to quit anti-Japanese education. Most notably, it recommended to 
both governments that ‘while drawing lessons from history, it is time they liberated 
themselves from an "enchantment with history" and aimed for a future oriented 
relationship’. From this, the primary focus of Koizumi’s China policy was to make 
China abandon the ‘history card’ in its diplomatic relationship with Japan and establish 
a new framework. Therefore, his uncompromising stance on the Yasukuni issue was 
justified by claiming that it was necessary to overcome a conventionally fragile 
‘friendship’ and to achieve a more firm and ‘future-oriented’ relationship with China. 
Secondly, social antagonism produced by China’s negation of postwar Japan’s 
national identity as a peaceful country might play an important role to legitimize 
Koizumi’s policy and marginalize other policy options. As the Yasukuni issue was 
regarded as a matter of how Japan’s postwar development as a peaceful nation was 
evaluated in China, it was no longer just the history issue but an identity problem. 
Koizumi asserted that even if he had made a concession to China and relinquished a 
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visit to the Shrine, which might warm up the bilateral friendship, it might be 
inappropriate as Japan’s diplomacy (NDRP: 2006-a). Japan should not concede to 
China because foreign policy was a practice of representing national identity. Koizumi 
later stated that his visit to Yasukuni might symbolize Japan as being a liberal and 
democratic country in which freedom of thought was guaranteed. Therefore, 
concession on the Yasukuni issue cannot be made because it would mean Japan admits 
the negation of its identity. In addition, this social antagonism provided an outlet for 
traditional resentment against China among the right-wing traditionalists on the history 
issue, which Koizumi could maneuver as his political capital. In this way, China’s 
negation of Japan’s identity gave rise to social antagonism in Japan, which would 
legitimize an uncompromising approach to China and marginalize a conciliatory policy 
to it.    
     Finally, according to anti-Chinese discourse, the differences between the two 
countries were interpreted to be so radical that the ‘other’ China could not be 
assimilated with the identity of the ‘self’ Japan. In addition, there might be a 
hierarchical relationship within the binary oppositions; ‘peaceful’ might be treated as 
morally superior to ‘militaristic’, ‘democracy’ can enjoy an advantage over 
‘authoritarian’ and so forth. Therefore, it was argued that Japan was not only 
‘different’ from China but also had a moral advantage. In this respect, Japan needed 
not underestimate itself in international society and should not make concession on the 
Yasukuni issue to China because it might hold a superior positioning from an ethical 
standpoint. 
     What should be noted here is that although binary oppositions were also used to 
justify conflicting attitudes mainly by the anti-Chinese group. However, the Koizumi 
cabinet seemed to be careful not to put too much emphasis on radical difference 
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between Japan and China. Koizumi and his cabinet members, even Shinzo Abe when 
he was a cabinet minister, did not explicitly focus on those radical differences. 
Although they seemed to exploit the effects of emphasizing such radical differences, 
they limited themselves to only highlighting representations of Japan as a liberal 
democracy. This might be because the Koizumi administration sought to find a way to 
improve the Japan-China relationship without making concessions on the Yasukuni 
issue. If radical differences and dissimilarity were exclusively stressed, there might 
have been no room to negotiate for the rapprochement. However, Koizumi’s argument 
might imply that the improvement of the bilateral relationship could only be set out 
when the Chinese government would acknowledge Japan’s postwar development as a 
‘peaceful nation’. Actually, from May 2005, the Koizumi administration started the 
‘Japan-China comprehensive policy dialogue’ to get a foothold on the improvement of 
the Japan-Sino relations, which actually put in place the conditions for the remarkable 
rapprochement that took place in the next Abe administration. Taken together, from 
Tokyo’s perspective, it can be argued that the rhetorical justification of the Koizumi 
administration and its uncompromising policy toward China might have actually been 
designed to make room for the rapprochement under Abe.   
 
3.7 Conclusion  
 
     It has been a matter of debate why Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was so 
uncompromising over visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in the face of 
expected domestic and international criticism. The prime ministerial visits to the shrine 
might be irrational insofar as a diplomatic row might be unavoidable with those 
countries. From the diplomatic point of view, Japan needed close cooperation with 
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China and South Korea to settle the North Korean issue and to achieve a permanent 
seat in the United Nations Security Council. This section has attempted to explain such 
apparent irrationality by exploring how Koizumi manipulated the Yasukuni issue and 
what kind of Japanese national identity was reconstructed in the rhetorical justification 
of his administration’s uncompromising policy toward China. Through an intensive 
debate on the Yasukuni issue, China’s criticism constructed a vision of a ‘militaristic’ 
‘unrepentant’ and ‘irresponsible’ Japan, which was used to counter Japan’s bid for the 
UNSC. In order to resist and reverse these representations, Japanese political leaders 
tried to articulate their country as a ‘peaceful’, ‘responsible’ democracy with deep 
remorse for its past. At the same time, they also reproduced China’s identity as a 
‘militaristic’, ‘unapologetic’, ‘authoritarian’ country, aiming at highlighting the sharp 
contrast with Japan. These binary schemes allowed Koizumi to provide a moral 
advantage to Japan, representing it as an ‘innocent victim’ of the ‘savage’ ‘threatening’ 
China. In addition, the Yasukuni Shrine was treated not as a place where prewar 
militarism was whitewashed and supported, but a place where Japanese political 
leaders renew their pledge of no war. In this context, Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine was articulated as evidence that shows postwar Japan as a ‘peaceful nation’ 
which reflects its past and renews a pledge not to commit war again in front of the war 
victims.  
     This representation of the Yasukuni issue was regarded as more than just 
‘interference in domestic affairs’, which was often claimed by the traditional 
right-wing nationalists of Japan. China’s criticism against Koizumi’s visit to the shrine 
was thus interpreted as a negation of postwar Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’, 
which would give rise to social antagonism. Coupled with construction of China’s 
identity as a country, which utilized the history issue as a ‘diplomatic card’, social 
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antagonism was manipulated to justify Koizumi’s uncompromising policy to China 
and marginalize other policy choices, such as making concessions on the Yasukuni 
issue. Koizumi also manipulated this social antagonism as an outlet for frustrations of 
anti-Chinese groups, which could be utilized to offset their discontents against 
Koizumi’s policy toward North Korea. From this perspective, the Yasukuni issue 
might not be a symbol of the rise of traditional right-wing nationalism. Rather, it 
seemed to be exploited as a catalyst to reconstitute and reinforce Japan’s national 
identity as it seeks to expand its role in international society and Koizumi’s political 
capital in domestic politics. 
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Chapter 4. Case study 2: Nationalism and Foreign Policy toward 
North Korea under the Koizumi administration 
 
                                                         
     Japan’s foreign policy toward North Korea had a great importance in Koizumi’s 
East Asian diplomacy as well as the Yasukuni Shrine issue in relation to the rise of 
nationalism. Both the ‘abduction issue’ and the ‘Yasukuni issue’ have been regarded as 
symbols of the resurgence of Japan’s nationalism in the 2000s. While some scholars 
and observers appreciate Koizumi’s North Korean foreign policy including his visits to 
Pyongyang as notable diplomatic accomplishments (Tanaka 2007-b: 273), it is also 
pointed out that the North Korean problem, in particular, the abduction issue caused 
not only strong resentments against the country but also a sense of ‘self-victimization’ 
among the Japanese people (Lee 2004). As a result, the North Korean issue triggered a 
remarkable upsurge in debate over postwar foreign policy toward the DPRK and of 
how postwar Japan has developed. In such circumstances, public opinion was 
dominated by a hard-line approach claiming a need for stiff sanctions with an 
uncompromising attitude. The Koizumi administration, however, generally tended to 
adopt a conciliatory attitude toward North Korea while there could be seen a rise of 
hard-line discourse in the public and in the Diet. What is more, this made a stark 
contrast to his unyielding China policy. In short, he seemed to juggle apparently 
contradicting foreign policies in East Asia; taking a tough stance to China, which was 
supported by the right-wing or conservative camp, and pursuing a ‘normalization’ 
policy towards North Korea, which was opposed by the same group at the same time. 
Therefore, it can be argued that Koizumi used a different logic to legitimize his North 
Korea policy in manipulating the abduction issue and the entire North Korea issue.  
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       From this perspective, this chapter tries to explore what made it possible for 
Koizumi to take this conciliatory approach toward North Korea, and how Koizumi 
manipulated the North Korea issue and legitimized it in accordance with nationalistic 
rhetoric by articulating national identity. My argument is as follows: it is true that a 
‘dialogue school’ including Koizumi himself constructed the North Korean identity as 
a ‘threatening other’ like the ‘pressure school’. However, Koizumi did not treat the 
abduction issue as Japan’s identity crisis and treated North Korea as, at least, a 
‘negotiable other’, with whom Japan could have common interests. Furthermore, he 
implied that Japan could realize its role as a ‘peaceful country’ with a more proactive 
initiative in Northeast Asia through normalization of Japan-DPRK relationships and its 
proactive engagement with a regional multinational security framework. Japan’s 
identity as a ‘peaceful nation’ might not be threatened but reinforced through engaging 
the North Korean issue, in a way very different from dealing with the Yasukuni Shrine 
issue with China. One reason may be that Japan could sustain a moral superiority in 
international society as Japan can be an ‘innocent victim’ of the North Korean missile, 
nuclear development, and abduction issues even when it made a concession towards 
Pyongyang. In sum, the Koizumi administration could assume a conciliatory attitude 
toward North Korea because it would not treat North Korea as an identity threat and 
considered it to be a measure to break a sense of diplomatic stagnation. In addition, by 
promoting the dialogue and negotiation on normalization of the Japan-North Korea 
relationship, it sought to reconstruct Japan’s identity, which might be suitable for 
playing a more proactive role in the region.  
      This section first explains the conflicting discourses over foreign policy toward 
North Korea in the Diet, and examines Koizumi’s policy. Then, it scrutinizes how the 
identity of Japan and North Korea were constituted in foreign policy discourse and 
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how a certain ‘reality’ was shaped. Finally, it looks at how Koizumi’s policy was 
legitimized relying on the construction of identities and a reality.  
 
4.1 The divisions on the North Korea issue in the Parliament  
 
4.1.1 The Dialogue School  
 
     There has existed two competing discourses on the North Korea issue in the 
foreign policy debate in the Japanese Diet: a pro-engagement group and a 
confrontation group. Funabashi (2007: 58) describes the former as a ‘dialogue school’ 
and the latter as a ‘pressure school’. The former group supported normalization of 
diplomatic ties with North Korea because it is the ‘only country with which postwar 
Japan has not restored its formal relationship’. Most members of this group opposed 
Koizumi’s worship at the Yasukuni Shrine because of diplomatic consideration. They 
insisted that the Japanese government should engage in dialogue with North Korea 
with patience based on the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. They have taken a 
cautious stance toward the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea 
considering its effectiveness on them. For instance, Natsuo Yamaguchi of the Komei 
Party insisted in the Diet session that the Japanese government should not be 
exclusively devoted to pressure and sanctions as the only policy options against North 
Korea (NDRP: 2002-c). Although sanctions might be effective to some extent, 
however, at the same time, the ‘dialogue school’ thought that it was more likely that 
North Korea might harden their attitude, which would result in a stalemate in the 
negotiations to resolve diplomatic issues. Katsuhiko Yokomichi of the SDP argued that 
the Japanese government should continue negotiations for normalization because it 
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might not be possible to uncover the full scope of the abduction issue and to urge 
North Korea to drop its nuclear program without dialogues (NDRP: 2002-k). While 
they recognized that the development and deployment of a North Korean missile 
system and nuclear weapons were direct and critical threats for Japan’s security, the 
pro-engagement school sought a way to settle the problems by diplomatic dialogues in 
a bilateral and multilateral framework.  
 
4.1.2 The pressure school  
 
On the other hand, the ‘pressure school’ or confrontation school basically 
opposed to a normalized diplomatic relationship because of various ‘threats’, which the 
DPRK poses to Japan. Most members of this school are anti-Chinese and promote a 
prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. The main arguments and members of 
this school mostly coincide with those of the traditional rightwing nationalists. They 
specifically highlight the abductions of Japanese nationals by North Korea claiming 
that these cases would be the violation of Japan’s sovereignty. They often claim that 
their government should not hesitate to implement economic sanctions as a form of 
diplomatic leverage. While Japan was, in their discourse, a genuine ‘victim’ of North 
Korea, the postwar Japanese governments just overlooked this fact at the expense of 
the security of their nationals. Hence, members of this school have insisted that the 
Japanese government should restore its sovereignty, national dignity, and ties between 
nations and the state by demonstrating an uncompromising attitude against North 
Korea. The imposition of economic sanction would be one of the most suitable 
measures for affirming Japan’s stance. As Abe is a prominent member of the ‘pressure 
school’, a later chapter on North Korean policy of the Abe administration will explore 
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more on this discourse. 
   
4.2 Koizumi’s policy toward North Korea  
 
     Koizumi attempted to normalize relations with North Korea based on the 
Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration with a ‘comprehensive approach’ emphasizing 
both ‘dialogue and pressure’. Vice Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi under the 
Koizumi administration explained Japan’s basic principles toward North Korea saying 
that the Japanese government would put emphasis on both ‘dialogue and pressure’, as 
well as a peaceful and diplomatic resolution, as well as a multilateral approach, closely 
working with other countries (NDRP: 2005-m). This policy made sharp contrast with 
one of the hard-line camps and sometimes seemed to be more conciliatory than the 
policy toward China, or the policy of the Abe administration. In this respect, 
normalization of diplomatic relations with the DPRK might be interpreted as an effort 
to realize Japan’s identity as a ‘peacemaker’ in the Korean Peninsula. The following 
section explains the policy the Koizumi administration pursued and how it was 
justified. 
 
4.2.1 The policy for diplomatic normalization  
 
     The basic stance of Koizumi’s foreign policy toward North Korea was ‘to realize 
normalization through resolving concerns based on the Pyongyang Declaration’ 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002, 2003, 2004). Foreign minister Yoriko Kawaguchi 
clearly argued that the purpose of normalization between Japan and the DPRK was to 
correct the ‘abnormal relations’ and also to contribute to the peace and security of 
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Japan, the region and even the world (NDRP: 2002-n). While it generally tended to be 
thought of as more ‘nationalistic’, Koizumi’s stance toward North Korea would 
actually be closer to the ‘dialogue school’ than to the ‘pressure school,’ considering 
this point. Koizumi repeatedly stressed that to achieve diplomatic normalization would 
be a ‘seriously important task as an politician’ (NDRP: 2004-n). In fact, an attempt to 
normalize relationships with North Korea itself would be the kind of policy that the 
traditional right-wing nationalists would find difficult to accept. Rather, as Funabashi 
(2007:14) points out, the right wing should be repugnant toward Koizumi’s effort to 
seek normalization of diplomatic relations with DPRK. As noted earlier, Wakamiya 
(2006: 19) revealed that after the first visit to North Korea, Koizumi himself told him 
that his visit to North Korea had generated fewer backlashes from the right-wingers 
than had expected. Koizumi made a guess that it might be partly because they 
appreciated the fact that he had visited the Yasukuni Shrine. Put it in another way, 
effort to normalize relations with Pyongyang was regarded as an engagement policy, 
which was likely to cause vehemence from the traditional right-wingers. Therefore, 
Koizumi should offset those discontents among opponents by other foreign policy 
choices in order to achieve this policy. 
     Since the DPRK issue has been an important task for postwar Japan’s diplomacy, 
the LDP governments in the postwar era tried to launch normalization negotiations 
several times but all of those attempts turned out to be failures. However, according to 
Hitoshi Tanaka, who was in charge of negotiations with North Korea during a large 
part of Koizumi’s premiership, the Koizumi administration could enjoy a good 
opportunity for conducting normalization negotiations due to favorable domestic and 
international conditions. Tanaka argues that it was partly because of the fact that Japan 
obtained deterrent power to some extent. Japan had been able to prepare for the 
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possibility of a new war on the Korean Peninsula and had established basic deterrent 
power by way of the New Guideline for Japan-US defense cooperation in 1997, as well 
as the ‘Law concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations 
in the Areas Surrounding Japan’ in 1999 (Tanaka 2005: 24, 2009: 99)1. This deterrent 
power made it possible for Japan to negotiate with North Korea toward normalization. 
In addition, rapprochement between North Korea and South Korea and the hard-line 
policy of the US worked to establish favorable conditions for Japan. As the 
North-South relationship was positive due to the ‘Sunshine policy’ of President Kim 
Dae Jung, the Japanese government held the view that South Korea might support 
Japan’s rapprochement with North Korea (Tanaka 2005: 24-5). Akaha (2007: 300) 
argues that Japan was encouraged by a visible improvement in North-South Korean 
relations, which culminated in the summit between President Kim and Chairman Kim 
in June 2000. In contrast, US President Bush labeled North Korea as one of the ‘axis of 
evil’ in his State of the Union Address on 1 February 2002 and did not hesitate to 
express its unfavorable stance. This impelled North Korea to approach Japan to act as a 
go-between. Therefore, all those conditions could pave the way for negotiations for 
normalization with North Korea under the Koizumi administration. 
               
4.2.2 Emphasis on dialogue  
    
     Another feature of North Korean policy of the Koizumi administration was its 
basic stance, which was called ‘dialogue and pressure’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2006). In sharp contrast with the pressure school, which has single-mindedly been 
                                                   
1 Tanaka argues that it was not the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 but the first Korean 
Peninsula Nuclear crisis that urged the Japanese government to pursue the New Guideline 
(Tanaka 2004: 24, 111). He also expressed that the New Guideline was intended to be a 
scenario for an emergency situation in the Korean Peninsula (2009: 99). 
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demanding tough sanctions against North Korea, the basic stance of the Koizumi 
administration was to put emphasis not only on ‘pressure’ but also on ‘dialogue’ with a 
‘comprehensive approach’ although Koizumi stated that both dialogue and pressure 
would be necessary (NDRP: 2004-a). Koizumi was consistent in his emphasis on 
dialogues, arguing that economic sanction might be a possible option, but he never 
thought of ‘sanction first’ (NDRP: 2004-s and 2005-a). The Koizumi cabinet 
maintained a cautious stance on imposing economic sanctions even after the 
intensification of collisions between the dialogue school and the pressure school 
because of the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT and when public opinion in 
Japanese society became hardened against the country over the abduction issue. 
Whereas the confrontation group insisted that the Japanese government should break 
off negotiation with North Korea when it demonstrated ‘dishonest behavior’ on the 
abduction issue and on the missile issue, Koizumi stated that the window for the 
negotiations would be kept open. It should be noted that when a hard-line policy was 
conducted, a conciliatory policy was implemented at the same time. For example, 
while the amendment of Japan’s Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, 
aimed at allowing economic sanctions against North Korea2, but the Koizumi cabinet 
postponed the enforcement of this law and announced Koizumi’s second visit to 
Pyongyang. Furthermore, Koizumi declared that he would not exercise sanction as 
long as North Korea observes the Pyongyang Declaration. Isao Matsuyama, a Foreign 
Vice-Minister at that time, explained Koizumi’s decision that the imposition of 
economic sanction might not be the most effective option at the moment (NDRP: 
2004-l). In this way, the Koizumi administration remained with a conciliatory attitude 
by putting emphasis on dialogue rather than sanctions. 
                                                   
2 The amendment to the foreign exchange law enabled Japan to take sanctions against the 
DPRK if necessary without a UN resolution.  
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4.2.3 The Pyongyang Declaration and the ‘comprehensive approach’  
 
It was the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration, which Koizumi and Kim 
Jong-Il signed after their first meeting in September 2002, and which had been a 
cornerstone of Koizumi’s foreign policy toward North Korea. Yet, it also was the 
subject of criticism from the pressure school in several respects. The hard-liners 
accused the Pyongyang Declaration of being too soft on North Korea because it did not 
contain any clause in which the DPRK promised to settle the abduction issue, the 
development of missiles and nuclear weapons. What is more, the confrontation school 
sharply criticized that the Declaration seemed to state that Japan would provide 
compensation acknowledging its responsibility for the prewar colonial rule. On the 
other hand, Koizumi seemed to be inclined to it even when North Korea’s ‘betrayal’ 
such as its withdrawal from the NPT regime was revealed. He promised at the second 
summit that Japan would not invoke sanctions on DPRK as long as it observes the 
Pyongyang Declaration (NDRP: 2004-j).  
     What is notable in on the Pyongyang Declaration might be that both 
governments should strive to resolve all the ‘concerns’ based on the Declaration. 
Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi explained that the word ‘concerns’ in the 
Declaration includes all the problems existing between Japan and North Korea such as 
the abduction issue, nuclear arms and the missile problem, and the settlement of 
prewar colonial rule (NDRP: 2002-l). Put in another way, this stance is often called a 
‘comprehensive approach’. Hitoshi Tanaka (2009: 100, 108) explained that since North 
Korea issue contains a number of serious tasks directly connected with national interest, 
from the abduction issue to the past settlement, and national interest would not be 
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monolithic’, ‘settlement of all issues are vital’. This indicates that this word seemed to 
be used to demonstrate that the Japanese government would not leave any one of those 
problems unresolved. In other words, Japan would not focus exclusively on one issue 
and ignore others, which was different from the pressure school whose emphasis was 
put only on the abduction issue.  
     In this respect, it seems that the usage of a ‘comprehensive approach’ was 
manipulated depending on time and situation. Although the Koizumi administration 
focused on the abduction issue in the first phase, it started to highlight both the 
abduction issue and nuclear problems after the summit with president Bush and the 
meeting with the US Assistant Secretary of State, James Kelly (Sankei Shimbun: 2002). 
At this time, ‘comprehensive’ could be used to show that Japan would pay much 
attention not only to the abduction issue, which was of domestic importance, but also 
to the North Korean nuclear problem, which was an international security concern. 
Later, when security concerns came to the front it was used for domestic appeal, to 
ensure that the Japanese government would not set aside the abduction issue. For 
instance, Koizumi insisted to ‘comprehensively’ resolve concerns and stated that since 
the abduction issue was closely related to Japan’s security, Japan would not attempt to 
settle the nuclear problem first (Koizumi 2005-e). Thus, it can be argued that a 
‘comprehensive approach’ was utilized by Koizumi to appeal to different actors. 
     Furthermore, a ‘comprehensive approach’ might be used to avoid making North 
Korea feel that Japan entered into negotiation only to resolve the abduction issue. 
Hitoshi Tanaka repeatedly emphasized that Japan should avoid giving the impression 
that its focus was exclusively on the resolution of the abduction issue not to hamper 
North Korea from moving toward negotiations (Tanaka 2005: 36). He explained that 
the exclusive focus on the abduction issue might not solve the entire Japan-DPRK 
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problem and even the abduction issue itself. It would be needed to ensure the benefit of 
normalization as a result of the resolution of the abduction issue because ‘mutual 
benefit is a premise of diplomacy’ (Tanaka 2005: 36). According to Tanaka, Japan 
should persuade North Korea to take a big step on the abduction issue or the nuclear 
issue, specifically demonstrating its benefit after normalization (2009: 204-5). In line 
with Tanaka’s idea, Koizumi also argued that North Korea’s becoming a member of 
international society, which might be necessary for normalization, would be beneficial 
for the DPRK itself, needless to say, for peace and stability of Japan and the world 
(NDRP: 2002-k). The Prime Minister repeatedly noted that he had told Chairman Kim 
that the biggest benefit for North Korea would be to become a responsible member of 
international society (NDRP: 2004-e)’. In other words, the Koizumi administration 
attempted to solve the abduction issue as a part of the whole diplomatic negotiation 
process with North Korea based on mutual benefits.  
     Taken together, it can be argued that the Koizumi administration primarily 
sought to achieve normalization of its diplomatic ties with North Korea based on the 
Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration. Considering Koizumi’s emphasis on dialogue 
rather than imposing sanctions together, his approach seems closer to a stance of the 
engagement school rather than the pressure school. Therefore, Prime Minister had to 
deal with discontents among opponents by coping with other issues. 
 
4.3 The construction of national identity in foreign policy discourse  
 
     It can be argued that Japan’s national identity was discursively reconstructed 
through the reconstruction of North Korea’s identity, similar to Chinese case discussed 
in the last chapter. In other words, Japan’s national identity was reshaped and 
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reinforced through binary oppositions concerning identities of the two countries. 
Although there were some common descriptions about North Korea between the 
dialogue school and the pressure school, however, the usage and connotations of these 
articulations were different from each other. In what follows, this section tries to 
uncover what kind of identities were constructed in foreign policy discourse, focusing 
on the arguments of the ‘dialogue school’, in which Koizumi, his cabinet member, and 
the MOFA made efforts to settle issues with North Korea through dialogues and to 
negotiate toward normalization. 
 
4.3.1 The constructions of North Korea in the dialogue school discourse  
      
     The Koizumi cabinet and the dialogue school recognized the difference between 
the political regime of Japan and North Korea and described the latter as 
‘authoritarian’ or ‘tyrannical’. For example, Katsuhiko Yoshimitsu, a lawmaker of the 
Social Democratic Party, who insisted on the importance of dialogues for the 
negotiations, also described North Korea as an ‘authoritarian’ (NDRP: 2002-k). In 
addition, looking at descriptions on North Korea in the Diplomatic Blue Book 2003, it 
argued ‘Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Korea Worker’s Party, controls all of 
North Korea mainly through the Korea Worker’s Party and has been implementing a 
“military-first policy” (Songun Policy). Furthermore, the party advocates the 
construction of a “powerful nation “that is a major power in terms of ideology, politics, 
the military and the economy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003: 24).  
     Indeed, it was true that members of the dialogue school depicted North Korea as 
a ‘military state’ and a ‘threat’ due to its nuclear proliferation and the Koizumi 
government observed that North Korea had implemented a ‘military-first policy’. The 
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MOFA stated that ‘The North Korean nuclear issue is not only a direct threat to the 
peace and stability of the Northeast Asian region, including Japan, but also a serious 
challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime (MOFA 2005: 21).’ 
Koizumi himself also argued that the nuclear development by North Korea was a threat 
to Japan’s security and thus was unacceptable (NDRP: 2004-j). What should be 
mentioned here, however, is that it was not the identity of North Korea itself but its 
nuclear and military development that was represented as a ‘threat’ to Japan. Koizumi 
did not represent the current regime of North Korea as an ‘enemy’ or as an ‘identity 
threat’ to Japan. Therefore, he never argued that a regime change in the DPRK would 
be either desirable, or essential for normalization.    
     In addition to these points, there can be seen some representations which only 
the dialogue school employed. First, North Korea was the only country that Japan has 
not reached normalization of relations, which was a historical task of postwar Japan. 
The dialogue school tended to emphasized this point more than the other group. For 
example, a diplomat Hitoshi Tanaka, who was a Koizumi’s right hand on East Asian 
diplomacy in his tenure, argued that successive Directors for North East Asian Affairs 
of Japan’s MOFA have sought avenues for normalization of a relations with North 
Korea because it has been a major task of postwar Japan’s diplomacy (2009: 48). 
Lawmaker Seiken Akamine of the JCP maintained that North Korea was the only 
country with which Japan has not settle its past legacy, and that normalization with the 
DPRK should be considered as a question of ‘settlement of Japan’s colonial rule in the 
Korean Peninsula’ and thus ‘an issue of historical responsibility, in which prewar 
Japan committed aggressive war in the Asia-Pacific, causing WWⅡ, and postwar 
Japan has not settled its past (NDRP: 2004-d)’. In this narrative, Japan was articulated 
as a ‘past colonial ruler’, who has not settle its history responsibility while North 
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Korea was a ‘victim of prewar Japan’. As referred to later, it is regarded as an 
underlying cause of the ‘abnormal relationship’ between the two countries. North 
Korea can be seen, in this context, rather as an ‘abnormal’ country.   
     In addition, economic grievances such as food and energy shortage in North 
Korea were often highlighted. According to the Diplomatic Blue Book 2003 (MOFA 
2004: 42), despite an effort to reconstruct its economy, economic conditions in North 
Korea remained in a difficult situation and the energy shortages were thought to be a 
‘grave situation’. It continues to argue that ‘there continues to be a food shortage, and 
assistance from foreign countries is still necessary’. The increase in ‘North Korean 
defections’ because of severe food shortages and economic difficulties was thought to 
indicate how severe a situation it had been in North Korea (MOFA 2004: 40). This 
might lead to the rationalization that the Japanese government was also taking into 
account ‘humanitarian considerations’. In short, North Korea was described by the 
Koizumi government not only as a country that was a military threat and a ‘troubled 
neighbor’ of Japan, but also as a ‘poor’ country in need of international assistance.    
  
4.3.2 The construction of Japan’s identity and differences from the pressure school  
 
     There can be seen some binary oppositions concerning the identities of Japan 
and North Korea in the narrative put forth by the Koizumi cabinet. For instance, 
Koizumi clearly stated that the political regime of North Korea is totally different from 
‘democratic Japan’ (NDRP: 2005-c). However, there seemed to be less explicit 
representations of Japan’s identity compared to those of North Korea. Japan emerged 
as a ‘democratic’, ‘non-militaristic’, and ‘responsible and respectable member of 
international society’ in contrast with the representations of North Korea as 
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‘authoritarian’, ‘militaristic’, and a ‘wrongdoer’. 
     On this point, there can be seen some notable points which could distinguish it 
from the identity constructions made by the pressure school. First, unlike the pressure 
school and the Abe administration, the Koizumi administration did not put much 
emphasis on these binary oppositions. Although it admitted differences between the 
two countries, the Koizumi administration treat North Korea neither as an 
‘inassimilable’ other nor as an ‘enemy’. For instance, differences in the political 
regime between Japan and North Korea, at least for the dialogue school, might not 
reduce the possibility to settle issues toward normalization through negotiations. Take 
the example of Koizumi, he justified his unconventional visit to Pyongyang by 
insisting that he himself should go because it was the only way to confirm the 
dictator’s will (NDRP: 2004-n)3. As it was an ‘authoritarian country’, all the important 
decisions should render only its dictator’s will (NDRP: 2004-k). In addition, although 
North Korea was ‘authoritarian’ state, not to mention that different from ‘democratic’ 
Japan, Koizumi assumed that the two countries could have a common interest by 
achieving normalization. Koizumi legitimized his second visit to Pyongyang saying 
that ‘My decision to visit North Korea for a second time is based on my belief that 
making another visit and talking face-to-face once more with Chairman Kim is the 
only way that we can expect to see any advance in the situation as it currently stands 
(Koizumi 2004-a)’. According to Koizumi, not only Japan but also North Korea could 
benefit from stabilization of the region as a result of normalization. He insisted that the 
Japanese government should work hard to encourage North Korea to understand that 
normalization with Japan would be most beneficial to North Korea. The Prime 
                                                   
3  Iijima also justified Koizumi’s visit to North Korea arguing that it was because the 
country is an ‘authoritarian’ country, where Kim Jong Ill would decide everything, there 
was no use negotiating with other people than Kim in the end (Tahara and Iijima 2007: 
174).   
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Minister successively stated that North Korea had nothing to gain from isolation from 
the international community, and that it was the most promising security guarantee and 
the only way for economic development to become a responsible member of 
international society, and support North Korea to transform its attitude to do so 
(NDRP: 2004-f). It would mean that despite different and conflicting identity, the 
Koizumi government tried to treat North Korea not as an ‘enemy’ to be annihilated but 
a dialogue partner to cooperate with. It would thus indicate that the Koizumi 
administration considered that the regime change in North Korea might not be 
necessary for negotiations for normalization and for the settlement of all concerns 
between the two countries. Therefore, it can be thought that the binary oppositions 
played a smaller role in the reproduction of Japan’s identity in foreign policy discourse 
of the Koizumi administration. 
     Second, relating to the above, while both group tended to argue that the DPRK 
was an ‘isolated wrongdoer’ in international society and a destabilizing factor in the 
region, members of the dialogue school were likely to assume that the North Korean 
identity could be changeable without a regime change. It was often emphasized by that 
North Korea was ‘isolated’ from international community and provoked a military 
crisis several times after World War II. For instance, the bombing of a KAL Airline 
and the withdrawal from the NPT can be cited as examples of North Korean 
international ‘wrongdoing’ and ‘isolation’. Above all, the abduction issue and nuclear 
development problem has been the target of criticism in the context of regional and 
Japan’s security. However, it seemed that the dialogue school including Koizumi did 
not consider that the identity of North Korea as a ‘wrongdoer’ was neither fixed nor 
unchangeable as the pressure school argued. As they thought that North Korea itself 
was not a threat to Japan but its nuclear weapons and missiles were the threats posed 
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by the country could be removed if it entered into and was involved with a multilateral 
framework of regional security. In short, it can be argued that the dialogue school 
seemed to assume that the identity of North Korea might be changeable; they took the 
position that the identity as a ‘wrongdoer’ can be transformed to a ‘member of 
international community’ through bringing North Korea into the circle of international 
society and changing its behavior. In this sense, binary oppositions came to play a 
minor role to highlight differences of the two countries for treating North Korea as the 
‘enemy’.  
     Third, the dialogue school might not have only exclusively focused on the 
current security situation but had also tried to apprehend it from the historical context. 
While the opposite group tended to simplify the relations of the two countries in a way 
that Japan was a ‘victim’ of North Korea, the Koizumi administration remained 
consistent in depicting North Korea as only a country with which Japan had not 
restored a diplomatic relations since World War Ⅱ. From this, there emerged Japan’s 
hidden identity as a ‘victimizer in the past’ as a colonial ruler that had not come to 
terms with its past. In this sense, normalization was considered to be the last task of 
‘war settlement’. Nevertheless, this ‘past’ image of self might not be used to 
discourage a ‘peaceful’ identity of postwar Japan. Moreover, Japan’s ‘peaceful 
country’ identity was reinforced and realized by implementing a normalization policy 
as will be discussed later.  
     In addition, related to the third point, Japan was seen to be responsible for peace 
and stability in the region. It made a difference from a so-called ‘one-country pacifism’, 
in which Japan would not be enthusiastic about involving security issues even in its 
surrounding area. As normalization of the relations between Japan and North Korea 
was thought to be one of the pillars for peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula, 
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Japan can play an important role for peace making in the entire region. The fact that 
Japan was a party concerned with regional security affairs, as was stipulated in the 
Pyongyang Declaration, it could indicate that Japan demonstrated its will to play a 
central role as a ‘peace-maker’. It seemed to assume that it would be useful to seek a 
‘peaceful resolution’ and normalization could be a chance to achieve Japan’s new 
‘peaceful identity’.  
     Furthermore, although the Koizumi government agreed that North Korea was a 
military threat, however, there seems to be no argument that claimed North Korea 
threatened Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity. This is a notable difference from the China’s 
case. China’s demand on the Yasukuni issue was not only identified with the violation 
of Japan’s sovereignty but was regarded as a negation of postwar Japan’s development 
as a ‘peaceful nation.’ On the other hand, the abduction issue and the security issues 
were not thought of as an identity threat to Japan. It might be partly because North 
Korea might not have much discursive power to deny postwar Japan’s ‘peaceful 
development’. Even though a North Korean broadcast repeatedly described Japan as a 
‘colonial militarist’, it was not able to construct an internationally accepted discourse 
of present Japan as an ‘imperial colonialist’. Thus, they could not deny Japan’s 
‘peaceful country’ identity. Moreover, it is easy to articulate Japan as a ‘victim’ and 
North Korea as a victimizer because of the abduction issue and missile problem. As it 
might be clear that Japan’s security has been threatened by North Korean behavior, 
Japan is easily constructed as an ‘innocent victim’, which might give moral superiority 
to its identity in international society. In short, although Koizumi and the dialogue 
school recognized that North Korea could be a military threat to Japan’s security, 
however, they did not treat it as a threat to Japan’s identity. These differences in 
identity construction of North Korea would be closely related with the definition of a 
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‘reality’ and the rhetoric of legitimating foreign policy.  
 
4.4 The construction of a ‘reality’  
 
     Both the pressure school and the dialogue school were likely to construct a 
‘reality’ according to their point of views, often defined as a ‘crisis’, which subjects 
were facing. This construction of a certain ‘reality’ is deeply related to how the 
subjects, Japan and North Korea in this case, were articulated in their discourse so that 
they could legitimate a certain policy to overcome the crisis. In terms of this ‘crisis 
situation’ construction, debates seemed to be converged on the ‘abnormal relations’ 
and ‘exposed to the North Korean security threat’. In what follows, it discusses on how 
the Koizumi administration articulated a ‘reality’ concerning the North Korea issue. 
      It seems that the dialogue school agreed with the pressure school to define 
current relationships between the two countries as not ‘normal’. According to the 
Diplomatic Bluebook, ‘relations between Japan and North Korea continue to be 
abnormal since World War II (MOFA 2003: 39)’. Furthermore, it would also mean 
that negotiations to resume the normalization talks and to settle a series of issues have 
been obstructed because of the lack of diplomatic relations. What would be important 
is the recognition of the differences and the points that would make it ‘abnormal’. As 
will be discussed in detail in a later chapter, what would mean ‘abnormal’ relations for 
the pressure school was that Japan had been exposed to a series of threats imposed by 
North Korea such as the abduction issue and the missile tests. In addition, they were 
likely to blame the ‘untrustworthy’ and ‘insincere’ character of North Korea for the 
impasse of negotiation talks. To put it plainly, what would bring this ‘abnormal’ 
situation about was North Korea’s ‘abnormal’ identity.  
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     On the other hand, what would generally mean to be an ‘abnormal’ relationship 
for Koizumi and the dialogue school was the severance of diplomatic ties between the 
two countries. Thus, it was often argued that stalemates in negotiations arose from lack 
of diplomatic relations. For instance, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda explained 
that ‘since North Korea lacks diplomatic relations with Japan and has a different 
political regime, it might be really difficult to proceed negotiations (NDRP: 2002-b)’. 
What is more, ‘abnormal’ relations might not be attributed to the identity of North 
Korea but might result from the fact that postwar Japan had not yet settled the issue of 
its colonial rule in the Korean Peninsula. Hitoshi Tanaka delivered an account of 
‘abnormal relations’, arguing that Japan lacked diplomatic ties with North Korea and 
that ‘we have been in such an abnormal relationship in which Japan has not settle the 
past since its 36-years of colonial rule’ (NDRP: 2002-c). In their point of view, since 
postwar Japan has long failed to come to terms with its imperial and colonial past, it 
has not been able to restore a ‘normal’ relationship with the DPRK. In other words, it 
would not be North Korea itself but the postwar relationship between the two countries 
which has been ‘abnormal’, and which caused a stalemate of negotiations. This 
perception would lead the Koizumi cabinet to conduct a policy to encourage an 
engagement in normalization talks instead of pursuing regime change in North Korea. 
In addition, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi argued that Japan had not restore its 
ties with North Korea for more than fifty years and it was because of these 
circumstances that all the cases happened such as the suspicious ship, missile problem 
and the abduction issue (NDRP: 2002-f).  
     Second, there can be observed a certain kind of ‘reality’ constitution in which 
Japan’s security was exposed to the North Korean threat. Even among the dialogue 
school and the Koizumi cabinet, the sense of a threat was shared with the pressure 
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group. For instance, the Diplomatic Bluebook published in 2005 clearly argued that 
‘the North Korean nuclear issue is not only a direct threat to the peace and stability of 
the Northeast Asian region, including Japan, but also a serious challenge to the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime (2005: 21)’. Prime minister Koizumi 
admitted that it would be natural for Japanese people to feel threatened by North 
Korean nuclear weapons more than the US because it was the closest neighbor (NDRP: 
2005-l). What should be highlighted here is that although Koizumi showed a concern 
over North Korean nuclear weapons, but he also carefully picked his words; that the 
security threat would be the nuclear arsenal, not North Korea itself. For instance, 
Koizumi stated that ‘I emphasized that the nuclear development by North Korea is a 
threat to Japan’s security as it is simply unacceptable and demand to dismantle all 
nuclear arsenal under international verification’ (NDRP: 2004-j). In other words, what 
would be problematized was not the identity of North Korea, but the ‘wrong behaviors’ 
by it. This representation of ‘security crisis’ would also be reflected by a certain idea of 
the Koizumi cabinet that this crisis should be overcome by North Korea’s ‘change of 
behavior’. Therefore, Japan would pursue a settlement in a multilateral framework on 
regional security such as the six party talks instead of supporting a ‘regime change’ 
policy.  
          
4.5 The legitimization of policy  
 
     It can be argued that these constructions of identities and the ‘reality’ served to 
legitimize foreign policy of the Koizumi administration toward North Korea. 
Promoting normalization of the bilateral relationship was legitimized as an only 
measure to overcome the ‘abnormal relationship’ because normalization was Japan’s 
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last ‘war settlement’. This policy was also made possible by constructing the identity 
of North Korea not as an ‘identity threat’ but as a ‘dialogue partner’. Furthermore, it 
was legitimized because Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’ was achieved through 
stabilization in the Korean Peninsula. 
 
4.5.1 normalization  
 
     First of all, Koizumi’s policy for normalization of the bilateral relationship was 
legitimized as an only solution for the current ‘abnormal relationship’. As the 
‘abnormal relationship’ derived not from the ‘hostile’ identity of North Korea but from 
Japan’s incomplete war settlement, the relationship can be transformed from ‘hostile’ 
to ‘cooperative’ through normalization (Koizumi 2004-b). The primary significance of 
normalization of the relationship with North Korea would be that it was a part of 
Japan’s war responsibility. This coincided with the construction of the identity of 
North Korea as the ‘only country which postwar Japan has not restored its diplomatic 
ties’ and the constitution of a ‘reality’ that the ‘abnormal relationship’ was caused by 
Japan’s ‘incomplete war settlement’. Masataka Akamine of the JCP, from the House of 
Representative, argued that ‘Japan could not finish its “postwar period” without 
establishing “normal relations” with North Korea. It might only be Japan’s historical 
responsibility’ (NDRP: 2004-d)4. As there was common view that its ‘incomplete war 
settlement’ has impaired Japan’s international credibility in the region, it would be 
vital for Japan to restore trust with neighboring countries by completing war settlement 
in order to obtain political initiatives. Hitoshi Tanaka (2009: 140) argued that as it 
would be vital for Japan to regain trust from neighboring countries in East Asia, the 
                                                   
4  Lawmaker Togashi from the Japan Communist Party also pointed out the necessity of 
the normalization in terms of the settlement of prewar colonial rule (NDRP: 2004-p).  
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negative legacy, that is, Japan’s past issues, were clearly a major hurdle to pursuing 
such a policy. Normalization might be an important opportunity for Japan to settle its 
history issues, in which North Korea is the last one. In other words, normalization of 
diplomatic ties with the DPRK might mean Japan’s coming to terms with its past, 
‘history issues’, which would be an obstacle against Japan’s proactive engagement 
with regional leadership. Therefore, normalization of the relationship with North Korea 
might be necessary for Japan to realize its ‘peaceful’ identity. Japan could not become 
free from the historical burden without completing war settlement. In this context, the 
normalization policy can be interpreted as a part of a conventional strategy of history 
reconciliation conducted by the LDP. Koizumi might seek to achieve history 
reconciliation in order for Japan to become a new ‘peaceful’ nation’, which would be 
free from the ‘spell of history’. In this way, normalization of diplomatic ties with North 
Korea was legitimized from the viewpoint of the realization of national identity. 
     Furthermore, normalization of the relationship between Japan and North Korea 
was justified by arguing that it can transform its identity and relationship with Japan. It 
was based on the idea that the identity of North Korea was considered to be positively 
changeable through normalization. In the congressional debate, Koizumi insisted that 
efforts should be made to encourage North Korea to change its hostile attitude and to 
become a responsible member of international society (NDRP: 2002-q). Koizumi 
stated that he was going to persuade Pyongyang that the security of North Korea could 
be guaranteed by becoming a responsible member of international society through the 
dismantlement of nuclear arms (NDRP: 2005-b and 2005-l). In other words, the 
Koizumi government implicitly assumed that the North Korean identity as a ‘closed’, 
‘isolated’ ‘wrongdoer’ could be transformed to a ‘responsible’ member of international 
society like Japan. 
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     Therefore, while there were a series of concerns like drug smuggling and 
unidentified suspicious vessels other than the abduction issue or missile problem, 
Koizumi did not treat North Korea as a mere security threat. This was corroborated by 
Tanaka’s argument that problems between Japan and DPRK were not only a kind of 
military security issue but also that of war settlement. It was an idea that all of these 
problems can be seen as products of an incomplete settlement of WWⅡand that they 
could be resolved by normalization of the diplomatic relations. Hence, once 
normalization was achieved, North Korea would no longer be threat to Japan. In this 
context, Koizumi maintained that he did not take a stance of supporting the regime 
change and that every country should cooperatively work together to make North 
Korea change its mind with keeping the current regime and become a responsible 
member of international society (NDRP: 2002-q). In fact, members of the Koizumi 
government often implied the possibility to change the identity of North Korea. 
Koizumi repeatedly emphasized the importance of effort to encourage Pyongyang to 
become a responsible member of international society (NDRP: 2004-e and 2004-h). 
The Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda also noted that the Japanese government 
would continue negotiations with North Korea, indicating possibility for it to have its 
own way to develop peacefully as a member of international society (NDRP: 2003-a). 
In addition, according to the Diplomatic Bluebook (MOFA: 2003), the purpose of 
Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang was ‘to strongly urge North Korea to act responsibly as 
a member of the international community in order to wipe out the international 
community’s concerns over security issues such as the nuclear issue and the missile 
issue and to resolve these issues by promoting dialogue with relevant countries such as 
the US and the ROK’. This would mean that the Koizumi administration had a 
recognition that North Korea can reshape its identity from an ‘isolated wrongdoer’ to a 
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‘responsible member of international society’ as a result of normalization, just like 
from ‘savage’ to ‘civilized’, which would belong to the same community as Japan. 
Hence, North Korea was presented not as an ‘enemy’ to be extinguished or identity 
threat to Japan’s national identity, but as a potential dialogue partner. Along with this 
reconstruction of North Korea’s identity, Koizumi also stressed that ‘a transformation 
of Tokyo-Pyongyang relationship from hostile to cooperative through negotiations, in 
tandem with the DPRK’s becoming a member of international society, might wipe out 
concerns on the abduction or security issues’ (NDRP: 2002-k). This transformation of 
identity and the bilateral relationship was expected to bring settlements of all concerns 
over bilateral and international issues so that the policy for normalization was 
legitimized.  
     The Koizumi administration assumed that in accordance with changes in identity 
and the bilateral relationship, military threat of North Korea could be diminished by 
normalization because it was carried out in the framework of the Japan-DPRK 
Pyongyang Declaration. Abiding by the Pyongyang Declaration and the agreement 
achieved in the Six Party talks, the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement 
of nuclear weapons of North Korea can be accomplished, which would greatly 
contribute to regional and world peace. As it would be certain that the dismantlement 
of nuclear weapons of the DPRK was in line with Japan’s national interest, it can 
easily be legitimized. Foreign Minister Kawaguchi clarified that the most important 
merit of the normalization for Japan would be the denuclearization in the Korean 
Peninsula and the East Asia region (NDRP: 2004-o). In other words, normalization 
between Japan and North Korea might not only be a Japan’s concern but also a 
regional and even global security problem. Kawaguchi also mentioned that 
negotiations with the DPRK was an important channel not only for dealing with 
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various concerns between Japan and North Korea, but also for drawing the country into 
international society, which contributes to world peace’ (NDRP: 2002-n). As 
‘normalization with Japan would surely lead to peaceful development of North Korea’ 
(NDRP: 2004-e), according to Koizumi, Japan could significantly contribute to world 
peace. In short, Koizumi’s policy for normalization with North Korea can be 
legitimized in relation to Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity.  
     To be more specific, Hitoshi Tanaka created an overview in which normalization 
of Japan-North Korea relationship can build peace in the Korean Peninsula and 
contribute to peace and stability of the entire region of Northeast Asia. It can be 
pointed out that the primary framework of foreign policy of the Koizumi 
administration toward North Korea was based on a ‘grand picture’, which was 
proposed by Hitoshi Tanaka. As mentioned before, Tanaka was in charge of 
negotiations with North Korea during a large part of Koizumi’s premiership. Tanaka 
(2005: 40) explained his basic idea of ‘grand picture’ that Japan should voluntarily and 
actively build peace in the Korean Peninsula, as it was essential for Japan’s peace and 
security. It means that Japan should play a major role for regional peace and stability in 
Northeast Asia not as a ‘free-rider’ but as the party concerned. Based on this ‘grand 
picture’, negotiations with North Korea were conducted on Tanaka’s idea as follows; 
‘we demonstrated to the DPRK that our primary purpose was to achieve peace in the 
Korean Peninsula, suggested to build a roadmap for that, which should also be of 
benefit to North Korea, and insisted that Pyongyang should resolve the abduction issue 
when they recognized the settlement of this issue as its own interest (Tanaka 2005: 40). 
In this narrative, Tanaka depicted Japan as being ready for diplomatic initiatives in 
negotiations with North Korea, which served to settle both the security problem and 
the abduction issue.  
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     Engaging North Korea and pursuing normalization meant that Japan would seek 
to be directly involved in regional security issues by establishing a multilateral security 
framework. While it is sometimes maintained that Japan did not play a major role in 
the Six Party Talks, Secretary Isao Iijima, Koizumi’s right-hand man, highlighted 
Japan’s proactive diplomatic effort and its result, arguing that the launch of the Six 
Party Talk itself was an accomplishment of Japan’s diplomacy because the 
establishment of the Six Party Talks had been stipulated in the Pyongyang Declaration 
(Tahara 2007: 182). This concept that Japan’s proactive engagement with North Korea 
follows its ‘peace-maker’ identity seemed to be shared by other politicians of the 
dialogue school. Quoting a statement of Lee Bu-young, a former Uri Party chairman, 
Yasuo Ogata of the JCP appreciated Koizumi’s policy for normalization and applied 
the word ‘peace initiative’ to it (NDRP: 2004-v). Therefore, Koizumi’s policy for 
normalization with North Korea was regarded as a political initiative of Japan to build 
peace in the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia. On the whole, Japan was described as 
an ‘active peacemaker’ in Northeast Asia and would proactively be responsible for the 
regional security issue. This would be a new expression of Japan’s ‘peaceful identity’ 
and thus contribute the legitimization of policy for normalization. In short, to 
normalize the relation with North Korea was not only regarded as a solution for 
‘abnormal relationship’ and war settlement but also legitimized as a vital step for the 
realization of a ‘peaceful nation’. 
     In short, Koizumi’s policy to normalize the relationship with North Korea was 
legitimized in discourse in which North Korea was constructed not as ‘identity threat’ 
based on the assumption that its identity is changeable from ‘isolated wrongdoer’ to ‘a 
responsible member of international society’. Furthermore, it was considered that 
normalization would also reflect and realize Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful’ country, 
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by completing its ‘war settlement’, which is necessary to obtain trust from neighboring 
countries and then take political leadership in the regional framework on the security 
issue. Especially, normalization was treated as a key policy to express Japan’s 
willingness to proactively contribute to regional and world peace. 
      
4.5.2 Emphasis on dialogues  
 
     Prime Minister Koizumi was consistent in emphasizing ‘dialogue’ than 
‘pressure’ and tended to hesitate to imposing sanctions on North Korea. He articulated 
that continual dialogues and negotiations would be the only way to solve the abduction 
issue and other concerns (NDRP: 2002-k). When the pressure school called the 
Japanese government upon imposing sanctions on Pyongyang, he rebutted by saying 
that ‘while some says that the resumption of negotiations are too early because North 
Korea is untrustworthy, however, such an attitude will not solve the problems’ (NDRP: 
2002-k). The dialogue school supported this opposition to sanctions against North 
Korea not only because it would worsen the situation but also because it would damage 
Japan’s international reputation. Lawmaker Keiji Kokuta of the JCP argued that as the 
Japanese government agreed to prevent the condition from deteriorated in the Six Party 
Talks, sanction policy, which would deteriorate the situation, was a violation of the 
international agreement (NDRP: 2004-l). In short, sanction policy was marginalized 
because it might damage Japan’s identity as a ‘responsible and respectable member of 
international society’. 
     This emphasis on dialogue was also legitimized by another identity construction. 
As a result of its identity construction as a ‘peaceful nation’, the Koizumi government 
argued that Japan should pursue peaceful resolution via diplomatic effort without the 
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use of force aiming at the regime change in North Korea. Defining the primary purpose 
of negotiations with North Korea as normalization of the relationship and peaceful 
resolution and describing the use of force as an undesirable last resort, Koizumi argued 
that ‘it is really important to achieve the purpose without taking measures of last 
resort’ (NDRP: 2004-e). He successively stated that ‘countries other than Japan can 
take every possible measure including the use of force. However, Japan renounces the 
use of force as a means of settling international disputes, and seeks a peaceful 
resolution. Therefore, it would be proper and best way to reach a negotiated settlement 
with North Korea, instead of imposing sanctions’. From this, the representation of 
Japan as a ‘peaceful country’ was used to marginalize a policy option of supporting the 
use of force and imposing sanctions against North Korea. Instead, it was used to 
legitimize ‘peaceful resolution’, which implies negotiated settlement in this case. 
     
4.5.3 Conciliatory approach  
 
     As a result of policy stance, it has often been maintained that the Koizumi 
administration took a conciliatory approach to North Korea. Examples of policies 
criticized from the pressure school as too conciliatory were Koizumi’s two visits to 
Pyongyang, the continuation of negotiations for normalization, food and medical aid. 
For instance, in 2004 before the second of Koizumi’s visits, food, and medical aid was 
provided for North Korea in order to appeal for the resumption of normalization 
negotiations (Asahi Shimbun: 2004-b). In this appeal, the Japanese government 
indicated that it would provide ‘humanitarian aid’ if North Korea would return families 
of the abductees. The construction of North Korea as a country dealing with ‘economic 
grievances’ and ‘food and energy shortage’ was utilized to legitimize the aid policy of 
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Japan as a country that embraces ‘humanitarian support’. As Japan is a responsible 
member of the international community and enshrines basic human rights, it must 
cooperate with other countries to seek peaceful settlements and sometimes should 
provide ‘humanitarian aid’. Lawmaker Yasuo Ogata of the JCP argued in one Diet 
session that if Japan cuts off food aid carried out within the framework of 
‘humanitarian aid’ with other counties such as the US, EU, and other international 
organization like FAO, it would undermine Japan’s international credibility (NDRP: 
2004-x). Thus, it seems that ‘humanitarian aid’ is considered closely linked with 
Japan’s credibility as a ‘responsible and respectable member of international society’. 
In this context, to provide ‘humanitarian aid’ was legitimized in relation to the identity 
constructions of Japan. 
     Moreover, it can be argued that what enabled Japan’s concessions to North 
Korea is that Koizumi did not construct North Korea as an identity threat similar to 
China on the Yasukuni issue. It was true that he recognized it was threatening Japan’s 
security, but he did not think a concession toward North Korea might threaten Japan’s 
identity as a ‘peaceful nation’. It was partly because there was a strong argument in 
which Japan was the victim and North Korea was the victimizer concerning the 
abduction issue. This was in sharp contrast to the argument regarding the Yasukuni 
issue with China, in which Japan had been the aggressor against China during the 
Asia-Pacific War. Therefore, the Koizumi administration might think that to make 
concessions might not threaten Japan’s moral superiority, both domestically and 
internationally. As a result, the North Korean issue did not produce ‘social antagonism’ 
because Japan’s identity was not negated although there was increasing resentment 
against Pyongyang over the abduction issue. Due to this lack of ‘social antagonism’, a 
hard-line approach was not promoted under the Koizumi administration.  
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4.6 North Korean issue as political capital  
 
     As well as other foreign and domestic policy, it can be argued that the Koizumi 
administration tried to utilize the North Korean issue as political capital to take 
advantage in domestic politics. As mentioned before, Koizumi’s policy to normalize 
relations with North Korea could cause harsh opposition from the traditional 
right-wingers and the pressure school in the Diet. Therefore, it should be offset by 
other foreign policy choices in order to pursue this policy. It was his uncompromising 
stance toward Beijing over the Yasukuni Shrine issue that offset his conciliatory 
approach toward Pyongyang. Although this might give the impression that the North 
Korean issue had only a negative effect on political capital, Koizumi attempted to 
manipulate this issue in a positive way.  
     First of all, it was intended to remove a sense of stagnation from Japanese 
diplomacy. While frustrations among anti-Chinese people could possibly be offset by 
an unyielding China policy, it was true that this caused diplomatic deadlock in Japan’s 
foreign policy in East Asia. The advancement in normalization with North Korea was, 
ironically regarded as a measure to break this stagnation. Yasuo Fukuda, the Chief 
Cabinet Secretary in the Koizumi administration, reflected on that time and pointed out 
that there was a sense of stagnation on Japan’s foreign policy with every country. For 
instance, Japan faced deadlock in ‘the rise of China and the feud with China over 
Yasukuni Shrine’ and he wished to ‘break the overall diplomatic deadlock. 
 
That’s why I wanted to advance normalization of relations with North Korea, 
which would be provide Japan with a great opportunity to contribute to the 
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stability of northeast Asia. I believe that the prime minister’s visit to Pyongyang 
made the Japanese people feel that something was moving and that Japan might 
be overcoming its deadlock with North Korea (Funabashi 2007: 69).  
 
From this, it can be argued that the Koizumi administration tried to manipulate its 
policy toward North Korea as political capital to break a sense of diplomatic 
stagnation.  
     What is more, the advancement of the North Korean issue, especially the 
abduction issue, seemed to be directly linked to the buoyancy for the Koizumi 
administration. It was sometimes argued that the second visit to Pyongyang in 2004 
was aimed at gaining an edge in the Upper House election two months later (Asahi 
Shimbun: 2004-c). Furthermore, a lot of people thought that there also was political 
intention behind the timing of this announcement because it drowned out the exposure 
of Koizumi’s scandal over his failing to pay into the pension system for a period of 
time. One lawmaker Yokomitsu of the JCP expressed his doubt at the plenary session, 
‘I cannot get over the doubt that there might be political intention of diverting public 
attention from his failing to pay into the pension system and earning points before the 
election of the House of Councilor behind prime ministerial visit to Pyongyang this 
time’ (NDRP: 2004-j). In addition, it was said that the Kantei voiced a strong desire to 
return the husband and two daughters of Hitomi Soga, one of the returned abductees, 
before the aforementioned election. It can be argued that the Koizumi administration 
needed visible achievement on the abduction issue to boost his declining popularity 
due to stalled ‘structural reform’ and a soured relationship with China. 
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4.7 Conclusion  
 
     There have been a series of diplomatic issues between Japan and the DPRK 
during the Koizumi administration, from the abduction issue to the nuclear 
development problems, just like with China. Nevertheless, Koizumi’s stance seemed to 
be conciliatory due to its comprehensive approach and emphasis on dialogue based on 
mutual benefit rather than economic sanctions. There can be observed a notable 
difference in China’s case in the identity reconstruction in foreign policy discourse. It 
was certain that the Koizumi administration and the dialogue school articulated that 
North Korea was an ‘authoritarian’, ‘militarist’, and ‘isolated wrongdoer’ in 
international society like the pressure school. However, there also were differences in 
recognition and representation of it, which might make it possible to conduct 
alternative policy from the pressure school. Although North Korea placed a military 
threat on Japan’s security, the country itself was not represented as an identity threat 
that could produce ‘social antagonism’. The transformation of North Korea’s identity 
without regime change might be possible by a course of continued and persistent 
dialogues, which might enable changes in bilateral relations from ‘abnormal’ to 
‘normal’, or from ‘hostile’ to ‘cooperative’, and the crisis situation could be overcome. 
These constructions made it possible for Koizumi to pursue the policy for 
normalization.  
     Another factor, which served to legitimize his conciliatory attitude, was the fact 
that the North Korean problem was treated as an issue of the ‘settlement of postwar’, 
which should be resolved for establishing Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful country’ 
under the Koizumi administration. Normalization of diplomatic ties with the DPRK 
might mean Japan’s coming to terms with its past, which had long been an obstacle 
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against its proactive engagement in regional political and security framework. In this 
context, normalization of diplomatic ties with North Korea was regarded as a measure 
for Japan to take proactive initiatives to build peace in the Korean Peninsula, the entire 
region, and even the whole world. Therefore, Koizumi’s policy was legitimized as 
creating a great opportunity to reconstruct and reinforce Japan’s identity as a proactive 
‘peace-maker’.  
     Taken together, it can be argued that the Koizumi administration tried to 
legitimize its policy toward North Korea based on discourse of Japan’s identity as a 
‘peaceful’ country. In this sense, his rhetoric was ‘nationalistic’ as well as his China 
policy. In addition, it was ironic that although he tried to offset frustrations among 
anti-Chinese-anti-DPRK groups by his China policy, on the other hand, he attempted 
to manipulate the North Korean issue as a form of political capital to break a sense of 
stagnation in diplomacy and boost his domestic credibility.  
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Chapter 5 Analysis of the post-2000 ‘neo-revisionist’ Discourse 
 
                                                          
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe launched an over-arching concept, ‘a beautiful 
country’ to represent his ideal of Japan’s national identity when he published his book 
‘Toward a Beautiful Country’ in the succession race for the LDP presidency. While ‘a 
beautiful country’ was a key concept of his vision, from domestic affairs to foreign 
policy, however, Abe did not give any clear definition to it in his books. Whereas, he 
encouraged Japan to be ‘a country that shows leadership and that is respected and loved 
by the countries of the world’, in his first speech as a Prime Minister to the Diet, he 
could not escape the vagueness of his vision (NDRP: 2006-j). According to an opinion 
poll by the Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri Shimbun 2006), 64% of people answered that 
they could not have a substantial image of ‘a beautiful country’ from Abe’s statement.  
Therefore, it is important to grasp the politics that give meaning to Abe’s concept 
of Japan’s national identity. As Ted Hopf (2002: 20) argues, identities and their 
meanings are established both contextually and intertextually ― they could not be 
produced in a vacuum. Abe’s ‘beautiful country’ can also be understood with reference 
to his slogan, ‘a departure from the postwar regime’. His idea represents keynotes of the 
‘neo-revisionists’, who inherited most of their political philosophy from the older 
right-wing traditionalists. Therefore, it is necessary to scrutinize Abe’s argument further 
in order to clarify what kind of nationalism he pursued. 
 Actually, Abe’s argument focused primarily on dismantling the discourse of 
‘postwar democracy’, which has been dominant in Japanese society since the end of 
WWⅡ. At the same time, he sought to transform, redefine, and fix the meanings of the 
core of identities established in ‘postwar democracy’ discourse, such as ‘peace’, 
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‘autonomy’ and ‘democracy’. What is particularly notable about his argument is the 
binarization of the domestic and the foreign. Thus, it is important to pay attention to 
how the ‘self’ is constructed through the articulation of domestic ‘others’ as well as 
foreign ‘others’. In this context, this chapter firstly aims to explore what kind of 
national identity might be constituted through domestic others in Abe’s discourse. Then, 
it also tries to uncover in what situations and in what context Abe and his supporters 
emphasized values of ‘peace’, ‘democracy’, and ‘autonomy’.  
My argument is as follows: Abe’s theme of a ‘departure from the postwar regime’ 
was a cluster of domestic and foreign policies. He utilized values of ‘peace’, 
‘democracy’, and ‘autonomy’ in order to bolster domestic credentials, to defeat political 
opponents, and to manipulate those values as political capital. While ‘postwar pacifism’ 
was rejected as ‘hypocritical’ ‘one-country pacifism’, which would neither protect 
Japanese people nor receive international acclaim, Abe insisted that a ‘peaceful’ Japan 
should proactively contribute to world peace by closer cooperation with the US and 
revising the Constitution. ‘Democracy’ was regarded as an integral part of Japan’s 
identity, which naturalized the enhancement of ties with the US, EU, Australia and 
India. It could also highlight differences from China, and could be utilized to ease 
frustrations among his anti-China supporters against rapprochement with China. Instead 
of the conventional arguments of the traditional right wing, according to Abe, it was not 
the US but the Constitution and China that impeded Japan’s true independence. In 
addition, Abe’s group constructed domestic ‘others’ as the ‘enemy within’ in his 
discourse of the ‘departure from the postwar regime’. These were mainly progressives, 
the Yoshida School politicians and the Keisei-kai politicians and political rivals of 
Abe’s group. By defining them as the ‘enemy within’ and ‘anti-Japanese’, Abe and his 
supporters tried to abandon their political rivals and to expand their power base in 
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domestic politics so as to achieve their ultimate goal, the revision of the Constitution. 
 
5.1 Historical context 
 
     It is sometimes argued that nationalistic politicians and movements have gained 
momentum in Japan since the 1990s. The Committee on History and Screening, for 
instance, was established to offset a series of statements by top-level officials including 
Prime Minister Hosokawa. It officially acknowledged Japan’s war responsibility and 
apologized to victims in neighboring countries. Younger members of this committee, 
such as Shinzo Abe and Shoichi Nakagawa, rallied and launched the Young Diet 
Members Committee to Consider the Future of Japan and History education in 1997. 
Those ‘nationalistic’ political actors were mainly hereditary politicians, who succeeded 
in ideals and agendas from the traditionalists and sought to achieve their goals like the 
revision of the Constitution. They insisted that the Nanjing Massacre and the comfort 
women were fabrications and that articulations in history textbook were distorted by 
pressure from China and South Korea. Although they were anti-mainstream in the LDP, 
their anti-China and anti-North Korea stance wielded a certain impact on foreign policy 
making. Those young nationalists were called ‘neo-revisionists’ distinguished from the 
traditional right-wing nationalists. As Abe was a major member of this group and his 
supporters coincided with members of this group, this thesis calls them 
‘neo-revisionists’ or ‘Abe’s group’ even though it was not an official ‘faction’ in the 
LDP. 
 
5.2 Basic arguments 
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This section aims to examine what ‘the departure from the postwar regime’ would 
exactly mean in Abe’s discourse. Although he used the term ‘rejimu’ or ‘taisei’, both of 
which may be translated as ‘regime’ in English, his intention might not correlate to 
changes in the system of governance, such as move from a democratic political system 
to an authoritarian system. ‘The postwar regime’ for Abe was firstly a so-called 
‘postwar democracy’ based on the ‘Peace Constitution’, ‘the Tokyo Tribunal view of 
history’, and ‘idealistic pacifism’, and secondly the ‘postwar democracy’, which the 
current Constitution and the Basic Education Law institutionalized. They were often 
regarded as a legacy of the Occupation policy of the US, so that the postwar regime 
could be seen as the ‘Occupation Regime’. The third component of the postwar regime 
was the Yoshida Line, a grand design for postwar society. Since the Yoshida Line was 
based both on the Constitution and the Japan-US Security Treaty, it was regarded as 
supporting and constituting the postwar regime. 
 
5.2.1 The Constitution 
 
The revision of the Constitution was a vital mission for the departure from the 
postwar regime. Indeed, a number of conservative debaters (revisionists) shared the 
view that the Constitution must be revised because it was ‘the root of all evil’ in 
postwar Japanese society. What was repeatedly emphasized is that the constitution was 
‘written and imposed’ by the Occupation regime. Thus, this foreign-written constitution 
was regarded as a symbol of dependency, un-Japanese, and even anti-Japanese. Abe 
argued that it was impossible to ‘change the postwar regime offered by the Occupation 
Army without entirely revising the existing Constitution (Abe 2006-a: 78) and that one 
of the core missions of the LDP would be to remove the ‘postwar regime’ or ‘the 
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Occupation regime’, that is, the revision of the Constitution (Abe 2006-a: 90). 
According to Abe’s explanation, although Japan ‘formally’ restored its independence by 
adopting the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, fundamental framework of postwar 
Japan, the Constitution, was created during the Occupation period and maintained since 
then (Abe 2006-b: 28). He claimed that Japan’s true independence could not be 
achieved by ‘enshrining and maintaining the Constitution and the Basic Education Law 
written by GHQ during the Occupation period (Abe 2006-a: 90)’.  
Furthermore, he repeatedly proposed three reasons why Japan should revise the 
Constitution (Abe 2006-b: 121-126) 1 . Firstly, Abe highlighted the fact that the 
Constitution was written by GHQ, and described the Constitution as ‘imposed by the 
Occupation’. Secondly, he insisted that there could be found a separation between 
reality and what the Constitution stipulated, especially Article 9, which renounced war. 
Thirdly, according to Abe it would have significance for Japanese people to create their 
own Constitution by themselves in order to cultivate a bright future. Abe also expressed 
antipathy toward the preamble of the Constitution, arguing that the phrase ‘we desire to 
occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of 
peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all 
time from the earth’ as horribly servile (Abe 2006-a: 85, Abe 2006-b: 122-123). 
Additionally, Abe’s group questioned the legitimacy of the Constitution in terms 
of the discontinuity of national history and the constraints on Japan’s sovereignty; that 
the Constitution was not based on Japan’s traditional values because it was written and 
imposed by the GHQ. They also suggested that the Constitution restrained Japan’s 
sovereignty as a ‘normal state’ because it was elaborated to avoid the resurgence of 
Japan as a great power against the US and its allied countries. In this way, the existing 
                                                   
1 Abe reiterated this point in his books (Abe and Okazaki 2004: 217, Abe 2006-a: 33, 82, 
131-132, 144, 233-234). 
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Constitution was depicted as both un-Japanese and anti-Japanese, and thus it should be 
revised. Hence, the significance of revising the ‘imposed’ Constitution seemed obvious 
to Abe’s group because “it is just the revision of the Constitution that symbolizes the 
‘restoration of independence’” (Abe 2004-g: 94, 2006-b: 29)’.  
 
5.2.2 Pacifism 
 
What became the focus of criticism by Abe’s group was ‘postwar pacifism’, as 
established in the Constitution, especially Article 9. Abe condemned postwar pacifism 
as ‘idealistic’, ‘irresponsible’, and even ‘hypocritical’. It was just ‘idealistic’, which 
meant there was a wide gap between the ideal of the Constitution and reality 
surrounding Japan. Abe clearly argued that it was not the ‘peace constitution’ enshrined 
by the progressives, but the Japan-US Security Treaty and the SDF that had effectively 
protected Japan from regional turmoil since 1945 (Abe 2006-a: 134, 256). What is more, 
according to Abe, postwar pacifism did not contribute to the peace and security that  
Japan had enjoyed since WWⅡ, but rather it was useless and did not serve to protect 
the life and property of the Japanese people. Revisionists (Abe 2006-b: 122) often 
pointed out that ‘progressive pacifists’ espoused a policy of disarmament depending on 
the phrase ‘We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious 
of the high ideals controlling human relationship and we have determined to preserve 
our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples 
of the world’ in the Preamble of the Constitution. However, this idea was nothing but an 
evasion of the responsibility to protect Japanese citizens (Abe 2006-a: 85). In this light, 
there seemed to be a difference between Koizumi and Abe on attitudes towards the 
Constitution. Koizumi argued that the dispatches of the SDF to Iraq for reconstruction 
 168 
and humanitarian assistance would surely go along with the ideal of the Constitution, 
quoting the same phrase in the Preamble that Abe cited (Koizumi 2003-a). In other 
words, Koizumi did not question the authority of the Constitution but utilized it to 
legitimize his policy. Moreover, postwar pacifism, according to Abe, was hypocritical 
in that it only concerned Japan’s peace and did not concern itself with world peace. In 
their argument, this logic would be totally unacceptable in international society (Abe 
and Okazaki 2004: 75, Abe 2006-b: 132, Abe 2006-a: 46). Given this, Abe and the 
revisionists concluded that postwar pacifism should be discarded because it was 
irresponsible to both the Japanese people and the international community. 
  
5.2.3 The History verdict of the Tokyo Tribunal  
 
The historical verdict of the Tokyo War Tribunal might be an important 
component to constitute the ‘postwar regime’ when combined with the Constitution and 
pacifism. Abe and his supporters tend to claim that the view is ‘masochistic’ and 
‘anti-Japanese’. As the traditional rightists argued, the historical view of the Tokyo 
Tribunal was a part of the policy of GHQ to ‘psychologically disarm’ the Japanese 
people and to deny them any healthy narratives on their ‘national history’. They also 
asserted that the Tokyo War Tribunal denied the legitimacy of the ‘Greater East Asian 
War’ and condemned it as Japan’s ‘aggressive war’. At the Tribunal, prewar political 
leaders other than the Emperor were accused as war criminals that forced ‘innocent’ 
Japanese people to engage in war under militarism and ultra-nationalism. According to 
the revisionists, the view has played a role in brainwashing Japanese people into 
believing that what had been praised in the prewar society, statism, militarism, and 
ultra-nationalism, turned out to be genuinely vicious. As a result, they claimed, postwar 
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Japanese cannot be proud of their history, nor positively identify with their country. In 
addition, this ‘masochistic’ view makes it possible for China and South Korea to 
manipulate a ‘history card’ in political dealing with Japan. In other words, it forced 
Japan to abandon its national interest in diplomacy and to accept intervention in internal 
affairs. Given these, the history verdict of the Tokyo Tribunal should be discarded 
because it eroded the national pride of the Japanese people and damaged Japan’s 
national interests. 
 It is notable that Abe seemed to choose his narrative on history from a series of 
revisionist texts. They shared a common assumption that the ‘Greater East Asian War’ 
was not an ‘aggressive war’ and agreed with the accusation against the Tokyo War 
Tribunal. The Nanjing Massacre and the ‘comfort women’ were regarded as a 
‘fabrication’ to incriminate Japan. However, there were wide ranges of narratives even 
within the conservative camp. For instance, Fusao Hayashi (1963) published his famous 
‘The Affirmation of the Greater East Asian War’, arguing that it was inevitable that 
imperial Japan would resist Western imperialism to protect itself. In addition to those 
‘self-defense war’ narratives, ‘the dual nature of the war’ narrative was also widespread 
among conservatives. It argued that the war had a twofold meaning: a war between 
imperialist states on the one hand, and a war to liberate Asia from Western colonial rule 
on the other. The former often led to a ‘conspiracy theory’ in which Stalin, the Chinese 
Communist Party, and Roosevelt are said to have conspired to drag Japan into war. In 
addition, some claimed that the US or other Western imperialist were equally guilty and 
thus they were not qualified to blame Japan because they had ruled colonies abroad as 
had Japan and committed atrocities such as the nuclear bombings at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. The latter often claimed that Japan’s war contributed to independence of 
colonies in Asia. It highlighted positive aspect of Japan’s colonial rule in Asia and the 
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war, and emphasized how much Japan would be appreciated among Asian people. 
Among these, the old revisionists tended to criticize the US because of its 
initiatives during the Tokyo War Tribunal. In this regard however, Abe’s group did not 
sympathize with anti-American narratives, such as those against the nuclear bombings. 
This may be because sharing revisionist narratives offered him a strong base from the 
right-wingers, that is, it served as political capital for Abe. At the same time, however, 
to avoid criticizing the US would give him standing as pro-American, which might also 
be more important political capital for Abe. Although Abe’s pro-US conservative group 
tended to criticize the Occupation policy, they distinguished GHQ, or SCAP from ‘the 
US’, arguing that even the GS had doubted on the adequacy of Article 9 (Abe 2006-b: 
123). In other words, the Occupation Army and its policy before the reverse course was 
regarded as different from the current US, an alliance partner of Japan. By doing so, 
Abe struck a balance between the traditional right-wing, anti-US stance, and the 
neo-revisionist, pro-US stance. Given these, it can be argued that Abe selectively 
manipulated history narratives to maintain his power in domestic politics. 
 
5.2.4 The Yoshida Line  
 
Although the Yoshida line was launched and established by the same 
conservative camp as Abe’s group, it was criticized as being indistinguishable from 
progressives in terms of going along with, or even supporting the postwar regime. As 
explained before, the Yoshida line was based on both the Constitution and the Japan-US 
Security Treaty. Criticism against the Yoshida line by right wing conservatives makes 
three points: security policy, diplomacy, and morality. The right-wingers and Abe’s 
group have repeatedly condemned mainstream conservatives of the Yoshida school who 
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elaborately used the Constitution and the existence of ardent peace movements as a 
pretext for avoiding full-fledged rearmament. Though the government has often 
encouraged the ‘self-defense’ awareness of the Japanese people by emphasizing ‘a spirit 
to defend our nation’ in order to raise a sense of national unity, the national defense of 
Japan has indeed depended on American security guarantees. In other words, the 
Yoshida Line forced Japan to depend on the US security guarantee without full-fledged 
rearmament and allowed it to single-mindedly pursue its economic development 
without efforts to revise the ‘foreign-written’ Constitution (Abe 2006-a: 90, Abe 
2006-b: 126). Abe believed that it was an ‘irresponsible’ attitude because the 
government waived the right to self-defense and the duty to protect its own people, 
which led to the decay of ‘national security thinking’. This would form part of the 
context for the North Korean abduction issue. 
The second point of the criticism was aimed at the foreign policy toward East 
Asian countries, especially China and South Korea. In terms of postwar diplomacy, it 
seems to be obvious for Abe that the ‘self-constrained’ attitude of postwar diplomacy, 
fostered by the moral debt of WWⅡ and ‘postwar-democracy’ toward East Asian 
countries, especially China and North Korea, had damaged national interests. He 
described the traits of such diplomacy as ‘lacking political initiatives’, ‘avoiding 
international frictions’, ‘waiting for passing tempests without any claims to justify 
itself’, and ‘making a humble apology’ in order to obtain returns (Abe 2006-a: 68-69, 
Abe 2006-b: 49). He criticized that it was extraordinarily ‘inactive diplomacy which 
neglected national interests’ and caused diplomatic error (Abe 2006-a: 69, 128). It might 
be the ‘price for defeat during the WWⅡ’ that caused such a humble diplomacy, and 
consequently, Japan’s posture has given the impression that Japan should be blamed 
while repeatedly apologizing (Abe 2006-b: 150).  
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As for postwar foreign policy towards North Korea, Abe noted that little attention 
had been paid to the abduction issue because it might be an obstacle to the 
normalization of the bilateral relations. Abe insisted that if the Japanese government did 
not make a strong protest against the abductions, things would go as those who were 
heavily influenced by ‘postwar-democracy’ had hoped (Abe 2006-a: 201). In other 
words, supporters of ‘postwar-democracy’ were regarded as the ‘enemy-within’. He 
continuously referred to a certain atmosphere ‘which suppresses criticism against North 
Korea and communist countries’ (Abe and Okazaki 2004: 104). ‘The abduction issue 
has revealed’, as he put it, ‘hypocrisy’ of the JSP and the JCP by exposing their posture 
‘to protect Article 9 of the Constitution while leaving the issue untouched (Abe 2006-a: 
180)’.  
Put another way, the JSP and the JCP damaged national interests and security by 
upholding the Article 9. Therefore, the Constitution was the primary cause of Japan’s 
security crisis and those who supported it were regarded as ‘enemies within’. In the case 
of the bilateral relations with China, he maintained that Japan has taken an 
‘extraordinarily constrained’ attitude since the normalization in 1972 (Abe and Okazaki 
2004: 161). ‘Japanese Politicians and diplomats had been obsessed with the 
friendship-first policy’, which urged them to compromise with China even when Japan 
should purport its own legitimacy (Abe and Okazaki 2004: 161). Abe evaluated this 
‘over-constrained’ diplomacy as nothing but diplomatic error because ‘although Japan 
formally apologized for its past twenty-one times and offered more than three trillion 
yen in loans, anti-Japan movements and strong protests still occurred’ (Abe 2006-a: 
68-69). Given these, Abe supported the view that Japan’s postwar diplomacy has been 
considerably restricted by ‘postwar-democracy’, which prevailed over long-term 
national interests.  
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In addition to security and diplomatic issues, the Yoshida line was criticized as a 
cause of moral degeneration in postwar society. In this context, one aspect of the 
Yoshida line, which highly prioritized economic development, was regarded as 
‘mammonism’. Abe claimed that postwar Japan had single-mindedly pursued material 
prosperity at the expense of richness of spirit by revising the Constitution. This 
‘mammonism’ can easily be connected to the pro-China group, which insisted on the 
importance of economic benefit from close ties with China and emphasized political 
consideration on history issue with China. They were regarded as a kind of ‘fifth 
column’ in that they only concerned themselves with economic gains and accepted the 
use of the ‘history card’ by neighboring countries instead of saving national dignity. It 
has also criticized that the mainstream has gone along with progressives and maintained 
a left-leaning ‘postwar democracy’. In that sense, the Yoshida School was treated as 
guilty as the progressive camp and thus should be abandoned. 
 
5.2.5 Postwar democracy  
 
     Indeed, the term ‘postwar regime’ may imply more than just institutions like the 
Constitution and the Basic Education law expounded by Abe. He asserted that in 
addition to revising the Constitution, it might be ‘necessary to breakdown postwar 
‘fixed beliefs’ to establish a brand-new Japan in the 21st century (Abe 2006-a: 78)’. Abe 
implied that it was the so-called ‘postwar-democracy’ that fostered and maintained a 
certain kind of social atmosphere and has been pervasive throughout Japanese society 
(Abe 2006-a: 201). In this ‘postwar-democracy’, even the LDP could not escape from 
its societal ‘constraints’ and thus their thinking and behaviour has also been restricted 
by ‘the loss of the war’ and the ‘reaction against prewar society’ (Abe 2006-a: 40).  
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     From his point of view, ‘postwar democracy’ might include a conventional social 
framework in which ‘conservatives’ conflict with ‘progressives’ and in which the latter 
has been predominant. In his book, ‘conservatives’ were represented by the mainstream 
of the LDP, former British Prime Ministers Churchill and Thatcher, and former 
American President Reagan. On the other hand, ‘progressives’ are labeled ‘left-wing’, 
‘anti-establishmentarian’ and ‘supporters of communist groups’, and represented in the 
former Japan Socialist Party, the Japan Communist Party, Asahi Shinbun (newspaper), 
‘Nikkyouso (the Japan Teacher’s Union)’ and so-called ‘progressive intellectuals’ (Abe 
and Okazaki 2004: 33, 104, 142-143, 201, Abe 2006-b: 19, 21). They opposed the 
revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960, which Prime Minister Kishi forced 
through. Abe noted that he had become sympathetic to ‘conservatism’ due to the 
reaction against criticism of his grandfather who had been called an ‘evil reactionary 
conservative’, and Abe came to distrust those who offered such criticism of his 
grandfather in the name of ‘progressivism’ (Abe 2006-b: 18, 21). Put simply, the 
‘progressives’ became Abe’s political opponents, and thus were treated as ‘enemies’ 
because they supported ‘postwar democracy’. 
Abe repeatedly described postwar Japan as a society dominated by these 
‘left-wing’ ‘progressives’. From his childhood, at ‘The 1960 Anpo-toso (the movements 
against the revision of the Japan-the US security Treaty in 1960)’ throughout the Cold 
War era, ‘conservatives’ were considered villains who strove for the return to the 
prewar regime and ‘progressives’ were heroes who sought to cultivate Japan’s future, 
implying that capitalism was a social ill and communism was virtuous (Abe 2006-a: 120, 
Abe 2006-b: 24). The mass media, critical circles and the academic community have 
been occupied by ‘left-wing’ ‘progressive’ intellectuals, with whom Abe has never felt 
sympathy (Abe and Okazaki 2004: 201, Abe 2006-b: 24). Despite the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union, ‘the remnants of communism had maintained its strength’ and it had been 
pervasive in all corners in postwar Japan (Abe and Okazaki 2004: 107, Abe 2006-a: 
149).  
In such a society, anti-American and pro-Constitution groups like the JSP and the 
JCP have been regarded as pacifists, while pro-American ‘conservative’ groups were 
likely to be considered as militarists. The Yoshida School conservatives also supported 
this social climate, considering that it enabled Japan to depend on US security without 
complete rearmament and allowing it to single-mindedly pursue its own economic 
development without efforts to revise the ‘foreign-written’ Constitution (Abe 2006-a: 
90, Abe 2006-b: 126). Given this situation, ‘postwar-democracy’ was represented as a 
social belief system rather than democracy as a political system, in which ‘left-wing’ 
‘progressive’ values were predominant while ‘conservatism’ was marginalized. In this 
context, Abe sought to transform values which were given to both groups; he provided 
positive meanings and roles for ‘conservative’ thought while demonstrating the negative 
effects of ‘postwar-democratic’ views which had been heavily influenced by 
‘progressive’ thought. He critiqued ‘progressive’ thought in the light of nationalism and 
the relationship between a state and people, and pointed toward its negative effects on 
Japanese politics and society in terms of education, diplomacy and security.  
     The most frequent representation of ‘progressive’ thought in Abe’s books was as 
an ‘allergy against the state (kokka)’ and any nationalistic values. This allergy, which 
was brought about by defeat in WWⅡ and the reaction against prewar statehood, has 
been considerably strong (Abe 2006-a: 40, Abe 2006-b: 124). A ‘commonly mistaken 
notion’ among people (kokumin) spread by progressives is that ‘a state (kokka) and 
individuals (kojin) were competing’ (Abe 2006-a: 160). Those who were influenced by 
such an idea, Abe said, tended to be hostile toward the state and nationalism and 
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supported ‘cosmopolitanism’. Abe believed that ‘cosmopolitanism’ was ‘unnatural’ and 
‘ideational’ because ‘only states can in effect secure individual rights and properties’ 
and explained that the allergy to the concept of ‘a state’ might be so strong that it serves 
to combine individuals with cosmopolitanism to bypass the state (Abe 2006-b: 95). He 
also pointed out that progressive people demonstrated a tendency to negate and attack 
‘nationalism’ itself and to avoid highlighting their national identity (Abe 2006-a: 19, 
Abe 2006-b: 83, 99). They seemed to abhor the national anthem ‘Kimigayo’ and the 
national flag ‘Hinomaru’ as symbols of militarism and hated to see young people 
cheering national football team (Abe 2006-b: 82-83).  
     In this respect, Prime Minister Abe mentioned that due to the trauma of WWⅡ 
cautiousness against the term ‘patriotism’ could not be removed from minds of the 
Japanese people. As a result, ‘wounded nationalism because of defeat’ has not been 
restored. On that point, he defined nationalism as ‘sound patriotism’, ‘unifying national 
feeling’, and ‘to identify the state to which he or she belongs and to confirm his or her 
identity’ and regretted that Japan’s nationalism has only been allowed in the case of 
sports (Abe 2006-b: 79-80). Thus, it was argued that in ‘postwar-democracy’, Japan’s 
nationalism had been marginalized under the influence of progressive thought, in which 
the ‘state allergy’ became widely held among postwar Japanese people. 
     With respect to postwar Japanese education, Abe criticized not only the Basic 
Education Law formulated during the Occupation period but also the ‘progressive’ view 
towards history (Abe 2006-b: 206). He claimed that the Basic Education Law would 
lack Japanese uniqueness because it referred to neither ‘the importance of a state 
(kokka), locality, history, and family’ nor ‘values of public service’ (Abe 2006-a: 234). 
In addition, according to Abe, postwar education established by the Occupation also 
deprived Japanese people, especially the younger generation, of their national pride by 
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negating traditional Japanese values and historical achievements (Abe 2006-b: 207). 
Furthermore, this system ‘left behind the essential Japanese values of self-discipline, a 
spirit of public-mindedness, and affection for one’s community and national traditions 
(Abe 2006-j)’. As a result of postponing revision of the Basic Education Law, as well as 
amendment of the Constitution, ‘profit-and-loss arithmetic has become an important 
standard for value judgment while values beyond such arithmetic as family ties, 
affection to the land of birth, and attachment to a country have been downplayed’ (Abe 
2006-b: 29). In addition, Abe attributed the distortion of society and moral degeneration 
to postwar education, stating that:  
 
There is no denying that our education system has not sufficiently addressed ideas 
such as moral values, ethics, and self-discipline. Experts today often call attention 
to this issue of decline in children’s morals and desire to learn, and families and 
communities are said to be less and less capable of filling the educational roles 
they once did (Abe: 2006-i). 
 
Abe noted that one of the most serious problems would be ‘masochistic and biased 
education’ peculiar to defeated countries (Abe 2005-b: 79-80, 2006-b: 206). This was 
partly because of the Occupation policy, which sought to remove attachment to their 
own history from the Japanese people (Abe 2006-a: 133). He mentioned that 
‘pro-communists’ held a historical view that only illuminated the negative aspects of 
history and negated the positive achievements in order to hinder Japanese national pride 
(Abe and Okazaki 2004: 107). Furthermore, postwar education has helped to bolster the 
‘allergy’ to the state and prevented people from creating a strategy from a state view 
(Abe 2006-b: 202). Therefore, postwar education has exerted negative effects on the 
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relationship between people and this country. Given the convergence of these concepts, 
‘postwar democracy’ was constituted in a way that it was deviant and thus should be 
utterly revised. 
  
5.3 Key concepts and Identity Construction  
 
There were three key concepts at the core of national identity in the discourse of 
Abe and the neo-revisionists: ‘peace’, ‘democracy’, and ‘independence/autonomy’. It 
might give the strange impression that these concepts coincide with slogans of 
progressive, ‘pro-constitution’, nationalism in the 1960s given that right-wing 
traditionalists tend to use ‘traditional culture’ or ‘the Emperor’ instead. However, it 
could be thought that neo-revisionists might try to dismantle the particular meanings of 
these words, which were assigned by left wing progressives, offering new meanings to 
them in accordance with their own thoughts. National identity could be constructed 
through the process in which the new meanings are given and fixed, constituting a 
particular reality of the world. Moreover, each concept, given a new meaning, might 
result in the polarization of the world, implicit or explicit articulation of ‘other’ in order 
to construct the identity of ‘self’. In what follows, an argument about how the meanings 
of the three key concepts were transformed will be presented exploring what kind of 
national identity was constituted in relation to the discourse on the postwar regime, as 
well as how this identity was utilized to legitimize Abe’s policy. 
 
5.3.1 Peace  
 
There can be no doubt that ‘peace’ has been one of the primary concepts in 
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postwar Japanese society. In particular, the passage of the Article 9, which renounces 
the right to wage war, represents the core of ‘pacifism’. ‘Peace’ in the progressive 
context, thus originally went along with the pro-Constitution movement and makes 
reference to ‘anti-war’, ‘unarmed neutralism’ and ‘anti-nuclear’. It was also used to 
mobilize people against the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960 claiming 
that it would deepen subordination to the US. Therefore, it can be argued that ‘peace’ in 
progressive terms would imply the existence of postwar Japan’s ‘nationalism’ behind 
the backlash against the Japan’s ‘blindly following’ the US. In this context, it would 
seem to be inconsistent if neo-revisionists pursued national identity as a ‘peaceful 
country’ in accordance with progressive connotations, because they relentlessly claimed 
it was necessary for the revision of the current Constitution, and they tended to seek 
enhancement of the Japan-US Alliance. In addition, it seemed to be contradictory that 
while Abe criticized the ‘peace constitution’ and ‘postwar pacifism’, he also argued that 
‘Japanese people should be proud of their path as a peaceful country’.  
     However, Abe attempted to utilize the word ‘peace’ as a core concept of national 
identity, by transforming the meaning of ‘peaceful country’ and by adopting the 
dichotomy to reconstruct national identity and to legitimize his stance. First of all, Abe 
and his colleagues re-articulated the feature of progressive’s ‘peace’ as ‘idealistic’ and 
‘hypocritical’, and defined their peace movement as virtually equal to the ‘anti-America, 
pro-Communism’ movement. It was ‘idealistic’ because the Constitution, which the 
progressive’s pacifism relied upon, became far removed from the reality of the world. It 
was ‘hypocritical’ because a country which offered only money without providing 
contribution in personnel under the name of ‘pacifism’ could be seen only as ‘dubious 
(zurui)’ (Abe 2006-b: 136). Such ‘pacifism’ would mean no more than ‘one-country 
pacifism’, which might serve only self-satisfaction and could not be welcomed in 
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international society. Therefore, there can be seen ‘othering’ of postwar Japan, more 
precisely, postwar Japan which had been dominated by the progressive ‘pacifism’. As 
postwar Japan with ‘one-country pacifism’ must not be regarded as an honorable 
member of international society, it should be discarded and reconstructed to be a true 
‘peaceful country’. In this context, Abe’s ‘peaceful country’ should be opposite to the 
‘one-country pacifism’ with resentment against the US. Therefore, it was a country, 
which proactively contributed to the peace and stability in the world in cooperation with 
the US, instead of escaping from responsibility as an alliance partner and concentrating 
on self-defense.  
     What should be noticeable here is that Abe tried to ensure compatibility between 
‘peaceful’ identity and the Japan-US Alliance by defining that it was not the 
Constitution but the Japan-US Alliance that maintained peace surrounding Japan in the 
postwar era (Abe 2006-a: 134, 256). In other words, Abe tended to use Japan’s ‘peace 
contribution’ when he emphasized the significance of the ‘Japan-US Alliance in the 
global context’ and ‘Japan-US alliance for Asia and the world’ (NDRP: 2006-p), in 
which the two countries were cooperating to demonstrate leadership on global security 
issues. The Prime Minister insisted that as the ‘Japan-US alliance for Asia and the 
world’ was a cornerstone of Japan’s security policy, ‘it should be necessary to further 
strengthen the Japan-US Alliance in order to protect the lives of the Japanese people, 
peace, and independence, as well as freedom and democracy in our country’ (NDRP: 
2007-b). He successively claimed that in order to contribute to the peace and stability of 
the world, Japan should make legislative preparation especially on the right to collective 
self-defense to deal with security issues according to the current situations. In addition, 
Abe (2004-e: 16-17) clearly insisted that Japan should revise the Constitution and 
authorize to have the right to wage war and that the SDF should be allowed to play 
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military role in making international contributions. Put another way, the revision of the 
constitution and the specification of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense 
would be necessary for Japan to proactively contribute to international peace. In this 
context, the Constitution was regarded as an obstacle to Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful 
nation’, which contributes to world peace. In short, there can be seen the transformation 
of the meaning of a ‘peaceful country’ from ‘unilateral pacifism’ to the proactive 
contribution of international security with the US.  
With regard to the construction of national identity, Abe might reinforce the 
‘non-militaristic’ aspect of a ‘peaceful’ country by emphasizing differences from a 
‘militaristic’ other. It was because the representation of ‘militaristic’ others is necessary 
to rely upon the constitution of ‘non-militaristic’ identity of Japan. Thus, the emphasis 
on ‘peace’ and a ‘peaceful country’ would presuppose the boundary between a ‘peaceful 
country’ and a ‘militaristic country’ or a ‘terrorist country’, which could threaten peace 
and stability in the world. While the former was a member of international society, the 
latter was regarded as non-member or even a threat to the international community. Abe 
believed that postwar Japan has been a ‘peaceful country’ in that it has nothing to do 
with militarism. He argued that Japan has never demonstrated an aggressive attitude 
towards other countries for more than sixty years since the end of WWⅡ(Abe 2006-b: 
137, 150). From his statement, it seemed to be clear that he tried to construct Japan’s 
‘peaceful’ identity by highlighting differences from an oppositional ‘other’.  
 
Has Japan tried to equipped long-range missiles to attack other countries? Has 
Japan aimed to rearm with nuclear weapon? Has Japan suppressed human rights? 
Has Japan restricted people’s freedom? Has Japan tried to destroy the democratic 
system? All of the answers are “No”. Japan is undoubtedly a democratic country 
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that is immune to militarism (Abe 2006-b: 69). 
 
 In this narrative, there can be seen an implicit construction of an oppositional 
‘other’ to articulate the identity of the ‘self’; it articulated Japan’s identity (A) by 
constituting and denying the identity of ‘other’ (non-A). There is assumed to be a 
country as ‘other’, which attacked other countries by long-range-missiles; and which 
suppressed human rights, freedom and democracy. As will be discussed in later chapters, 
‘other’s will turn out to be China and North Korea. China was often described as a 
country with ‘hegemonic’ and ‘militaristic ambition in the region’ with the ‘lack of 
transparency’ (Nakanishi 2001: 103-4, Abe 2006-a: 61-62). North Korea was frequently 
represented as a country which is a military-driven, ‘genuinely terrorist state’ 
(Nakanishi 2001: 57, 143, 2003: 26). Both countries were treated as having an opposite 
identity from Japan.  
In this way, Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful’ country was reconstructed to 
legitimate Abe’s policy toward both domestic and foreign issues; the revision of the 
Constitution, the enhancement of the Japan-US Alliance, and approach to China and 
North Korea.  
 
5.3.2 Democracy  
 
 ‘Democracy’ has also been one of the core ideas of progressive nationalism 
often employed in the event of the mass demonstration against the revision of the 
Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960. In the progressive context, ‘democracy’ was used to 
express backlash against the policy of ‘reverse course’ to the prewar system, which was 
non-democratic and authoritarian policy making process exemplified in the Kishi 
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administration. The term ‘the drift to the right’ was often used to imply ‘the drift 
towards militarism and authoritarianism’ and was often described as ‘the crisis of 
democracy in postwar Japan’. It was clear that ‘democracy’ was the oppositional value 
to ‘militarism’, ‘authoritarian Emperor System’ and ‘the right-wing prewar values’ in 
the progressive context. ‘Postwar democracy’ would mean, in other words, a ‘departure 
from the prewar regime’. Therefore, it appears to be strange that Abe and his colleague 
emphasized ‘democracy’ as a fundamental value considering that they criticize ‘postwar 
democracy’.  
Indeed, Abe’s usage of ‘democracy’ might be different from what the 
progressives employed and what ‘postwar democracy’ meant in the context of Abe’s 
group. It could be thought that they might redefine ‘democracy’ by giving different 
meanings from the progressives view and transform it in accordance with their own 
interests. In the argument of the right-wing traditionalists, ‘postwar democracy’ was 
transplanted from foreign culture and has been maintained by the ‘deviant’ progressives. 
Therefore, it would deny the continuity of national history and traditions; it could rob 
Japanese people of their national affinity and pride because it was based on a 
‘masochistic’ view of history; it could hinder people’s identification with their ‘state’ by 
defining that ‘a state can conflict with its national people.’ In short, ‘postwar 
democracy’ can be defined as a ‘democracy without a state’, which is anti-Japanese in 
nature (Saeki 2001). Abe and his supporters basically shared this view with the 
traditional right-wing nationalist, and used ‘postwar democracy’ and ‘postwar regime’ 
interchangeably. Put simply, ‘postwar democracy’ should be discarded because it was 
produced and maintained by the Constitution, and it distorted Japan’s identity.  
The point to be noted is that ‘postwar democracy’ was not equalized as 
‘democracy’ as a universal value in Abe’s discourse. ‘Democracy’ was repeatedly 
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emphasized as a ‘universal value’ as well as freedom, human rights, rule of law and 
market economy. According to Abe, democracy was the fundamental system and value 
of postwar Japan without referring to the prewar society. It would distinguish them from 
the traditional right wing whose claims often focused on the restoration of traditional 
values and the skepticism of ‘Western universal values’ (Yagi 2007). ‘Universal values’ 
would not be a kind of values which traditional right-wing nationalists tended to 
embrace. It might be partly because Abe and his colleagues intended to avoid being 
identified with the traditional right wing which was often regarded as prewar militarism 
and to assuage concerns of people at home and abroad that prewar-type militaristic 
nationalism was resurgent in Japan. Abe often argued that postwar Japan was far from 
militarism in his book (Abe 2006-b). Instead, they would emphasize how genuine Japan 
has been a supporter of democracy and how Japan should contribute to the world peace 
with the US. Therefore, by emphasizing universal values, they might attempt to make 
an impression that the departure from the postwar regime will not mean the revival of 
militarism and thus draw the attention of Japanese people. 
The narrative that Japan was a supporter of universal values inevitably assumes 
that there existed ‘others’ who did not share universal values. Among ‘others’, there can 
be distinguished two sorts, one that will take in and support universal values in the days 
ahead, and one that is totally opposite to such values. The former was regarded as an 
‘assimilable’ other, a potential ally, whereas the latter was viewed as an ‘inassimilable’ 
other, an inconvertible enemy. These articulations might be important for Japan to 
conduct foreign policy in Asia because it identified itself as a ‘vanguard of universal 
values in Asia’. In this context, there can be seen some situations when ‘democracy’ 
could play an important role in the discourse of Abe and his supporters; as a part of 
Japan’s identity, as a universal value which makes further cooperation with other 
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‘democratic’ countries, as a fundamental differences from ‘non-democratic’ countries, 
and as political capital in domestic power relationships. 
Abe often described Japan’s postwar ‘peaceful development’ that ‘Japan has 
modestly strived to reconstruct itself for international contribution by endorsing 
freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law (Abe 2006-b: 150). ‘Democracy’ 
was treated as an integral part of Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity. Instead of regarding 
‘democracy’ as merely a ‘foreign’ value transplanted to deny the Emperor System by 
the Occupation regime as some traditional right-wingers claim, Abe’s group often 
argued that democracy was never alien to Japan. Actually, Taro Aso of the LDP often 
argued that Japan was the oldest democracy in Asia when he was a Foreign Minister in 
the Koizumi and Abe administration and this claim was one of the premises of the 
policy of the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, which emphasized ‘universal values’ as 
will be discussed in a later chapter. It can be thought that the claim that Japan was the 
oldest democracy in Asia could make two ideas compatible: that a primary value should 
not serve to the discontinuity of national history and that Japan is a genuine supporter of 
universal values. Therefore, Japan as a ‘democracy’ was used as an essential part of 
‘peaceful’ country and thus naturalized in Abe’s discourse. 
Second, as it is a ‘universal value’, ‘democracy’ was a common value with other 
‘democratic’ countries such as the US, EU countries, Australia and India. As they 
would share fundamental values to national identity, they were regarded as an 
‘assimilable’ other, or ‘friend’. Based on this identity construction, it was naturalized to 
strengthen ties with those countries. A policy of deepening cooperation with India under 
the Abe administration, as discussed in a later chapter, was conducted in line with this 
logic. The policy to enhance ties with other democratic countries was ardently 
supported by Abe’s supporters because of two reasons. These two reasons would 
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correspond to the third and fourth situation in which ‘democracy’ was utilized by Abe 
and his supporters.  
As a third role, ‘democracy’ highlighted a difference between Japan and 
‘non-democratic’ countries so as to illuminate ‘radical otherness’ and thus legitimate 
hard-line approaches to those countries. Abe argued that in ‘authoritarian’ and many 
communist countries, values of freedom and democracy were denied and people were 
suppressed and slaughtered (Abe 2006-b: 65-66). In this context, ‘non-democratic’ was 
regarded not merely as different, but also demonstrated a lower moral standard in the 
country; ‘democracy’ and ‘non-democracy’ were not only conflicting but also 
incompatible. Therefore, a hard-line stance without any concession to those countries 
was legitimized in the foreign policy discourse of Abe and his supporters. Abe often 
emphasized the difference of political systems between Japan and China (Abe 2006-b: 
153) and depicted China as a ‘developmental dictatorship’, which does not observe 
democratic rules (Abe 2006-a: 60). He also argued that Japan should not be optimistic 
about such a country like China, which did not accept “the standard values of developed 
countries” in either economic or security areas (Abe 2006-a: 224). A professor of Kyoto 
University Terumasa Nakanishi (Sakurai, Kasai and Nakanishi 2007: 56-57) supported 
Abe and Aso’s emphasis on democracy as universal values in foreign policy towards 
China, because it would set off China’s manipulation of the ‘history card’ and give 
advantage to Japan since universal values were widely shared in international society. In 
addition, Abe’s supporters launched the Diet Member’s Group for Promoting 
Value-Oriented Diplomacy and stated that they would appeal for the need to keep a 
close watch on China, which would not share universal values (Furuya 2007). In this 
way, the emphasis on ‘democracy’ was utilized to highlight difference from 
‘non-democratic’ countries like China and to legitimize a hard-line policy to those 
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countries. 
Finally, ‘democracy’ as a universal value might play an important role as political 
capital in a domestic power relationship. In relation to the second and third role, 
pursuing a policy to strengthen ties with ‘democratic’ countries was manipulated as a 
measure to consolidate Abe’s power base in domestic politics in two aspects. To begin 
with, this policy served to offset frustrations among Abe’s supporters against the 
rapprochement with China as will be touched in Chapter 6. As the statement of Keiji 
Furuya, the president of the Diet Member’s Group for Promoting Value-Oriented 
diplomacy, demonstrated above, Abe’s ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ was closely related 
to policy toward China. Abe’s endorsement of ‘democracy’ was considered to be setting 
a demarcation between Japan and China, so as to construct the latter as an 
‘inassimilable’ other. Therefore, it might contribute to the appeasement of his 
supporters and thereby the consolidation of Abe’s power base in the LDP. Secondly, as 
the remark of Furuya showed again, Abe’s group tried to achieve their ‘true 
conservative values’ and goals by gathering conservative powers under the name of 
‘universal values’. In other words, they attempted to manipulate ‘democracy’ or other 
universal values to consolidate their power to realize their domestic political agenda 
such as the revision of the Constitution, which had nothing to do with ‘universal values’ 
in fact.   
  
5.3.3 Independence/autonomy  
 
     Compared with ‘peace’ and ‘democracy’, which seemed to be more universal 
rather than nationalistic, ‘jishu dokuritsu’ or merely ‘dokuritsu’ (translated into 
‘independence’ or ‘autonomy’,) seems to be more of a nationalistic value. Although 
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Japan’s independence was restored in legal terms with the conclusion of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, it has long been argued by the traditional right wing as 
if Japan had not restored its autonomy (Abe 2006-a: 39). Both the left-wing 
progressives and the right-wing traditionalists have attacked the Japanese government 
for its lack of self-reliance. The ‘lack of autonomy’ has generally been identified with 
the ‘subordination to the US’, and thus ‘independence/autonomy’ would mean 
independence from the US subordination in the context in which they criticize the 
one-sided nature of the Japan-US Security Treaty. In short, the Security Treaty might be 
a symbol of ‘blindly following’ of Japan to the US in conventional interpretation. The 
Japan-US Security Treaty and pro-US conservative politicians in the LDP were 
regarded as obstacles to Japan’s autonomy in a historical context of postwar Japan. 
 On the other hand, however, there can be observed some different points on 
what has restrained Japanese sovereignty and prevented it from achieving genuine 
‘independence’ in the narratives of Abe and his supporters. Firstly, it was the current 
Constitution, which might hinder Japan from meeting the requirements as a ‘normal’ 
independent state. In their argument, as long as Japan upholds the current Constitution 
written and imposed by a foreign country, and it denies the right to wage war, Japan has 
to remain a quasi-sovereign state. Therefore, the revision of the current Constitution 
would be a symbol of the achievement of genuine independence for Japan (Abe 2006-b: 
29). In addition, against the criticism that pro-American conservatives tend to accept, or 
even try to deepen, subordination to the US, they argued that it was the pro-Constitution 
power that was truly dependent on the ‘imposed’ Constitution. In their argument, the 
status quo might not be ‘blindly following’ but merely reflecting ‘one-sided’ relations, 
which could become more equal when Japan could make the security treaty more 
reciprocal. Abe argued that it was by increasing mutuality that might enhance Japan’s 
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influence on the US, thereby make the bilateral relationship more equal (Abe 2006-b: 
133). At this point, there seemed to be a difference between the traditional right wings 
and Abe’s group. For instance, a famous writer Jun Eto, who represented traditionalists, 
argued that the US had restrained Japan’s sovereignty by imposing the Constitution 
(1991: 329). However, Abe did not follow this idea although he often supported and 
cited Eto’s statements. In short, it was not the Japan-US Security Treaty but the 
Constitution that was a symbol of the lack of autonomy and it was the people who 
supported the Constitution that impeded Japan’s independence in neo-nationalist 
narratives. In this context, the revision of the Constitution and the enhancement of the 
cooperation with US proposed by Abe’s group were legitimized to achieve Japan’s 
autonomy. 
Another factor to which neo-revisionists would attribute Japan’s lack of 
autonomy was the concession to neighboring countries on the history issue. It was 
claimed by Abe’s group that ‘apology diplomacy’ based on the history view of the 
Tokyo War Tribunal, which has blocked Japan from pursuing its national interest 
through foreign policy. As long as the Japanese government prioritizes consideration for 
national feelings among neighboring countries over Japan’s national interests, and by 
accepting a situation in which the ‘history card’ is manipulated, China and South Korea 
could exploit the history issue regarded as interference in domestic affairs. As a result, 
Japan might have difficulty to conduct an ‘autonomous’ policy to secure its national 
interest. Therefore, in their argument, it was not the United State but China and South 
Korea that restrained Japan’s diplomatic autonomy by manipulating the history issue. In 
this way, it was insisted that it should be necessary to depart from ‘apology diplomacy’ 
for Japan to attain full autonomy as an independent state. For this, taking a tough stance 
and making no concessions on the history issue to China were legitimized for Japan’s 
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‘autonomy’ in the narratives of Abe’s group. 
  
5.4 The construction of domestic ‘others’  
 
By manipulating these key concepts, Abe and his supporters tried to achieve their 
political goals and legitimize their policy choices through the identity constructions of 
political actors. As discussed above, there can be seen two kinds of external ‘others’; 
‘assimilable’ other which share ‘universal values and might not claim the history issue, 
and ‘inassimilable’ other which would not have common values and tend to raise the 
history issue. In addition to those external others, there can be found domestic others in 
Abe’s discourse; the progressives and his political rival within the LDP, that is, the 
Keisei-kai and the Yoshida School conservatives. Those groups were regarded as 
radical other for Abe’s group; they were described as ‘anti-Japanese’ and treated as the 
‘enemy within’.  
To begin with, it would be clear that the progressives were seen as the ‘deviant’, a 
fifth column or ‘anti-Japanese’ for Abe’s group because the ideas of left-wing 
progressives would be the opposite to Abe’s conservatism. It was obvious that Abe took 
a hostile attitude against the group by the fact that he tried to define his beautiful 
country by dismantling the discourse of ‘postwar pacifism’ endorsed by the 
progressives. Indeed, Yagi (2008: 22) argues that Abe’s ‘beautiful country’ was named 
against the title of Kenzaburo Oe’s Nobel lecture, ‘Japan, the ambiguous, and Myself 
(Oe 1994)’, because Oe could represent the progressive intellectuals who has supported 
postwar democracy. What would mean ‘anti-Japanese’ in the texts of neo-revisionists 
was a negative evaluation of prewar Japan, represented by the ‘the Tokyo War Tribunal 
view of history’. Yagi (2008: 265) explained that what decisively distinguished them, 
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Abe’s group, from ‘those who would kill Japan’ was the ‘understanding of history’. As 
argued before, the progressives viewed prewar Japan as militaristic, authoritarian, and 
ultra-nationalistic, all of which should be discarded to become a ‘peaceful nation’. On 
the other hand, Abe’s group thought that such a progressive view of history was 
‘arrogant’ because it ignored the sense of continuity of national history. They claimed 
that Japanese people should be ‘humble’ on national history in a way that they respect 
the ancestors who maintained the long history of Japan, instead of regarding prewar 
Japan as evil as the progressives use the phrase ‘humble on national history’. In addition, 
in the argument of Abe and his supporters, as postwar education was launched by the 
Occupation Regime and maintained by the progressives, it brainwashed the Japanese 
people into thinking ‘a state is evil’ based on the Tokyo War Tribunal view of history, 
people were not be able to be proud of history and traditions of their country. By doing 
so, the progressives deprived the Japanese people of their national pride and sense of 
belonging. What was more, postwar education broke the ties between the state and its 
people, and destroyed traditional cultures. In this sense, the progressives were described 
as not only ‘non-Japanese’ but also ‘anti-Japanese’ because they regard prewar Japan as 
negative and thus diminish the foundation of their country.  
In addition, it was often said that ‘anti-Japanese’ people turned out to be the 
‘enemy within’ especially in terms of diplomatic relations with Asian countries over the 
history issue. ‘Enemies within’, in this context, were those who had an ‘anti-Japanese’ 
view of history, the Tokyo War Tribunal view of history in other words, and supported 
neighboring countries on the history issues instead of supporting their own country. In 
progressive discourse, since postwar Japan had been established on feelings of remorse 
for the war, it should demonstrate consideration for national feelings of victim countries 
like China and South Korea rather than high-profile diplomacy. Abe’s group often 
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condemned that it was not only ‘unpatriotic behavior’ but also an act of ‘treachery’. For 
example, some progressive activists supported ‘comfort women’ and helped them to 
bring a suit against their own government despite the fact that they were Japanese. In 
addition, it was often claimed that it was the Asahi Shimbun and other progressive mass 
media that made the textbook issue a diplomatic problem (Abe 2005-d: 28-32). They 
intentionally reported the textbook issue and the Yasukuni Shrine issue so as to draw 
the attention of China and South Korea, which encouraged both countries to attack 
Japan. Behind this backdrop, neo-realists believe, the Comintern or the Chinese 
Communist Party might undertake secret operation or conspiracy in order to put Japan 
in a pinch (Nakanishi 2007: 33). Moreover, according to Abe (Abe 2005-e: 33), the 
Asahi Shimbun collaborated with North Korea and tried to ensnare Abe and Shoichi 
Nakagawa in order to inhibit the enactment of sanctions. As the progressives might be 
manipulated to serve the conspiracy, they were regarded as a kind of fifth column. In 
that sense, the progressives and those who go along with them were treated as ‘enemies 
within’ in the discourse of Abe’s group.   
Another construction of domestic ‘other’ was concerning mainstream 
conservatives within the LDP, the Yoshida School (the Kochi-kai) and the former 
Tanaka faction (the Keisei-kai). Although the division line between the progressives 
and the conservatives has been focused on the existing literature, what is noticeable is 
that Abe’s group regarded those mainstream conservatives as ‘others’ and ‘enemy 
within’ even though they belong to the same party because Abe’s ‘departure form the 
postwar regime’ partly aimed to revise the Yoshida line and to break the Keisei-kai 
dominance. Terumasa Nakanishi (2001: 253), a professor of Kyoto University and a 
conservative debater, clearly pointed out that ‘the true division line concerning the 
settlement of the “postwar issues” as an ideology can be drawn not between the 
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progressives and the conservatives, ! the resistance of the progressives and mass 
media has not truly been the real issue !, but always between the conservative camps.’ 
There were three reasons why the mainstream conservatives were considered to be 
‘other’; power struggle within the LDP, pandering to the progressives, and pursuing 
pro-China policy.  
In postwar Japanese politics, the Yoshida School (the Kochi-kai) and later the 
Tanaka faction (the Keisei-kai) have dominated the LDP while the Seiwa-kai, to which 
a number of Abe’s group Diet members belong, has remained anti-mainstream in the 
party. It can be argued that the rivalry between the Keisei-kai and Seiwa-kai might 
reflect the self-other nexus in the narratives of neo-revisionists. As argued before, the 
mainstream of the LDP has followed the Yoshida line, which was based both on the 
Constitution and the Japan-US Security Treaty and thus has been attacked from both 
sides of the progressives and traditional right wing. The fact that they have manipulated 
the double standard logic on the history issue was also singled out for criticism. From 
the right-winger’s view to come around on the historical view would mean that the 
mainstream would go along with the progressive view. As for China policy, the division 
line coincides with one on the history issue because it was vital to acknowledge Japan’s 
war responsibility to establish and maintain the diplomatic relations with China. From 
the 1970s, the former Tanaka Faction dominated the LDP in addition to the successors 
of Yoshida. As Kakuei Tanaka restored diplomatic relations with mainland China and 
his faction has been closely linked to China, the former Tanaka Faction is known as the 
pro-China power in the LDP2.  
Taken together, elements of the domestic radical other in Abe’s discourse were 
                                                   
2 Komachi (2006: 50) argues that “pro-China” scholars and intellectuals were regarded as 
“progressives” and those who maintained critical approaches were grouped together as 
“conservatives”. However, the Tanaka faction is reputed as pro-China while it is 
“conservative”. 
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the progressives and the mainstream conservatives, and they were constituted as 
‘anti-Japanese’ and the ‘enemy within’ because they had a deviant view of history 
which would diminish their country and served to realize China’s interests rather than 
Japan’s. In this context, it can be observed that ‘anti-Japanese’ had the same meaning of 
‘having an understanding of history in which Japan was assailant’ which justified a 
pro-China policy. 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
Abe and his supporters tried to deconstruct ‘postwar democracy’ and proposed a 
‘departure from the postwar regime’. All the essential components of postwar 
democracy were denied and rejected as what constituting distorted the ‘genuine’ 
‘innocent’ Japan. In particular, the Constitution was regarded as a symbol of the 
postwar regime and became a target of criticism. Looking at what kind of national 
identity was constructed in foreign policy of Abe’s group, there can be seen three key 
concepts. These were ‘peace’, ‘democracy’, and ‘independence/autonomy’, and were 
utilized to realize their domestic and foreign policy goals in the discourse of the 
neo-revisionists. While all these concepts had a historical context in which the 
progressives used as the ‘nationalistic values’ of the 1960s to resist the LDP 
government, Abe’s group transformed the meanings of those values so as to legitimize 
their policy goals. In the domestic arena, Abe’s group treated its political rivals as 
‘domestic others’, namely the progressives, the Yoshida School and the Keisei-kai 
politicians. By defining them as the ‘enemy within’ and ‘anti-Japanese’, Abe and his 
supporters tried to abandon their old political rivals and to expand their power base in 
domestic politics so as to achieve their ultimate goals; the revision of the Constitution.  
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In the foreign policy arena, three key concepts were utilized to naturalize and 
consolidate ties with the US, EU, Australia and India, and to marginalize ties with 
China and North Korea. These were the claim that Japan’s contribution to world peace 
and stability should be based on the close cooperation between Japan and the US: that 
was natural for Japan to cooperate with the US because both countries endorse universal 
values such as democracy: and that when Japan achieves its ‘true independence’ by 
revising the current Constitution, which might make it possible to exercise the right of 
collective self-defense, it could be an equal partner by increasing reciprocity with their 
states. In short, the three concepts were manipulated to justify natural and strong ties 
with the US because both countries share fundamental values and the mutuality between 
the two would imply Japan’s ‘independence’. On the other hand, they were also utilized 
to marginalize an alternative policy option, which identified China as a ‘friend’ to Japan 
and promote a good relationship. It was argued that China was the opposite to 
‘peaceful’ and ‘democratic’ Japan, it was ‘inassimilable’, and that the ‘history card’ 
manipulated by China hindered Japan’s autonomy: therefore, China was treated as the 
‘enemy’ to Japan. Thus, taking a tough stance to China was legitimized in the logic of 
Abe’s group. Although the Abe administration improved the bilateral relationship with 
China, it did not seek a fundamental reconciliation because of this staunch anti-Chinese 
logic, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6. Case Study 3 and 4: Nationalism and Foreign Policy toward 
China and North Korea under the Abe administration 
                                                           
 
     Prime Minister Shinzo Abe undertook a step to mend relations with Japan’s 
disgruntled neighbors immediately after his taking office. This went against general 
expectations that it might be difficult for Abe to repair ties with China because he was 
well-known as a ‘staunch nationalist’ and one of the leaders among anti-Chinese politicians. 
The new Prime Minister visited Beijing and realized a summit with President Hu Jintao and 
Premier Wen Jiabao. Leaders of both countries agreed to establish a ‘mutually beneficial 
relationship based on strategic interests’, which aimed at strengthening cooperation and 
enhancing mutual interests in a wide range of agendas like the East China Sea. Abe shelved 
the history issue especially Yasukuni, using strategic ambiguity in order to realize a summit 
and avoid a diplomatic dispute which could lead to a diplomatic hiatus like the Koizumi 
administration had made. On the whole, it can be argued that the Abe administration was 
successful in improving soured bilateral relations between Japan and China, taking a soft-line 
foreign policy and avoiding major confrontations on the history issue, at least on the surface.  
     On the other hand, Abe maintained a tough stance against North Korea with a very 
high priority on the abduction issue. Unlike the previous government, the Abe administration 
made every effort to boost pressures against the DPRK, aggressively imposing unilateral and 
international sanctions on North Korea’s declaration of the nuclear test and its ‘insincere’ 
attitude to the resolution of the abduction issue. Abe’s uncompromising stance seemed to 
make a sharp contrast with his predecessor’s North Korean policy and also his policy toward 
China. This chapter thus explores what made it possible for the Abe administration to 
conduct a reconciliatory policy to China on the one hand, and to take an utterly unyielding 
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stance against North Korea on the other hand. This question will be discussed by examining 
how national identity was reconstructed and what sort of logic was manipulated in order to 
legitimate Abe’s policy. Furthermore, it will explore how Abe and his supporters tried to 
manipulate China policy and the North Korea issue in order to strengthen their political 
capital. 
     My argument is as follows: the Abe administration avoided diplomatic embarrassment 
with China, unlike the Koizumi administration, by shelving the Yasukuni Shrine issue, 
which would mean that his cabinet did not treat China as an ‘identity threat’ to Japan at least 
on the surface. Due to a diplomatic stagnation in the relationship with China, the improved 
relationship became a source of political capital for Japan’s political leaders. Abe wanted to 
prevent his opponents from exploiting the deadlock with Beijing against him. In addition, the 
fact that China demonstrated understanding and appreciation of Japan’s postwar 
development as a peaceful nation might contribute to the tentative settlement of the 
‘identity-crisis’, which had been highlighted in the Yasukuni issue during the previous 
administration. The efforts of both governments did not produce social antagonism, so that 
Abe’s soft-line policy toward China was legitimized. Instead, the Abe administration 
explicitly and implicitly constructed China as only a ‘potential threat’ or an ‘inassimilable 
other’ in foreign policy discourse.  
     On the other hand, there seemed to be no room for concessions to North Korea, 
because the abduction issue was treated as a question related to fundamental character of 
Japan as a ‘state’. That is, it was considered to be an identity issue and was made a part of his 
political agenda of ‘the departure from the postwar regime’. It seemed that Abe tried to 
reconstruct Japan’s identity by using North Korea to restore a bond between nation and state, 
reconsidering postwar security policy, and reviewing the postwar low-profile foreign policy 
in East Asia. Furthermore, a hard-line approach against North Korea served as political 
 198 
capital to appease the frustrations among Abe’s anti-China supporters. In this way, Abe’s 
foreign policy toward China and North Korea might be ‘nationalistic’ in the sense that it was 
closely linked with his desire to reconstruct Japan’s national identity.    
  
6.1 China Policy 
 
6.1.1 Chronology 
 
      8 October 2006 marked the remarkable moment in which Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe visited Beijing and realized a bilateral summit with Chinese President Hu Jintao 
and Premier Wen Jiabao. This was described as an ice-breaking visit because China had 
refused the bilateral summit for nearly 18 months due to the visit to Yasukuni Shrine by the 
previous Prime Minister Koizumi. Now Abe and Hu agreed to establish a ‘strategic mutually 
beneficial relationship’ aimed at ‘strengthening mutual trust’ to contribute to peace and 
stability in the region and the world’, ‘advancing the bilateral relations for further 
cooperation to tackle regional and global challenges together’ and ‘enlarging strategic 
common interests (Abe: 2006-f)’. Shelving the Yasukuni Shrine issue, both leaders also 
agreed to facilitate cooperation in a wide variety of areas such as energy, environmental 
protection, and the East China Sea1. Above all, they acknowledged common interest in 
addressing the North Korean nuclear problem, emphasizing ‘denuclearization and peaceful 
settlement of concerns in the Korean Peninsula through dialogue’. From then on, the 
high-level meetings continued, including reciprocal visits of leaders, foreign ministers, and 
high-level officials, such as the Japan-China High-Level Economic Dialogue. These 
                                             
1 Other areas for cooperation were finance, information and communication technology, cultural 
exchanges, protection of intellectual property, the reform of the United Nations and so on.  
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meetings were intended to create a ‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common 
strategic interests’, which would be expected to expand those common interests thereby ‘the 
two countries take their solemn responsibility and contribute jointly to Asia and the world 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 2008)’2. In addition to various high-level meetings including 
the 6 foreign minister’s meetings, Wen Jiabao made an ‘ice-melting’ trip to Japan in April 
2007 to consolidate and give a more concrete meaning to their ‘strategic reciprocal 
relationship’. After the summit between Abe and Wen, both countries released the 
Japan-China Joint Statement, in which they confirmed and advanced contents of the 
‘mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests’ (Abe: 2007-c). Wen 
also addressed the Japanese Diet for the first time in history. On the whole, the Japan-China 
relationship during the Abe administration marked an improvement and comparatively 
stabilized phase even though the East China Sea issue made little progress.  
    
6.1.2 Background of Abe’s rapprochement with China  
 
     It can be thought that a growing domestic pressure to call for the new Prime Minister 
to mend the soured Japan-China relationship was so strong that Abe did not have a choice 
but to do so. Since the Koizumi period, it was regarded as an urgent diplomatic task and the 
opposition parties strongly criticized the government in the Diet session. They asserted that 
Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine caused the diplomatic isolation of Japan in Asia, 
which severely damaged national interest. In other words, the reality of ‘diplomatic crisis’ 
was constructed in foreign policy discourse and dominated in the Diet. The business 
community also came to make a request to improve the Japan-China relationship more 
                                             
2 For instance, Foreign Ministers of both countries, Taro Aso and Li Zhaoxing, and Abe and Hu 
had a meeting at the APEC in Hanoi in November. They agreed to set up a joint study group of 
Japan-China history, discussed on the joint development of the East China Sea, and called for 
North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. 
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loudly.  
     The Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) called for 
self-restraint in terms of the visit to Yasukuni Shrine of Koizumi and published a document 
titled a ‘Proposal to the Japanese and Chinese Government’ in 20063. This Association, the 
second largest business community in Japan, articulated the prime ministerial visit to the 
Shrine as a ‘principal impediment to immediate resumption of the top-level meeting and 
warned that further visits ‘would not benefit Japan’s national interest but also could damage 
what postwar Japan has achieved’ (The Keizai Doyukai 2006: 3-4).  
     Although Prime Minister Koizumi dismissed this proposal and express his unpleasant 
feeling that ‘business and politics are different’ (Asahi Shimbun: 2006-c), it can be thought 
that strong demand from the business communities could not be ignored with regard to 
domestic politics and close economic ties with China. In addition, there was an idea that the 
improvement of the Japan-China relationship might be necessary to strengthen international 
pressure against North Korea. Thus, the Abe government recognized the necessity of 
rapprochement with China. The Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki remarked that it 
should be a top priority to hold summit talks with Chinese leaders as soon as possible and to 
improve the bilateral relationship the day Abe takes office.  
 
6.1.3 The Rapprochement with China as Political Capital  
 
     Due to the deterioration of the relationship between Japan and China under the 
Koizumi administration, the rapprochement with China became an urgent task and also 
political capital for Japanese political leaders. Actually, in the last days of the Koizumi 
                                             
3 It might be notable that this proposal suggested to upgrade a phase of the Japan-China 
relationship from friendship to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ based on mutual interests, 
which seems to be incorporated into the ‘Strategic reciprocal relationship based on common 
interest’ in the Abe administration.  
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administration, a number of politicians visited Beijing and had meetings with Chinese 
top-level officials to break diplomatic deadlock. For instance, the Minister of Economy, 
Trade and Industry Toshihiro Nikai, who was a potent pro-Chinese lawmaker of the LDP, 
had a meeting with Premier Went to find a breakthrough in the deadlocked relationships 
(Asahi Shimbun: 2006-a). Ichiro Ozawa, who is also well known as a pro-Chinese politician, 
visited Beijing and met with President Hu. It was reported that his intention of visiting China 
this time was to put forward his diplomatic position of stressing relationship with China 
(Asahi Shimbun: 2006-e). In addition, Ichiro Aisawa of the LDP launched ‘The Study Group 
on Strategy toward China’ aiming at the improvement of the Japan-China relationship, and 
more than forty lawmakers across factions in the LDP joined this group (Asahi Shimbun: 
2006-b). Those activities of pro-Chinese politicians would demonstrate that the 
rapprochement with China was not only important diplomatic task but also regarded as an 
opportunity to expand their influences and power resources in political situation.  
     In particular, the debate among the contenders for the LDP presidency revolved 
around the Yasukuni Shrine issue and the improvement of the Japan-China relationship. All 
the candidate were requested to clarify their view on these issues; Finance Minister Sadakazu 
Tanigaki clearly criticized Koizumi’s visit to the Shrine and insisted on the rapprochement 
with China; former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda called for the establishment of a 
separate national war memorial to honor the war dead to resolve the Yasukuni issue; and 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso took a cautious stance on the Yasukuni issue stating that he 
would prioritize ‘national interest over personal feeling’ (Aso 2006-d). Given these, it can be 
argued that the cancelation of the prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and the 
rapprochement with China rather than the frustration among anti-Chinese groups would be 
an important source of political capital in the successor race of Koizumi. Among them, 
Fukuda was considered to be the most prominent rival candidate for Abe and political 
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opponents of Abe started to gather together under him.   
     Abe seemed to be in a disadvantaged position because he supported Koizumi’s 
worship at the shrine and took a more conservative view of history and a hard-line stance to 
ward China, compared with other candidates. It might count against Abe if he kept his 
original stance on the Yasukuni Shrine and China issue. Even worse, there was a high 
possibility that his rivals could exploit the rapprochement with China to beat him. In order to 
avoid this, Abe insisted that the Yasukuni Shrine problem should not be a major issue in the 
presidential election and refused to say whether he would visit the shrine as Prime Minister. 
In this sense, foreign policy toward China seemed to be closely related to power struggle in 
Japanese domestic politics.  
     Looking back the history of the LDP, there was similar story to this case. In the 
successor race of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1972, Kakuei Tanaka utilized the issue of 
normalization of the Japan-China relationship, defeated his greatest competitor Takeo 
Fukuda and became a Prime Minister (Ogata 1992: 81-83). Although it was not certain that 
Abe took account for the case of Fukuda, who was former leader of his faction and the father 
of his rival, at least, Abe had to avoid the Yasukuni Shrine issue and the improvement of the 
Japan-China relationship being utilized by opponents in the presidential election, especially 
Fukuda. Even after Fukuda revealed he would not run the presidential election and Abe was 
practically assured of victory in the presidential election, his opponents such as Koichi Kato 
and Taku Yamasaki established ‘The Study Group on the Vision to Asian Diplomacy’. 
Yamasaki (2006) explained that this group promoted the improvement of the relationship 
between Japan, China and North Korea as a matter of the highest priority of Japan’s 
diplomacy and aimed to break diplomatic stagnation with those neighboring countries 
‘across the borders of factions’ (Yamasaki: 2006). It would mean that Abe’s opponents 
might be gathered together in the name of correcting his diplomatic stance toward East Asia 
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across the borders of factions within the LDP. Therefore, Abe needed to prevent the 
improvement of the Japan-China relationship from being manipulated by his opponents after 
he took office to take a firm grip on power.  
     In addition to power struggle within the LDP, the improvement of the bilateral 
relations with China was also utilized as political capital to counter against criticism from the 
DPJ, the biggest opposition party. The leaders of the DPJ such as Katsuya Okada or Naoto 
Kan repeatedly criticized Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine because it caused 
diplomatic deadlock. Although Abe’s hard stance to China and his revisionist view of history 
had been an easy target for criticism, however, the DPJ lost a great opportunity to criticize 
the Abe administration because of Abe’s shift to the rapprochement with China. One of the 
DPJ executives expressed a sense of frustration saying that ‘if Prime Minister Abe would not 
go “rightward”, the DPJ could not acquire support from conservative-centrist voters’ (Asahi 
Shimbun: 2006-h). This means that the improvement of the Japan-China relationship was 
regarded as a source of political capital to attract right of center constituencies, who 
conventionally supported the DPJ.  
 
6.1.4 Obstacles to the rapprochement  
 
     Despite the necessity to break diplomatic stagnation, there were some obstacles for 
Abe to tackle and overcome the ‘reality’ of diplomatic crisis: the integrity of his words and 
deeds, expected opposition from the anti-China politicians, and especially the Yasukuni 
Shrine issue. Abe was one of the leaders of anti-Chinese politicians who claimed that China 
should not intervene Japan’s domestic issues related to its identity. It was unthinkable for 
such anti-Chinese groups to make a compromise to China on the Yasukuni Shrine issue. It 
was expected that those anti-Chinese politicians among the LDP might strongly oppose the 
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rapprochement with China. What was more, it was obvious that the issue of the prime 
ministerial visit of the Yasukuni Shrine should be critical point. Abe, however, had strongly 
supported Koizumi’s visit of the Yasukuni Shrine and had insisted that the next Prime 
Minister should continue the visit. Furthermore, Abe himself had made no disguise of his 
anti-Chinese stance at least until when he had entered into the Koizumi cabinet. He had 
reiterated the radical ‘otherness’ of China with regard to the wide difference between the two 
countries, representing China as an ‘authoritarian’, ‘militarist’ and ‘untrustworthy’ enemy 
which sought to intervene Japan’s sovereignty with manipulating the history issue. Given 
these, it seemed to be very difficult for Abe to undertake the rapprochement with China.       
      
6.1.5 Identity Construction and policy legitimization  
 
6.1.5.1 Abe’s shift from a past anti-Chinese stance to a more moderate stance  
 
     Despite those hurdles, however, Abe undertook and succeeded in the improvement of 
Japan-China relations and legitimize his policy. It appeared that Abe had prepared to deal 
with the first obstacle, his personal staunch anti-Chinese reputation. Since when he had 
entered into the Koizumi cabinet, Abe came to refrain from radical remarks on China and the 
history issue. In particular, he refrained from emphasizing binary oppositions, which 
highlighted difference between Japan and China so as to illuminate China’s radical otherness. 
Abe’s remark on perception of history also changed; while his view had been based on the 
revisionist view, which challenges the legitimacy of the Tokyo War Tribunal, and rejects the 
successive governmental view such as the ‘Kono Statement’ and the ‘Murayama Statement’, 
but he still came to declare that he would follow the conventional governmental view since 
he entered into Koizumi’s cabinet.  
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     In particular, Abe’s tough stance against China seemed to gradually tone-down since 
he became a potent candidate of the next LDP president, thus the next Prime Minister. With 
regard to the linkage between economic ties and political relationship with China, for 
example, Abe concluded that economic ties and political relations with China should be 
considered separately to stabilize the entire relationship. In his book, Abe naturalized a ‘hot 
economics and cool politics’ relationship due to the difference of political regime and 
criticized China’s using economic ties as leverage to intervene in the Yasukuni issue. Behind 
this, he implied that Japan did not have to resume the top-level summit if it hinged on 
Japan’s compromise on the Yasukuni Shrine issue. That is, ‘hot economics and cool politics’ 
might be bound to happen because China was a radical ‘other’ and the naturalization of a 
political clash might be reflected in his insistence on the principle of the separation between 
politics and economy.  
     However, when he attended the second ‘Beijing-Tokyo Forum’ on 3 August 2006 as a 
Chief Cabinet Secretary, he explanation on a desirable relationship between Japan and China 
changed. While his argument was not changed in terms of arguing that politics should not 
damage economic ties, on this occasion, he argued that ‘Japan and China should create a 
relationship in which two wheels of ‘politics’ and ‘economy’ boldly work together, so that it 
would promote the advancement of the bilateral relationship.’ In order to achieve that, both 
countries should appropriately recognize the other via direct dialogues’ and take the ties one 
step further from mere friendship to partnership (Genron NPO 2006: 8). This would make 
contrast with his past uncompromising and confrontational wording and attitude. It seems 
that Abe came to demonstrate more a conciliatory attitude by referring to the importance of 
direct talks and the necessity to alleviate a ‘hot economics and cool politics’ relationship by 
using the metaphor ‘two wheels’. Furthermore, in the Japan-China Joint Press Statement 
issued when Abe visited Beijing, the metaphor ‘two wheels’ was used here again by denying 
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the principle of separation between politics and economy (Abe: 2006-g). In this way, Abe 
gradually moderated his confrontational wording and avoided demonstrating obvious 
anti-Chinese attitude.     
 
6.1.5.2 Easing the frustration among Abe’s anti-Chinese supporters  
 
     In order to improve and stabilize the relationship between Japan and China, Abe had to 
deal with the frustrations among his anti-China supporters because a tough stance on China 
had been important political capital for him. Otherwise, there was a risk of losing the support 
of anti-China supporters and having his China policy disturbed by them. Yet, Prime Minister 
Abe carried out the rapprochement with China and stabilized the bilateral relations without 
losing supports from anti-Chinese group. There can be seen some factors which enabled Abe 
to do so.  
     In terms of opposition from anti-Chinese and revisionist groups, the fact that he was a 
hawkish and anti-Chinese politician might work to Abe’s advantage for the rapprochement 
with China. Interestingly, there could be seen little criticism against Abe’s rapprochement 
with China from anti-Chinese camps in the Diet debate. It can be said that since Abe was one 
of their leaders, anti-Chinese politicians in the LDP did not criticize Abe’s rapprochement 
with China in order to stabilize and consolidate his administration. Berger (2007: 202) noted 
that ‘it is possible that Abe’s conservative credentials will provide him with political cover 
on the Right that he needs to pull off a sustained change in Japanese policy on the history 
issue, much as President Nixon’s reputation as a “cold Warrior” enabled him to change the 
US policy on China in the 1970s’. Furthermore, Wakamiya (2006: 148-9) pointed out that 
this was a ‘logic of the right wing’, which could be observed when former Prime Minister 
Takeo Fukuda, who was also known as a hawkish and anti-Chinese, had agreed to reach the 
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Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China. In other words, if other 
pro-Chinese and dovish politicians such as Fukuda or Tanigaki did the same thing, it might 
be harshly criticized as ‘servile tribute diplomacy’ from the anti-Chinese school (Wakamiya 
2006: 10). Because Abe was a leader of anti-Chinese group, he could avoid a backlash from 
critics at home and abroad. A research of Kenneth A. Shultz (2005) on the US foreign policy 
made similar point with a ‘logic of the right wing.’ His model suggested that ‘hawks enjoy a 
number of political and strategic advantages in trying to make peace (2005: 4)’. Taking an 
example of Nixon’s approach to China, Shultz (2005:5) argues that as a ‘dovish government 
that cooperates is considered to be extreme, while a hawkish government that cooperates is 
believed to be moderate, ‘initiating cooperation can be an electoral boon for a hawk but 
electoral suicide for a dove’. Therefore, ‘a moderate hawk is the most likely type to initiate 
cooperation’, because hawks need to use cooperation to guard against being seen as 
hard-liners. 
     Furthermore, Abe’s supporters attempted to consolidate the power base of the 
administration in order to achieve their primary goal: the revision of the Constitution. As 
Abe stated several times, his primary agenda was to revise the current Constitution, on which 
the ‘postwar regime’ has been based. To accomplish this, he had to win the coming Upper 
House election and to consolidate his power base for long period in office. Therefore, he 
tried not to lose the point by prolonging diplomatic deadlock but pull off a credible 
diplomatic achievement before the election. Since Abe’s ambition to revise and recreate the 
Constitution based on more conservative values was shared by his anti-Chinese supporters, 
they might refrain from working against their leader’s effort to improve the Japan-China 
relationship. From this point of view, Abe’s hawkish position might work in his favor to 
suppress intra-group criticism against the rapprochement with China and his policy was 
enabled through a power relationship in domestic politics. 
 208 
     Although the ‘right-wing power dynamics’ might serve to contain the frustrations 
among the anti-Chinese group in the LDP to some extent, Abe had to take other measure to 
divert them from their discontents on China policy. Put simply, Abe’s conciliatory approach 
toward China had to be offset by other foreign policy choice to appease the frustrations 
among his anti-Chinese colleagues in order to retain their support. In this circumstance, 
North Korea seemed to be a perfect target. As Abe’s anti-Chinese colleagues demonstrate a 
pronounced propensity to take a tough stance against North Korea, they strongly supported 
Abe’s hard-line approach to Pyongyang. In fact, harsh criticism against North Korea by 
emphasizing its radical ‘otherness’ and differences between the two countries seemed not to 
be contained in the Parliamentary debate in contrast with comparatively moderate wording to 
China. Furthermore, the nuclear test by North Korea provided excellent excuse to accelerate 
a hard-line stance such as imposing unilateral sanctions to the country, which was not 
promoted under the previous administration. In this way, it can be thought that the frustration 
among Abe’s right-wing supporters against his rapprochement with China could be offset to 
some extent by conducting a hard-line policy toward North Korea. 
     In addition to the ‘right-wing power dynamics’ and trade-off by a hard-line policy 
toward North Korea, there seemed to be another way to appease frustrations among 
anti-Chinese supporters through the representation of China in foreign policy discourse. 
While the Abe administration pursued a foreign policy to improve and stabilize relationships 
with China on the whole, it might not mean that Abe and other anti-Chinese policymakers 
changed their mind-set on China. It was true that Abe and his colleagues, who had loudly 
represented China as a radical ‘other’ or ‘identity threat’, tended to publicly refrain from 
emphasizing differences between Japan and China such as in terms of political regime. 
Although China was rarely depicted as ‘authoritarian’ country by using direct expressions, 
differences between the two countries were implicitly constructed to highlight China’s 
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‘otherness’ in political discourses.   
     First, the negative representation of China was converged on its rapid military buildup 
and the lack of transparency of defense budget. A lawmaker of the LDP Naoki Okada argued 
that a fracture experiment of space satellites by China was puzzling and violent practice and 
that it should clarify its enormous military capabilities in the Diet session (NDRP: 2007-h). 
In response, the Deputy Foreign Minister Katsuto Asano made contrast between Japan and 
China in terms of transparency of defense budget and argued that: 
 
Although the National People’s Congress announced that the Chinese defense budget 
has caught up with Japan, but China should make an effort to be open on its 
transparency of military defense in order to dispel the concerns of neighborhood 
because it is clearly different from Japan in that while Japan’s defense budget was 
100% transparent through a series of parliamentary debates the transparency of the 
Chinese military budget was almost 0%.  
 
Prime Minister Abe also pointed China continued double-digit growth of its military budget 
for the 18th consecutive year and the lacked transparency about its contents (NDRP: 2006-m). 
In addition, Abe expressed opposition to deregulation of arms import from the EU to China 
at a summit with Prime Ministers of Denmark and France, pointing out China’s lack of 
transparency. Given these, policymakers implicitly constructed China as a ‘militarist’ 
without transparence, which might indicate that it was ‘dangerous’ and ‘untrustworthy’ 
coupled with the difference in political regime.     
      On the other hand, China was implicitly constructed an ‘other’, who can not share 
fundamental values with Japan by emphasizing other countries with common values. The 
endorsement of universal values seemed to play a major role to distinguish ‘inassimilable 
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others’, even though who might not directly constituted as an enemy, from ‘assimilable 
others’, who could be depicted as friends or partners with common values. For instance, as 
discussed in a later chapter, India was highlighted as a country with increasing importance 
for Japan in foreign policy discourse during the Abe period. The Abe administration 
assiduously promoted closer ties with India, illuminating India as a ‘pro-Japanese’ country 
who could share universal values with Japan. In addition, Abe sought to strengthen 
cooperation with the US, Australia, New Zealand, and India, emphasizing that they are all, 
including Japan, democratic countries. It can be thought that these foreign policies which 
emphasizing universal values implicitly highlight a representation that China does not share 
universal values with Japan, therefore, it could not become a genuine ally or friend.  
 
6.1.5.3 The Yasukuni Shrine issue and social antagonism   
 
     As for the Yasukuni Shrine issue, Abe used so-called the ‘strategic ambiguity’. 
Although he thought that the intention to visit the Shrine was not to ‘glorify militarism’ but 
to pray for ‘lasting peace’, it was not desirable that the Yasukuni Shrine would become a 
‘political and diplomatic problem’ and utilized as political capital of his opponents. 
Therefore, Abe determined that he would not comment on whether he visited it or not, or 
whether he will or not (NDRP: 2006-m). This ambiguity was supposed to intend mainly to 
downplay the Yasukuni Shrine issue, which would indicate that the Abe administration 
would not treat it as an identity issue unlike the previous administration.  
     It is true that this ‘ambiguity’ could also be regarded as effort to make consistency 
between what Abe had remarked previously and his current position, that is, Abe’s attempt to 
save his neck. However, it can also be considered to be more than mere self-protection; it 
was regarded and legitimized as an important diplomatic measure for Japan to take an 
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initiative. Then Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi referred to change of Abe’s wording in 
his book and made clear how he utilized Abe’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ during the Japan-China 
Comprehensive Dialogues to persuade Chinese counterpart Dai Bingguo to resume the 
bilateral summit (2009: 40-41). Yachi explained that whereas the Yasukuni Shrine issue had 
played an over-proportionate role during the Koizumi administration and had made the 
Japan-China relationship abnormal, Abe tried to normalize and establish a strategic 
reciprocal relationship by downplaying the issue. He argued to Dai that Abe’s ambiguity 
would mean the same thing as him not visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. Yachi described the 
‘strategic ambiguity’ as kind of a tightrope act for Abe because he might be criticized from 
both the right-wing and the left-wing. At the same time, however, he also explained that it 
would mean that Abe obtained a major diplomatic card by this ‘ambiguity’, which was that 
‘if China still rejects Abe’s visit to China, he would make a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine’. In 
addition, one of Abe’s supporters, a lawmaker, mentioned that it would be a strong bargain 
chip to improve the relationship with China for Abe to maintain the right to visit the 
Yasukuni Shrine but refrain voluntarily from worship for the time being (Asahi Shimbun: 
2006-d). Furthermore, Seiji Maehara, who tends to take a hard-line stance to China, also 
appreciated that Abe’s ambiguity on the Yasukuni issue, could be a major diplomatic card in 
view of the international setting in which international society should be united against the 
nuclear test by the DPRK and deal with North Korea problem (NDRP: 2006-m). Given these, 
Abe’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ on the Yasukuni Shrine issue seemed to gain tacit approval from 
his colleagues and was not criticized as too-large a concession to China but legitimized as a 
major bargaining chip.      
     What should be notable here in relation to the Yasukuni Shrine issue in the 
Japan-China relationship during the Abe administration was that there seemed not to be 
visible ‘social antagonism’ in foreign policy discourse. As discussed previous chapter, China 
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had been criticized because it did not acknowledge Japan’s peaceful development in postwar 
era, demonstrated little appreciation toward Japan’s contribution like enormous amount of 
ODA to China, and carried out anti-Japanese education. As a result, ‘social antagonism’ 
came to the forefront due to China’s negation of Japan’s ‘peaceful nation’ identity. This 
antagonism worked to legitimize Koizumi’s unyielding stance against China. It might be 
interesting to note that ‘social antagonism’ did not come to the forefront at the time when the 
well-known anti-Chinese Abe became a Prime Minister and sought a way to resume the 
top-level summit. On the one hand, Abe’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ might contribute to avoid the 
stimulation of anti-Chinese policy discourse. On the other hand, it would be of great 
importance that China demonstrated its understanding and appreciation towards Japan’s 
national identity as a ‘peaceful nation’. For instance, ‘Japan-China Joint Press Statement’ 
released in April 2007 articulated this point.  
 
(2) The Chinese side expressed its positive evaluation of Japan's consistent pursuit of 
the path of a peaceful country and Japan's contribution to the peace and stability of the 
world through peaceful means over more than sixty years since World War. The two 
sides agreed to strengthen dialogue and communication on the issue of United Nations 
reform and to work toward enhancing common understanding with each other on this 
matter. The Chinese side attaches importance to Japan's position and role in the United 
Nations and desires Japan to play an even greater constructive role in the international 
community (Abe: 2007-c). 
 
This passage would have significant impact on the subsequent foreign policy making 
discourse. Yuji Miyamoto (2007), then Japanese Ambassador to China, also made clear 
about this point. One of the most notable points in the Joint Press between Japan and China 
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launched in October 2006 and April 2007 would be the fact that the Chinese government 
officially acknowledged a peaceful development of postwar Japan for the first time in return 
for Japan’s recognition of China’s ‘peaceful rise’. Miyamoto explained that China’s 
historical view on Japan had made little improvement after normalization in 1972. Even at 
the Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and 
Development in 1998 indirectly referred to postwar Japan’s ‘peaceful nation’ identity’, only 
mentioning that ‘The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from 
history and adhere to the path of peace and development (Obuchi: 1998-b)’.  
     This time, however, the difference was clear and evident; the Chinese government 
expressed ‘its positive evaluation of Japan's consistent pursuit of the path of a peaceful 
country’ and ‘Japan's contribution to the peace and stability of the world through peaceful 
means over more than sixty years since World WarⅡ’. According to Miyamoto, although 
China’s past view on Japan as a ‘resurgent militarist’ might only impede a true bond of 
friendship, but a positive evaluation of this new recognition could shape foundation of the 
development of Japan-China cooperative relationship. China showing appreciation of 
Japan’s ‘peaceful nation’ identity had great importance in foreign policy debate in the Diet. 
Jyunji Higashi, a Lower House member, argued that it was the first time for China to give 
positive evaluation to Japan’s postwar peaceful development, and its importance should be 
emphasized because ‘Chinese side finally received Japan’s message that Japan has long 
hoped that China would acknowledge her postwar peaceful development, that is, Japan as a 
‘peaceful country’, and quit carrying out anti-Japanese education from the Jiang Zemin 
period (NDRP: 2006-m).’ In response, Prime Minister Abe agreed Higashi’s point saying 
that ‘Japanese people have had some ill feeling so far against China’s negation toward our 
postwar development’ and argued that the Joint Statement was meaningful in a sense that 
China positively evaluated Japan as a ‘peaceful and democratic’ country. In other words, 
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Japanese policy-makers positively evaluate China’s attitude that demonstrated its 
understanding and appreciation to Japan’s postwar ‘peaceful nation’ identity, which serve 
not to produce social antagonism.  
     In addition to the Joint Statement, China went a step further when Premier Wen Jiabao 
visited Japan in April 2007 and delivered a speech in the Japanese Diet, where he was 
supposed to mention China’s appreciation to Japan’s postwar peaceful development. 
Although Premier Wen omitted this part for a ‘technical’ reason’4, it might be clear that 
China would demonstrate its understanding and positive recognition toward Japan’s postwar 
peaceful identity in order to improve the bilateral relationship. Given these, along with Abe’s 
‘strategic ambiguity’ which aimed to downplay the Yasukuni Shrine issue, changes in the 
Chinese stance on evaluation of postwar Japan led to positive responses among Japanese 
policy-makers. As a result, it can be argued that ‘social antagonism’, which resulted from 
China’s negation of Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity, did not come to the forefront in the Abe 
administration, which in turn might justify a more conciliatory policy toward China. In other 
words, the Abe administration did not treat the Yasukuni Shrine issue as an identity issue; it 
did not construct China as an ‘other’ who threatened and negated Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity 
because of changes in China’s attitude. This might not produce ‘social antagonism’ and 
might make it possible for Abe to improve the bilateral relationship with China.  
 
 
6.1.6 Conclusion  
                                             
4 The omitted passage was as follows; ‘After the war, Japan embarked on the path of peaceful 
development, and became a leading economic power and influential member in the international 
community. As a friendly neighbor of Japan, the Chinese people support the Japanese people in 
their continued pursuit of peaceful development.’ ‘Speech by Premier Wen Jiabao of the State 
Council of the People's Republic of China at the Japanese Diet’ on 13 April. Available at Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s republic of China 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t311544.htm 
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      In this way, the Abe administration implemented rapprochement with China by 
downplaying the Yasukuni Shrine issue and built a ‘strategic reciprocal relationship’. This 
was made possible by Abe’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ on the Yasukuni Shrine issue, because it 
would indicate that the administration might not treated the issue as an ‘identity crisis’ and 
China as an ‘identity threat’. In addition, the fact that China demonstrated understanding and 
appreciation to postwar Japan’s peaceful development, that is Japan’s ‘peaceful national 
identity’, also contributed to remove social antagonism, which was emphasized in the 
Koizumi administration to legitimize uncompromising policy. As a result, Abe’s foreign 
policy to improve and stabilize the bilateral relationship with China was legitimized. 
Furthermore, Abe’s policy shift was discussed from the viewpoint of a domestic power 
relationship. In addition to the right-wing power dynamics, as the improvement of the 
bilateral relations with China was regarded as an important source of political capital in 
power struggle in domestic politics, Abe had to prevent the issue from being utilized by his 
opponents to defeat him. This political intention also contributed to the realization of Abe’s 
China policy. At the same time, however, Abe had to ease the frustration of his anti-Chinese 
supporters. Abe pursued a policy to enhance cooperation with countries with ‘common 
values’, excluding China and repeatedly pointed out China’s lack of transparency on defense 
budget. This policy implicitly constructed China as a ‘non-democratic’, ‘militaristic’ and 
‘dangerous’ other, which was ‘inassimilable’, and indicated that rivalry between Japan and 
China was not over. In addition, a hard-line approach to North Korea served to offset 
discontents among his anti-Chinese supporters against Abe’s non-confrontational stance to 
China. 
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6.2. Policy toward North Korea  
 
     As a whole, the period of Abe’s prime ministership saw little developments for 
normalization and, rather, Abe moved in a new direction; a hard-line policy against North 
Korea, with its almost exclusive focus on the abduction issue unlike the previous Koizumi 
administration. Foreign policy toward North Korea during the Abe administration could 
generally be depicted as ‘diplomacy for pressure’, which was generally characterized as 
being close to the pressure school, by its focus on imposing sanctions on and an 
uncompromising stance against the DPRK. Despite its placing high priority on the abduction 
issue in the bilateral relations, there was little progress concerning this problem during Abe’s 
tenure. Rather, Japan seemed to be isolated in the Six Party Talk because of its ‘obsession’ 
with the abduction issue. In addition, even when the US came to shift toward a more 
‘flexible’ approach to Pyongyang in the process of the Six Party Talk, for instance, over 
North Korea’s frozen funds at a Macao bank, Abe would not change his hard-line stance 
unlike his China policy. This section attempts to examine how it was made possible for Abe 
to take an unyielding stance against North Korea, especially on the abduction issue, when the 
situation was fallen into the deadlock and how this issue was manipulated as political capital. 
It starts from outlining the bilateral relationship between Japan and North Korea during the 
Abe administration. After explaining background of his hard-line stance to North Korea, it 
will argue on the discourse of the pressure school including the Abe administration, 
illuminating its narrow focus on the abduction issue. In this section, discourse to be 
examined would include those which had been made during the Koizumi administration, 
because there can be seen little changes in the narratives of the pressure school and Abe. 
     My argument can be summarized as follows: Abe’s narrow focus on the abduction 
issue can be explained not only by the simple fact that he gained national popularity for his 
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hard-line approach to Pyongyang, but also by more complicated domestic power balance. 
His tough stance to North Korea was utilized as political capital in domestic politics to ease 
the frustrations among anti-Chinese revisionists and to criticize political opponents. 
Furthermore, discourse among the pressure school policymakers demonstrated that Japan’s 
response to the abduction issue would be politics of ‘restoring Japan’. According to the 
pressure school, the issue was considered to be a good opportunity to regain a strong bind 
between a state and its nationals. In that discourse, not only North Korea was articulated as 
‘authoritarian’, ‘militarist’ and ‘isolated wrong-doer’ but also the domestic opposite groups 
were constructed as the ‘enemy within’. In addition, the North Korea problem was regarded 
as a part of the ‘settlement of Japan’s postwar’, in a different way from what the dialogues 
school used, by restoring the bind between the state and its people, reconsidering security 
policy, and reviewing conventional low-profile diplomacy in Asia. In this sense, as the 
abduction issue was treated as an ‘identity issue’ which might question Japan’s foundations 
as a state, Abe’s uncompromising stance was legitimized and other policy choices like the 
appeasement policy was marginalized.     
    
6.2.1 Chronology  
 
     A policy shift in direction, from conciliatory approach with its emphasis on dialogues 
to a hard-line stance with its focus on pressures and sanctions, actually started in the last days 
of Koizumi’s premiership. There can be seen recurrent pattern in which the Japanese 
government retaliated with sanctions for North Korea’s provocations. When North Korea 
launched missiles into the Sea of Japan in July 2006, the Japanese government immediately 
asked the UNSC to convene an urgent conference and proposed a draft of the Security 
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Council Resolution calling for sanctions against North Korea5. It is said that Abe and his 
political ally Aso, then Foreign Minister, who had strong influence in the Koizumi 
administration in terms of foreign policy making, played a leading role in promoting this 
proposal. The UNSC Resolution 1695 was adopted and the Japanese government put a series 
of unilateral sanctions on North Korea in line with the Resolution such as a six-month ban on 
port against the North Korean ship Mangyongbong-92 and strengthened screening of entry 
requests to impede North Korean officials from entering into Japan. Immediately after North 
Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on 9 October 2006, Japan imposed unilateral 
sanctions on the DPRK; totally banned North Korean ships from coming into Japanese ports, 
all imports from the country, and entrance of its people. The Japanese government once 
again pushed hard for a tough UNSC Resolution 1718 coordinating closely with the US. As 
a result, Japan-North Korea relations continued to be stalemated while there could be seen 
some progress in the Six Party Talks. Although there was a certain degree of progress in the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, such as the implementation of the “Initial Actions 
for the Implementation of the Joint Statement”, Abe would not change his unyielding 
insistence on making the resolution of the abduction issue a top priority for the agenda in the 
bilateral relations.  
     In February 2007 at the Six Party Talks, the “Initial Actions for the Implementation of 
the Joint Statement” was agreed in which North Korea will be provided limited energy aid in 
return for disabling its nuclear development program. Although the Japanese government 
welcomed the deal with the DPRK, however, it refused to give any energy assistance to 
North Korea because the abduction issue was not resolved. In early March, the two countries 
resumed normalization dialogues after a 13-month hiatus, but failed to make substantial 
                                             
5 This proposal aimed at preventing North Korea from acquiring funds, materials or technology 
for the development of weapons of mass destructions.  
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progress leading to an additional 6-month hiatus without political initiatives to improve 
bilateral relationships by both countries. The Japanese government continued unilateral 
sanctions against North Korea and the Diet approved a so-called ‘North Korea Human 
Rights Law’, which stipulates responsibility of the government to make effort for the 
resolution of the abduction issue. Afterwards, there seemed to be little visible improvement 
on the Japan-North Korean relationships until when Abe stepped down September 2007. 
 
6.2.2 Background of Abe’s hard-line policy  
 
6.2.2.1 North Korea’s provocation  
 
     It is supposed that there were some factors, which would make it possible for Abe to 
take a hard-line stance against North Korea such as international environment, personnel 
affairs, and considerations concerning domestic politics. Firstly, North Korea’s provocative 
actions in this period, missile launch and nuclear test, would give credentials to hard-line 
policymakers like Abe. Some internal and external observers argued that missile tests by the 
DPRK ‘worked favorably for Japanese hard-line politicians, enabling them to better appeal 
to both domestic and international audiences, in particular, the missile tests and a sense of 
crisis caused by it might be a ‘big plus for Abe’ (Kang and Lee 2006d: 1-2)’. Actually, A 
poll taken on 25 July showed that 77 percent of respondents felt a threat from North Korea 
because of the missile launch (Asahi Shimbun: 2006-g). This public sense of threat made the 
Japanese people to seek a hard-line policy with strong leadership. In this circumstance, as 
Green and Koizumi (2006c: 4) argued, North Korea’s missile launches provided Abe with 
‘an optimal opportunity to demonstrate his leadership credentials’. Thus, international 
environment might be one of the causes to promote Abe’s hard-line policy.  
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6.2.2.2 Personnel Affairs  
 
     Secondly, it can be thought that the personnel affairs might have huge impact on 
policymaking direction. It is said that the Japanese government took a more hard-line stance 
against North Korea partly because Abe and Aso came to hold important position in the 
cabinet; Abe became a Chief Secretary of the Cabinet in the third reshuffled Koizumi cabinet 
and Aso also entered into it as Foreign Minister6. Furthermore, there were no cabinet 
members or senior officials in the Abe administration who were categorized in the dialogue 
school. In addition, the fact that Shotaro Yachi, a diplomat with close ties with both of them, 
was appointed a Vice Foreign Minister in the last days of the Koizumi administration also 
might serve to turnaround of foreign policy toward North Korea from a conciliatory stance to 
a hard-line. Yachi held a firm belief that as the abduction issue is the most serious 
humanitarian problem, the Japanese government should not make any concession on this 
issue. When the Koizumi cabinet divided concerning whether five abductees should be 
returned to North Korea, Yachi strongly insisted that the government should not return them 
to Pyongyang and persuaded Koizumi to do so with Abe (Yachi 2009: 186). Masayuki 
Takahashi (Yachi 2009: 188-9) revealed that although Koizumi intended to appoint Hitoshi 
Tanaka as a Vice Foreign Minister at first, Abe, Foreign Minister Machimura and Aso 
persuaded him to reverse his decision. It was because they were concerned that if Tanaka 
became the Vice Foreign Minister, North Korea could control negotiations to its satisfaction, 
as Tanaka seemed to be too conciliatory to Pyongyang. As a result of persuasion, Koizumi 
gave up his original plan and instead nominated Yachi, whom Abe, Aso and Machimura 
                                             
6 The third reshuffled Koizumi administration (31 Oct 2005-26 Sep 2006), but Aso had been a 
Minister of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications Koizumi’s cabinet 
from 22 September 2003 to 31 Oct 2005.  
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recommended. Takahashi concluded that as a personality of the Vice Foreign Minister can 
affect diplomatic orientation, it was an important decision to promote a hard-line stance to 
North Korea. In other words, this personnel decision might serve to enable a shift in foreign 
policy toward North Korea from conciliatory to uncompromising. 
 
6.2.2.3 High Popularity and political capital  
 
     Thirdly, Abe’s tough stance against Pyongyang could not be explained without 
referring to domestic political consideration and maneuver. Since Abe owed much of his 
popularity to a hard-line policy he had conducted against North Korea, it was a vital source 
of political capital for Abe to take a tough stance against North Korea. For one thing, it 
played a decisive role for his victory in the presidential election of 2006. The provocation of 
North Korea by missile launch in July obviously served to prompt a sense of crisis among 
the public and to boost Abe’s credibility. In addition, it was said that it was the missile 
launch that made Yasuo Fukuda, the most important rival for Abe, abandon his candidacy 
for the party president (Asahi Shimbun: 2006-f). Although Fukuda posed a competitive 
threat to Abe because Fukuda’s pro-Chinese stance was expected to contribute to the 
improvement of the Japan-China relationship, however, North Korea’s provocation put 
Fukuda at a disadvantage because he supported a reconciliatory approach toward Pyongyang. 
In contrast, it served as a tail wind for Abe’s victory. From this, it might be clear that a 
hard-line stance to North Korea could be a source of political capital for political leaders, and 
this capital might become increasingly important when Japan-DPRK relations deteriorate.  
     On the other hand, it might be fatal for the administration to make concession or take a 
soft stance. For instance, Abe’s popularity saw a decline in early 20077. While public 
                                             
7 According to Asahi Shimbun, from 63 percent in September 2006 to 41 percent in March (Asahi 
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expectations were high because of his tough stance against Pyongyang, mishandling of some 
domestic issues8 and scandals of cabinet members seemed to have disappointed the public. 
It can be argued that this decline of popularity urged Abe to take an unyielding stance against 
North Korea. Even when negotiations with North Korea remained deadlock, Abe could not 
choose to change his unyielding stance to bring about a breakthrough. Moreover, as taking a 
tough stance might play a role to calm discontent with a soft-line approach to China among 
Abe’s anti-Chinese supporters, he had no choice to maintain a hard-line approach in order to 
attract and retain those supporters. In this way, the issue of North Korea was an important 
source of political capital for Abe. 
     
6.2.3 Identity constructions: 3 binary oppositions  
 
     In addition to these conditions, which facilitated and legitimized taking a tough stance 
against North Korea, I would argue that it would be the constructions of subjects and a 
certain ‘reality’ that served to the justification of Abe’s uncompromising policy and 
marginalization of other policy choices. There seemed to be three sets of subject 
constructions and their corresponding ‘realities’ in foreign policy debate on North Korea by 
Abe’s group. It might be evident that North Korea was articulated as a ‘radical other’, in 
contrast with the ‘self’ Japan. Differences between the two countries were highlighted and 
led to shape the ‘abnormal relationship’, and then used to legitimate an unyielding stance. 
The second self-other nexus was constructed on the differentiation between what Japan 
should be and what postwar Japan tended to be, focusing on the way of diplomacy, security 
                                             
Shimbun: 2007-a).   
8 In particular, his too-late decision to bring back the members who were expelled by Koizumi 
due to their opposition to the postal services privatization and a suicide of Toshikatsu Matsuoka, 
the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, followed by dubious money scandal had huge 
impacts on declining support ratings. 
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policy and the role of the state. This might be related to and was used to support Abe’s 
political agenda, the ‘settlement of the postwar’ and ‘a beautiful country’. Another 
dichotomy was constituted between domestic opponents and Abe’s camp; the former was 
described as the ‘enemy within’ while the latter was implicitly constructed as ‘faithful 
guardian of the people’. In what follows, this section explore what kind of identity 
construction was utilized to legitimized Abe’s foreign policy. 
   
6.2.3.1 Japan and North Korea: construction of external radical ‘other’  
 
     While emphasis on ‘radical otherness’ of China by Abe and his colleagues of the 
pressure school was moderated to some extent, the representation of North Korea saw little 
changes, or rather, differences from Japan was much more highlighted. Although, as well as 
the dialogue school, they articulated the DPRK as ‘authoritarian’, ‘militarist’, and ‘isolated 
wrongdoer’, but they tended to use more radical expression. Since there were little changes 
in representation of North Korea, this section examines how the country was constructed in 
foreign policy discourse including what had been made in the Koizumi administration.    
     Firstly, North Korea was often articulated as an ‘authoritarian’ country emphasizing its 
‘abnormality’. A lawmaker of the LDP, Masaharu Nakagawa noted that North Korea was 
not a ‘normal’ country because it was under ‘military dictatorship’ (NDRP: 2002-f). The 
DPJ member Yoshitake Kimata also made clear on the difference in political system from 
Japan that it was an ‘abnormal authoritarian state’ (NDRP: 2002-g). Yuriko Koike, who 
entered into the Abe cabinet, argued that North Korea was a ‘totalitarian’, ‘militarist’ and 
‘authoritarian’ country which ‘disregarded human rights and there could not be seen any 
essence of democracy (NDRP: 2002-i)’. Wataru Ito of the Komei Party argued that the 
country was volatile and unstable because ‘North Korea was a really peculiar, that is, 
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installed dictatorship’ (NDRP: 2006-o). In this way, there were a large number of 
representations of North Korea as an ‘authoritarian’ or ‘non-democratic’ state. In their 
narratives, North Korea tended to be articulated not just ‘authoritarian’ but as ‘inhumane’ 
and ‘tyrannical’, which totally lacked respect for basic human rights or democratic values. 
These focuses on the political regime would illuminate the difference from Japan, and 
thereby reinforce its ‘radical otherness’. In short, it made stark contrast between ‘democratic 
Japan’ and ‘non-democratic North Korea’, and would give moral superiority to the former by 
highlighting the latter’s ‘abnormality’.  
     In this context, Atsushi Watabe of the LDP described the negotiations with North 
Korea as a ‘confrontation between a democratic country and a totalitarian regime’ and 
therefore ‘Japan’s diplomacy is tested’ (NDRP: 2006-e). These articulations would imply 
that negotiation was regarded as a kind of diplomatic ‘battle’ and ‘zero-sum game’ instead of 
seeing it as a ‘dialogue’ based on the mutual interest. As Japan faced ‘authoritarian’ North 
Korea on behalf of ‘democracy’, negotiations were actually clashes over fundamental values 
between the two different political regimes. In this circumstance, it was a self-evident 
assumption that Japan should protect ‘democratic’ values because it was fundamental to 
Japan’s identity. In this circumstance, to make concessions in negotiations was viewed as 
being equivalent to back down on fundamental ‘democratic’ values. Therefore, Japan should 
abandon the appeasement policy to make breakthrough in the negotiations because it might 
be identity-threatening. In this way, a policy option of making a concession for consensus 
was marginalized in the Abe administration. 
     Depiction of North Korea as a ‘militarist’ country was also a typical representation. 
Shozo Azuma of the LDP clearly described the DPRK as a country, which had 
‘single-mindedly pursued military expansion at the expense of people’s lives and posed a 
threat to other countries’ (NDRP: 2002-p). Prime Minister Abe described North Korea as 
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‘military-first country’ and ‘being isolated from international community’ and emphasized 
how serious threat it would be for such a dangerous country to gain nuclear capability and to 
develop missile delivery means (NDRP: 2006-m). Lawmaker Shoichi Nakagawa, Abe’s 
sworn ally and well-known hawkish, anti-Chinese and anti-DPRK nationalist, repeatedly 
articulated North Korea as a ‘terrorist state’ (NDRP: 2006-k). These articulations illuminated 
‘abnormality’ of North Korea and emphasized how ‘dangerous’ ‘deviant’ it was in 
international society. Moreover, by depicting it as a ‘terrorist state’, North Korea was 
articulated as ‘enemy’ of international society. Therefore, it would mean that there was no 
room for the appeasement or mutual understanding. In this way, the appeasement to North 
Korea was marginalized as a policy option under the Abe administration. 
     Furthermore, North Korea was represented as ‘untrustworthy’ and ‘insincere’ other, 
which was isolated from international society due to its ‘misdeeds’. Abe often criticized that 
North Korea had not responded in sincere manner on the abduction issue (NDRP: 2006-n). 
Therefore, it was so dishonest that Japan should not treat it as a ‘dialogue partner’ on the 
assumption of mutual interest. In addition, North Korea was trustless because it easily breaks 
agreements reached with Japan. Abe and Seiji Maehara agreed that it was the fact that North 
Korea reneged on the Pyongyang Declaration, which turned out to be a dead letter (NDRP: 
2006-m). Put it in another way, North Korea was depicted ‘untrustworthy’ because it did not 
think twice about reneging on the promise it had made. Moreover, it has been described as a 
‘wrongdoer’ or ‘criminal state’, which not only broke international agreements but also 
committed international crime on national scale such as the smuggling of drugs into Japan. 
Seiji Maehara, one of the leaders of the DPJ, argued that North Korea might be the only 
country whose government took the initiative on cultivating, purifying and smuggling drugs 
to a unified standard and high-grade9’ (NDRP: 2002-l). Abe also labeled North Korea a 
                                             
9  Lawmaker Takeshi Hidaka also made a remark on the same point (NDRP: 2002-o). 
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‘criminal state’ and stated that as it sponsored the production of drugs and exported it to 
Japan, the Japanese government should not place trust in such a country (NDRP: 2004-y). 
Thus, the Abe administration minimized a policy option of ‘dialogues’ on even footings 
because North Korea was not worthy to trust as a dialogue partner and it took part in crimes.   
     These representations of North Korea as an ‘authoritarian’, ‘militarist’, ‘wrongdoer’ or 
‘inhumane’, ‘immoral’ ‘deviant’ country might explicitly or implicitly construct Japan as the 
opposite; ‘democratic’, ‘non-militarist’, and a ‘responsible and respectable member of 
international community’. For instance, Shigeru Ishiba, the Director General of the Defense 
Agency at that time in the Koizumi cabinet, clearly highlighted differences from Japan and 
stated that ‘our country is not a country of autocratic despotism. As diplomacy of our country 
is based on the national support and understanding, normalization would be unthinkable 
when leaving out the abduction issue, missile and nuclear problems, and spy ship incident 
and ignoring public opinion’ (NDRP: 2002-l). He also made it clear that  
 
Decision-making in that country is supposed to be really different from that of our own 
country. I would have no idea why this country calls itself “Democratic People’s 
Republic”, while there can be seen no public opinion, democratic election, a 
parliamentary cabinet system, which are foundation of political decision-making, and 
it conducts military-first policy (NDRP: 2002-o).  
 
On the whole, the ‘abnormality’ and ‘peculiarity’ of North Korea with an ‘inhumane’ and 
‘immoral’ nature was emphasized. As the identity of North Korea was so radical and 
‘inassimilable’, there seemed to be no indication that identity of North Korea was 
transformable or that Japan should treat it as a ‘dialogue partner’ with mutual interest. The 
argument of Masatotoshi Wakabayashi of the LDP, a Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
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Fisheries at the Abe administration, summarized the articulation of North Korea by the 
pressure school: 
 
North Korea is a military country which is ruled by dictator Kim Jong-Il, enforces 
nuclear development despite facing economic collapse and a starvation problem, 
intimidates Japan by missile launches, repeats intrusion into Japan’s territorial water, 
violates Japan’s sovereignty like kidnapping our nationals, and ignores human rights. 
That is, it is an extremely dangerous country (NDRP: 2004-b).  
 
In addition, the articulations of North Korea made sharp contrast with Japan so as to 
construct and reinforce Japan’s identity as the opposite to it; ‘democratic’, ‘non-militarist’ 
and ‘well-conducted’ state. Furthermore, Abe believed that the identity of North Korea 
would not change without the regime change, and that only stiff sanctions could pave the 
way for it (Abe 2005-a: 54-55). As a result, an uncompromising policy was legitimized 
because to make concessions was regarded as detracting Japan’s fundamental values and 
identities.  
     The pressure group tended to describe a ‘reality’ as ‘abnormal’ and ‘Japan’s crisis’ as 
did the dialogue school, but its cause and prescription were totally different. Both schools of 
thought assumed that Japan was facing a military threat from North Korea such as missiles 
and nuclear weapons in addition to the abduction issue. The dialogue school attributed this 
‘abnormal relationship’ to the lack of diplomatic ties and insisted on the necessity of the 
settlement of the past including compensation for the past colonial rule. On the other hand, 
the pressure school blamed the identity of North Korea for the current ‘abnormal 
relationship’. Abe, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary argued that ‘we would like (the North) to 
think about who brought about the current relationship. The abductions, the nuclear, and the 
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missile issues--- North Korea caused all of them (Kang and Lee 2006d: 2)’. Put simply, it 
was the ‘abnormal’ identity of North Korea itself that caused the current ‘abnormal 
relationship’, not Japan’s incomplete war settlement. Therefore, according to the pressure 
school, it was not Japan but North Korea who should be responsible to the current ‘abnormal 
situations’. 
     With respect to the situation in which Japan was exposed to a threat by North Korea, 
the pressure school tended to emphasize how ‘dangerous’ an ‘enemy’ it was for Japan. 
Shozo Azuma, a vocal member of the pressure school, described the current ‘reality’ in the 
Diet session that: 
 
North Korea points more than one hundred Nodong missiles at Japan at this moment 
and many of them are said to be carrying chemical or biological weapons. There might 
be nothing to stop ballistic missiles once they fire. Even at this very moment, we, 
whether it is nuclear plants in Niigata or the Imperial Palace or the Diet building or 
Kasumigaseki or ten million Tokyoites, are taken hostage by Kim Jong-Il (NDRP: 
2002-f).   
 
A lawmaker Shingo Nishimura noted that it was no doubt that ‘North Korea was clearly 
Japan’s ‘enemy’ because ‘it puts on a bluff of making Tokyo sea of fire, breaks agreement 
with us, deceives us to get money, and kidnapped more than two hundred Japanese nationals’ 
(NDRP: 2003-c). Abe clearly stated that the development of missile capability and nuclear 
test would imply that the threats Japan was facing doubled (NDRP: 2006-n). In their 
narrative, North Korea tended to be depicted not just as a ‘military’ threat but an ‘any and all 
threat’ to Japan. Yuriko Koike, a Lower House member, condemned North Korea as a 
‘terrorist state’, which was ‘unpredictable’ with a ‘high risk of exploding’, arguing that; 
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(North Korea) kidnapped a junior high school girl, sent agents, obtained components 
of weapons, alleged irregularities of Chogin Credit Unions10 and a scandal over 
secretive payments, steals information. That is, North Korea has seized all of things, 
people, materials, money, and information from our country. As that country is too 
dangerous a neighbor, it is normalization of North Korea itself, that is needed before 
negotiations for normalization even start (NDRP: 2002-i).  
 
In other words, because of its ‘abnormal’ and ‘hostile’ identity, Japan should not normalize 
its relationship with North Korea without regime change. In sum, the pressure school and the 
Abe administration argued that Japan was exposed to a security crisis because North Korea 
was a ‘dangerous’ ‘terrorist’ country in essence; it would be Japan’s ‘enemy’ by its very 
nature and this identity is assumed not be transformable by dialogues or diplomatic 
normalization. North Korea was treated as an ‘enemy’ and ‘threat’ against Japan by nature, 
which was too different from Japan to assimilate. There was no room for the existence of 
concessions or mutual interest. This construction of subjects and a ‘reality’ might serve to 
legitimate Abe’s hard-line stance against the DPRK and marginalize alternative policy.  
     In order to argue the construction of subjects and a reality concerning North Korea 
questions, it is inescapable to examine narratives on the abduction issue. Actually, the second 
and the third dichotomies emerged in discourse on this issue. Although the Koizumi 
administration and the dialogue school also treated the problem as important and as an urgent 
task to be solved before normalization, the way to handle this issue by the Abe 
administration and the pressure school was far more uncompromising. This was related to 
                                             
10 Chogin Credit Unions mainly served the large community of ethnic Koreans in Japan who are 
loyal to the North and alleged to transfer billions of dollars to the DPRK.  
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how the abduction issue was conceptualized in foreign policy discourse. 
      First of all, the abduction problem was often defined as a state crime by North Korea 
that infringes Japan’s national sovereignty. It was also regarded as a violation of human 
rights and serious crime as lawmaker Akira Oide of the DPJ argued that the abduction issue 
was ‘a serious crime, which threatened the peace and security of Japanese nationals and 
infringed national sovereignty’ (NDRP: 2002-a). Ishiba, a cabinet member, declared that the 
abduction issue was a security issue (NDRP: 2002-e) and Togashi of the JCP condemned the 
abduction as ‘unacceptable international criminal act, which menaced the security and 
human rights of Japanese nationals’ (NDRP: 2004-p). Ryuji Matsumura of the LDP argued 
that as the root of the abduction issue was the ‘infringement of sovereignty’ and was the 
‘matter of the national prestige’, ‘it should be resolved at any cost and any means, even 
resorting to war’ (NDRP: 2004-r). Since national sovereignty is a foundation of a state, the 
appeasement to the ‘other’, who infringed upon it, should definitely be unacceptable. In this 
context, increasing pressure for North Korea was justified. According to Jin Matsubara, the 
Japanese government should pose more sanctions in order to demonstrate its stance that 
Japan was a country, which surely fights back against the infringement of national 
sovereignty, even at the slightest effect (NDRP: 2004-y). Yoshitake Kimata of the DPJ also 
insisted on the necessity of imposition of sanctions, arguing that it was not a matter of 
effectiveness but a matter of national will and prestige. In sum, by articulating the abduction 
issue as a matter of national sovereignty related to national pride, Japan called into question 
one's raison d’être as a ‘state’, and thus legitimate to strengthen pressure and made it difficult 
to make concessions.    
     In addition, the abduction issue was treated as ‘humanitarian concerns’, which 
international society should work together cohesively. The Vice Foreign Minister in the Abe 
administration Takeshi Iwaya emphasized that one of the points in the ‘Resolution on the 
 231 
Human Right Situation in North Korea’, which had been collaborated by Japan and the EU, 
was that it stipulated the abduction issue was one of the international concerns and added 
statement that the abduction by the DPRK would be the violation of human rights in all other 
sovereign states (NDRP: 2006-q). In addition, the Diet approved ‘the Revised Bills on the 
Abduction Issue and Other Violation of Human Rights Problems by North Korean 
Authorities’, so-called ‘a North Korea Human Rights Law’, which stipulates responsibility 
of the government to make effort for the resolution of the abduction issue. This bill declared 
that the abduction issue and other problems on Human rights violation by North Korean 
authorities were tasks that the entire international community must tackle. These efforts 
indicated that the Abe administration tried to treat essentially different problems in the same 
way; the abduction issue, which infringed Japan’s sovereignty, and problems of human 
rights violation in North Korea such as ‘defectors from North Korea’ issue, which was 
basically a domestic issue, and formulate a policy relying on this categorization. By doing so, 
it enabled the Abe administration to pursue, organize, and tighten an international coalition 
against North Korea. At the same time, it might give Japan moral superiority by endorsing 
the protection of human rights and reinforce its identity as a country with universal values. In 
other words, making concessions to North Korea was regarded as tacit approval of the 
violation of human rights and might ruin Japan’s identity. Therefore, concessions to North 
Korea were marginalized and increasing pressure was legitimized under the Abe 
administration. 
 
6.2.3.2 ‘Postwar regime’ and ideal Japan  
 
     Secondly, the pressure school tended to link the abduction issue with the negative side 
of the path of postwar Japan. This problem was an identity issue concerning national 
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sovereignty but also an identity matter over the ‘settlement of the postwar era’. This 
conceptualization of the issue served to construct the second dichotomy between what Japan 
should be and how postwar Japan tended to behave. For instance, Katsuei Hirasawa, a LDP 
lawmaker of the pressure school, argued that ‘what the abduction issue posed might be a 
series of concerns--- the problem on the Constitution, national security, and how diplomacy 
and politics should function’ (NDRP: 2004-y). Seiken Sugiura, the Deputy Chief Cabinet 
Secretary at the time, after defining the abduction issue as a ‘criminal act’ and the 
‘encroachment of sovereignty’, stated that ‘there might be a number of faults in postwar 
Japan that it should reflect on, including a concept of “state” and political system, which 
allowed such problems to happen’ (NDRP: 2004-y). More clearly, Yutaka Kobayashi of the 
LDP pointed out that although ‘there seemed to be no strong sense of protecting people’s 
lives, property, and sovereignty in postwar Japan under the Japan-US security Treaty system’, 
however, ‘how to defend our safety by ourselves’, ‘how to conduct foreign policy’, and ‘how 
to review postwar democracy’ might be highly questioned through this North Korea problem 
and declared that the resolution of the abduction issue might lead to the ‘settlement of the 
postwar era’ (NDRP: 2004-q). In other words, the abduction issue was constructed as the 
issue caused not only by North Korea but also by inability of the successive postwar 
Japanese governments. Yuriko Koike of the LDP harshly criticized conventional Japanese 
foreign policy toward North Korea that postwar Japan’s diplomacy seemed to be too willing 
to obey that country (NDRP: 2002-i). Chubei Kamata of the LDP also stated that ‘postwar 
Japanese government have not protected the Japanese people from kidnapping and have not 
made this issue a matter of the highest priority’ (NDRP: 2005-s). Atsushi Kinoshita of the 
DPJ critically mentioned that considering conventional Japan’s diplomacy towards China, 
Russia, and especially North Korea, it had been ‘preoccupied with such a low-profile attitude 
that it had conducted a weak-kneed diplomacy so as not to offend those countries’, which 
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was sometimes humiliated by being labeled as ‘kowtow diplomacy’ (NDRP: 2002-f). In this 
way, Abe’s supporters of the pressure school constructed the postwar Japanese governments 
as being too ‘weak-kneed’ and ‘submissive’ to North Korea, unwilling to protect its people at 
any cost, and thus harm national interest, and those ‘inabilities’ of postwar governments had 
allowed North Korea to kidnap innocent Japanese people. Therefore, the Abe administration 
and the pressure school was implicitly constructed as ‘protector of Japanese people’ and thus 
being suitable for the administration, because they staunchly took a tough stance against 
North Korea.  
     What the pressure school criticized was not only the fact that the successive 
governments had not taken appropriate actions, but also, or more precisely, the ‘postwar 
regime’ itself. As discussed in previous chapter, Abe and his like-minded politicians harshly 
criticized the ‘postwar regime’, which has downplayed the role of ‘state’, a concept of 
national security, and a proper course of diplomacy. Their criticism was closely connected 
with Abe’s slogan of ‘the departure from the postwar regime’ and ‘toward a Beautiful 
Country’, in which he insisted on the necessity of reviewing low-profile diplomacy, 
reconsidering security policy, and restoring national prestige and a bind between the state 
and its people. In this discourse, mainstream LDP politicians were constructed as 
policy-makers who had not been enthusiastic about protecting Japanese people and national 
interests, and thus caused current ‘abnormal’ situations. Therefore, by criticizing a handling 
of the abduction issue by the successive governments, Abe and his colleagues sought to 
condemn the ‘postwar regime’ and the mainstream LDP politicians, who had supported the 
‘postwar regime’ and were political rival of them. In this sense, Abe and the pressure school 
seemed to utilize the abduction issue to crush their political rivals.  
 
6.2.3.3 political Rivalry in domestic politics  
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     There can be seen the third dichotomy; it was not only mainstream LDP politicians but 
also other political enemies who were criticized as a ‘betrayer’ in the discourse of the 
pressure school on the abduction issue. Most directly, a conciliatory approach of the dialogue 
school was harshly condemned as damaging national interest. Tsutomu Nishioka, who was a 
president of the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea, 
asserted that diplomatic strategy of Hitoshi Tanaka, which promoted negotiations based on 
common interests, could be regarded as a practice of collaboration with enemies (NDRP: 
2005-r). This indicated that in addition to North Korea, those who assume shared interest 
with the ‘enemy’ could be labeled as its ‘collaborator’ or the ‘fifth column’. In addition, 
so-called the ‘Left-wingers’ such as the Social Democratic Party, the Japan Communist Party, 
and the Asahi Newspaper became a target for criticism. For instance, Akihiro Ota, a head of 
the Komei Party, at that time, argued that:  
 
I would like to refer to some opposition parties, which have maintained close 
relationship with North Korea, so that they served to sweep the abduction issue under 
the carpet. The SDP has taken a stance that it denied the fact of the abduction, treated 
the issue as ‘invented’, and defended North Korea. The JCP, on the other hand, has 
lauded the DPRK as a “Paradise on Earth” and asserted that the resolution of the 
abduction issue should not be seen as a precondition of normalization talks because we 
could only speculate about the problem. Both of the parties should regret their attitudes 
toward the abduction issue in front of the public (NDRP: 2002-h).    
 
This statement showed that the Komei Party, ruling coalition partner, attacked the 
conventional friendly-stance to North Korea of the two opposition parties, the JSP and the 
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JCP, arguing that it was a clear act of betrayal to the Japanese people. Yuriko Koike of the 
LDP also stated that ‘the SDP and the JCP, both of which currently opposed to the 
legislation on emergency measures, had mindlessly followed North Korea’ (NDRP: 2002-i). 
Shoichi Nakagawa, who was once the chairman of the Parliamentary Members Alliance for 
the Swift Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (Kitachosen ni Rachi sareta 
Nihonjin o Sokyu ni Kyuushutsu suru tame ni Koudo suru Giin Renmei), criticized 
responses on the abduction issue of the SDP and the JCP in his speech in Sapporo city, and 
described the two as ‘accomplices to the kidnapping (Asahi Shimbun: 2002-c)’. Furthermore, 
Abe, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary at that time, criticized Naoto Kan, one of the 
leaders of the DPJ, and Takako Doi, then leader of the SDP, as ‘idiots’ because they had 
joined the call for Sin Gwang-su, who was suspected of kidnapping Japanese people, to be 
released (Asahi Shimbun: 2002-b). These articulations of the opposition parties would allow 
Abe and his colleagues to represent their opponents as the ‘fifth column’ or ‘enemy within’, 
and therefore to delegitimize opponents’ discourses. Behind the scene, there can be seen the 
fact that the Komei Party and other two parties contested at the nationwide local elections 
and that the SDP and the JCP had opposed to the legislation on emergency measures as 
Yuriko Koike mentioned. In other words, the Abe administration tried to take advantage in 
domestic politics over the opposition parties by depicting them as ‘enemy within’. Thus, the 
abduction issue was utilized as a political discourse by constructing a dichotomy between 
Abe’s camp and the opponents, and giving the former a high evaluation.  
     There can be seen another point to be argued; the abduction issue was treated as a 
question on the bind between a state and its people. Lawmaker Takehiko Endo argued that 
the abduction issue would ultimately question whether ‘Japan could take action to rescue 
only single Japanese person’ (NDRP: 2004-m). Shu Watanabe of the DPJ mentioned that the 
abduction issue was not only a problem of national sovereignty but also an issue of 
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‘patriotism’, arguing that: 
 
I would suppose that patriotism should not be taught as a school course but might 
spontaneously be felt among people. That is, if there could be seen no expressions of 
national will that the state would surely rescue its people encountering a crisis, even 
one person, they would not want to do anything for the state (NDRP: 2004-z).  
 
Kosaburo Nishime of the LDP also made a point that ‘when we think of the abduction issue, 
--- a desirable relationship between a state and its people will be enabled only when the state 
would make sure that it protects lives and property of the people’ (NDRP: 2005-r). 
Considering these narratives, it would be clear that the abduction issue was closely linked 
with ‘patriotism’ and the bind between a state and people in a discourse of the pressure 
school and Abe’s ‘beautiful country’. Therefore, the resolution of this issue could be seen as 
the restoration of the ‘lost ties between nation and states’. As this tie would be a fundamental 
national value to unify a nation-state, it was difficult to make concession to North Korea on 
the abduction issue.   
     Given these arguments above, the essence of the insistence of the pressure school 
seemed to be summarized in a statement by Atsushi Watabe of the LDP: 
 
The abduction issue is clearly on infringement on national sovereignty and is 
state-sponsored terrorism, which violates human rights of our people. When I think of 
the role of the state, I would assert that the state has an obligation to protect its people. 
The Japanese government should strongly recognize and remember it. The abduction 
issue will test how we, as a democratic country, deal decisively with North Korea, 
which is a totalitarian state. That is, what is now tested would be what country Japan is 
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really like (NDRP: 2005-u).  
 
On the abduction issue, the discourses of Abe and the pressure school constructed Japan and 
North Korea, highlighted the differences between them, and constituted other sets of 
dichotomies: conventional mainstream policymakers in the postwar era, who had conducted 
a cowardly attitude toward North Korea and had not protected the lives and property of 
Japanese people, and Abe and the pressure school, who adopt a firm attitude toward North 
Korea and a promise to protect the lives and property of Japanese people: political dissents as 
‘betrayers’ and ‘internal enemies’ of the people and the ‘self’ as a ‘faithful guardian’ of the 
people. Those dichotomies were aimed at legitimizing Abe’s policy and excluding 
alternative policies proposed by his opponents. In this sense, the North Korea issue was used 
as a source of political capital in order to gain an advantage in domestic political struggles. 
Furthermore, the abduction issue was treated as a ‘test’ to question whether Japan could 
settle its ‘postwar pathology’ in addition to the problem of national sovereignty, national 
prestige and especially national identity how Japan should behave as a ‘state’. Coupled with 
the first dichotomy, it constructed and reinforced Japan as a ‘democratic’ country, this made 
it desirable to take an uncompromising attitude against North Korea and to marginalize other 
policy choices .    
  
6.3 Conclusion  
 
     Abe’s foreign policy toward China and North Korea seems to form a clear contrast. 
Despite his previous confrontational attitude, Abe improved the bilateral relationship with 
China by using an ‘ambiguous strategy’ on the Yasukuni Shrine problem and shelving the 
general history issue, complying with a request from political and economic circles. It seems 
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that Abe’s strategic ambiguity could be tacitly accepted by his anti-Chinese supporters, 
partly because the strategy might be useful to consolidate the administration so as to realize 
Abe’s grand design of ‘the departure from the postwar regime’, and might also be regarded 
as a diplomatic card in order to gain initiatives in the Japan-Chinese relationship. In this 
sense, foreign policy toward China seemed to be closely related to power struggles in 
Japanese domestic politics. For instance, as the rapprochement with China was an important 
source of political capital, Abe sought to prevent it from being utilized by his opponents. 
Furthermore, a notable factor, which made the improvement of the bilateral relationship, was 
that ‘social antagonism’ was not emphasized and reproduced in the foreign policy debate. 
This was because the Abe administration did not treat the China issue as an ‘identity issue’ 
by shelving the Yasukuni Shrine issue on the one hand, and because the Chinese government 
officially came to demonstrate its understanding and appreciation of postwar Japan’s 
‘peaceful’ identity on the other. Therefore, China was not articulated, at least explicitly, as an 
‘identity threat’ unlike in the previous administration, which would contribute to the 
legitimization of Abe’s rapprochement with China. At the same time, however, China was 
implicitly constructed as an ‘inassimilable other’, who could not be ‘trustworthy’ and could 
not share universal values. This construction of China was compatible with Abe’s original 
stance towards China and his vision of the ‘departure from the postwar regime’.  
     As for policy toward North Korea, there seemed to be some factors, which enabled or 
encouraged Abe to take a tough stance to the country. It was partly because he obtained high 
popularity because of his hard-line policy. What is more, Abe had to ease the frustrations 
against the rapprochement with China among his anti-Chinese supporters by demonstrating 
an unyielding attitude. In this sense, the North Korean issue was also an important source of 
political capital for the Abe administration. Furthermore, there can be seen three sets of 
dichotomy on identity constructions in discourse on the abduction issue, all of them might 
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serve to legitimate Abe’s utterly uncompromising stance against Pyongyang. The first 
dichotomy was between North Korea as ‘external other’ and Japan as ‘internal self’. By 
constructing the former as ‘authoritarian’, ‘militaristic’ and ‘isolated wrongdoer’ and 
highlighting differences from Japan, Japan’s identity as ‘democratic’, ‘non-militarist’ and a 
responsible member of international society’ could be reconstructed and reinforced. In 
addition, these constructions of North Korea would allow the pressure school including Abe, 
to choose a hard-line policy, because the current ‘abnormal relationship’ was made possible 
by the ‘abnormal’ identity of North Korea. As Pyongyang was described as ‘untrustworthy’ 
and not ‘transformable’, Abe’s pursuit of ‘diplomacy for pressure’ was legitimized and 
making any concessions to the country was marginalized as a policy option.  
     The second construction of the self-other nexus was between conventional mainstream 
policymakers and Abe’s camp. The pressure school tended to criticize a traditional approach 
to the North Korea issue by saying it was ‘too low-profile’, ignored the importance of 
national sovereignty and discarded lives and property of the Japanese people. According to 
them, it was the pressure school, which could really protect the lives and property of 
nationals and restore national sovereignty and prestige. This construction might be closely 
related to Abe’s political vision of the ‘departure from the postwar regime’ and thus 
supported Abe’s unyielding attitude. Another dichotomy articulated Abe’s dissidents as the 
‘internal enemy’ or the ‘fifth column’ while implicitly constructing Abe’s group as a ‘faithful 
guardian of people’. This contributed to the marginalization of the policy of Abe’s political 
opponents. Considering the second and third dichotomies, the abduction issue or more 
generally the North Korea issue was treated not be a diplomatic issue but also as a matter of a 
domestic power relationship. Abe’s ‘nationalistic’ foreign policy discourse thus sought to 
gain advantages in domestic politics, to defeat his political opponents, and ultimately achieve 
his primary goal, the revision of the Constitution.  
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Chapter 7. Case Study 5: Nationalism and Abe’s Foreign Policy 
toward India and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 
                                                       
                                                      
     On 22nd August in 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Abe delivered a speech entitled 
‘Confluence of the Two Seas’, in which he proposed a concept of ‘broader Asia’. It can 
be considered an expression of Abe’s ambition to enhance close cooperation among the 
four democratic countries, Japan, the US, Australia and India. Indeed, Japan’s Asian 
diplomacy saw the rapid development of partnership with India especially in Abe’s 
administration. It seems to be a sharp contrast with the deteriorating relationship with 
neighboring countries such as China and South Korea as the history issues came to the 
forefront. In addition, Abe announced that he would launch ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ 
to promote ‘proactive diplomacy’ when he came into office. At the same time, Foreign 
Minister Taro Aso also proposed the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ as a part of this 
‘value-oriented diplomacy’. Policy towards India was articulated as the pillar of those 
new diplomatic orientations under the Abe administration.  
     In this context, this chapter attempts to examine how the enhancement of the 
partnership with India was legitimized, and how Japan’s identity was reconstructed in 
foreign policy discourse. Then, it also explores how foreign policy towards India was 
manipulated as a source of political capital, especially in relation to Abe’s 
rapprochement with China and his political agenda of the ‘departure from the postwar 
regime’. In terms of theoretical framework, it tries to highlight the role of positive 
representations of a similar ‘other’, stressing similarities between the ‘self’ and a similar 
‘other’, and the implicit construction of a different ‘other’ in foreign policy discourse. 
Although an aspect in which negative differences and antagonism could deeply involve 
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the construction of the ‘other’, thereby the ‘self’, however, positive identification and 
assimilation could also involve the process of identity-making as Messari (2001) 
persuasively argues. Relying on this idea, this chapter will mainly highlight a positive 
identification of ‘what constitutes the self’ through examining Japan’s India policy in 
the Abe administration. In addition, it will also pay attention to the implicit construction 
of a ‘different’ other, which is constructed behind an explicit construction of a ‘similar’ 
other to uncover the relationship with other foreign policies. 
     My argument is as follows: the enhancement of the partnership with India in the 
Abe administration played a key role in Abe’s ‘proactive diplomacy’ as well as Aso’s 
Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. In foreign policy discourse, India was represented as a 
‘friend’, a country that would share universal values, have strong sympathy with Japan, 
respect Japan’s contribution for peace and would not problematize the history issues. 
Similarity between Japan and India were emphasized to reproduce positive facets of 
Japan’s identity and India was articulated as an ‘assimilable’ other. On the other hand, 
China would be defined as a political subject, which would not share universal values, 
which often demonstrates an ‘anti-Japanese’ attitude, tends to negate positive aspects of 
Japan’s identity and exploits the history issue as a diplomatic tool. The friend-foe 
division between India and China could be reinforced and Japan’s identity as a 
‘peaceful nation’, which upholds universal values and contributes to world peace, would 
be reproduced. This strategy could also play a role to counter the ‘logic of guilt’ by 
assimilating India’s identity. These constructions of subjects could make deepening ties 
with India more likely while fundamental improvement of the bilateral relationship with 
China less likely. In addition, policy to strengthen ties with India based on 
‘value-oriented diplomacy’ was treated as a source of political capital of political 
leaders firstly to offset discontents among anti-Chinese group against Abe’s 
 242 
rapprochement with China, secondly to highlight China’s ‘otherness’ and to counter it 
on the history issue, and to consolidate support for the Abe administration in order to 
realize its ‘conservative’ political agendas, namely the ‘departure form the postwar 
regime’. In short, foreign policy could produce and reproduce national identity not only 
by dealing with an ‘enemy’ through opposition and exclusion, but also by dealing with 
an ‘ally’ through assimilation and constitution of similarities.   
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section briefly introduces why 
this case was selected, and then discusses the theoretical framework of Messari’s 
argument on how positive representation of the ‘other’ constructs and reconstructs the 
identity of the ‘self’. This is followed by analysis of Abe’s ‘proactive diplomacy’ and 
‘vale-oriented diplomacy’. Then, it will examine how Japan’s political leaders intended 
to reconstruct national identity in a discourse of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’. 
Applying Messari’s argument to the case of Japan’s approach toward India, the final 
section attempts to explore how subjects of foreign policy, both the self and the other, 
were articulated, how the relationship between them was constructed, and how a certain 
policy, an approach to India in this case, was made possible by the discourse of foreign 
policy toward India.  
 
7.1 Case Selection 
 
     There were some reasons why Abe’s policy toward India was selected as one of 
the case studies in this research. India was of great importance in Japan’s foreign policy 
toward East Asia under the Abe administration in several ways. First of all, policy 
toward India was aimed at balancing its China policy for domestic political 
considerations. Although the enhancement of ties with India was often discussed 
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convincingly in terns of geopolitical aspect, domestic considerations seem to be more 
plausible in the context of Abe’s China policy. As Prime Minister Abe carried out the 
improvement of the Japan-China relationship immediately after he came into office, he 
had to calm discontents of his anti-Chinese supporters. In this respect, India appeared to 
be a perfect candidate for him; the country was perceived as a ‘Japan-friendly country’ 
without any history disputes unlike China. Thus, it would not polarize public opinion 
unlike North Korea, which meant it could be a source of political capital to attract a 
wider range of people.  
     More importantly, India was the mother country of Judge Radha Binod Pal, who 
might be one of the most famous Indian figures in Japan due to his submission of 
separate opinion at the Tokyo War Tribunal in WWⅡ. Pal was known as the only judge 
who found all the defendants to be innocent in his ‘Dissentient Judgment’. It was 
enthusiastically received in Japan, especially by ‘conservative’ or ‘right-wing’ people 
who espoused the view that Japan had fought WWⅡ in order to liberate Asian nations 
from Western colonialism. Pal’s separate opinion was translated by Masaaki Tanaka 
and published as ‘The Proposition of Japan’s Innocence: Justice of the Truth’ (1952) 
and later ‘The Proposition of Japan’s Innocence by Judge Pal’ (1963) and became a 
best seller. Conservative debaters have frequently referred to Pal’s separate opinion so 
as to dispute the legitimacy of the Tokyo War Tribunal. Furthermore, they even tend to 
regard Pal’s judgment as justifying Japan’s colonialism and war acts in WWⅡ and 
utilize it to authorize ‘the affirmation of the Great Eastern Asian War’ and ‘the 
affirmation of Japan’s innocence’.
     Actually, it was the existence of Judge Pal that makes India be perceived as 
special for Abe and Japan’s revisionists. While Australia or New Zealand could be 
another choice to emphasize the diplomatic and strategic significance, because they 
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share universal values with Japan and does not have intensive confrontations on the 
history issue in the bilateral relationships as well as India, however, They do not have 
an icon like Judge Pal. Hence, although the strengthened cooperation with Australia or 
New Zealand was positively accepted, it cannot be used as significant political capital to 
appeal to Abe’s right-wing supporters. Therefore, it is important to focus on Abe’s 
foreign policy to India in that Abe could manipulate Judge Pal and the friendly 
approach toward India as political capital for bolstering domestic credibility, mainly to 
appeal to his anti-Chinese supporters.  
     On the other hand, this thesis does not focus on Koizumi’s policy toward India. 
Although Koizumi visited India in April 2005 and made an agreement with Prime 
Minister Singh that a strategic orientation would be added to the Japan-India relations 
(MOFA 2006)1. In addition, it was true that the Koizumi administration insisted that the 
East Asian Summit should give membership to India as well as Australia and New 
Zealand. In this way, although Koizumi generally took an amicable stance to India, 
however, his policy toward India did not contained domestic political strategy like Abe, 
which aimed to offset discontents with his other foreign policy. It might be because a 
sense of frustration among the ‘pressure school’ was eased by his uncompromising 
China policy to some degree. Moreover, when Koizumi visited India in 2005, he laid a 
wreath in front of the memorial of Mahatma Gandhi, not that of Judge Pal. Gandhi is 
different from Pal in that he is not regarded as a ‘friend of Japan’s nationalists’ and thus 
might not appeal to the right-wing groups. Thus, Koizumi’s policy toward India was not 
political capital to appeal to the revisionists who opposed his policy for normalization of 
relationship with North Korea. In this way, this thesis focuses on the policy toward 
                                                   
1 In order to strengthen economic ties, the ‘Joint-statement on the Japan-India Partnership 
in a New Asian Era’, and the ‘Eight-fold Initiative’ were launched, and the Japan-India Joint 
Study Group (JSG) began its work. 
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India under the Abe administration as one of case studies because it would have a great 
importance to analyze how political leaders try to offset their weakness in a foreign 
policy by choosing and conducting other foreign policies. 
 
7.2 Theoretical framework  
 
     As discussed in Chapter 1, foreign policy would be an identity-making practice 
by dealing with an ‘other’ by which national identity is permanently reconstructed. In 
other words, what kind of ‘self’ could be revealed through the definition of an ‘other’ in 
foreign policy discourse. Therefore, it would be crucial to pay attention to how ‘other’ 
is articulated in foreign policy discourse to construct an identity of the self. Among 
them, the ‘other’ is more likely to be represented as a threat to what ‘the self is’ rather 
than just what ‘the self is not’. This seemed to be clear in Koizumi’s policy toward 
China and Abe’s policy toward North Korea, both of which regarded the two countries 
as a ‘threat’ or ‘enemy’. Yet, it can be assumed that not only negative differences and 
antagonism could construct an ‘other’. There might be an ‘other’ whose difference is 
not defined as a ‘threat’ to the ‘self’. According to Messari (2001), ‘other’ can be 
divided into two groups, allies and enemies, and national identity is reconstructed 
through the contact with both allies and enemies. In dealing with differences, there can 
be assumed two attitudes, assimilating difference as a friend or transforming it into 
otherness. Messari maintains that the construction of similar others reproduce a certain 
aspect of the existing identity of the self. When identity is constructed by dealing with 
similar other, firstly, particular elements of identity, which might be of positive and 
common between the self and other, are enhanced to construct ‘similarity’. This 
construction of similarity would lead to a specific representation of other which 
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Wennersten (1999) calls inside-inside articulation; some aspects of identity (similarity) 
are emphasized while others (difference) are not likely to be referred to. Then, ‘once 
representation is made, and once it is implied that “it is similar to us” and that “we 
ought to defend it”, by defending it, the self reproduces those very same emphasized 
aspects of its own identity (Messari 2001: 236). ’ In sum, the positive aspect of others 
would be assimilated in order to reproduce specific aspects of identity of the self. 
     From this perspective, foreign policy would be a practice of a state to seek to 
reproduce and confirm a specific part of national identity by emphasizing similarities 
with others. Therefore, positive representation of other would aim to reproduce a certain 
facet of national identity by positively identifying the self with the other. Messari 
(2001) demonstrates how the national identity of the US was reproduced through its 
dealings with Bosnia’s Muslims and concludes that ‘the similarities between the United 
States and Bosnia’s Muslims were part of a process of confirming a representation of 
national identity (2001: 244).’ Thus, positive representation of Bosnia’s Islam was 
intended to reproduce precise aspect of the US identity. In sum, when an other is 
represented positively in foreign policy discourse, similarities are emphasized whereas 
silence is maintained on any other differences. Furthermore, links are established to 
legitimize the supportive commitment to the ‘assimilable’ others to defend them 
because they are identified with the self. Given these, it can be argued that assimilation 
and constructing similarities plays as important a role as antagonism and negative 
differences in the process of reproducing national identity in foreign policy discourse. 
     In addition to this, there might be an implicit construction of a different ‘other’. 
Messari himself admits that the positive identification of other could simultaneously 
exclude many others (2007: 233), and then, shows that the construction and the 
representation of similar other would rely on some dichotomies. Wennersten (1999: 
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289) also mentions that while EU foreign policies in the 1990s ‘include’ the Baltic 
States in the Western self by using inside-inside articulation, it simultaneously ‘exclude’ 
Russia by using inside-outside articulation. Applied to this analysis, when India is 
identified with a similar ‘other’, China might be the ‘other’ who is implicitly 
differentiated and excluded. Japan’s foreign policy uses inclusionary logic on India at 
the same time with exclusionary logic on China. By both the politics of inclusion and 
exclusion, a certain ‘reality’ would be constructed so as to make a particular policy 
possible and other policy less likely.  
     In the later section, the following analysis would apply this theoretical framework 
to Japan’s approach to India in the Abe’s administration. It intends to explore how a 
certain aspect of national identity of Japan is attempted to reproduce and affirm through 
constructing similarities with India in foreign policy discourse. At the same time, it 
would also pay attention to the implicit construction of China as an ‘inassimilable’ 
other.  
 
7.3 Abe’s policy toward India  
 
7.3.1 Chronology: The development of Japan-India relationship in the 2000s 
 
    The development of Japan-India relations was intensified in the later part of 
Koizumi administration. India became the largest recipient country of Japanese ODA 
from 2004 for the fifth consecutive year. In April 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi visited 
India to reinforce the strategic orientation of a global partnership with India which had 
been established in 2000 during then-Prime Minister Mori’s visit to India. Koizumi and 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh issued a joint statement on the ‘Japan-India 
 248 
Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of the Japan-India Global 
Partnership’ and ‘Eightfold Initiative for Strengthening Japan-India Global Partnership’. 
To raise the bilateral relation to a higher level, Foreign Minister Aso in the Koizumi 
cabinet visited India in January 2006 and set several agendas to work with together. In 
December of that year, Prime Minister Singh visited Tokyo and agreed with Prime 
Minister Abe on the establishment of a Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan 
and India2. Succeeding working-level meetings with the US, Australia and India in May, 
Abe had a meeting with Prime Minister Singh in India in August 2007 and signed the 
Joint Statement by Japan and India on the Enhancement of Cooperation on 
Environmental Protection and Energy Security. They also set forth a Roadmap for New 
Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership reiterating political, defense and 
security cooperation such as the enhancement of cooperation on coast guards, 
comprehensive economic partnership like the promotion of the Special Economic 
Partnership Initiative (SEPI). Prime Minister Abe’s speech, ‘Confluence of the Two 
Seas’ delivered during a session of the Diet emphasized the historical ties between the 
two countries and proposed the concept of a ‘broader Asia’ in which the US and 
Australia would also be incorporated. During his visit, Abe met Pransanta Pal, the son 
of the Indian judge Radhabinod Pal, who declared all Japanese defendants to be 
innocent at the Tokyo War Tribunal in WWⅡ. 
 
7.3.2 Foreign Policy toward India in the wider context under the Abe administration  
7.3.2.1 Abe’s ‘Proactive Diplomacy’ and ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ 
 
                                                   
2 This partnership involved closer political coordination on bilateral, regional and global 
issues, comprehensive economic engagement, stronger security and defense relations, 
greater technological cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges. 
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     ‘Proactive Diplomacy’ would be the key term to express Prime Minister Abe’s 
nationalism in the foreign policy area. In his first policy speech at the 165th Diet on 29 
September 2006, he stated that it was high time to change conventional Japan’s foreign 
policy to ‘proactive diplomacy’. At first, Abe depicted ‘proactive diplomacy’ as Japan’s 
diplomatic footing from which to secure national interests from a strategic viewpoint 
and to demonstrate international leadership asserting what Japan should do for the 
region and the whole world and what international society should pursue (NDRP: 
2006-p). In the next policy speech on 26 January 2007, he further elaborated his concept 
of ‘proactive diplomacy’ referring to three principles. First, he spoke of the 
enhancement of relationships with countries which shared fundamental values such as 
freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law; the second principle was 
the construction and promotion of an ‘open’ Asia full of innovation; and finally, 
contributions to the peace and stability of the world.  
     Although the definition of ‘proactive diplomacy’ seemed to be too general and 
the three principles lacked coherence at first glance, his real intention looked clearer in 
his statement. Abe explained that ‘it is necessary for Japan to become a new model in 
international society in the 21st century, to vigorously redress its ‘postwar regime’ in 
diplomatic and security areas and to demonstrate a new image of Japan (NDRP: 2007-a). 
Put simply, the essence of ‘proactive diplomacy’ was its role in the ‘departure from the 
postwar regime’. That is, it was primarily intended to deny conventional low-profile 
diplomatic style in East Asia and to seek to reconstruct Japan’s national identity. Abe 
recognized that Japan had become a country which could win respect from other 
countries in the world due to its effort to realize universal values in the 60 years since 
the end of WWⅡ. He therefore considered it necessary that Japan should discard its 
‘apology diplomacy’ in Asia because of the ‘burden of history’, and meet its global 
 250 
responsibilities commensurable with this respectable status. Identifying Japan as a 
‘major power’, Abe stresses the importance for Japan to take a leadership role in order 
to contribute to the peace and stability of the world as a ‘peaceful nation’ (NDRP: 
2007-g). In short, ‘proactive diplomacy’ was not just the proclamation of a new 
diplomatic orientation, but also the expression of his determination to reconstruct 
Japan’s identity by abandoning the traditional way of diplomacy. As this was a part of 
his domestic political agenda of ‘departing from the postwar regime’, these three 
diplomatic principles can be viewed as being highly associated with a domestic political 
power relationship. 
     The three principles of ‘proactive diplomacy’ might make a clear departure from 
conventional policies of Japan’s diplomacy in some respects. Firstly, the conventional 
‘value-neutral’ approach seemed to be replaced by the stress and promotion of 
‘universal values’. The postwar Japanese government has not generally put exclusive 
emphasis on particular values like democracy in foreign policy discourse as can be seen 
in its policy towards China immediately after the Tiananmen Square Incident, and the 
approach toward the military junta of Myanmar. In this context, Prime Minister Abe 
was not the first person to emphasize universal values in foreign policy area. For 
instance, the Japanese government issued the ODA Guidelines 1n 1992 (MOFA: 1992), 
in which a new principle stated that ‘it should pay attention to the promotion of 
democratization, efforts to introduce a market economy, and the protection of human 
rights’. In addition, it seemed that the Koizumi administration tended to make effort to 
incorporate ‘universal values’ into a series of statements on East Asian diplomacy such 
as ‘the Tokyo Declaration’ (Koizumi: 2003-b) issued on the occasion of the 
ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit. Furthermore, in ‘the Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration’ on the first East Asian Summit, Japan was successful in including a point 
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that declared ‘we strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognised values 
with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership (Koizumi: 2005-f)’. In the 
Diplomatic Blue Book issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, universal values might 
not be highlighted so much until its volume from 2006 when Foreign Minister Taro Aso 
referred to Japan’s deep commitment to universal values throughout the postwar era. In 
the Diplomatic Blue Book 2007, the concept of ‘value oriented diplomacy’ was 
presented by Aso, which involves placing emphasis on the “universal values” such as 
democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy. In sum, 
universal values have come to the forefront in the 2000s especially in the Abe 
administration, in contrast to conventional Japanese diplomacy. 
At this point, it is now a matter of argument about what kind of role universal 
values would play in Abe’s foreign policy. In this respect, Prime Minister Abe made 
notable remarks on the relationship between diplomacy and universal values in pursuing 
national interest. It would be a kind of ‘hypocrisy’ for him to conduct foreign policy 
only to defend universal values such as democracy and human rights. Although he 
acknowledged that the effort to realize those universal values might be important in 
international society, it would gain no ground if political leaders failed to persuade the 
public that universal values would be linked with national interests. In short, he argued 
that universal values would be the ‘rhetoric’ which would allow him to skillfully 
capture national interest (Abe 2003-a: 70). Therefore, it can be concluded that foreign 
policy emphasizing universal values was regarded as a source of political capital for 
him, using national interests and to achieve his political goals.  
     As for the second diplomatic principle, an expansion of the geographical concept 
of Asia within foreign policy discourse was discussed. Conventionally, Japanese Asian 
diplomacy tended to focus on relationships with East Asia, especially Northeast Asia 
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particularly China and South Korea. However, Abe proposed the concept of a ‘broader 
Asia’ in his speech at the Indian Diet, which would incorporate South Asia and the 
Pacific area into a single geographical concept of ‘Asia’. Behind this conceptualization 
of a ‘broader Asia’ was the fact that the Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and the 
following deterioration of the relationships with China and South Korea had been the 
subject of controversy during the Koizumi administration. The dominant discourse in 
Parliament could be summarized as follows; ‘Japan is alienated in Asia because of the 
Yasukuni Shrine issue. The Japanese Prime Minister should stop visiting the Shrine, 
considering popular sentiment of neighboring countries, which were victims of Japan’s 
aggression, and vigorously attempt to improve relations with China.’  
     However, Abe strongly objected to this idea regarding it as the ‘logic of guilt’. 
This ‘logic of guilt’ would be a part of the postwar regime, which he sought to abandon. 
Based on the history view of the Tokyo War Tribunal, which treated the Asia-Pacific 
War as Japan’s ‘aggression’, resulted in the continuous request that the Japanese 
government to apologize to neighboring countries, absolutely negated the prewar values 
and militarism, and strictly supported the ‘peace Constitution’. In other words, Japan 
was constructed as a ‘past aggressor’ who could not take political initiative because of 
its ‘historical burden’. It was obvious that Abe sought to discard and reverse this 
construct of identity and the ‘logic of guilt’. In order to do that, the Abe administration 
tried to expand diplomatic horizons and highlight its ties with India, Australia and New 
Zealand, which do not have history issue with Japan, and to insist that Japan was not 
isolated in Asia because of history issue. In this sense, the concept of ‘broader Asia’ can 
be seen as another part of Abe’s political agenda in the ‘departure of the postwar 
regime’. 
     Third, the stress on the responsibility toward world peace was thought of a clear 
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departure from postwar ‘one-country pacifism’, which would hesitate to commit global 
security issues because of its Constitution. This endorsement of ‘unilateral pacifism’ 
partly stemmed from a fear for the entrapment of the Japan-US Alliance, that is, Japan 
can be dragged into a war for America’s own sake and the resentment against Japan’s 
independency on the US. Hence, traditional Japan’s ‘pacifism’ tended to oppose 
expansion of its security role by deepening commitment to the Japan-US Alliance, such 
as by approving the use of the ‘right of collective self-defense’. On the other hand, Abe 
insisted on the necessity to strengthen cooperation with the US to expand Japan’s role in 
the region and the world. Abe equated this with the ‘proactive contribution to world 
peace’ and gained legitimacy by how Japan was facing an ‘unconventional’ threat from 
the international environment. As expressed in the New Defense Guidelines in 2004, 
external threats would be now discussed at the global level. In order for Japan to survive 
in a more ‘uncertain’ and ‘unpredictable’ environment than the Cold War era and to 
contribute to world peace, its commitment to global security issues should be justified. 
To accomplish Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful’ country, Japan should no longer endorse 
‘one-country pacifism’.  
      In a nutshell, it could be argued that Abe’s ‘proactive diplomacy’ would attempt 
to transform conventional Japan’s postwar diplomacy characterized by ‘value-neutral’, 
‘stress on China and Korea’ and ‘one-country pacifism’, to ‘value-oriented’, ‘increasing 
cooperation with broader Asia’ and ‘proactive contribution to world peace’. These 
points were interpreted as strategies that the Abe administration would utilize ‘universal 
values’ to achieve its political and diplomatic goals; that it would enhance the 
cooperation with countries without the history issue, such as India, Australia, and New 
Zealand; and that it would abandon traditional ‘one-country pacifism’ and deepen the 
Japan-US Alliance to expand a security role. Therefore, all of these were closely 
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associated with his domestic political agenda, the ‘departure from the postwar regime’. 
       
7.3.2.2 The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity  
 
     In addition to ‘proactive diplomacy’, a new axis of Japan’s foreign policy was 
introduced under the Abe administration. It was originally presented in Foreign Minister 
Aso’s speech on 30 November 2006 and was stipulated in the Diplomatic Blue Book of 
2007 that to create the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was the new diplomatic axis of 
Japan in addition to the existing three pillars, namely diplomacy centered on the United 
Nations, the Japan-US Alliance and the enhancement of the relationship with 
neighboring countries. The concepts of ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ and ‘the Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity’ were originally elaborated by a diplomat Shotaro Yachi and 
then proposed by Foreign Minister Taro Aso as he clarified in his book ‘Totetsumonai 
Nihon (Astonishing Japan)’ (Aso 2007-a: 160-161). The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity 
was defined as ‘a region of stability and plenty with its basis in universal values’ along 
the outer rim of the Eurasian continent (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007: 2). It was 
created through ‘value-oriented diplomacy’, which ‘involves placing emphasis on 
“universal values” such as democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the 
market economy as we advance our diplomatic endeavors (Aso: 2006-e).’ 
Geographically, it would cover from ‘Northern Europe and traverse the Baltic states, 
Central and South Eastern Europe, Central Asian and the Caucasus, the Middle East and 
the Indian subcontinent, then cross Southeast Asia finally to reach Northeast Asia 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007: 2).’ A number of countries in this region have 
experienced great changes after the end of the Cold War and started democratization 
and economic development to obtain ‘peace and happiness through economic 
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prosperity’ just as ‘Japan has developed after the war’ (Aso: 2006-e). By espousing 
freedom and economic prosperity as fundamental values, special emphasis was put on 
the promotion of democracy and market economy. Aso explains the relationship 
between them: 
 
And when we consider which political or economic system might be ideal for 
advancing freedom and prosperity, we can say with confidence that it will 
ultimately boil down to the question of equity in its procedures. This leads us to 
the market economy with regard to economic systems and democracy for political 
systems, as democracy values the rule of law and basic human rights (Aso: 
2007-e).  
   
In sum, in discourse on the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, democracy and a market 
economy would play an important role for the establishment of it, because they would 
be indispensable to achieve freedom and prosperity, which could lead to peace and 
happiness among people.  
     Aso explained that the policy of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity emerged from 
a context of identity crisis of Japan, which might be reflected to the increasing concern 
for foreign policy among Japanese people. As there were growing concerns of a security 
threat from North Korea and the rapid development of China, which threatened Japan’s 
status as the economic leader in the region, ‘a number of Japanese people have become 
aware of a great change in history.’ In particular, ‘as Japan has been uncomfortable with 
the ‘Chinese Central World Order’ from more than a thousand years, ‘how to deal with 
China is now a point of nation-wide debate’. In addition, according to him, although 
Japan has long been suffering from self-distrust by deep remorse of causing the 
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Asia-Pacific War, however, this self-distrust seemed to be overcome. Aso, then, argued 
that the Japanese people were longing for acquiring a new vision for ‘what we are’. In 
this circumstance, Aso made clear about the role of diplomacy in reconstructing 
national identity. Foreign policy might serve to foster a well-grounded sense of 
self-esteem and ‘it is high time to attempt to do this intentionally (Aso 2007-b: 4-9)’. In 
this respect, Abe also made a statement that ‘forming the Arc of Freedom and 
Prosperity to my mind represents an attempt for Japan to define itself (Aso: 2007-d).’ 
Hence, it was clear that political leaders sought to reconstruct Japan’s national identity 
through diplomacy in the argument of the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.  
     In the discourse on the Arc of the Freedom and Prosperity, Aso repeatedly 
proposed three kinds of self-definition on the types of leadership Japan would take: a 
‘thought leader’, a ‘stabilizer in the region’, and ‘an equal peer of Asian countries’. 
Firstly, a ‘thought leader’ was explained as ‘one who through fate is forced to face up 
against some sort of very difficult issue earlier than others’ and one who moves 
‘forward not only through successes, but also through failures (Aso: 2005-c).’ He noted 
that Japan could represent itself as a thought leader in Asia through its consideration of 
three challenges: nationalism, environmental issues and aging society. In other words, 
Japan is and must be a thought leader that can teach others even through its failures. 
Secondly, Aso argued that Japan has been and would continue to be a stabilizing force 
in the region. Aso highlighted the importance of the Japan-US Alliance and Japan’s 
identity ‘firstly as a democratic state and secondly as a market economy’ with the 
longest track record among Asian countries. Thus Japan is and should be a stabilizer 
‘whose readiness enables it to provide security, the cornerstone for Asian prosperity, in 
the areas of both economic and regional security (Aso: 2005-c).’ Finally, Japan was 
defined as a country that respect other states as peers and equals rather than viewing 
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them as above it or below.  
     Behind these three self-definitions of Japanese identity in the discourse of the Arc 
of Freedom and Prosperity, there can be observed the articulations of three basic 
national identities on which the former definitions would rely. All three identities seem 
to be interconnected with each other. The first one would be Japan as a country 
honoring universal values. This representation was repeatedly emphasized in statements 
such as ‘Japan is second to none in holding dear the value of freedom, democracy, and 
respect for human rights and the rule of law (Aso: 2006-e).’ Another identity was Japan 
as the oldest democracy and market economy in Asia due to its earliest modernization. 
Since Japan has been respecting the rule of law and other universal values from more 
than a thousand years ago and established democracy and market economy in the mid 
nineteenth century, Japan was a ‘true veteran player’ of democracy and thus a 
‘forerunner’ and an ‘escort runner’ of young democracies in the region. The third one 
was concerning Japan’s sixty-year effort of ‘peace contribution’ throughout postwar era 
as a ‘peaceful nation’. Japanese political leaders including Abe and Aso insisted that 
Japanese people should be more proud of history of their country, because based on its 
solid democracy, postwar Japan neither invaded other countries nor violated universal 
values. Therefore, these self-perceptions could discursively allow Japan to become a 
democratic leader in the region and promote ‘peace and happiness through economic 
prosperity’. 
     With regard to internal relationship, Abe acknowledged that policy of the Arc of 
Freedom and Prosperity was one of the approaches to realize his ‘proactive diplomacy’ 
(NDRP: 2007-f). Firstly, both of them put emphasis on universal values and Japan’s 
global commitment. Secondly, they might also share the view that Japan needs to 
abandon conventional self-distrust and rearticulate its national identity. When 
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differences are to be found, it might be argued that Abe’s emphasis was put on the 
backlash against the postwar regime while Aso’s stress is put on the new self-image of 
Japan. Those arguments can be viewed as being associated with Abe’s ‘departure from 
the postwar regime’. Furthermore, both Abe and Aso emphasize the importance to 
strengthen the partnership with other democratic countries, especially India. In addition 
to Foreign Minister Aso’s insistence on common beliefs with India to an increasingly 
extent (Aso: 2006-e), Prime Minister Abe clearly argued that ‘the Strategic Global 
Partnership of Japan and India is pivotal for such pursuits to be successful’ as pursuing 
‘the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (Abe: 2007-e)’. In short, the approach to India 
would be a common and important foreign policy for both ‘proactive diplomacy’ and 
the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, which would be connected with Abe’s political 
agenda, the ‘departure from the postwar regime’. 
 
7.3.3 Policy to India as political capital  
 
     Foreign policy to enhance ties with India with emphasis on universal values can 
be viewed as a source of political capital for Japan’s political leaders especially among 
the ‘conservatives’, and Abe tried to exploit it. Simply put, it was utilized to offset 
Abe’s rapprochement with China by appeasing the frustrations among anti-Chinese 
revisionists and manipulated to enhance solidarity among anti-Chinese ‘conservatives’. 
Firstly, as discussed earlier, Abe had to offset the discontents against the improvement 
of the Japan-China relationship among anti-China politicians because they were strong 
support base in the LDP. This thesis has already argued in Chapter 6 that the Abe 
cabinet tried to do so by taking a hard-line policy toward North Korea. In addition to 
this foreign policy, the reinforcement of cooperation with India could appeal to Abe’s 
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anti-Chinese supporters. First of all, because India was the ‘mother country of Judge 
Pal’, Abe’s paying honor to Pal’s family when he visited India was regarded as a sign 
that Abe’s view of history had not change even though he shelved the history issue in 
order to improve relationship with China. As Judge Pal was a kind of historic icon to 
legitimize Japan’s past aggression to Asia, to strengthen ties with India could boost 
Abe’s credibility among the ‘conservatives’. 
     In terms of the relation to China policy, policy to India with emphasis on 
‘universal values’ played an important role. In May 2007, 43 lawmakers of Abe’s 
supporters launched the ‘Diet Member’s Group for Promoting Value-Oriented 
Diplomacy’. Members of this group were ‘conservative’ politicians, who worked with 
Abe to promote the prime ministerial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, to abandon the 
Murayama Statement, and to revise the Constitution. They came from different factions 
within the LDP and were thus labeled as a de facto ‘Abe faction’. This group officially 
endorsed ‘universal values’ such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law in 
accordance with Abe’s ‘value-oriented diplomacy’. The president of this group, Keiji 
Furuya of the LDP explained the purposes of the establishment of this group: the 
enhancement of the ties with countries with those shared values and the realization of 
‘true conservatism’ (Furuya: 2007). He clearly argued:  
 
It was an impressive result of diplomacy that Prime Minister Abe realized the 
meetings with Chinese leaders last year. However, we should face what is behind 
China’s ‘smile diplomacy’. Although Japan could promote mutually beneficial 
cooperation such as the development of an economic relationship and the 
enhancement of cultural exchanges, but should take a tough stance on other 
important issues and strengthen ties with other countries which share universal 
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values.  
 
Referring to the increase of opaque military budget and the infringement of human 
rights, Furuya (2006) concluded that the ‘strategic and mutually beneficial relationship’ 
between Japan and China was totally different from genuine ‘partnership’ because 
China would ‘not share universal values such as freedom, democracy and the rule of 
law’. In other words, ‘universal values’ created and reinforced the division between 
India and China, giving the former superiority due to its sharing ‘universal values’. In 
addition, promoting universal values was aimed to counter the history issue, which 
China tended to raise. In this sense, universal values were regarded as giving moral 
superiority to Japan and India. Given these, a set of policies to promote a friendlier 
approach to India and to endorse universal values were manipulated as a means of 
attacking China by anti-Chinese supporters of Abe.  
     Furthermore, endorsing universal values and promoting ties with India were 
connected to a domestic power relationship. Keiji Furuya (2006) claimed that 
‘(value-oriented) diplomacy makes a different angle’ to realize ‘true conservatism’, 
because ‘universal values would have something in common with our “values”’ This 
statement seemed to be strange because there can be seen little similarity between 
universal values and their ‘conservative values’, such as the opposition to the 
advancement of the status of women, the objection to a female Emperor, and the denial 
of the ‘comfort women’. In fact, Furuya’s argument might become clear when looking 
at his other statement that ‘our mission is to firmly support the Abe administration in the 
Diet (Furuya 2006)’. In other words, promoting universal values and support for 
approach to India could contribute to the consolidation of the Abe administration, which 
would thus serve to realize the
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to say, the enhancement of ties with India with emphasis on universal values was 
regarded as a source of political capital among Japanese politicians to obtain their 
political goals.  
     In this way, Abe’s policy to India based on ‘value-oriented diplomacy’ was 
treated as a source of political capital of political leaders first to offset frustrations 
against Abe’s rapprochement with China, second to highlight China’s ‘Otherness’ and 
to counter it on the history issue, and to consolidate supports to the Abe administration 
in order to realize their ‘conservative’ political agendas of the ‘departure form the 
postwar regime’. 
 
7.3.4 The Construction of national identities  
 
     When applied to Messari’s identity-making model, policy toward India would be 
the case of dealing with ‘friend’ or ‘ally’. It might be obvious that India was recognized 
as such by Japanese political leaders because the most frequent presupposition of the 
country would be ‘pro-Japanese’ or ‘Japan-friendly’ throughout postwar era. Once India 
was identified with a potential friend, similarities between Japan and India would be 
constructed and a certain aspect of Japan’s national identity would be reproduced 
through emphasizing those similarities and positive representation of India. Furthermore, 
it can be thought that positive representation of India might rely on implicit construction 
of different ‘Other’. It might be because national identity of a state was constructed only 
through a simultaneous delineation of Other as Campbell (1998) argued. In fact, when 
India was referred to in foreign policy discourse in Japan in the 2000s, it has been 
mentioned in a wider context of Asian diplomacy in particular in relation to China 
rather than bilateral relationship with Japan. Therefore, it would be necessary to pay 
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attention to implicit construction of China as well as explicit construction of India in 
order to find out what aspect of Japan’s identity would be intended to reproduce. In this 
context, this section examines how identities of India, Japan and China were 
constructed in foreign policy discourse, which allowed legitimizing Abe’s policy of 
strengthening ties with India. 
     In foreign policy debates, first of all, India tended to be represented as a 
‘democratic nation’, more precisely ‘the largest democracy in Asia’, which embraced 
‘universal values’ just like Japan3. India has increasingly been described as a democratic 
nation in the 2000s especially during the Koizumi administration and the Abe 
administration. In his speech at the India Diet, Abe claimed that Japan was now 
experiencing ‘the discovery of India’, by which India is redefined as ‘a partner that 
shares the same values and interests and also as a friend that will work alongside us to 
enrich the seas of freedom and prosperity (Abe: 2007-e).’ It might be easy to understand 
that the representation of India as such would be attempted to construct similarity 
between India and Japan in terms of the emphasis on universal values. The Joint 
Statement on the Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnership 
between Japan and India in 2007 would expressed Japan’s focus on universal values in 
the bilateral relationship; ‘Japan and India share universal values of democracy, open 
society, human rights, rule of law and market economy and share common interest in 
promoting peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world.’ In addition, this 
statement also argued that the relationship between Japan and India would have ‘the 
largest potential for growth’ and that ‘a strong, prosperous and dynamic India is in the 
interest of Japan and a strong, prosperous and dynamic Japan was in the interest of India 
and recognized that Japan and India share a congruence of interests.’ In sum, 
                                                   
3 Prime Minister Abe clearly stated that India shares universal values such as freedom, 
democracy, and the rule of law (NDRP: 2007-d).  
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similarities such as sharing universal values were emphasized and their relationship was 
described as non zero-sum; the rise of India was not depicted as a threat to Japan. By 
describing the relationship between the two countries as ‘natural partner’ and not a 
potential ‘enemy’, the enhancement of ties could be justified and taken for granted.  
     On the other hand, it should be noticed how different ‘other’ was implicitly 
constructed in relation to the emphasis on universal values. Hansen (2006) noted how 
universal discourse could articulate political subjects to be mobilized; ‘universal 
discourse holds out the difference between universal principles and those who adopted 
them on the one hand, and those who have failed to, on the other, thereby constituting 
spatial as well as temporal identities (Hansen 2006: 48)’ In other words, discourse of 
universal values could produce dichotomy between those who uphold and share them 
and those who do not comply with them. In contrast with ‘democratic’ India, China was 
described as a typical ‘developmental dictatorship’, which ‘does not comply with a 
democratic rule’ and ‘oppresses freedom of speech’ (Abe 2005-a: 54-57). From these 
expressions, it might be obvious that China was represented as a ‘non-democratic 
country’, which does not share universal values. According to a dichotomous 
framework, China’s rise especially its increasing military spending could be easily 
interpreted as a direct ‘threat’ to Japan because it was not ‘transparent’ and 
‘unpredictable’ due to its character of ‘non-democratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ regime with 
‘hegemonic military ambition’ (Abe 2005-a; 57, 2007-a). Thus, negative differences 
might be reinforced through the construction of China in contrast with the case of India. 
In this context, what aspect of Japan’s identity would be reproduced and reinforced was 
that: Japan was a solid democracy upholding universal values. It would mean that Japan 
was a ‘thought leader’, ‘stabilizer’ and ‘protector’ of universal values in the region. This 
positive identification would also articulate Japan as being ethically superior to a 
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country that does not comply with universal values, that is, China. On the other hand, 
this representation would rely on much silence. It would be silent, for instance, on 
India’s nuclear test outside the NPT regimes. While Japan should strictly criticize India 
on this matter as the only country to have suffered nuclear attacks, the Japanese 
government just stated it will ‘give careful consideration’ to this issue (NDRP: 2007-c).  
     Second, the strategic and economic importance of India would be highlighted in 
foreign policy discourse. Abe alleged that no one could ignore its importance as 
strategic and an economic hub (NDRP: 2007-d). With regard to strategic importance, 
India has long sea-lanes that connect Japan and the Middle East. In addition, India was 
‘one of the axis of the four democratic countries’ cooperation’, to which Abe vigorously 
aspired. The aspiration for strengthening the cooperation among these four democratic 
countries, Japan, the US, Australia and India, would be expressed in a form of the 
proposition of a ‘broader Asia’. Abe explained that his policy aimed to enhance regional 
stability by complementing existing regional institutions (Abe 2006-b: 159). However, 
there seemed little doubt that this construction of India as a ‘broader Asia’ would aim to 
counter the rise of China. Although real intention was sealed off, at least on the surface, 
a number of major Japanese newspapers reported that the concept was Abe’s 
hobbyhorse rhetoric to contain China. This rhetoric was familiar not only domestically 
but also abroad. The US government expressed some concern for Abe’s plan because ‘it 
has a possibility to send unpredictable signal to China’ when the Secretary of State Rice 
and then-Defense Minister Koike had a meeting (Asahi Shimbun: 2007-b). In Abe’s 
idea, he would not deny the strategic and economic importance of China, but he put 
more emphasis on India because of the ‘democratic tie’. In addition, the economic 
importance of India could not be emphasized without comparison to China. For instance, 
India was described as ‘another central force of rapid economic development in Asia’, 
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‘the largest recipient of Japan’s ODA’, and has an enormous population as much as one 
billion, ‘which will counter China’ (Abe 2006-a: 71). It seemed to be notable that the 
economic importance of China was not negated but recognized; rather Aso admitted that 
Japan’s relations with India certainly paled in comparison to China (Aso: 2006-e). In 
fact, according to MOFA, the amount of bilateral trade with India had increased by 22% 
between 2006 and 2007 but it only occupied 0.8% of the whole amount of Japan’s trade 
(MOFA: 2008-b). However, the potential development of India was more focused on to 
resist an argument that the Japanese government should only focus on the improvement 
of the political relationship with China not to damage its economic benefit. Abe argued 
that ‘now that a large number of Japanese companies are eager to access India’ and that 
it would be a narrow-sited idea without strategic perspective only focus on the 
economic importance of China (NDRP: 2007-e). It was also stressed that India would 
really appreciate Japan’s ‘high quality economic assistance’ while China was often 
depicted as a country which would not appreciate large amount of Japan’s ODA (Aso 
and Komori 2006: 134). In short, although the strategic and economic importance of 
both India and China would be acknowledged, however, India tended to be more 
emphasized because of its appreciation to Japan’s assistance. In this context, the 
strategic and economic importance of India was highlighted in order to counter the 
dominant argument that the Japanese government should emphasize the relationship 
with China because of its significance in terms of economy and security strategy. It 
could reinforce a facet of Japan’s identity as a ‘stabilizer’. Japan might no more espouse 
‘unilateral pacifism’ but contribute to the peace and stability of the region. Its high 
quality economic assistance to India would emphasize contribution of postwar Japan as 
a ‘peaceful nation’ who has attempted to import its rehabilitation model of ‘peace and 
happiness through economic prosperity’ to other countries in the region. 
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      The third representation of India was genuinely ‘pro-Japanese’; ‘friendly’ and 
‘has strong sympathy with us’. In his book, Abe noted that according to the public 
opinion in India one of the most amicable countries in the world has always been Japan 
(Abe 2006-b: 159). In the Diet session, Abe depicted that India as a ‘definitely 
Japan-friendly country’ (NDRP: 2007-d). Above all, Judge Pal would be a firm proof 
that India was always described as a pro-Japanese country as former Japanese Prime 
Minister Hashimoto expressed Pal as a ‘symbol of the spiritual bond between Japanese 
and Indian people’ (NDRP: 1998). In delivering his speech at the Indian Diet, Abe 
stated that ‘Justice Pal is highly respected even today by many Japanese for the noble 
spirit of courage he exhibiting during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(Abe: 2007-e).’  
     As mentioned before, Judge Radha Binod Pal might be one of the most famous 
Indian figures in Japan due to his submission of a separate opinion at the Tokyo War 
Tribunal in WWⅡ. Pal was known as the only judge who found all the defendants to be 
innocent. Hence, Judge Pal had enormous popularity with Japanese people especially 
among the right-wingers. Abe himself expressed his sympathy to India as ‘the mother 
country of Judge Pal, who insisted on Japan’s innocence at the Tokyo Tribunal’ in his 
book (2006). Briefly, Pal has been a symbol of ‘the affirmation of Japan’s innocence’ 
and regarded as representation of all Indian people who sympathize with Japanese 
people. In this context, India was regarded as a country, which did not have the history 
issue with Japan and demonstrated its understanding for Japan’s past. 
What was emphasized here is that ‘India is different from China’ in terms of the 
history issue. Against the dominant discourse on the Yasukuni issue, Abe argued that 
while China claimed that all Asian nations felt resentment against Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, however, India demonstrated understanding for 
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it (Abe 2005-d: 60). Thus it was only China and South Korea that complained about the 
Yasukuni issue. While there was a wide gap in the history problem with China and it 
often became a diplomatic issue, Abe asserted that ‘there exists no gulf in the history 
understanding with India and, moreover, history could have a positive effect on bilateral 
relation (Abe 2005-c: 98).’ Therefore, Japan should strengthen the partnership with such 
a country as India. Based on this recognition, it seemed that the Joint Statement in 2006 
included the articulation that the Japan-India relationship was ‘unencumbered by 
historical differences’. Furthermore, the articulation that ‘India is the mother country of 
Judge Pal who insisted on Japan’s innocence at the Tokyo War Tribunal’ (Abe 2006-a: 
71) would also play an important role in the light of the history issue from Conservative 
politicians.  
Meanwhile, China problematized the fact that the Yasukuni Shrine honors the 
Class-A Criminals at WWⅡ and criticized that Prime Minister’s visit to the shrine 
might connote the affirmation of militarism in Japan. There can be observed ‘the 
blockage of identity’ which would produce ‘social antagonism’ as Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985) pointed out. It would imply that China might negate Japan’s identity in two 
aspects. First, along with the ‘Tokyo War Tribunal view of history’, it might negate 
prewar Japan’s identity as a ‘liberator of Asia from Western imperialism’. Second, 
China might not admit the development of postwar Japan as a ‘peaceful nation’. Abe 
expressed his resentment against China’s ‘blockage of identity’, arguing that ‘there have 
existed some ill feelings among Japanese people against China for why it would not 
positively evaluated Japan’s postwar development as a peace-loving nation’ (NDRP: 
2006-m). According to Abe, Japanese people should have more confidence in the 
postwar development of their country as a ‘democracy completely detached from 
militarism’ and ‘honoring universal values’ (Abe 2005-b: 44). Foreign Minister Aso 
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also noted that the sixty years’ effort of postwar Japan would prove the sincerity of 
Japan’s aspirations for peace and stability and its determination not to repeat the 
mistakes of the past and that China and Korea should look at this statement ‘with an 
open mind (Aso: 2005-c)’. In this way, once the negation of Japan’s identity by China 
was recognized, it would reinforce the division between Japan and China. 
On the other hand, however, India was constructed as a country that would affirm 
Japan’s Identity. Judge Pal’s ‘Dissentient Judgment’ was used to dispute legitimacy of 
the Tokyo War Tribunal and the perception of history it produced. By identifying Judge 
Pal’s opinion that the Class-A Criminals were innocent with the consensus of the Indian 
people, India can be described as supporting prewar Japan’s identity. Abe’s meeting 
with the son of Judge Pal would demonstrate the importance of Pal for Japan’s identity. 
In addition, Japan-India relations were considered to be ‘based on deep respect for each 
other’s contribution in promoting peace, stability, and development in Asia.’ It seemed 
that India would appreciate postwar Japan’s contribution for peace, thus would affirm 
Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’. Hence, there can be seen antagonism concerning 
the blockage of identity between Japan and China while there was not with India. In this 
way, the difference between India and China in the history issue was constructed. As a 
result of these articulations, the friend-foe division between India and China was 
reinforced and Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’, which upholds universal values 
and contributes to world peace, would be reproduced. It could also play a role to counter 
‘logic of guilt’ by assimilating India’s identity.  
 
7.3.5 The constructions of ‘reality’ and the legitimization of Abe’s policy toward India  
 
In this way, identity reconstruction through assimilation of India and the 
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emphasis on similarity with India could reinforce and reproduce Japan’s positive aspect 
of its national identity. They are namely: Japan as an ‘ardent supporter’ of universal 
values, as a ‘stabilizer’ in the region, and a ‘peaceful nation’ contributing to the stability 
of the whole world. Furthermore, it would shape three arguments to constitute a 
particular ‘reality’ and legitimize a certain course of foreign policy. Firstly, its emphasis 
on universal values as a feature of Japan’s identity might deny ‘logic of guilt’ in which 
Japan was often treated as negating universal values by showing an ambivalent attitude 
on the history issues. Japan would be respected by other countries in the world due to its 
effort to protect universal values throughout postwar era. The second argument was that 
‘Japan is not alienated in Asia’; Foreign Minister Aso argues that ‘it is only China and 
South Korea that reject the summit with Japan in Asia (NDRP: 2006-b). In this reality, 
Asia would not exclusively mean China and South Korea, which criticize Japan on the 
history issue, but also other countries like India, which would not problematize the 
history issue. Moreover, as Japan promotes universal values and deepens its ties with 
like-minded countries, the history issue might cease to exist in diplomatic problems 
(Abe 2006-b: 150). As a result of these constructions of reality, there was the third 
argument that India would be an ‘assimilable’ other while China was not. It might be 
because the former has similarities with Japan, acknowledges Japan’s positive identity, 
and is identified as a ‘friend’ with strategic and economic benefits. The latter, however, 
might not have similarities and negates Japan’s positive identity while still having 
enormous economic importance.   
These constructions of identities and ‘reality’ would legitimize a certain policy 
and marginalize other policies. They could make the enhancement of ties with India 
more likely while fundamental reconciliation with China might be less likely. The stress 
on similarity with India and the representation of it as a ‘friend’ led to represent India as 
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an ‘assimilable’ other. On the other hand, the emphasis on negative differences, 
antagonism caused by the ‘blockage of identity’, would reinforce ‘inassimilability’ of 
this radical other, China. The identity of honoring universal values would not only 
enable a state to reinforce ties to promote these values but also make it policy. It seems 
to be obvious when reading Abe’s speech: ‘Japan and NATO are partners. We have in 
common such fundamental values as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law. It is only natural that we cooperate in protecting and promoting these values (Abe: 
2007-a).’ 
 Furthermore, the aforementioned dichotomy could also reproduce the boundary 
by naturalizing cooperation on how to deal with ‘the other’. In the same speech as above, 
Abe made remarks on how to deal with China, saying ‘We need to pay close attention to 
the future of this nation. And we should continue to have dialogue, to improve the 
regional security environment. Partners sharing fundamental values should enhance 
cooperation to this end (2007-a).’ It would be no doubt that ‘we’ meant countries, which 
share universal values with Japan and NATO countries. It would also imply that China 
was not ‘us’, and did not share universal values, and that countries which share 
universal values should be united in dealing with China. This assertion could also 
justify the reinforcement of the four democracies’ cooperation. In this way, the 
enhancement of the partnership with India would be made possible and legitimized 
while a policy of the fundamental rapprochement with China might be marginalized. 
Furthermore, it might also normalize cooperation among democratic countries, which 
could alienate China.  
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7.4. Conclusion 
 
The enhancement of the strategic and global partnership with India in the Abe 
administration can be regarded as an axis of Abe’s ‘proactive diplomacy’ and the 
‘departure from the postwar regime’ as well as Aso’s Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. In 
foreign policy discourse, India was represented as a ‘friend’ and defined through a 
positive ‘process of linking’: as a country, which would share universal values, have 
strong sympathy with Japan, respect Japan’s contribution for peace and would not 
problematize the history issues. Similarities between Japan and India were emphasized 
to reproduce positive facets of Japan’s identity and India was articulated as an 
‘assimilable’ other. It can be said that in this sense, India as an ‘ally’ would play an 
important role in the identity-reconstruction process as argued in Messari’s theoretical 
framework. 
 At the same time, however, a negative process of differentiation would take 
place in an attempt to implicitly construct ‘China’. China would be defined as a political 
subject, who would not share universal values, often demonstrate an ‘anti-Japan’ 
attitude, tend to negate positive aspects of Japan’s identity and exploit the history issue 
as a diplomatic tool. Differences between Japan and China were illuminated and China 
was represented as an ‘inassimilable’ other. Therefore, it can be argued that the stress on 
similarity with India would lead to further focus on the radical otherness of China. 
These constructions of subjects, positive identification of India with emphasis on 
similarity and implicit articulation of China with focus on negative differences, could 
contribute to the reinforcement of a particular facet of Japan’s national identity and the 
production of a particular ‘reality’. It would be a ‘reality’ in which it is natural for Japan 
to deepen the partnership with countries that share universal values without the history 
 272 
issues. As Japan was a ‘protector’ and ‘promoter of universal value’s and other 
countries acknowledged its identity as a ‘peaceful nation’, they would understand that 
the Yasukuni issue would not conflict with upholding universal values. Thus, a 
particular ‘reality’ was constructed in which ‘Japan is not alienated in Asia’ even with 
the Yasukuni issue. These constructions of subjects and reality could make deepening 
ties with India more likely while fundamental improvement of the bilateral relationship 
with China less likely. In addition, policy to strengthen ties with India based on 
‘value-oriented diplomacy’ was treated as a source of political capital of political 
leaders first to offset discontents among anti-China group against Abe’s rapprochement 
with China, secondly to highlight China’s ‘otherness’ and to counter it on the history 
issue, and to consolidate support for the Abe administration in order to realize their 
‘conservative’ political agenda of the ‘departure form the postwar regime’. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
                                                          
     What is Japanese nationalism? This thesis, ‘Nationalism in Japan’s contemporary 
foreign policy toward East Asia’ started from such a simple question. Considering the 
historical context, the relationship between nationalism and Japan’s diplomacy in Asia is 
a politically sensitive topic in postwar Japan. As nationalism tends to be identified with 
the ‘prewar’, ‘militaristic’, and ‘right-wing rhetoric’, the perspective on how it is related 
to foreign policy has largely remained one-sided. This can be seen in the way that the 
deterioration of the Japan-China relationship over the Yasukuni Shrine issue and growing 
tension in the Japan-North Korea relationship over the abduction issue during the 
Koizumi and Abe administration drew attention to the rise of nationalism at home and 
abroad. However, it has been pointed out above that Koizumi visited Pyongyang to 
embark on the negotiation for diplomatic normalization and Abe actual improved the 
relationship with China, It is hard to reconcile either of these with the conventional view 
that these leaders represent a resurgence of a conventional understanding of ‘nationalism’. 
Given these cases, it seems to be an oversimplification to argue whether the foreign 
policy of Koizumi and Abe was ‘nationalistic’ or not. Therefore, this thesis has offered a 
new perspective on the role of nationalism in foreign policy. 
     In this context, this thesis has primarily explored what role nationalism has played 
in Japan’s foreign policy in Asia under the Koizumi and Abe administrations. In 
accordance with this primary goal, the chapters have sought to give a detailed analysis of, 
firstly, how Japan’s policy makers strove to employ foreign policy to construct a certain 
type of national identity by articulating a version of ‘reality’ in their foreign policy toward 
China, North Korea, and India. The thesis has also shown how the resulting national 
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discourse was exploited by such leaders in order to legitimate their policy programs and 
to create advantageous positions in domestic power relationships. This concluding chapter 
will summarize the arguments of each chapter, discuss the findings of the research and 
propose some implications for future research. 
 
8.1 Summaries of the argument  
 
     Adopting an alternative framework of foreign policy and conceptualizing 
nationalism as a kind of discourse on national identity, the Introduction chapter clarifies 
the focus of this thesis. Put simply, this dissertation aims to explore how the role of 
nationalism can be defined in Japan’s foreign policy in the region and how political 
leaders exploited it. The use of discourse analysis for analyzing the case studies is 
explained. 
     The second chapter provides background information on domestic politics with an 
emphasis on historical context and power struggles among factions within the LDP. In 
postwar Japan, there have been division lines between the progressives and the 
conservatives, and also between mainstream conservatives and anti-mainstream 
politicians. These compete against each other for the legitimacy of their different versions 
of national identity that are implied by the history issues, the security problem, and the 
debate over the Constitution. Despite the dominance of the conservative camp in the Diet, 
postwar pacifism, which was actually ‘pro-Constitution’ nationalism endorsed by the 
progressives, was widely embraced in Japanese society. In contrast, anti-mainstream 
conservatives with a revisionist view of history upheld the traditional right-wing 
nationalism, which emphasized ‘traditional values’, insisted on the revision of the 
Constitution, and claimed it was right to have a policy of full-fledged rearmament. 
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Although the government led by mainstream conservatives failed to integrate these 
competing nationalisms, it partly accommodated them by establishing the ‘Yoshida Line’ 
as a national strategy based on the twin pillars of the Constitution and the Japan-US 
Security Treaty.  
     On another front, the confrontation among the conservatives took the shape of a 
power struggle among factions within the LDP. The Yoshida School and the Keisei-kai 
formulated the mainstream while the Seiwa-kai became the anti-mainstream. The latter 
harshly opposed the pro-China stance and the ‘strategy of historic reconciliation’ initiated 
by the former group. The strategy was based on the recognition that Japan should restore 
trust from the neighboring countries by resolving the history issues in order to achieve 
political leadership in the region and expand its role to contribute to world peace. The 
anti-mainstream camp, led by a new generation of ‘neo-revisionists’, tried to counter this 
project, expressing resentment against China’s manipulation of the ‘history card’ and its 
rapid economic and military growth. In this context, both the settlement of the history 
issue and the anti-China stance became a source of capital for political actors. Prime 
ministers Koizumi and Abe emerged in these circumstances and pursued their foreign 
policy on China and North Korea as a way to utilizing this new source of political capital. 
In this way, the chapter discussed the linkage between nationalism both in foreign policy 
and in the domestic power struggle to demonstrate that postwar Japan’s nationalism was 
not monolithic and that political actors utilized various ‘nationalisms’ that appealed to the 
ways in which they tried to legitimize their bids for power. The focus is thus mainly on 
what kind of political actors formed what kind of power relationships in domestic politics 
when articulating versions of national identity, and what kind of issues could be utilized 
as a source of political capital for them as a consequence. 
     Chapter 3 dealt with Koizumi’s foreign policy to China: how China was 
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represented as a radical ‘other’ and Japan’s identity was reconstructed, how these 
constructions were manipulated to provide rhetorical justification for policy toward China, 
and then what role the Yasukuni Shrine issue played in the reconstruction of Japan’s 
identity and Koizumi’s identity politics. In order to resist China’s construction of Japan as 
an ‘unrepentant, insensitive and irresponsible’ country, Japanese political leaders tried to 
construct a ‘victimized and trustworthy’ Japan and to constitute China as ‘victimizing and 
untrustworthy’. The Yasukuni worship was used not for right-wing nationalistic 
mobilization, as is commonly believed, but as evidence that shows postwar Japan reflects 
its past and pledges not to commit war again. This was actually supposed to serve to 
construct and reinforce Japan’s national identity as a ‘peaceful country’. At the same time, 
China’s resulting criticism was regarded as the negation of Japan’s peaceful identity. This 
produced a kind of social antagonism, which legitimized Koizumi’s uncompromising 
attitude towards China. Behind this, there seemed to be Koizumi’s intention to remove 
‘the spell of history’ and to manipulate the Yasukuni Shrine issue as political capital to 
minimize frustrations against his other policies, especially toward North Korea.  
     The next chapter discussed what made it possible for the Koizumi administration to 
conduct a policy for normalization with North Korea, and how Koizumi manipulated the 
North Korean issue and legitimized his policy by articulating national identity. The 
construction of the DPRK not as an identity threat but as a ‘negotiable other’, with whom 
Japan could have common interests contributed to a conciliatory approach. By 
constituting North Korea as the ‘last country’ with which postwar Japan had not restored 
its diplomatic ties and by considering the ‘abnormal relationship’ derived from Japan’s 
incomplete war settlement, normalization with the country was legitimized as the 
fulfillment of its war responsibility. Furthermore, diplomatic normalization was treated as 
serving the realization of Japan’s role as a ‘peaceful country’ with a more proactive 
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initiative in Northeast Asia and a proactive engagement with an emerging regional 
multinational security framework. In a nutshell, Koizumi’s conciliatory approach was 
made possible by the logic that North Korea was not a threat to Japan’s identity and that 
to promote normalization would contribute to the realization of Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity 
by bringing an end to the history issue. 
     The following chapter discussed the discourse of the ‘neo-revisionists’, centering 
on Prime Minister Abe. Analyzing his slogan the ‘departure from the postwar regime’, it 
demonstrated how Abe and his supporters manipulated values of ‘peace’, ‘democracy’, 
and ‘autonomy’ as a source of political capital in order to bolster their domestic 
credentials and to defeat their political opponents. In addition, these values were utilized 
to naturalize and consolidate Japan’s ties with the US, EU countries, Australia, New 
Zealand, and India, at the same time as marginalizing China. While abandoning ‘postwar 
democracy’, which was supported by the ‘Yoshida line’ and deeply embedded in 
Japanese society, Abe insisted on the revision of the Constitution and the enhancement of 
the Japan-US Alliance in order to achieve ‘true independence’ and a more active 
contribution to world peace. In addition, Abe’s group constructed domestic others as 
‘enemies within’: these included mainly progressives like the Yoshida School of 
politicians and the Keisei-kai politicians. By defining them as the ‘enemies within’ and 
‘anti-Japanese’, Abe and his supporters tried to marginalize their political rivals and to 
expand their own power base in domestic politics so as to achieve their ultimate goal: the 
revision of the Constitution. These arguments explain how nationalism shaped foreign 
policy toward China, North Korea and India under the Abe administration. 
     Abe’s diplomacy toward China and North Korea was examined in Chapter 6, which 
focuses on how the rapprochement with China was legitimized and how the issue of 
North Korea policy was manipulated by Abe’s group. Unlike Koizumi, the apparently 
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nationalistic Abe actually improved the bilateral relationship with China by shelving the 
history issue, modifying his wording, and adopting a ‘strategic ambiguity’. In addition, 
China’s showing its understanding and appreciation to Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity avoided 
the rise of the kind of social antagonisms inside Japan that had been used to justify 
Koizumi’s uncompromising stance. On the domestic political front, this had allowed any 
improvement in the relationship to become a source of political capital for Japan’s 
political leaders, which Abe wanted to use for himself and prevent his opponents from 
utilizing it against him. Furthermore, his strong power base in the right-wing traditionalist 
group within the LDP worked out in his favor because his Abe’s hard-line policy toward 
North Korea could offset discontents against the rapprochement with China among 
anti-China groups. Indeed, the Abe administration explicitly and implicitly reduced China 
to only a ‘potential threat’ or an ‘inassimilable other’ in foreign policy discourse, which 
prevented the administration from achieving fundamental reconciliation with China but 
was far less confrontational than the stance of his predecessor. On the other hand, Abe 
was consistent in taking a tough stance to North Korea and rejected making any 
concessions over the abduction issue because it was considered to be a question related to 
the fundamental character of Japan as a ‘state’. In a nutshell, Abe tried to use the 
abduction issue to reconstruct Japan’s identity by restoring a bond between nation and 
state, reconsidering postwar security policy, and reviewing the postwar low-profile 
foreign policy in East Asia. In this sense, a hard-line policy toward North Korea was an 
integral part of his political agenda of ‘the departure from the postwar regime’. 
     The final case study in chapter 7 scrutinized how nationalism was used in the 
enhancement of ties with India under the Abe administration in order to provide a more 
neutral comparison for understanding the role of nationalism in policy towards China and 
North Korea. Japan’s increased access to India was officially placed in the context of 
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‘proactive diplomacy’ and the ‘Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’, whereas it was actually a 
part of policy toward China. This can be seen in the construction of India as a 
‘Japan-friendly’ country, which shares universal values, has strong sympathy with Japan, 
respects Japan’s contribution for peace and that will not problematize the history issue. 
While these constructions served to reproduce positive facets of Japan’s identity, they 
also highlighted its differences with China: not sharing universal values, often 
demonstrating an ‘anti-Japanese’ attitude, negating positive aspects of Japan’s identity 
and exploiting the history issue as a diplomatic tool. These constructions of subjects made 
deepening ties with India more likely because it was an ‘assimilable other’, while any 
fundamental improvement of the bilateral relationship with China could be said to be less 
likely because it was an ‘inassimilable other’. In addition, the emphasis on ‘value-oriented 
diplomacy’ in policy toward India was treated as a source of political capital for political 
leaders to offset frustrations among the anti-Chinese group against Abe’s rapprochement 
with China. It could also be used to highlight China’s ‘radical otherness’ and to counter it 
on the history issue, and finally to consolidate support for the Abe administration in order 
to realize its ‘conservative’ political agenda of the ‘departure from the postwar regime’. 
 
8.2 Findings from case studies: the role of nationalism  
 
     As described above, the past chapters set out to chart the complex relationship 
between nationalism and Japan’s foreign policy in East Asia. The five case studies clearly 
demonstrate that nationalism plays an important role in foreign policy-making and 
Japanese politics, which could shed new light on the existing literature. There can be seen 
some implications and findings that Japan’s nationalism is not monolithic, that Japan’s 
political leaders try to reconstruct Japan’s national identity through diplomacy in Asia, 
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and that they utilize nationalism as a source of political capital.  
 
8.2.1 Japan’s multiple nationalisms  
 
     First, as touched on in the introduction, nationalism tends to be identified with 
right-wing traditionalism and is regarded as ‘marginalized’ or ‘suppressed’ in postwar 
Japan. However, it would be misleading to assume that postwar Japan’s ‘nationalism’ 
belongs to only one group or the other. In fact, there were divided nationalisms, both of 
which expressed a national desire of the restoration of Japan’s ‘autonomy’ from the US: 
the progressives endorsed the ‘pro-Constitution’ nationalism and the right-wing 
conservatives advocated the right-wing traditional nationalism centered on ‘traditional 
culture’ and the ‘sacred’ Emperor system. In addition to these types of nationalism, not 
only the revisionist movements from the 1990s but also the strategy of historic 
reconciliation led by mainstream conservatives can also be seen as an alternative 
expression of nationalism, which aimed to reconstruct Japan by reinforcing the 
relationships with neighboring countries. Therefore, there can be seen at least three kinds 
of nationalism in historical context of postwar Japan and they came to be inherited by 
various actors.  
     In the case of the two Prime Ministers looked at this thesis, both broke the mold by 
adopting different nationalistic values from the progressives, mainstream conservatives 
and the revisionists. It is sometimes argued that Koizumi’s China policy was based on the 
‘right-wing’ nationalism while his policy toward North Korea was not. However, this is 
not plausible as the case study demonstrated. By reiterating apologies for past aggression 
and completing the war settlement through normalization of ties with Pyongyang, 
Koizumi seemed to follow the strategy of historic reconciliation and attempted to attract 
 281 
support from centrists and the progressives. He thus appropriated nationalism in his own 
way, using a strategy that came to be endorsed by mainstream conservatives in the LDP 
and other centrist powers in the Diet. On the other hand, his uncompromising attitude to 
China garnered support from anti-Chinese revisionists. Although Koizumi mobilized 
‘social antagonism’ to legitimize his stance on the Yasukuni Shrine issue, his emphasis 
was put on the representation of Japan as a ‘peaceful country’ to counter China’s 
manipulation of the history issue.  
     Therefore, Koizumi’s foreign policy seemed to have a multi-faceted aspect because 
he incorporated various nationalisms into his policy. Moreover, it might be argued that 
the fact that Abe improved the Japan-China relationships shelving the history issue and 
his original anti-Chinese stance would demonstrate that Japan’s political nationalism was 
likely to be marginalized in foreign policy. However, Abe’s foreign policy toward China 
definitely represented nationalism because it was hinged on China’s understanding and 
appreciation of Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity as a matter of logic and because his approach 
to India was inextricably associated with policy toward China. As the case study shows, 
the dichotomy between India and China is a good way to emphasize the 
‘anti-Japanese-ness’ and ‘inassimilablity’ of China so that a fundamental reconciliation 
with China becomes less likely to realize. It is in this sense that nationalism played a key 
role in the foreign policy of the Abe administration. Both Koizumi and Abe can thus be 
said to have picked and chosen various issues to mobilize different faction, voters and 
resources by utilizing variant nationalistic rhetoric. Therefore, it can be proposed that not 
only a particular group of actors but all political leaders in Japan must endeavor to take 
advantage of nationalism of some kind. As a result, Japan’s nationalism should not be 
reduced to a single right wing ideology but should be understood as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon.   
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8.2.2 The reconstruction of national identity in foreign policy  
 
     Secondly, the case studies in this thesis demonstrate that Japan’s political leaders 
attempted to reconstruct Japan’s national identity in the post-Cold War era by utilizing 
foreign policy toward East Asian countries. As a number of narratives on foreign policy 
debate in the Diet reveal, political actors sought to legitimize their stance by articulating 
an appropriate version of national identity based on themes such as ‘democracy’ or a 
‘peaceful’ country’. The Koizumi administration thus justified its uncompromising policy 
toward China by contrasting differences between China as a ‘militaristic’, ‘interfering’ 
and ‘authoritarian’ state and Japan as a ‘peaceful’, ‘respectful of rule of law’, and 
‘democratic’ nation. In other words, it reconstructed and reinforced Japan’s identity by 
alienating China as a radical other and thus legitimized its inflexible approach on the 
Yasukuni Shrine issue. The policy to normalize diplomatic ties with North Korea was 
also endorsed by the Koizumi government by arguing that it would mean that Japan had 
become a more proactive contributor to regional peace and stability. Put simply, 
normalization of the relationship with North Korea was alleged to be necessary for Japan 
to realize its ‘peaceful’ identity because Japan could not become free from the history 
burden without completing the war settlement. Therefore, normalization would serve to 
realize Japan’s role as a ‘peaceful country’ with a more proactive initiative in Northeast 
Asia without the ‘spell of history’ that dominated foreign policy discourse in Koizumi’s 
camp.  
     On the other hand, the Abe administration did also articulated a version of Japan’s 
national identity in its foreign policy. This can be seen in the representation of North 
Korea not just as an ‘authoritarian’ but as an ‘inhumane’, ‘tyrannical’ and ‘hyper 
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militaristic’ state, which totally lacks respect for basic human rights or democratic values. 
These representations worked to emphasize how ‘abnormal’, ‘dangerous’, and ‘deviant’ 
the DPRK was in the international community and illuminated the differences from Japan. 
By highlighting these ‘abnormalities’ of North Korea, the Abe administration delineated a 
picture of Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity. Furthermore, a hard-line policy toward the DPRK 
was a part of Abe’s primary agenda, the ‘departure from the postwar regime’, which 
obviously sought to reconstruct postwar Japan’s identity by restoring the bond between 
state and its people, reconsidering security policy, and reviewing conventional low-profile 
diplomacy in Asia. 
     With regard to policy toward China, a tentative settlement of the diplomatic crisis 
inherited from Koizumi was enabled partly because of the fact that China demonstrated 
an understanding and appreciation of Japan’s postwar development as a peaceful nation. 
This indicates that the Abe administration legitimized the rapprochement with China by 
arguing that it served to reconstruct and reinforce Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity. At the same 
time, the representation of China as a ‘non-democratic’, ‘militaristic’ and ‘dangerous’ 
other, was articulated in foreign policy discourse to emphasize Japan’s opposite identity. 
Moreover, a policy to enhance the ties with India was based on the similarities between 
Japan and India and the difference between India and China. By contrasting ‘friendly’ 
India and ‘anti-Japanese’ China, the friend-foe division between India and China was 
reinforced and Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’, which upholds universal values and 
contributes to world peace could be reproduced. In short, a policy toward India worked to 
reproduce the positive facets of Japan’s identity while, at the same time, reinforcing its 
‘peaceful’ identity by abandoning China as a subject that will not share universal values, 
often demonstrates an ‘anti-Japanese’ attitude, tends to negate positive aspects of Japan’s 
identity and exploits the history issue as a diplomatic tool. In this way, Japan’s political 
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leaders sought to reconstruct or reinforce Japan’s identity by articulating an identity of the 
‘other’ in foreign policy discourse. 
 
8.2.3 Nationalism as political capital  
 
     Finally, there can be observed a linkage between nationalism in foreign policy and 
domestic power relationships. Political leaders utilize nationalism as a kind of political 
capital to legitimize their policy, to secure their footing, and marginalize their rivals. They 
utilize the construction of the self/other nexus in foreign policy discourse in order to take 
advantage in domestic power struggles. In other words, to raise their domestic credentials 
and defeat their rivals, political leaders tend to construct not only elements of an ‘external 
other’, who are foreign countries, but also an ‘internal other’, made up of their political 
opponents. It might be no wonder that political subjects attempt to do so, because a 
discourse naturalizes a hierarchy between the self and the other.  
     In this way, Prime Minister Koizumi utilized nationalism among the traditionalists 
centering around their resentment against China and tried to offset their discontents to his 
policy to North Korea. Moreover, his unyielding approach to China was inextricably 
associated with his effort to marginalize the Keisei-kai faction, which were his political 
opponents and the most China-friendly group in the LDP. In this sense, nationalism 
played a role as a source of political capital in domestic power politics for him that was 
more than just as a vote-gathering strategy for the presidential election. On the other hand, 
Koizumi’s policy to normalize the bilateral relationship with North Korea can also be 
regarded as a source of political capital for his government. Ironically, the Koizumi 
administration sought to remove a sense of stagnation on Japan’s diplomacy, such as the 
diplomatic deadlock in the Japan-China relationship, which was the result of Koizumi’s 
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attempt to balance his reconciliatory approach to Pyongyang by an uncompromising 
stance to China.  
     In the case of Shinzo Abe, the linkage between nationalism foreign policy and 
domestic power relationships seems to be more visible. The fact that he improved a 
soured relationship with China immediately after taking office demonstrated that the 
rapprochement with China became an urgent task and also a source of political capital for 
would-be Japanese political leaders. At that time, the rapprochement with China rather 
than the frustration among anti-Chinese groups would be an important source of political 
capital in the successor race of Koizumi. This was a disadvantageous situation for Abe, 
who is well known as a staunch anti-Chinese politician because other politicians could try 
to exploit this as an opportunity to expand their influences and power resources in the 
situation of leadership change. Therefore, Abe needed to prevent the improvement of the 
Japan-China relationship from being manipulated by his opponents, especially the most 
prominent rival Yasuo Fukuda and the largest opposition party, the DPJ, in order to take a 
firm grip on power.  
     In addition, Abe’s China policy was closely associated with his approach to India in 
terms of domestic power politics. Put simply, India was utilized to offset Abe’s 
rapprochement with China by appeasing the frustrations among anti-Chinese revisionists. 
It was also manipulated to enhance solidarity among anti-Chinese ‘conservatives’ to 
consolidate Abe’s power base. Abe’s paying honor to Judge Pal and emphasizing 
‘universal values’ was used not only to legitimize their revisionist views and to 
marginalize China, but also to contribute to the consolidation of the Abe administration 
and to realize its political agenda of the ‘departure from the postwar regime’. Furthermore, 
Abe’s hard-line policy toward North Korea manifested the linkage between domestic 
politics and nationalism in foreign policy. As a part of the ‘departure from the postwar 
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regime’, he legitimized his tough stance towards Pyongyang by emphasizing how the 
conventional ‘low-profile’ policy had damaged Japan’s national interest and exposed the 
Japanese people to the ‘threat’ of North Korea. What was attacked in his discourse was 
not only the progressives but also mainstream conservative politicians who had shaped 
the Japanese government in the postwar era. In this way, Abe and his supporters utilized 
an uncompromising attitude on the abduction issue as a source of political capital to crush 
their political rivals and boost their credentials.  
     Moreover, it was not limited to the two Prime Ministers to utilize nationalism as a 
source of political capital in domestic politics. As touched on in the case study chapters, a 
number of other political actors also tried to appropriate nationalism to contend for power 
and influence. Anti-Chinese groups attempted to seize the occasion to publically attack 
China and to counter dissidents in the Diet when Prime Minister Koizumi was showing an 
unyielding stance on the Yasukuni Shrine issue. By supporting Abe’s policy toward 
North Korea, the Komei Party harshly criticized its rival parties, the SDP and the JCP. 
For the ‘neo-revisionists’, endorsing Japan’s identity with an emphasis on ‘universal 
values’ was a new tool to marginalize China and to consolidate their power so as to 
realize their ‘true conservatism’. In this way, various political actors tried to exploit 
nationalism as a source of political capital, utilizing different issues to legitimize their 
status or to offset their weakness. Therefore, nationalism is not just used as a 
vote-gathering strategy at the election but utilized in a more complex manner in factional 
politics.    
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8.3 The nationalisms of Koizumi and Abe  
 
     One of the most important aspects of this thesis, then, is the discussion of the 
different kinds of nationalism that can be found structuring foreign policy under the 
administrations of Koizumi and Abe. As mentioned earlier, Koizumi generally inherited 
the strategy of historic reconciliation in terms of the effort to normalize the relationship 
with North Korea. He sought to expand Japan’s international role and to take an initiative 
in the region in political and security field as a ‘peaceful’ nation. In order to achieve this, 
a closure of the history issue was indispensable. Although anti-Chinese politicians 
supported his uncompromising policy toward China, Koizumi’s basic perception toward 
China was not hostile and his perception of history was quite different from the revisionist 
view. It can be thought that his inflexible attitude on the Yasukuni issue was aimed at 
making China relinquish its manipulation of the history issue. In this sense, it can be 
argued that Koizumi contended for nationalism that pursued the reconstruction of Japan’s 
national identity as a ‘peaceful’ country which was free from the ‘spell of history’ and 
played a major role in international society, including the construction of a regional 
security framework.  
     On the other hand, Abe’s vision was clearly based on the ‘neo-revisionist’ 
discourse. Whilst he improved the bilateral relationship with China by shelving his 
original stance on the interpretation of history, his diplomatic orientation was consistent 
considering the approach to India. By emphasizing ‘universal values’, unlike the 
right-wing traditionalists, he insisted on the enhancement of ties with other democracies, 
which he explicitly promoted to deepen the commitment to the Japan-US Alliance and 
implicitly marginalize China. Abe also represented Japan as a ‘peaceful’ country, which 
plays a positive role to highlight the radical ‘otherness’ and ‘inassimilablity’ of China and 
 288 
North Korea. His hard-line policy toward North Korea was aimed at not only reviewing 
postwar Japan’s low-profile diplomacy in Asia but also at revising the domestic ‘postwar 
regime’ itself. Given these features, Abe’s policy can be regarded as representing a kind 
of ‘neo-revisionist’ nationalism. In what follows, the next section explains in more details 
the different features of Koizumi and Abe’s versions of nationalism, namely, the 
representation of a ‘peaceful country’, the focus on a ‘closure of the history issue’, and 
the consequent vicious circle of nationalism and foreign policy toward Asia.  
 
8.3.1 A ‘peaceful country’  
 
     Despite differences in basic stance, the nationalisms of the two Prime Ministers 
have some commonalities. First, both of them tried to reconstruct Japan’s identity as a 
‘peaceful’ country, which would be appropriate to their own type of nationalism. As a 
background, there was a political intention widely shared by political leaders that in order 
to survive in an era of globalization and grip a political leadership commensurate with its 
economic power, Japan should reconstruct its national identity. As a ‘peaceful’ country 
identity has been an unshakable national value in postwar Japan, they tried to exploit it by 
giving it an alternative meaning so as to fit their policy programs. In general, their 
‘peaceful’ country was different from the conventional usage that is based on Article 9 in 
the Constitution. In general, the two administrations tended to emphasize ‘Japan's 
contribution to the peace and stability of the world through peaceful means over more 
than sixty years since World WarⅡ’, which was, in their idea, widely appreciated by 
countries all around the world. This construction of Japan’s identity seemed to rely on the 
contrast with the representation of China and North Korea as ‘militaristic’, ‘untrustworthy’ 
and ‘deviant’ in the international community. Furthermore, to decide whether or not a 
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country appreciated Japan, this identity was used as a standard to judge if it was a 
‘pro-Japanese’ country or not. When the country did not acknowledge postwar Japan’s 
‘peaceful’ path and tried to raise the history issue, it was regarded as an ‘anti-Japanese’ 
country which negated Japan’s identity. Domestic social antagonisms arising from this 
would then legitimize a tough stance towards that country according to this logic. In 
addition, they abandoned traditional ‘unilateral pacifism’ and desired to play a more 
active role in the regional security framework as a ‘true partner’ of the US based on the 
enhancement of the Japan-US Alliance. In short, Japan’s ‘peaceful’ identity was largely 
reconstructed through the articulation of China and North Korea as others in foreign 
policy discourse in the Koizumi and Abe administrations. 
     Yet, there can also be seen a different emphasis on the content of ‘peaceful-ness’ 
between Koizumi and Abe. In the context of justification of his annual visit to the 
Yasukuni Shrine, Koizumi’s focus was on postwar Japan’s non-militaristic development 
and its deep remorse for its past misdeeds during the war. Although he mobilized ‘social 
antagonism’, which was caused by China’s consequent negation and blockage of his 
version of Japan’s alleged identity, the ‘peaceful country’ identity itself was not designed 
to marginalize the feelings of neighboring countries. This can be seen in the way that the 
Koizumi administration also attempted to legitimize its policy of normalization with 
North Korea and thereby to take an important political initiative in the regional security 
framework. In a nutshell, Koizumi’s ‘peaceful country’ was constructed as a country, 
which would expand the regional role of Japan as a ‘major power’ in the political, and 
security areas. This might be made possible by the fact that Japan would have no more 
diplomatic rows over the history issue as a result of the normalization of the relationship 
with North Korea.  
     In contrast, Abe’s articulation of Japan as a ‘peaceful’ country mainly played the 
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role of highlighting his country’s differences from China and North Korea. In other words, 
a ‘peaceful’ identity was defined by the articulation of an opposite identity to China and 
North Korea. Therefore, it was represented as opposite to a ‘militaristic’, ‘authoritarian’, 
‘inhumane’, ‘untrustworthy’ country which posed a threat to the international community. 
Furthermore, this construction of a ‘peaceful’ identity served to illuminate the radical 
‘otherness’ and the ‘inassimilablity’ of China and North Korea, which was utilized to 
legitimize a hard-line policy toward them. In addition, as demonstrated in chapter 5, the 
representation of Japan as a ‘peaceful country’ would mean further commitment to the 
US Alliance to contribute to ‘world peace’ and by revising the Constitution. Therefore, 
there can be seen no concerns in Abe’s thinking for the ‘burden of history’ or diplomatic 
considerations for neighboring countries over the history issue because the revisionist 
view of history refuses to accept the war responsibility of Japan.  
     In this way, despite being seen by many as right wing nationalists, the Koizumi and 
Abe both tried to construct Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful country’ in foreign policy 
discourse. Judging from their way of manipulating the term, a ‘peaceful’ nation seems not 
to have a stable or fixed meaning but tends to be defined by the construction of an 
opposite identity from that of China and North Korea. In this sense, the meaning of a 
‘peaceful country’ is not fixed but remains arbitrary in their discourse so that it can be 
used to accumulate factional and popular support and legitimize their policy programs.   
 
8.3.2 A closure of the ‘postwar era’  
 
     The second commonality between Koizumi and Abe was that they pursued a 
closure of the ‘postwar era’. As mentioned before, Japan’s political leaders sought to 
reconstruct Japan’s national identity in order to survive in the global era and expand its 
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presence in international society. To achieve this, it was widely recognized that Japan 
should resolve its history issue because a ‘spell of history’ has prevented it from playing a 
proactive role in the region. In other words, there has been a widespread perception that a 
heavy ‘burden of history’ has restricted Japan’s autonomy in Asian diplomacy. In relation 
to the reconstruction of national identity, it was considered to be necessary to get rid of 
the ‘spell of history’ for Japan to restore trust from neighboring countries and to expand 
its role in the region, that is to say, to become a ‘peaceful country’ which proactively 
contributes to the regional security framework.  
     Prime Minister Koizumi generally tried to deal with the negative legacy from the 
‘postwar era’ by reiterating the official apology to Asia for Japan’s past misdeeds during 
the war. But he also set out a different approach from the conventional diplomatic 
framework. For instance, his uncompromising attitude on the Yasukuni Shrine issue was 
the expression of his determination to discourage China to exploit the history issue as a 
bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations. The emphasis on the representation of North 
Korea as the ‘only country, which has not restored the bilateral relationship’ in the 
Koizumi administration reflected a widely-shared belief that the normalization of 
diplomatic ties with Pyongyang was an integral part of a closure of the history issue. On 
the other hand, as clearly shown by his slogan ‘the departure from the postwar regime’, 
Abe also strove for the termination of ‘history-bound’ foreign policy. For him and the 
revisionists the history issue was nothing but a ball and chain which has unduly restricted 
Japan’s diplomacy in Asia. In this sense, both administrations tried to bring an end to 
Japan’s history issue so as to restore the ‘autonomy’ of Japan.  
     Yet, there can be seen differences in approach between Koizumi and Abe on how 
to achieve a closure of the history issue. As seen from the fact that Koizumi reiterated an 
apology for Japan’s past misdeeds in international settings, he never denied Japan’s war 
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responsibility nor glorified its aggression towards China and its colonial role in the 
Korean Peninsula. For instance, the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration clearly stated 
that ‘The Japanese side regards, in a spirit of humility, the facts of history that Japan 
caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule 
in the past, and expressed deep remorse and heartfelt apology (Koizumi: 2002-b)’. The 
Koizumi administration sought to normalize the relationship with Pyongyang by 
accepting Japan’s responsibility to colonial rule in the Korean Peninsula. While he 
staunchly continued the annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and tried to make China 
relinquish the manipulation of the history issue, his rhetorical justification was not based 
on the revisionist view of history. Instead, he intended to bring the ‘postwar era’ to an end 
by removing the ‘spell of history’ and achieving reconciliation with neighboring countries. 
Given these, the Koizumi administration sought to obtain a diplomatic initiative in the 
region by settling the history issue in line with the strategy of historic reconciliation.  
     In contrast, efforts made by the Abe administration to bring the ‘postwar era’ to an 
end by pursuing the ‘departure from the postwar regime’, did rest on the revisionist’s 
view of history. Although he stated that he would follow the Murayama Statement when 
he became Prime Minister and shelve the history issue in the relationship with China, it 
was clear that his perception toward history remained the same as it had always been, 
judging from his paying honor to Judge Pal. For instance, Abe noted that the Class A 
Criminals should not be regarded as ‘criminals’ in Japan (NDRP: 2006-m), while 
Koizumi clarified that they were ‘war criminals’ (NDRP: 2005-n). In addition, unlike 
Koizumi, Abe was never too keen to express ‘deep reflection’ on Japan’s past aggression 
and offer apologies to the victims in Asia.  
     Therefore, Abe seemed not to seek reconciliation with China even though he 
improved the relationship and established a ‘strategic mutual beneficial relationship’. 
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Furthermore, with regard to the North Korea issue, he would not acknowledge the 
necessity to compensate for colonial rule or to normalize the bilateral relationship. Instead, 
Abe and his supporters diverted the focus of the ‘history issue’ from prewar Japanese 
aggression to the misdeeds of China and North Korea in the postwar era, emphasizing 
how these two countries infringed on Japan’s sovereignty. As mentioned in chapter 5, 
according to this discourse it was ‘apology diplomacy’ and exaggerated concerns over 
criticism of China and South Korea, which restricted Japan’s autonomy in the 
neo-revisionists’ discourse. In this context, Abe strove to end the history issue and restore 
‘autonomy’ not by achieving reconciliation with neighboring countries but by leaving 
behind the issue of Japan’s war responsibility. 
     In relation to the desire to restore ‘autonomy’ in foreign policy discourse, it should 
be pointed out that both the Koizumi and Abe administrations did not pursue 
‘independence’ from the US unlike the right-wing traditionalists or the progressives. 
Rather, they tried to obtain ‘autonomy’ by deepening ties with the US. For instance, 
Koizumi illuminated the centrality of the alliance in Japan’s foreign policy, and stated that 
‘the stronger and closer Japan-US relations are, the more likely we are able to forge better 
relations with countries around the world, starting with China, the Republic of Korea, and 
other Asian countries’ (Glosserman 2006: 22). This statement demonstrated Koizumi’s 
perception that even when the relationships with neighboring countries became soured, 
Japan could secure its position in the region as long as it maintains close ties with the US. 
Therefore, Koizumi seemed not to be cautious about over-dependency on the US and 
domestic resentment against it. While Abe’s camp criticized the Occupation policy of the 
US, however, they also vowed to enhance the commitment to the Japan-US Alliance 
because it would increase Japan’s voice in the Alliance and thus could establish an ‘equal 
relationship’. Despite often citing from the right-wing traditionalist narratives, Abe never 
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criticize postwar Japan’s over-dependency on the US and would not adopt anti-American 
discourse, which was typical in the argument of the previous generation. In this sense, 
Abe walked on a political tightrope, juggling both anti-US and pro-US stance. Given 
these, there can be seen little backlash against the subservience to the US in the discourse 
of Koizumi and Abe. Therefore, it can be argued that Koizumi’s and Abe’s nationalism 
could not defuse a sense of antipathy toward the US, which has long been an underlying 
essence of postwar Japan’s nationalisms.   
 
8.3.3 A negative cycle of nationalism and foreign policy  
 
     This thesis also offers some insights into the dynamics between the use of 
nationalism in the Koizumi and Abe administrations and the making of foreign policy. 
Central to this is the way in which both Prime Ministers became trapped in a negative 
cycle of reconstructing Japan’s identity, which was originally aimed at increasing the 
country’s autonomy in Asian diplomacy and enhancing its status in the region but resulted 
in some negative consequences. At first, the primary goal of the neo-revisionists to revise 
the ‘foreign-written’ Constitution shows, a sense of antipathy towards the US has not 
diminished but still underlies Japan’s nationalism. This sense of frustration over Japan’s 
subservience to the US was traditionally expressed in the form of criticism of the ‘lack of 
autonomy’. In this context, political leaders would utilize nationalism to demonstrate that 
they pursue the ‘restoration of autonomy’. Conventionally, postwar Japan’s ‘nationalistic’ 
politicians, whether the left-wing progressives or the right-wing conservatives, explicitly 
or implicitly claimed to be accommodating ‘anti-US’ sentiment and ‘independence from 
the US’. However, although both administrations aspired to bring the history issue to an 
end and to restore Japan’s ‘autonomy’ in diplomacy in Asia, they were not able to reflect 
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this discontents over Japan’s subservience to the US. Instead, they insisted that it was 
necessary to enhance ties with the US to obtain the ‘autonomy’ of Japan in Asia because 
all foreign relations with Asian countries relied on the Japan-US Alliance, as described 
above. Koizumi, therefore proactively strengthened Japan’s commitment to the Alliance 
whilst he weakened the relationship with China over the Yasukuni Shrine issue. In 
addition, as touched on in chapter 5, Abe and his supporters reconstructed the meaning of 
a ‘lack of autonomy’ to imply that Japan’s foreign policy was restricted not by the US but 
by the Constitution and the concessions to neighboring countries on the history issue. It 
was thus not the US but rather China that was presented as preventing Japan from 
achieving ‘true independence’. In this context, a hard-line policy toward China or North 
Korea can be regarded as a ‘trade-off act’ to calm public discontents of subservience to 
the US, as can be seen in Abe’s tough stance to ease frustrations over his rapprochement 
with China.  
     It can be seen, therefore, that the impact of nationalism on the foreign policies of 
the two administrations inevitably disrupted relationships with neighboring countries, 
although it was in ways more complex than much of the literature implies. Koizumi’s 
attempt to bring an end to the history issue in the relationship with China and to normalize 
the relationship with North Korea could not remove the ‘burden of history’ in the end. 
Instead, Japan suffered from a sense of diplomatic stagnation and could not increase its 
influence in the region. Not to mention his inflexible approach to North Korea, Abe’s 
policy toward China did not contribute to any fundamental reconciliation because he 
merely shelved the history issue and did not change his original stance. Because focus of 
both Prime Ministers put more emphasis on ties with the US and other ‘democratic’ 
countries like India, which might not raise the history issue, Japan could not restore trust 
from the regional countries or increase its diplomatic autonomy in East Asia during the 
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two administrations. In fact, the legitimization rhetoric of Koizumi’s visit was not widely 
accepted, considering the criticism that came even from Asian countries other than China 
and South Korea1. Moreover, the Koizumi administration could not obtain enough 
support from neighboring countries to obtain a permanent seat in the UNSC. 
Consequently, Japan could not break a sense of diplomatic stagnation on its own and 
came to seek closer ties with the US to secure its status in the region. This made Japan’s 
diplomacy even more dependent on the US and those who were discontented over Japan’s 
subservience to the US were not relieved. Political leaders thus tried to find an outlet for 
such discontentment in other foreign relations besides the US and ended up adopting a 
hard-line policy as a ‘trade-off’.  
     In this way, a negative cycle of Japan’s nationalism and foreign policy in the 
Koizumi and Abe administration was created and reproduced. As a consequence, there 
can be observed a strange pattern that the more Japan claimed the ‘restoration of 
autonomy’, the more it would deepen its dependency to the US. This vicious circle might 
not be terminated as long as Japan’s political leaders utilize resentment against the 
subservience to the US in anti-Chinese or anti-North Korea sentiment in political circles 
and towards the public. Instead, it is necessary to resolve the history issue and war 
compensation problem with neighboring countries and to restore trust with them if Japan 
seeks real diplomatic ‘autonomy’ that is acceptable to the region.  
  
8.4 Implications and prospects for future research  
 
     This thesis explores how nationalism was utilized by Japan’s political elite to 
                                            
1 For instance, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated that Koizumi’s worship 
gave an impression to the people of Singapore that Japan did not acknowledged responsibility 
of its past misdeeds (Asahi Shimbun 2005-c).  
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articulate national identity in contemporary Japan’s foreign policy discourse. It has raised 
some implications for the theory of nationalism and presented an empirical study of 
Japan’s foreign policy. First, having made a case for the importance of nationalism, 
including nationalism, which is conventionally treated as a domestic political factor, this 
study suggests that a structural analysis focusing solely on the material interests and based 
on the clear distinction between the domestic and the foreign is insufficient to understand 
the role of nationalism in foreign policy-making. As political actors manipulate 
nationalism by articulating national identity in order to legitimize their policy programs 
and to seek advantage in domestic politics, they build linkages between foreign policy 
and domestic politics every time they utilize nationalism as a form of political capital.  
     Furthermore, there can be seen a continuous process of drawing a line between 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’, that is, articulating the ‘domestic’ and the ‘foreign’ in foreign 
policy discourse. In this sense, what is ‘national’ is discursively reproduced: it cannot be 
stable or fixed but is arbitrary and fluid. Therefore, to analyze foreign policy with the 
assumption of a fixed national identity might not offer a plausible explanation for the role 
of nationalism in foreign policy. To make these observations does not mean a total 
rejection of the claims made by neo-realists and neo-liberalists. Instead, it aims to 
construct more powerful explanatory models of nationalism in foreign policy by 
combining domestic political factors, the self/other nexus and the legitimization strategy 
of foreign policy-making. Therefore, this thesis can contribute to enrich the study of 
nationalism in IR and foreign policy analysis.  
     In addition, this thesis has implications for the development of the study of 
nationalism in the subject of International Relations. In other words, the examination of 
foreign policy toward China, North Korea, and India under the Koizumi and Abe 
administrations demonstrates the utility of an approach that treats nationalism as a kind of 
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discourse on the continuous process of attaining, maintaining, and reproducing national 
identity. As the case studies have demonstrated, certain versions of nationalism produce 
various identities of subjects and the hierarchical relationship among them in foreign 
policy discourse. By doing so, nationalism naturalizes the hierarchy among subjects and 
thereby legitimizes a particular policy and marginalizes other policy options. For instance, 
the rapprochement with North Korea was abandoned due to the articulation of its national 
identity as an ‘authoritarian’, ‘hyper-militaristic’ and ‘criminal’ country, which was 
undoubtedly inferior to Japan, under the Abe administration. Taking another example, in 
the discourse of the pressure school, those who support the postwar regime and 
normalization of diplomatic ties with North Korea were labeled as the ‘enemy within’, 
who were treated as inferior to the ‘guardians of the Japanese people’, that is, Abe’s 
group. With regard to constructing the identity of subjects and a ‘reality’ in which a 
power relationship among subjects is articulated, nationalism can be regarded as a kind of 
discourse. In this sense, nationalism can be considered to be not only political capital or a 
legitimization strategy but ‘power as productive’. This perception might help to enrich 
understanding of the nature of nationalism, how it can be bound up with various 
ideologies, ideas and political thoughts, how it can be utilized in power struggles in 
domestic politics, and how a domestic power relationship might be projected on to 
foreign policy-making. Therefore, this thesis might contribute to the development of a 
new perspective on the relationship between nationalism and foreign policy.  
     Second, although it focuses on the Koizumi and Abe administrations, this thesis 
offers some implications for how Japan’s political leaders will try to utilize nationalism in 
foreign policy in the future. Unlike conventional observations, Japan’s nationalism is not 
limited to the right-wing traditionalist nationalism. In addition, a main division in 
domestic politics shifted from the confrontation between the progressives and the 
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conservatives under the ‘1955 system’ to the intra-conservative rivalry within the LDP 
and between the LDP and the DPJ. Despite a change in government, there can be seen a 
great continuity in the policies of the LDP and the DPJ as Dobson (2012: 250) points out. 
Therefore, the foreign policy of even the ruling DPJ toward Asia is not free from the issue 
of closure of the ‘postwar era’ and has to deal with contested ‘nationalisms’. Among them, 
for instance, the emphasis on the ‘East Asian Community’ in the Hatoyama 
administration and the reaction against it can be regarded as a recurrence of confrontation 
between the strategy of historic reconciliation and the neo-revisionist movements. 
Therefore, it can be argued that as long as there are divided nationalisms, they can still be 
a source of political capital among political actors. 
     On the other hand, the LDP recently shows an increasingly conservative tilt to 
make a sharp contrast with the DPJ and to consolidate support from the conservative 
constituency. Shinzo Abe has become increasingly active in claiming to uphold his ‘true 
conservatism’ to ‘depart from the postwar regime’ and in criticizing Asian diplomacy 
under the DPJ government. As the LDP is likely to strengthen its ability to regain control 
in the Diet, Abe’s nationalism might gain momentum in the LDP. Given these 
developments, it can be said that the arguments in this thesis will continue to be useful for 
analyzing Japan’s nationalism in foreign policy under the post-Abe administrations.   
     Finally, this thesis might contribute to the termination of the vicious circle of 
nationalism and Japan’s foreign policy toward Asia. Although there can be observed so 
little public debate on ‘nationalism in foreign policy’ in Japanese society because 
nationalism is always connected to the ‘prewar’ ‘militaristic’ nationalism, this should not 
be a reason for keeping the issue of ‘national identity’ untouched in the national debate. 
Japan’s nationalism is divergent and ubiquitous. Not only a small number of the radical 
right-wing politicians but all political actors, who contend for power and influence, try to 
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utilize nationalism and to construct a kind of national identity that can legitimize their 
footings. No matter how unrelated to ‘nationalism’ political leaders may appear, for 
example, by upholding ‘universal values’ instead of the sanctity of the Emperor, their 
foreign policy is inextricably associated with the articulation of national identity and the 
friend-foe division: ‘who we are’ and ‘who we are not’, and ‘who is our friend?’ and 
‘who is our enemy?’. Even the notion of a ‘peaceful country’, which is often taken for 
granted as a national value in postwar Japan, is likely to be manipulated by being given 
various timeserving meanings. Therefore, it might not be sufficient for Japan to restore 
trust from neighboring countries to merely represent itself as a ‘peaceful country’ by 
relying on binary oppositions.  
     In order to break the negative cycle of nationalism and Asian diplomacy, Japan 
needs to reconstruct its national identity in a way that is aimed not at offsetting 
discontents among a certain group or against another country but is based on a national 
consensus over how Japan can come to terms with its past. On this point, there is still 
room for further research into how Japan’s nationalism can be compatible with the 
movement of regional integration in East Asia. In general, the relationship between 
nationalism and regional integration seems to remain a matter of debate, with the former 
often identified as an obstacle to the latter. As Japan is seeking to expand its role in 
regional integration, understanding the relationship between nationalist politics and 
foreign policy remains an important task ahead. 
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